

HISTORY OF THE SCHOOLMEN

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By

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PREFACE

ALL philosophy for the last 150 years has been tinged with scepticism derived from Kant.

In the past no doubt philosophy was strictly limited to what the Church, in the state of civilization of the time being, conceived to be the limits of human knowledge.

In its first reaction on freedom from the dominating limitations placed upon it by the Church, philosophy eagerly declaimed that it had no part or parcel with theology ; and that there was no nexus between that to which man of his own experience could attain and those transcendent doctrines which theology propounded.

Philosophy has, however, survived the mechanistic age of the nineteenth century and in an ever increasing degree is being led to the conclusion that human experience is no longer to be regarded as being confined to the direct experience of the human senses.

Once this is admitted, philosophy must take within its purview the data derived from religious experience.

At the same time the enormous strides made in the last 150 years in the realms of mechanics and physics have to such an extent increased the mentality of civilized man in general that they cannot fail to have their repercussion upon philosophy.

Take as an example the mentality of a man to-day, who controls a motor-tractor plough, tilling even the steep slopes on the very edge of the wilds of Dartmoor, as contrasted with that of a man ploughing with a team of oxen merely fifty or a hundred years ago.

With all this increased power of mentality and this increased data of experience, philosophy cannot be expected to prove intractable to all progress and to remain for ever under the shadow of scepticism, because it is derived from Kant.

On the other hand, from the point of view of theology, since it is written " that the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood from the things that are made " : (Romans i. 20) it is obvious, that since Revelation is proffered to human reason, it is not to be presupposed that the source, from which such Revelation flows, has only endowed man with such natural reason " *lumen naturale* " that it must ever remain sceptical of such Revelation. Granted that Faith resides

in the Will, yet the Revelation must first be proffered to it by the Intellect and therefore in a measure considered by it.

It is therefore obvious that Theology must take into consideration such developments of the human mentality which may affect its appreciation of its Divine Revelation.

To take an example, the mediæval static view of God derived from His Immutability and His Eternal "Now," was for a time contrasted with and thought to be in complete opposition to a dynamic view arising from an evolutionary theory of creation. Yet, at the present time we learn, that having regard to the pure relativity of all movement and to the consideration that the "Eternal Now" cannot be equated with any instant in time, the static and dynamic views of God are no longer deemed incompatible.

Thus it would appear that some new form of philosophy must be found, which, whilst never seeking a human logical proof of super-human mysteries, will yet be enabled to extricate itself from the scepticism into which it has fallen. Then Theology though based on Divine Revelation, will no longer find Philosophy opposed to its reception, but will the better be able to appreciate and employ the Revelation, already received, through the ministrations of Philosophy.

In any search for a new branch of the Tree of Knowledge which such new Philosophy would involve, a close examination of the other branches already put forth from time to time must be made.

This involves a careful criticism of their origin, extent and decay, having special regard not only to their present intrinsic value, but also to the purposes which they served in the past; likewise to the circumstances, which tended to foster or to destroy them, when viewed from the standpoint of modern historical information.

Such being the case, any advance must of necessity be preceded by a further review of the various trains of human thought in the past. Shorn of the limitations of their age and the mistakes which arose out of them, there stands revealed a vast mass of intellectual endeavour which has gone to increase the heritage of humanity.

This work, then, is an attempt to deal in a concise manner with the history of that great body of thought of the Middle Ages which is comprised under the term of Scholastic Philosophy, in such a way as to afford some assistance for this great object by providing a general view of this particular phase of human thought.

For a long time it was a common practice to wave aside all enquiry into the vast region of Scholastic Philosophy, on the ground that it was but little more than the sophistical play of words pertaining to the Middle Ages, and that its quibbles finally ceased

to trouble the minds of men when the geocentric theory of the Earth was exploded and when men were illuminated by the emancipated Cartesian and Kantian Philosophies. It is true that the later developments of Nominalism or Terminalism in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries led to the divorce of philosophy from reality and thereby led to futile sophisticism, which brought about its own collapse, when in the words of Professor Etienne Gilson "It began to take itself for an end instead of serving the Wisdom which was at once its end and its source."

It has often been presumed that the abolition of the geocentric theory of the earth is sufficient to invalidate not only all Aristotelian Philosophy but also that of the Schoolmen. Such indeed is not the case, throughout this work all reference to deductions and examples based on contemporary beliefs as to biology and physics have as far as possible been excluded, and it will be found that this has given rise to a minimum of loss to the views expressed.

Platonic numbers, which it will be remembered gave rise to the adage "Numeris Platonicis nihil obscurius," Aristotelian spheres, and Ptolemaic astronomy had no important bearing upon the investigations into metaphysics. This is the more readily understood, when it is called to mind that the use of sensibles is for the most part based upon common experience and that such scientific explanations as were advanced were usually expressed as only possible or problematical conclusions.

When the eschatological outlook of the early Christians coupled with the neo-Platonic teaching adopted by St. Augustine, that all the world is transitory and lacks reality, is borne in mind, it is of but little surprise that the Schoolmen rested content with the Aristotelian Natural Philosophy as recorded by St. Isidore and with the astronomy of Ptolemy without seeking to add to such knowledge.

The development of historical science shows more and more clearly that the growth of any branch of knowledge cannot be treated as an isolated fact. Not only in order to understand the present, but also to strive to progress towards the future, it is necessary that a clear view of the past must ever be brought into due consideration.

Here then, whilst removing arguments based on false views of biology and physics, and at the same time eliminating that sophistry which led to its decline, there remains a great branch of learning with its roots in the past and its fruit in the future.

The General History of the Schoolmen has been but little considered by English writers during the last fifty years. The admirably translated works of M. de Wulf cannot be overlooked, but they are for the most part written from a strictly Thomastic

point of view and for that class of American students who came within his ken.

At the same time those works on neo-Thomæism, whilst of great value, do not cover the whole ground.

The whole body of Scholastic Philosophy would be without meaning unless traced from its source, so that the first part of this work contains a bird's-eye view of philosophy from the time of Thales.

This is followed by its development after the Dark Ages in the Cathedral Schools first established by Charlemagne. It reached its maturity in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries under St. Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, when as has been pointed by Grabmann the aim of the mediæval scholastic was threefold. "They sought to defend the traditional doctrines of the Church against heretics ; to establish a system of theology which was both articulate and unified : and to build up a system of philosophy which could stand by itself and could support the theological system which it aimed at establishing."

Its degeneration set in under the Terminalists when "mere dialectical traversities were indulged in by the use of syllogistic extravagances based on no relation to truth or reality."

Finally, there is the brave sporadic attempt at eclecticism by Francesco Suarez the Last of the Schoolmen, whose substantive mode bears a strong likeness to, if it is not the actual forerunner of, that "pattern" beloved by Leibniz and adopted by some modern philosophers.

In order that this work may have a wider range of usefulness a considerable amount of elementary matter has been included, which may even perchance prove of convenience for reference to those whose memories of such matters have not been recently refreshed. At the same time endeavour has been made to include a sufficient amount of documentation of the authorities quoted so as to provide a concise book of reference for those, who may wish to elaborate any special point or undertake any particular line of research.

In a work of this description there can be but little hope of new discoveries of unsuspected authors, nor scope for new and startling estimations of the hundreds of works brought under review. Nevertheless, some disappointment must be confessed in a prolonged failure to unearth any really fresh material, even after the ten years over which the compilation of this work has been spread.

Amongst the works mentioned in the Bibliography I must acknowledge my special indebtedness to Ludwig Fischer and to Lewes for the earlier chapters ; to the learned Archivist

M. Hauréau ; to Professor Gilson for his work on St. Thomas Aquinas ; and the Abbé Mahieu on Suarez ; also by the kind permission of the Clarendon Press, Oxford to Franciscan Philosophy at Oxford by Dr. D. E. Sharp and to Duns Scotus by Dr. C. R. S. Harris.

I have also to acknowledge my great indebtedness to my dear Wife for all the difficult typing which this MS-has involved.

May there shortly arise another outstanding philosophy, which will be void of scepticism and one which will to quote the words of St. Thomas Aquinas " support the truth of Faith, gain a greater insight into such truths and make them more acceptable to the human mind and defend them against objections."

Buckfastleigh.

E.C.T.

May, 1940.

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SOME MEDÆVAL-LATIN GEOGRAPHICAL NAMES

A			
Acquis Granan	Aix-la-Chapelle	Cluniacus	Cluny
Aedua	Autun	Colimbra	Coimbra
Agarnata	Granada	Colonia	Cologne
Alvernia	Auverne	Constantia	Coutence
Ambianum	Amiens	Corbeia	Courbie
Aminanis	Amiens	Corisopitum	Quimper
Andegavis	Angers		
Andegravis	Angers		D
Andemantunum	Langres	Dirro	Dijon
Angelostadium	Ingolstadt	Dividdunensis	Dijon
Antisiodorum	Auxerre		
Arausiacum	Orange		E
Arelas	Arles	Eborica	Evercux
Argentiensis	Strasburg	Edelburga	Heidelberg
Arvernia	Auvergne		
Augustidunum	Autun		F
Aurelianus	Orleans		Fécamp
Autissiodorum	Auxerre	Fiscannus	La Ferté
Avenio	Avignon	Firmitas	
		Floriscus-	
		S. Benedicti	Fleury
B			
Bagentia	Valentia		
Bececum	Bec		G
Beliacum	Beauvais	Gabillionensis-	
Bisunticum-		Ager	Chalons
Chrysopolis	Besançon	Ganda	Ghent
Bituricae	Bourges	Gemblacus	Gembloux
Bojobinum	Prague	Gemsticum	Jumièges
Bononia	Bologna	Grandi-monteus	Grandmont
	(also Boulogne)		
Braga	Prague		
Brurgis	Burgos (Spain)		H
Burdegala	Bordeaux	Herbipolis	Wurzburg
C			
Cabillionum	Cbalons	Inglostadium	I
Cadarcis	Cahors	Isbilis	Ingolstadt
Cadonus	Caen		Seville
Cadurcum	Cahors		
Carnotae	Chartres		L
Carthusia-Magna	Le Grand	Laudanum	Louvain
	Chartreuse	Legia	Liège
Cateloni	Chalons	Leodium	Liège
Cenomanis	Le Mans	Lexovium	Lisieux
Charbusia-Magna	Le Grand	Lingance	Langres
	Chartreuse	Lingonae	Langres
Claramontium	Clermont	Lugdunum	Lyons
Claravallis	Clairvaux	Luscorum	Toul
		Luxovium	Luxeuil

M		S	
Matisco	Maçon	Senona	Sens
Mediolanum	Milan	Sequana	Suni
Meladunum	Melun	Sexoniae	Soissons
Meldae	Meaux	Sibilia	Seville
Moguntia	Mainz	Suessionae	Soissons
Myrtilletum	Heidelberg		
N		T	
Narnetae	Nantes	Taurinum	Turin
Nevernum	Nevers	Toletum	Toledo
		Tolosa	Toulouse
		Trecae	Troyes
		Trecece	Troyes
		Treveris	Trèves
		Tridentum	Trent
		Tuingia	Tubingen
		Tullum	Toul
		Turnarcum	Tournay
		Turoni	Tours
O		U	
Oscha	Huesca	Ultrajactum	Utrecht
P		V	
Palentia	Palencia	Valentina	Valence
Panorma	Palermo	Vallisoletum	Valladolid
Papia	Pavia	Vallistoletum	Valladolid
Pictavium	Poitiers	Veneti	Vennes
Placentia	Piacenza	Vezeliacus	Vezelay
Podentiniacum	Pontigny	Vindobona	Vienna
Pontigniacum	Pontigny		
Prumiencis	Prum		
Prunciae	Prum		
R		W	
Ratoltescella	Reichnau	Wirceburgum	Wurzburg
Redoni	Rennes		
Remi	Rheims		
Rodominum	Rouen		
Rothomagus	Rouen		
Rupella	La Rochelle		

ABBREVIATIONS

- Bib. Nat. . . . La Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.
 B.M.R.L. . . . British Museum. Western MSS. in the Royal and King's
 Collection.

CHAPTER I

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHERS

THE Schoolmen or Scholastics may be said to have arisen about 800 A.D., at that date they were not in possession of all the works of Aristotle which have come down to us, though Boethius had made a Latin translation of some of his works about 500 A.D.

Their philosophy in fact may be said to have taken its origin in the works of Plato with some of which they were familiar.

It is therefore essential that the outstanding features of Plato's philosophy as well as those of Aristotle should be present to the minds of any who seek to comprehend the efforts of these Schoolmen.

Before undertaking a cursory review of the philosophy of Plato, it will be of advantage if a rapid glance be taken of the changes which Greek Thought had undergone in the previous two centuries.

There had been continuous attempts to set out the prime form or ἀρχή and the facts which related to it; also to explain the interpretation of opposing principles such as Heaven and Earth—Light and Dark—Warm and Cold—Heavy and Light—One and Many.

The tenets of the Ancient Philosophers must be ascertained in order that the growth of the different philosophic views and the measure of the importance to Plato be properly understood.

Thales of Miletus c. 636 B.C. is accorded the distinction of first separating the search of cosmic existence from the realms of mythology then prevailing; to him is attributed the origin of the inscription at Delphi, "Know thyself."

In his opinion *Water* was the origin of all things.

Anaximander of Miletus c. 610 B.C., who is said to have been the inventor of the sundial and of the sketch map, at any rate as far as the Greeks were concerned, based his philosophy on Infinity as the origin of All Things.

Anaximenes of Miletus c. 529 B.C. is said to have discovered the obliquity of the Elliptic by means of the gnomon or index of the sun dial. He considered *Air* to be the origin of All Things.

Diogenes of Appollonia in Crete c. 460 B.C., extended the theory of Anaximenes and considered *Air* to be the Soul.

Pythagoras at one time lived under Polycrates at Samos but after spending twenty years in Egypt finally went to Croton in the South of Italy.

Through the secrecy of the School of Thought, which he founded, the particulars of the founder are almost obliterated by legend of a miraculous nature, *e.g.*, that he was the son of Hermes or Apollo, and that he had a golden thigh; even the date of his birth varies by eighty years between 610 and 530 B.C.

He was the first to attempt to free philosophy from the notion of Substance. For him the *One* or *Number* was the principle of All Things. "Things are copies of Numbers." The ten fundamental numbers contained the whole system of the world, hence the decadal astronomic system of which the immobile sun as representing unity was the centre.

Anaximander had seen that things in themselves were not final, that they were variable, constantly changing both position and attributes; though the principle of such existence must, however, be invariable and this he called *The All*. Pythagoras on the other hand called such invariable existence Number. The position and attributes of a thing were all variable except number. It is always One. It was thought contrary to reason to suppose that the Principia partook of the nature of sensible phenomena, it was consequently not only invisible and intangible but incorporeal. Number was not therefore separated from Things, but was held to be not only the Principle and Material of things, but also their essence and power. From Number were found two fundamental opposites One and Many, from which he deduced the opposition of finity and infinity and later added quiescence and motion, light and darkness, etc. (cf., p. 39 note).

With regard to his doctrine of Transmigration of Souls, he defined the Soul as a Monad, which was self-moved. It has three portions, Reason, Intelligence and Passion. The first is the distinguishing character of man.

The soul being a self-moved monad is One whether connected itself with two or three; its essence remains the same, whatever its manifestations. The soul being a number is One that is perfect, but all perfection so far as it is moved must pass into imperfection, where it strives to regain its state of perfection. The Soul in a man being in a state of motion is therefore imperfect for it is a departure from Unity. Objection has been taken to the theory of transmigration from brutes, but it is clear from Plato that it was so taught.

Xenophanes of Colophon an Ionian Colony in Asia Minor, c. 620 B.C. was a Rhapsodist of Truth and a poet. In his view the Multiplicity and Manifoldness of the Whole merged in One and

that such Unity which contained the Whole was God, the power of Whose thought penetrated and moved the Whole.

Hence he was a mono-theist who considered God as All, All Wise, All Powerful, and All Existence. "Only One Existence with many Modes."

Parmenides of Elea, c. 536 B.C. distinguished between Truth obtained through Reason and Opinion or ideas obtained through the Sense, the former being considered "necessary truths" seem to have anticipated the later doctrine of Innate Ideas.

The paucity of his vocabulary gave rise to the endless confusion of thought caused by the inability to distinguish εἶναι to be and εἶναι to exist. To avoid using εἶναι in both senses he passes from the concept εἶναι to the concrete form τὸ ὄν which, however, meant for him "Thing in Itself" rather than "Being" for he describes it as quiescent, indivisible, unchangeable, unlimited, non-spatial and non-temporal, at the same time One and All and he finally establishes a close connection between εἶναι and νοεῖν. μὴ εἶναι is not the pure negative μὴ ἔεν but is correlative to εἶναι when it means 'in itself.' Likewise it signifies multiplicity in opposition to ἕν, also the Attribute in opposition to Substance and in a narrower sense appearance ἐστὶν εἶναι οὐκ ἐστὶν μὴ εἶναι Appearance is nothing in itself.

The latest translation of τὸ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστὶν τε καὶ εἶναι is *not* "To think that which is and to be are the same," but "Thought is Being."

Thus he began with supra individual Thought which he identified with Being and then treated Thought as Substance then as its content and its objective meaning also. Hence the object of imagination had existence only so far as it was Thought. In so far as it was manifested Opposition it pointed to something which lay behind Thought (illusion), but taken as something "in itself" it was mere appearance μὴ εἶναι.

Thus "All Being" and "All in Itself" were contained in the supra individual and so to speak absolute νοεῖν or νοῦς. Hence "all that, that is, is One and this One is that which is."

This theory of εἶναι and μὴ εἶναι is thought to have arisen from the influence of the doctrine derived from India, where at a very early date the whole world of Appearance was treated as possessing mere Truth of a lower order.

The Pythagorean One, then, he called Being and he denied the possibility of Non-Being; likewise he denied Motion as a Reality, but admitted Motion only as an Appearance.

This marks a distinct stage in the development of human thought by exhibiting the mistake of attributing positive qualities to words as if they were things and not simply marks of things.

Zeno called by Plato in the *Phaedrus Palamedes* of Elea, c. 500 B.C. was said to be the originator of Dialectics or the method of reasoning. As originally employed by him it chiefly amounted to "a refutation of error by 'reductio ad absurdum' as a means of establishing truth."

He was, in fact, the first to give scientific demonstration of philosophical assertions instead of proceeding by intuition.

He was the apologist of the doctrine enunciated by Xenophanes and established by Parmenides rather than the founder of a new system. With him was the habit of disproving the existence of the "Many," rather than the advancing of positive proof of the One. So his was the puzzle of Achilles and the tortoise, according to which though Achilles could run ten times faster than the tortoise, yet if the tortoise had a start Achilles could never catch it up; because the tortoise would always go one-tenth further in the same time: this puzzle is, of course, based on the fallacy, that time, which is infinitely divisible, must be infinite time. *

Heraclitus of Ephesus, c. 503 B.C., called the Obscure, was a misanthrope. He considered that "the true was the unhidden" by which he indicated that whatsoever was exceptional was false. According to him everything is in a state of flux and reflux, never "is" but always "becoming" which is the union of Being and non-Being; in addition, Fire not Water or Air like Thales and Anaximenes, was the origin or principle ἀρχή of all things.

Anaxagoras of Clazomene near Colophon in Lydia, c. 470 B.C., distinguished phenomena or appearance or manifestation from noumena or substance or essence. He held that Sense was the sole origin of knowledge; reason λόγος the regulating faculty of the mind; and Intelligence νοῦς the regulating faculty of the Universe.

As he regarded all knowledge based on phenomena merely to be inaccurate he stated "Things are to each according as they seem to him" upon which Plato poured such ridicule in the *Theaetetus* and *Cratylus*.

* *Note*.—Dialectic of Plato. This was invented by Zeno the disciple of Parmenides. Two hypotheses are laid down. If a thing is—If a thing is not; each of which may be tripled by considering:

1. What happens.
2. What does not happen.
3. What happens and at the same time does not happen.

Each of these may be considered in four ways.

1. We may consider itself with respect to itself.
2. We may consider itself with respect to others.
3. We may consider others themselves with respect to themselves.
4. We may consider others with respect to that thing itself.

As there is a positive and a negative hypothesis the whole process resolves itself into eight triads or four hexads making twenty-four in all.

According to him the All is not One but Many. There are an infinite number of elements "homœomeriæ" these were arranged by Intelligence νοῦς the force or Arranging Power of the Universe.

He admitted Sense and Reason whereas before they had always been placed in opposition.

Empedocles of Agrigentum (Girgenti) in Sicily, c. 444 B.C. (said to have invented rhetoric), regarded Reason as partly human and partly divine and Love as the creative power. Earth, Air, Fire and Water he regarded as the primary elements.

Democritus of Abdera an Ionian Settlement, c. 460 B.C., the Laughing Philosopher, had been instructed by the Magi of Xerxes. He held that things were perceived by the senses through their throwing off images of themselves εἰδῶλα, these images when in contact with the organ produced sensation αἴσθησις and this sensation produces thought νόησις. He declared "atoms" to be invisible and intangible primary elements with self motion. The monad of Leibniz was similar to this.

Socrates of Athens, 469-399 B.C. applied Dialectics as a negative process preparatory to the positive foundation of inductive inquiry. According to Aristophanes he was the author of inductive reasoning and abstract definition. But he ever sought for the common property of the object itself, rather than the common effects produced in the subject. He, it is said, made philosophy descend from heaven to earth and transformed the wise precept γνῶθι σεαυτόν "Know thyself" into a philosophic method.

As Plato put so much of his Dialogues into the mouth of Socrates, it is but rarely that it is possible to ascertain from that source what were Socrates' own opinions.

The *Cynics Antisthenes* and *Diogenes* professing to follow Socrates worshipped a Virtue of a ferocious and self-centred type, which they sought to display by a renunciation of sensuality, regarding the body as the curse of Man and supporting their obscene behaviour with a debauchery of pride.

CHAPTER II

PLATO

SUCH then had been the various traits of Greek Thought in the 200 years preceding Plato, 429-348 B.C., who in his travels spent some thirteen years in Egypt studying the lore and doctrines of the Sacerdotal caste there.

As, like his master Socrates, Plato employed Dialectics for establishing his philosophy, so, the long discussions which he sets forth in his numerous dialogues never, for the most part, end in a clear enunciation of doctrines, but rather tend to instruction by establishing a right point of view; by means of a negative demonstration elucidating the futility of the contrary.

Plato based his philosophy on his aspect of the future, rather than of the present, this involved the consideration of the supernatural first of all. Hence we find that, as a preliminary, he is occupied with the evidence of the immortality of the soul.

From the proposition that truth, wisdom, justice, beauty and goodness in fact all abstract matters cannot be perceived through physical senses, but only by reflection, he maintains that such alone were infinite: "The invisible always continuing the same, but the visible never the same."¹

The approach to the knowledge of such and the search for the essence of all things is by reflection thereon by the soul freed, as far as possible, from the physical senses.²

From this it follows that the body encumbers the soul in contemplation of that in which there is no change. This freedom being only complete after death, such knowledge can only be fully obtained then. Hence if that be ever possible, the soul must be immortal.³

Next, he definitely states the Pythagorean doctrines of re-incarnation and metempsychosis, that souls departing hence exist there and return hither again and are produced from the dead. And if this is so, that the living are produced again from the dead, can there be any other consequence than that our souls exist there? For surely they could not be produced again, if they did not exist and this would be a sufficient proof that these things are so, if it should in reality be evident that the living are produced from no other source than the dead.⁴

¹ *Phaedo*, 64.

² *ib.*, 28.

³ *Phaedo*, 30.

⁴ *ib.*, 40, 41.

The metempsychosis, he deduced from the working of the mind in correlation with abstract matters. This, he regarded as a form of recollection, so that all such learning was in fact a mere reminiscence of what the soul knew in the previous existence.

Souls have knowledge of such essences as equality, beauty, justice and holiness, when first indicated by the senses, but since such knowledge has not been obtained since birth, it must be recollection from some prior existence.⁵ Likewise "our soul existed before it came into the body because the essence which bears the appellation 'that which is' belongs to it."⁶ Hence if the soul had a previous existence it must also have a future one.⁷ Should this view be incorrect, then the doctrine of Anaxagoras would have to be true that "all things would be together."⁸

Further, from a consideration of the problems of contraries and reciprocal generation; *e.g.*, contraries produce contraries but will not admit of each other, but that even such things as are not contrary to each other and yet always possess contraries do not appear to admit of that idea, which is contrary to the idea that exists in themselves, but when it approaches, perish or depart, *e.g.*, three being odd will not admit of the idea of being even.⁹

Hence as a body has a soul and the soul brings life: death is contrary to life, therefore the soul will not admit of death and is therefore immortal and likewise life is produced from death.¹⁰

Finally, according to the doctrine of Heraclitus, "The Universe is motion and nothing else besides."¹¹

Plato definitely states in the *Phaedrus* "every soul is immortal, for whatever is continually moved, is immortal; but that which moves another and is moved by another, when it ceases to move ceases to live. Therefore that only which moves itself, since it does not quit itself, never ceases to be moved, but is also the source and beginning of motion to all other things that are moved. . . . Since then it appears that that which is moved by itself is immortal, no one will be ashamed to say that this is the very essence and true motion of the soul."¹²

It may be on this ground, though not so stated that Plato avoided admitting that "judgment could be altered"¹³ or "that virtue could be taught"¹⁴ as it might be said to move the soul.

Having thus discussed the immortality of the soul, Plato goes on to compare it with the combined power of a pair of Winged steeds and a Charioteer: wherein he states, "But the immortal derives its 'name' from no deduction of reasoning, but as we neither see nor sufficiently understand God we represent Him as

⁵ *Phaedo.*, 52-54. ⁶ *ib.*, 94.

⁷ *Phaedo.*, 122. ¹⁰ *ib.*, 127.

¹² *Theaetetus*, 63. ¹⁴ *Meno.*, 42.

⁷ *ib.*, 67.

¹¹ *Theaetetus*, 33.

⁸ *ib.*, 45

¹² *Phaedrus*, 51.

an immortal animal possessed of a soul and possessed of a body and these united together throughout all time. Let these things however so be and be described as God pleases."¹⁵ And then he goes on to say, "The mind of the deity is nourished by intelligence and pure science."¹⁶

Thus the Demiurgus,¹⁷ so called in the *Statesman*, is not only the great Artificer¹⁸ of the Universe but also of the Gods¹⁹ and of the best of causes who desired all things to resemble Himself,²⁰ and as we shall see later in this chapter, He is the Good, the Summum Bonum, the Supreme Idea, containing in itself all others and the Unity which comprises the essence of all things.²¹

In Book II of the *Republic* some intimation is given by Plato, in his selection of the class of fables, which should be taught to children, as to what attributes he ascribed to God.

Only those fables were to be taught, which inculcated such thoughts as ; that God was essentially good and the cause of all our blessings and not our troubles : that God did what is just and good and that they are benefited, who are chastened : that God is not a sorcerer, who changes His form ; that He does not change at all, as He cannot change for the better and it is impossible that He should choose to become worse : that God abhors a real falsehood : that external accidents least affect the souls of those, who are the wisest.

With regard to Plato's attitude to current mythology, nothing definite is stated, for in the *Republic* he says "for the divine (method) according to the proverb we keep out of the question!"²² and again in the *Cratylus* "having, as it were, declared to the Gods that we speculate nothing about them."²³ Nevertheless it may be summarised in the saying of Socrates in the *Phaedrus* with regard to the Legend of Boreas and Orithya "if I disbelieve it, as wise men do, I should not be guilty of an absurdity, I have not leisure for such matters, as I am not yet able according to the Delphic oracle to know myself. But it appears to me to be ridiculous, while I am still ignorant of this to busy myself about matters that do not concern me. Wherefore dismissing these matters and receiving the popular opinion I do not enquire about them."²⁴

So we find in the *Apology of Socrates* a direction to "Obey God . . . and take thought for wisdom and truth and for your soul how best it may be made perfect,"²⁵ and at the same time the *Phaedrus* finishes with a prayer "O, beloved Pan and all ye other gods of this place grant me to become beautiful in the inner man

¹⁵ *Phaedrus*, 55.

¹⁶ *Timaeus*, 9.

²¹ *Rep.* VII.

²⁴ *Phaedrus*, 7, 8.

¹⁶ *Phaedrus*, 56.

¹⁹ *ib.*, 16.

²² *Rep.* VI., 7.

²⁵ *Apology*, 17.

¹⁷ *Statesman*, 13.

²⁰ *ib.*, 10.

²³ *Cratylus*, 39.

and that whatever outward things I have may be at peace with those within."²⁶

The process of the Creation is fully stated in the *Timaeus*. BEING, PLACE and GENERATION existed before the Creation,²⁷ which occurred by the "persuasive power of Wisdom over Necessity."²⁸ "The Artificer was good, free from envy and desired all things, as much as possible, to resemble himself, all things to be good and nothing evil. He reduced all visible things not in a state of rest from disorder to 'Order' placing intellect in soul and soul in body that it might be most beautiful and best. . . . Hence therefore we have a reasonable motive for calling the world an animal with a soul truly intellectual and created through the providence of the deity."²⁹

As to the Hereafter, the number of souls ever remains the same³⁰ and they are the same in number as those of the stars.³¹ The Judgment of souls after death by Minos Rhadamanthus Aeacus and Triptolemus is mentioned both in the *Apology of Socrates*³² and in the *Gorgias*.³³ (Gorgias was said to be a disciple of Empedocles.) In the *Phaedo* true virtue is said to be a purification and temperance, justice, fortitude, and wisdom to be a kind of initiatory purification so "According to those, who instituted the mysteries, whoever shall arrive in Hades unexpiated and uninitiated shall lie in mud; but he, that arrives there purified and initiated, shall dwell with the gods. For there are many wand bearers but few inspired."³⁴ Further in the same work "the soul which is invisible . . . goes to another place, like itself, excellent, pure and invisible and therefore truly called the invisible world, to the presence of a good and wise God."³⁵ ". . . But it is not lawful for anyone, who has not studied philosophy and departed this life perfectly pure, to pass into the ranks of the gods, but only to the true lover of wisdom."³⁶

This same work concludes with a long legend of Tartarus, with an exact description of the judgment inflicted on different kinds of souls, but Plato ends by saying "to affirm positively indeed that these things are exactly as I have described them does not become a man of sense; that however this or something of the kind, takes place with respect to our souls and their habitations, since our soul is certainly immortal, this appears to be most fitting and to be believed."³⁷

In the legend of the Winged Horses and the Charioteer in the *Phaedrus*, to which attention has already been drawn (cf. p. 31)

²⁶ *Phaedrus*, 47.

²⁷ *ib.*, 10.

²⁸ *Apology*, 32.

²⁹ *ib.*, 68.

³⁰ *Timaeus*, 37.

³¹ *Rep.* X, 11.

³² *Gorgias*, 168.

³³ *ib.*, 71.

²⁸ *ib.*, 21.

³¹ *Timaeus*, 17.

³⁴ *Phaedo*, 37, 38

³⁷ *Phaedo*, 143

various cycles of 10,000, 3,000 and 1,000 years are mentioned, at the end of which different souls come up for revision of their sentences.³⁸

In the *Republic*, there is the long fable of Erus who came to life ten days after being killed in battle, giving an account of the Fates, Lachesis singing the past, Clotho the present and Atropos the future, and also of the distaff of Necessity.³⁹

In the *Timaeus*, if a soul has not lived well and gone to its own appropriate star⁴⁰ its reincarnation, it is stated, might be in a woman or an animal according to behaviour in this life: in particular in birds, in the case of men without vice, but light minded, trusting only in the senses; in wild animals, for those, who made no use of philosophy: in reptiles without feet, for the most unwise and in fish for the most unthinking.⁴¹

Plato's philosophy having now reached the stage, where it has been determined that the soul is immortal and having considered both its past and its future, now continues in its search of truth. The notion of Heraclitus had, as we have seen on page 31, been adopted: according to this, all concrete things perceptible to the senses are in a state of motion and do not exist in a state of rest, or "Being," but are forever in a state of "Becoming."⁴² This is explained by the fact that even if they are not moved in space, or changed in character, they are at least moved in Time; and so are forever changing in some manner. It follows then, that what can be perceived by the Senses is fallacious;⁴³ for even those very things which appear to the senses to be at rest are in fact not so, but are in a state of motion.⁴⁴

So we find in the *Phaedo* that concrete matters perceptible to the senses, never remain the same:⁴⁵ and in the *Theaetetus* nothing ever is, but is always becoming:⁴⁶ the universe is in motion:⁴⁷ nothing is essentially one, but is always being produced by something and the word Being must be entirely done away with . . . we ought not to allow anything of any other, or of me, or this or that, or any other name, which designates permanency; but we ought to speak of "the thing itself."⁴⁸

"Now, however, it is impossible for any of the first elements to be explained by a definition, for it does not admit of anything else being named, for it has only a name, but the things that have been composed from these, as they are complex, so their names, when connected together, constitute a definition; for a connection of names is the essence of definition."⁴⁹

³⁸ *Phaedrus*, 61.

⁴¹ *Timaeus*, 73.

⁴⁴ *Theaetetus*, 96.

⁴⁷ *ib.*, 33.

³⁹ *Rep.* X, 13-16.

⁴² *Theaetetus*, 25.

⁴⁵ *Phaedo*, 63.

⁴⁸ *ib.*, 37.

⁴⁰ *Timaeus*, 17.

⁴³ *Phaedo*, 25.

⁴⁶ *Theaetetus*, 25.

⁴⁹ *Theaetetus*, 140
and *Timaeus*, 23.

On the other hand, all abstract thoughts are treated objectively, and are ever considered as constant and are called "Essences."⁵⁰ They are not perceptible through senses, but are the objects of reflection.⁵¹

"Each of them which exists, being an unmixed essence by itself, continues always the same and in the same state and never undergoes any variation at all under any circumstances."⁵² Essence is described as follows "for essence that really exists, colourless, formless and intangible, is visible only to Intelligence that guides the soul and around it the family of true science have this for their abode."⁵³

The way in which these combine with concrete matters is as follows: "a thing is beautiful because it 'partakes' of abstract beauty."⁵⁴ Thus "things become possessed of an abstract quality or essence by the presence of communications of such abstract quality by whatever means and in whatever way communicated."⁵⁵

So, there is but one "beautiful" itself not many "beautiful"; one thing itself individually existing and not many such things.⁵⁶ As we shall find on page 40 beyond this conception Plato had a conjecture of an ultimate Unity, for after death he states "we shall in all likelihood be with others like ourselves, and shall of ourselves know 'the whole real essence' and that probably is Truth."⁵⁷

From a consideration of the foregoing, then, Plato based his theory of "Ideas."

From the immortality of the soul, the permanency of abstract notions, and the ever state of change of all concrete matter, Plato came to the conclusion that in its inception everything was created by the Deity as the image of some similar eternal pattern or essence,⁵⁸ to which the term Real or Idea is applied and that concrete matter is a mere image or appearance of Reality.

In Book VII of the *Republic*, a most graphic illustration is given by way of description of this theory. Supposing people were for ever fixed facing a blank wall, in a dark cave, with a bright light behind them, and figures or effigies of various objects were for ever being placed between the fire and them; then the sum of their knowledge of such objects would be confined to their acquaintance with the shadows which they saw in front of them. If however, one were brought into the light of day and gradually accustomed to see, first the images themselves and then the real objects in the light of the sun, and subsequently he were returned to the cave to explain to the others, by the light of his own experience, that

⁵⁰ *Phaedo*, 27.

⁵³ *Phaedrus*, 57.

⁵⁶ *Rep.*, VI, 8.

⁵⁸ *Timaeus*, 9, 10, 25, 26.

⁵¹ *ib.*, 28.

⁵⁴ *Phaedo*, 112.

⁵⁷ *Phaedo*, 31, cf.

Sophist 58.

⁵² *ib.*, 62.

⁵⁵ *ib.*, 113, cf. *Hippias*
Major, 28.

which they saw ; he would have to describe the objects of their vision as being but mere shadows of ideas or images of the real things themselves. Thus as the sun would be the last object of vision, which the observer in the illustration would have been able to look at, after coming out of the darkness, so the idea of " Good " is the last object of vision and must be inferred from reason to be the cause of what is right and beautiful in all things, while in that which is intelligible, it is the sovereign producing truth and intelligence.⁵⁹

All concrete matter, being then in a state of Generation⁶⁰ may be said to consist of Substance, *i.e.*, Essence or " That which is " ⁶¹ and Accidents⁶² or Appearances,⁶³ which generation imposes upon sensible objects.⁶⁴ What exactly is meant by substance is illustrated in the *Republic*, Book X, in the case of a bed made by a joiner and of which a painter makes a picture. There God is the producer in nature of the Idea or real being of a bed, though no particular bed, the joiner is the maker of the bed and the painter is the imitator, who makes what is generated the third from Nature.

Though Plato was convinced of the real idea both of the permanent being (*οὐσία*) and also of the mutable (*γένεσις*) of phenomena, yet he never seems quite clear as to the difference between such forms of reality. He clearly stated that each several essence or Idea existed of itself ;⁶⁵ but as to the difference between the idea of permanent being, like abstract matter and of the idea of concrete matter he is vague. It has been suggested that with regard to the former he employed the term *ἡ ἰδέα* and for the essence of concrete matter he used the term *τὸ εἶδος* but in this, as in many other things in his writings he is not consistent.

In the *Phaedo* we have seen (page 35) that the latter were imbued with the former by "*participation.*" According to Aristotle, Plato took the view that the visible things took their respective names from the Ideas, in consequence of their participation in the Ideas and all objects of the same genus received the same names as the Ideas : so that when the Pythagoreans said " Things are copies of numbers " Plato said " participation," he only changed the name.⁶⁶ But Plato did more than that, as he ventured on an explanation that the soul could by pure reflection, attain in a measure to that knowledge⁶⁷ of the Real which he called Science.⁶⁸ Further it must be borne in mind that this word " participation " is employed in two distinct connections : the one of a concrete

⁵⁹ *Rep.*, VII, 3.

⁶² *Rep.* II., 19.

⁶⁴ *Timaeus*, 14.

⁶⁷ *Phaedo*, 28.

⁶⁰ *Timaeus*, 9.

⁶³ *ib.*, VII, 3.

⁶⁵ *Phaedo*, 109.

⁶⁸ *Rep.* V, 20.

⁶¹ *Phaedo*, 28, 94 and
Timaeus, 23.

⁶⁶ *Metaph.* I, 6.

idea imbued with an abstract idea, and the other of a visible object in relation to its own idea or essence.

He stated the method by which he arrives at his theory of ideas as follows: "he regarded . . . individual ideas as hypothetical notions for which a true foundation can only be given by an idea, not requiring an explanation, but, which is confirmed by some higher explanation."⁶⁹ It is from the difficulty of this theory of Ideas that, as will be seen at a later stage, so much argument arose about the meaning of "Substance," *i.e.*, the Idea or General Term of the mutable or objects capable of being perceived by the senses.

Plato, having shown the fallaciousness both of men's opinions and of the senses, had to find some other criterion of truth. His theory of Ideas gave him this, providing at the outset a firm theory of Being as a sure criterion of Truth.

He had discarded the sufficiency of subjective truth, that mental perceptions are true simply because they take place; instead, he sought objective truth independent of human senses. "Using pure reflection itself to search out each essence purely by itself."⁷⁰

As opposed to the didactic method of the Sophists, who took it for granted that all current opinions were true (man is the measure of all things) Plato by his Dialectic, commenced by seeking with definitions to gain the general idea; and then by division, resolved the general idea into species.

Thus Dialectic, as a philosophy, is occupied about that which is or has "Being" in opposition to appearances, which are only "Becoming," and as a method, it investigates the reason and exact description of the Being of everything as "It is," by argument and exact definition, prolonged by sub-division into species where possible. So, in the *Phaedrus*, the methods are described: "on the one hand to see under one aspect and to bring together under one general idea many things scattered in various places. . . ."⁷¹ The being able on the other hand to separate the general idea into species by joints as nature points out and not to break any part.⁷² If I perceive anyone else able to comprehend the one and the many as they are in nature,⁷³ 'I follow behind as in the footsteps of a god.'⁷⁴

Again, in the *Republic* we have this description of the philosophy "dialectic Science executes the strain, which also being cognisable by the intellect may be said to be imitated by the power of sight, which faculty seeks first, as we observed, to gaze at animals, then at the stars and last of all at the sun itself. So when a man attempts

⁶⁹ *Rep.*, VI, 21.

⁷² *ib.*, 110.

⁷⁰ *Phaedo*, 28.

⁷³ *ib.*, 111.

⁷¹ *Phaedrus*, 109.

⁷⁴ Homer's *Odyssey*, V, 193.

to discuss a subject without the aid of his perceptive faculties, he is impelled by reason to what is individual and real being ; and if he stops not till he apprehends by intelligence what is the Good itself, then indeed he arrives at the end of the intelligible as the other does at the end of the visible."⁷⁵

It may be of some interest to mention the various refinements of the Rhetorical art of speaking, which Plato quotes in contrast to the simplicity of his dialectic. 1. Exaudium. 2. Narration and evidence to support it. 3. Proofs. 4. Probabilities. 5. Confirmation. 6. After confirmation. 7. Refutation. 8. After refutation. 9. Subordinate intimation. 10. Bye praises. 11. Bye censures in metre to assist the memory. 12. Recapitulation.⁷⁶

He considered Pericles to have been the most perfect of all men in rhetoric.⁷⁷

Having now established the doctrine of Ideas and explained the method of Dialectics it is necessary to revert to Plato's theory of the creation in order to assist in explaining the part which the Soul plays in the search for the " Good."

Plato regarded the Universe as an animal with a Soul, truly intellectual and creative through the Providence of the Deity.⁷⁸ All the Universe is divided into three parts : one species of the model according to sameness, is apprehensible only by the intellect ; of this kind are abstract matters.

Another species, generated and visible, is apprehended by Opinion united with Perception ; namely all concrete matter.

A third species, the nurse of generation : namely Place.⁷⁹

Plato says as follows :

" *As to the first kind of idea*, it subsists according to sameness unproduced and is not subject to decay ; receiving nothing into itself from elsewhere, and itself never entering into any other nature, but invisible, imperceptible by senses and to be apprehended by pure intellect.

As to the second kind of idea, it is perceptible by the senses, the effect of production, ever in motion, coming into a certain spot, and then again hastening to decay, being apprehended by opinion united with perception.

As to the third kind of idea, it is eternal place, which is never destroyed but becomes the seat of everything creative being perceptible of itself without the interference of the senses, by a sort of bastard reason.

With regard to real being, true and accurate reason aids it by affirming, that so long as two things differ from each other they

⁷⁵ *Rep.*, VII, 12.

⁷⁸ *Timaeus*, 10.

⁷⁶ *Phaedrus*, 112.

⁷⁹ *ib.*, 11, 27.

⁷⁷ *ib.*, 120.

cannot so exist one in another as to be at the same time two things and one only."⁸⁰

This seems to bring out the point that it was necessary for concrete matter to have something in which to be moulded, and though it is an image or shadow of its essence yet there is a wide difference between it and the idea after which it is fashioned (cf. p. 36).

With regard to Time he says, " God resolved to form a certain movable image of eternity, He, while He was disposing of other parts of the universe out of that *eternity which rest in unity* formed an eternal image on the principle of numbers."⁸¹ Very scanty records have been left of the ancient Harmonics and this and other like passages where Plato employs geometrical and numerical deduction taken from the Pythagorean School, have never yet been fully understood and have led to the adage " Numeris Platonis nihil obscurius." But Plato himself was a great geometrician and to him or his immediate disciples is ascribed the invention of Conic Sections.

From another point of view Plato, according to Aristotle, regarded all concrete essences as being derived from numbers, as though these were a sort of intermediate between the world of reason and the all embracing Deity : such numbers were, of course, abstract numbers.⁸² It may be as well to quote the passage from Aristotle " Plato thought that sensible Things, no less than their causes, were numbers, but the causes are Intelligible (Ideas) and other things are Sensibles."⁸³

Mention need not here be made of Plato's somewhat crude ideas of cosmology, physics, and anatomy, with which we are not concerned. He observes that in his opinion Being Place and Generation were in existence before the creation of the Universe.⁸⁴ But he seems to indicate that all things (which would include the ten Contraries or Elements of the Pythagoreans⁸⁵) were comprised in the Deity himself. For we find him mentioning the

⁸⁰ *Timaeus*, 26.

⁸¹ *ib.*, 14.

⁸² *Rep.*, VII, 8 and cf.

⁸³ *Metaph.*, I, 7.

⁸⁴ *Timaeus*, 27.

Philebus, 13.

⁸⁵ The ten contraries, which were the ten elements or Principia of the Pythagorean School, were as follows :

The finite and the infinite.

The odd and the even.

The one and the many.

The right and the left.

The male and the female.

The quiescent and the moving.

The right line and the curve.

Light and Darkness.

Good and Evil.

The square and the oblong.

“ whole of real essence which is Truth,”⁸⁶ and again the phrase occurs of “ capable of containing all things.”⁸⁷ And we have just seen above that Eternity rested in Unity.⁸⁸ That such unity was an abstract and not a concrete number is made clear both in the *Philebus*⁸⁹ and the *Parmenides*.⁹⁰

In the *Timaeus* speaking of the Creator he says, “ he found by reasoning that of things naturally visible, nothing without intelligence could be more beautiful than what is wholly endowed with intellect, and besides this, that apart from the soul no one could possess intelligence.”⁹¹ In respect of this, H. Davis, the translator, says in a note : “ Plato seems therefore to regard the soul (*ψυχή*) as an intermediate agent and uniting bond between perishable bodies and eternal and indestructible intellect, powerfully acting on matter ; but yet, on the other hand, closely and necessarily connected with intellect ; though not like the latter naturally eternal and indestructible, but the best of things generated and constituted eternal by divine decrees.”

Before proceeding in the search of essence which is to be ascertained by pure reflection alone⁹² the nature and faculties of the Soul must next be taken into consideration. Soul is divided into three parts :⁹³

1. *The Rational*, which though the smallest governs the rest this is the immortal soul, which is situated in the head.⁹⁴ It is the part which is affected by Reason, it is wise and charged with the care of the whole.
2. *The Irascible*, or Spirited, obeys and supports the Rational. This is the male mortal soul and is situated in the heart.⁹⁵
3. *The Irrational*, which is affected by desires, it is the largest part, but obeys the rational through Temperance. This is female mortal soul and is situated in the liver.⁹⁶

So far, as it is concerned with pleasure, it may be divided further into three parts :⁹⁷

- a. Love of learning.
- b. Love of ambition.
- c. Love of gain in carnal pleasures and in commerce.

But unless reason governs, the other parts are not brought into the symphony of the soul, with which is adjusted the harmony of the body.⁹⁸

⁸⁶ *Phaedo*, 45.

⁸⁹ *Philebus*, 13.

⁹² *Phaedo*, 28.

⁹⁵ *ib.*, 44, 45.

⁹⁸ *ib.*, IX, 13.

⁸⁷ *ib.*, 110.

⁹⁰ *Parmenides*, 23 *et seq.*

⁹³ *Rep.*, IV, 13-17.

⁹⁶ *ib.*, 46.

⁸⁸ *Timaeus*, 14.

⁹¹ *Timaeus*, 10.

⁹⁴ *Timaeus*, 19.

⁹⁷ *Rep.*, IX, 7.

The soul has certain faculties, which are described as a kind of real existence.⁹⁹ And first as to those connected with knowledge, which are four in number, and are analagous to four divisions of knowledge.¹⁰⁰

1. *νόησις* *Pure Reason* the faculty of knowledge of Pure Ideas.
2. *διάνοια* *Understanding*. The faculty of knowledge of Mixed Ideas, *e.g.*, mathematics and geometry.
3. *πίστις* *Faith*. The faculty of knowledge of concrete matter.
4. *εἰκασία* *Conjecture*. The faculty of knowledge of images and shadows.

The first, *νόησις*, is apprehended by Intellect.¹⁰¹ The second, *διάνοια*, is apprehended by Reason.¹⁰² The third and fourth, *πίστις* and *εἰκασία* are apprehended by *Opinion*¹⁰³ and *Perception*.

The education of the soul cannot be brought about by implanting "science," that is knowledge of the Real¹⁰⁴ in it, but rather by turning its attention in the right direction.¹⁰⁵

"The other virtues of the soul, as they are called, seem to be somewhat like those of the body, for in fact those not before contained therein, are afterwards engendered by custom and practice, but the faculty of the intellect possesses, it seems, a nature somewhat more god-like than all the rest; never losing its power, but by exertion becoming useful and profitable, and by the opposite useless and hurtful."¹⁰⁶

So again in the *Timaeus*, Intellect is contrasted with Opinion, the former produced by learning, based on true reason, stable and not movable by persuasion, held by only the gods and some small portion of mankind: the latter produced by persuasion, irrational and mutable is held by all.¹⁰⁷

Later in dealing with morals, there will be more as to the importance of the soul, but it may be well to note here that in the *Phaedo* the affection of the soul for the Real, which it acquires by Reason and not by the senses, is called Wisdom,¹⁰⁸ and in the *Republic*, Justice is said to be the best reward for the soul.¹⁰⁹

Following Plato's argument that no one is voluntarily bad¹¹⁰ as laid down in the *Protagoras* (who was said to be a disciple of Democritus), and also in the *Republic* and the *Timaeus*, the disease of

⁹⁹ *Rep.*, V, 21.

¹⁰² *ib.*, VII, 7.

¹⁰⁴ *Theatetus*, 107.

¹⁰⁷ *Timaeus*, 25.

¹¹⁰ *Protagoras*, 87; *Rep.*, IX 12.

¹⁰⁰ *ib.*, VI, 21.

¹⁰³ *Timaeus*, 26.

¹⁰⁵ *Rep.*, VII, 4.

¹⁰⁸ *Phaedo*, 65.

¹⁰¹ *Phaedrus*, 58, *Rep.*,

VII, 12.

¹⁰⁶ *ib.*, VII, 4.

¹⁰⁹ *Rep.*, X, 12.

the soul is folly, which is either madness or ignorance¹¹¹ (cf. pp. 46 and 47). But such disease not being its connate evil will not destroy it.¹¹²

His advice is, considering the soul to be immortal and able to bear all good and evil, ever to persevere on the road upwards and by all means pursue justice in unison with truth, so as to be friends to ourselves and to the gods, both here and hereafter and be happy.¹¹³

In the *Phaedo*, using the person of Socrates as expressing his thoughts in his dialogue, in his usual style, he relates how when young he was wonderfully desirous of that wisdom, which is called the history of nature¹¹⁴ and how he came across the writings of Anaxagoras that "intelligence sets in order and causes all things."¹¹⁵

We know from the *Timaeus*, that he considered that "Intellect" ruling over "Necessity" persuaded it to bring to the highest perfection the majority of created things; and in this way by the persuasive power of wisdom over "Necessity" this Universe was first created.¹¹⁶ Again "thinking that if anyone desires to discover the cause of everything he must seek to discover what way it was best to exist and therefore that man should consider nothing else, both with respect to himself and others, than what is most excellent and good."¹¹⁷ Though he found the reasonings of Anaxagoras assigned the cause of the ordering of all things, to such things as air, ether, and water yet they left out all consideration of the good. Nevertheless he concluded that good could only be ascertained by pure reflection¹¹⁸ and moreover that true virtue is a purification; and temperance, justice, fortitude and wisdom are a kind of initiatory purification.¹¹⁹

Plato, though ever aiming at definitions, but rarely commits himself, so we have no exact definition of virtue.

We are good ourselves and all other things, that are good, when a certain virtue is present. The virtue then of everything is regulated and adorned by Order.¹²⁰

Virtue, then, it seems is a kind of health, beauty and good habit of the soul.¹²¹ In the *Protagoras* there is a lengthy argument as to whether virtue can be taught or not which ends without any definite conclusion.¹²²

In the *Republic*, it is compared to turning one's attention to the good, "not for the sake of implanting sight but viewing him as

¹¹¹ *Timaeus*, 68.

¹¹⁴ *Phaedo*, 102.

¹¹⁷ *Phaedo*, 108-10.

¹²⁰ *Gorgias*, 133.

¹¹² *Rep.* XII, 9-11.

¹¹⁵ *ib.*, 106.

¹¹⁸ *Phaedo*, 28.

¹²¹ *Rep.* IV, 19.

¹¹³ *ib.*, X, 16.

¹¹⁶ *Timaeus*, 21.

¹¹⁹ *ib.*, 37.

¹²² *Protagoras*, 28, 30,
38, 42, 49, 125.

already possessing it, though not rightly turned and not looking in the right direction. . . . The other virtues of the soul seem somewhat like those of the body, for in fact those not before contained therein are afterwards engendered by custom and practice, but the faculty of intellect possesses a nature somewhat more godlike than all the rest, never losing its power but by exertion becoming useful and profitable, or by the opposite useless and hurtful."¹²³ (Cf. p. 41.)

In the *Meno*, there is a long argument in which it was agreed that it can be taught, if it was a science, which ends up with the conclusion, that if virtue is present it is present by a divine fate.¹²⁴

In the *Clitopho*, it is asserted that "virtue can be taught," was one of the things narrated as being what Socrates maintained and this is not there denied.¹²⁵ Thus whether virtue could be engendered, or only developed in the soul, by teaching seems to have remained a moot point.

Plato seems to have arrived at the conclusion that virtue must be regarded both as one and many, according to different points of view. Since virtue is considered a due measure or proportion, no single virtue comprises the whole of virtue; but on the other hand, each virtue is sometimes regarded as the whole, as no action, which is not also of that virtue, can be said to be virtuous.¹²⁶ Thus a wise action must be just, a just action must be temperate and so on.

From the exercise of the faculties of Reason and Spirit arise the four cardinal virtues, Wisdom or Prudence, Fortitude or Courage, Temperance or Self Control, and Justice.¹²⁷

Now as to *Wisdom*, it is variously described as the chief of all virtues,¹²⁸ as a history of nature,¹²⁹ as that affection of the soul, which leads it to any "thing by itself" (*i.e.*, the real) or that which is pure, immortal and unchangeable.¹³⁰ Further in the *Republic*, it is called: "a kind of science, the ability of advising well about the whole, how it may be best conducted":¹³¹ "it is that knowledge which presides over the action of well establishing one's own affairs, maintaining proper self-government and keeping Order, which is called Justice."¹³² Finally, in the *Timaeus* we find "it is well observed of the ancients, that to transact and know one's own concerns and oneself is alone the province of a prudent man."¹³³

With regard to *Fortitude* or *Courage*, it is not regarded merely as freedom of fear in danger,¹³⁴ but rather that power to maintain

¹²³ *Rep.* VII, 4.

¹²⁵ *Clitopho*, 4.

¹²⁸ *Protagoras*, 51.

¹³¹ *Rep.*, IV, 7.

¹³⁴ *Phaedo*, 35.

¹²⁴ *Meno*, 26, 42; *Protagoras*, 125.

¹²⁶ Cf. *Gorgias*, 133.

¹²⁹ *Phaedo*, 102.

¹³² *ib.*, IV, 7.

¹²⁷ *Rep.*, IV.

¹³⁰ *ib.*, 65.

¹³³ *Timaeus*, 47.

one's opinion about dreadful things, even when faced with them; so Plato called it a kind of preservative and likens it to an indelible dye as contrasted with one which easily gets washed out or "runs."¹³⁵

As to *Temperance*, Plato described it as a sort of symphony or harmony, a certain decorum and restraint, exercised over certain pleasures and desires, such as is found, when the smaller and better part of the soul governs the interior. He contrasts the many and various desires and pleasures and pains among the greatest and most depraved portions of those who are called free, with the simple and moderate desires, which are led by the intellect with judgment and right opinion, met with in those of the best temper and the best educated.¹³⁶

As to *Justice*, Plato often uses it to describe virtue in general, because no action, which is not also just, can be virtuous, and moreover he also employs the weak argument of demanding whether alternatively it be unjust, in cases where the justice of the matter is hardly under review. Justice is then described as to be good and wise,¹³⁷ also as virtue and wisdom.¹³⁸ Justice is to apply oneself to that which his genius most naturally inclines himself; in other words to attend to his own business and not to meddle in other people's affairs.¹³⁹ And in giving judgment, justice aims at ordering "that no one shall have what belongs to others or be deprived of his own."¹⁴⁰

As, in the *Republic*, Plato is dealing with the affairs of an imaginary state, and at the same time applying the precepts to the morals of the individual, he here interposes two self evident axioms. "That the same thing evidently cannot at the same time produce or experience contrary effects in the same respect and relatively to the same object."¹⁴¹

Likewise, "Things naturally relative, refer in each particular to this or that object to which they belong, while in their individual character they refer only to themselves."¹⁴²

In this way, he sought to apply the maxims for the state, to the individual and at the same time show that, though there were different parts of the soul and aspects of character or habit, yet they were all united together in one individual. Thus he goes on to say that "justice regards not merely man's external action, but what is really internal, relating to man himself, and what is properly his own; not allowing any principle in him to attempt what is in another's province, or to meddle and interfere with what does not belong to him; but really well-establishing his own

¹³⁵ *Rep.*, IV, 8.

¹³⁶ *ib.*, I, 22.

¹⁴¹ *ib.*, IV, 13.

¹³⁶ *ib.*, IV, 9.

¹³⁹ *ib.*, IV, 11.

¹⁴² *Rep.*, IV, 14.

¹³⁷ *ib.*, I, 24.

¹⁴⁰ *ib.*, IV, 11.

proper affairs, and maintaining proper self-government, keeping due Order, becoming his own friend and attuning these three principles . . . be led to combine all these together, and out of many to form one whole, temperate, attuned, and able to perform whatever is to be done . . . reckoning that action to be good and just which sustains and promotes this habit."¹⁴³

As we have seen on page 40 that Reason in the Soul aided by Spirit should govern the Irrational, so Plato says that it is Fortitude which maintains this opinion; Wisdom which dictates the necessary knowledge; Temperance which produces the harmony of the governing and the governed; and Justice which is the power which produces such.¹⁴⁴

Thus the sages (the Pythagoreans especially Empedocles) say that heaven and earth, gods and men, are held together by communion, friendship, order, temperance and justice, and for this reason they call this universe Order and not disorder or intemperance.¹⁴⁵

Finally, in the *Banquet* or *Symposium* Socrates relates what Diotima of Mantinea, a priestess of Zeus Lyceus, in Arcadia, had told him. How the consummation of the mysteries of the Daemon Love, by whoso follows the rites correctly, leads to the power to behold beauty itself, and it will be in the power of him to beget virtue in reality, and that to a person, begetting virtue in reality and bringing her up, it will happen for him to become god-beloved and if ever man was, immortal.¹⁴⁶

As we have seen Virtue is a good habit of the soul, but evil and vice are diseases of the soul (p. 41).

In the Protagoras, there is a long argument about two expressions in a poem of Simonides, on the one hand "that to become a good man is truly difficult, square as to his hands and feet and mind, fashioned without fault" and on the other "That saying of Pittactus does not please me, though uttered by a wise man wherein he says "it is difficult to continue to be good";¹⁴⁷ which Protagoras alleges to be contrary the one to the other. Plato, however, makes Socrates prove that they are different and that what is meant is, that it is not possible to become good, so as to continue good, God alone possesses this privilege; a man cannot help being evil, whom irresistible calamity prostrates. But that it is possible to become good and for the same person to become evil; "and they are for the longest time best whom the gods love."

So he goes on "I praise and willingly love all who do nothing base, but with necessity not even gods contend." "For no wise man thinks that any man errs willingly nor willingly commits base

¹⁴³ *Rep.*, IV, 18.

¹⁴⁶ *Banquet*, 36.

¹⁴⁴ *ib.*, IV, 17.

¹⁴⁷ *Protagoras*, 82, *et seq.*

¹⁴⁵ *Gorgias*, 136.

and evil actions, but they well know, that all those, who do base and evil things do them unwillingly."¹⁴⁸

If a man know good and evil he can never be overcome by anything. So the discussion goes on about those, who say that they are overcome by the temptation of pleasure, which, however, Socrates, is made to show, are really evil and that it is through ignorance in not recognizing the fact that men are led away.¹⁴⁹ So we ought only to do such things as are pleasant for the sake of the things that are good.¹⁵⁰

As exemplifying the ignorance of what is good and what is evil, Plato refers to the character of philosophers and shows that men of this character possess fortitude, magnanimity, aptitude for learning and a good memory, but the public contend that those qualities which we commend in the nature of a philosopher, each corrupts the soul possessing them, and withdraws it from philosophy. This he seeks to show is due to the ill training of the Sophists who instead of instructing the populace, seek merely to say that which is pleasing to them, and to voice their own opinions, in fact to teach nothing but 'the dogma of the vulgar' who have wrong opinions as to what the several characteristics really are.¹⁵¹

Plato in the *Statesman*, gives one very curious explanation of the existence of evil. He refers to the state of the world under the rule of Kronos (Saturn), "how at one time it is conducted by another divine cause possessing the power to live again and receiving the immortality prepared by the Demiurgus; but at another time when it is let loose it proceeds itself, by itself, and after being thus let loose, for such a time as to perform back again many myriads of revolutions, it proceeds, by its being of the greatest size and most equally balanced, to move at the smallest foot."¹⁵² (This is an allusion to the theory, that the whole system of the universe took about 120,000 years to complete the great year, when everything was brought back to the point from whence the system first started: not altogether different from the modern calculations of the orbit of the sun.)

He then goes on to state "for from him who put it together, it obtained every good; but from its previous habit, whatever harshness and injustice exist in heaven, these, it does both possess itself, from that former habit, and introduce likewise into animals."¹⁵³

But in the *Theaetetus* he says "that it is not possible that evil should be destroyed; for it is necessary that there should be always something contrary to good; nor can it be seated among the gods, but of necessity moves round this mortal nature and this region.

¹⁴⁸ *Protagoras*, 103.

¹⁴⁹ *ib.*, 104.

¹⁵⁰ *Gorgias*, 119.

¹⁵¹ *Rep.*, VI, 5-10.

¹⁵² *Statesman*, 13.

¹⁵³ *Statesman*, 16.

Wherefore we ought to fly hence thither as quickly as possible. But this flight consists in resembling God as much as possible and this resemblance is becoming just and holy."¹⁵⁴

Speaking of the selection of philosophers to be guardians of the state, Plato says " what difference is there between blind persons and those who are deprived of the knowledge of each individual essence, and have no clear demonstration in the soul, and cannot if need be, form settled notions of the beautiful, just, and good, and so maintain them, as if sanctioned by law ? But philosophic dispositions, as respect learning, always covet that which discovers to them that ever existence, which does not vary through generation or corruption. And likewise I say they desire the whole of such learning."¹⁵⁵

So at last he arrives at the conclusion that the highest branch of study is the "*Idea of the Good.*"

Without this knowledge, though we understand everything else as fully as possible, yet we know that it could be of no service whatever to us, in the same manner as no possession whatever would be of aught avail without the possession of the good : and think you that it is more profitable to possess all things, without the possession of the good, than to know all things, without the knowledge of the good, having no perception at all of the beautiful and good.¹⁵⁶

As to *Truth*, in the *Phaedo*, it is stated " I ought to have recourse to reasons and to consider in them the truth of all things."¹⁵⁷ So also referring to mathematics " our real need of this branch of science is probably because it seems to compel the soul to use pure intelligence in the search after pure truth."¹⁵⁸ Again in the *Phaedo*, speaking of existence after death : " And thus being pure and freed from all folly of the body, we shall of ourselves know the whole of real essence ; and that is probably truth."¹⁵⁹ His criterion of truth is that of the unseen world of ideas, not of this perceptible one.

In reply to Glaucon as to what is *Good*, Socrates declines to answer, but says he will describe the offspring of the good and its nearest representative.

He begins, then, by clearly enunciating the theory of Unity in Multiplicity, with regard to things real or the realm of ideas. For as he had arrived at the idea of beauty and abstract matters from many things beautiful, etc., though each of those ideas or essences had an existence of itself, so now " we are again establishing them according to the Unity of the General Idea to which we conceive each to be related." In this he compares ideas perceived by the

¹⁵⁴ *Theaetetus*, 84.

¹⁵⁷ *Phaedo*, 111.

¹⁵⁵ *Rep.*, VI, 1, 2.

¹⁵⁸ *Rep.*, VII, 8.

¹⁵⁶ *Rep.*, VI, 16.

¹⁵⁹ *Phaedo*, 31.

intellect to things seen by the eye. For when there is sight in the eyes, when used in respect of an object, which has colour, light is necessary in order that the colour may be seen. Light is engendered by the sun, but sight is not the sun nor is the sun the eye. So then the offspring of the good, which the good generates is "this, in the sphere of intelligence, with reference to the intellect and the object of the intellect, what the light of the sun is in the visible world, with reference to sight and to visible things.

"So with reference to the soul, when it firmly adheres to what is enlightened by truth and real being, then it understands and knows it, and appears to possess intellect. But when it adheres to what is blended with darkness, and is subject to generation and destruction, it then has to do with Opinion and is dull, wandering from one opinion to another, like one without intellect.

"That, therefore which imparts truth to what is known and dispenses the faculty of knowledge to him, who knows, you may call the idea of the Good and the principle of science and truth as being known through intellect.

"Likewise, as the sun imparts to things, that are seen, not only their visibility but also their generation, growth and nourishment, though not itself generation, so as to things cognizable by the intellect, they become cognizable from the good, by which they are known, and indeed their being and essence are thence derived.

"The Good itself is not essence, but beyond essence and superior to both in dignity and power."¹⁶⁰

We have now seen how Plato, commencing with the immortality of the soul, the sameness of abstract thought, and the mutability of the visible world, came to discard the senses as being fallacious and thus to evolve his theory of Ideas.

Then by applying his method of Dialectic to this and to the Creation of the world, he arrived at his Dialectical Philosophy, to attain which he inculcates the practice of virtue.

Thus as the soul becomes less trammelled with the affairs of this transitory world, it is led to the gradual contemplation of the Unity of all in that Diety from which all is derived.

He commences with thinking of the Kingdom of Heaven and also finally ends doing so.

¹⁶⁰ *Rep.*, VI, 18, 19.

CHAPTER III

ARISTOTLE

ARISTOTLE 384-322 B.C. was born at Stagira in Northern Greece. He was the son of Nicomachus a physician to Amytas II, the father of Philip of Macedon, at whose court he was brought up. At the age of seventeen he came to Athens, where he remained for twenty years and became a pupil of Plato at the Academy. He subsequently became tutor for four years to Alexander the Great. In 335 he returned to Athens and founded his school at the Lyceum gymnasium. He had only permission to teach in the shady walks there, and it was from this circumstance that his followers became known as Peripatetics. After thirteen years he retired to Chalcis in Euboea on account of political troubles, and in his absence he was condemned to death on a trumped up charge of blasphemy and paying divine honours to mortals.

According to Strabo, Theophrastus on his death in 287 B.C. gave the works of Aristotle to Nelius of Scespis in the Troad, where they were hidden in a cellar for 150 years from the Kings of Pergamos. Though damaged by worms and the damp, about 100 B.C. they were purchased by Apellicon of Athens and were subsequently brought to Rome after the taking of Athens by Sylla in 86 B.C.

Tyrannion of Rome then got permission to arrange the manuscripts and Andronicus of Rhodes, as mentioned by Cicero, made a recension of them. Some have thought that this recension is all that we have left of his works. It is true that a catalogue of the Alexandrian Library, founded 220 B.C. and destroyed by fire in 47 B.C., gave the works of Aristotle as having 146 titles or parts as against only forty which have come down to us. Likewise, Diogenes Laertius *c.* 175 A.D. describes his works as containing 445,270 lines, contained in 365 books and twenty-one letters. But not much reliance can be placed on his statements, his chief value residing in the length of his quotations.

Still, it is definitely known that his treatise containing the outlines of 255 constitutions, together with his *Dialectics on Philosophy, the Good, Justice, Contraries and Astronomy, etc.*, have not come down to us, beyond a few quotations in the works of other writers.

After the fall of the Roman Empire, the only knowledge of the works of Aristotle, in the West, was derived from the Latin translation of Boethius, 470-524 A.D., which only included part of his works on logic.

In the East, John of Alexandria called Philoponus, 605 A.D., wrote commentaries upon Aristotle.

John Bishop of Edessa, 684-708 A.D., the Monophysite had the dialectical works of Aristotle translated into Syriac. John of Damascus d. 754 A.D., also known as Chrysorrhoes kept up attention to Aristotle and the patriarch of Constantinople Photius 820-891 A.D., formed his *Myrobiblion* of extracts from 280 volumes of classical authors including Aristotle. Photius was excommunicated in 863 by Pope Nicholas I, whom he also excommunicated in turn.

However, the Arabians after the capture of the Persian kingdom of the Sassanians in 651 eagerly absorbed the literature and civilisation which they found at Bagdad.

The Moors, who had been won over to the Moslem Faith in 709, invaded Spain in 711 and established an independent caliphate at Cordova in Spain in 755 A.D. They were too weak in numbers to hold the country wholly in subjection and so permitted both the Christians and Jews to retain their religious rites.

Thus, Cordova became a great centre of learning; and so we find that Gerbert of Aurillac, who afterwards became Pope Sylvestre II, 999-1003, having studied at Cordova, introduced some knowledge of Aristotle into Rheims, Chartres and Bobbio. Later William of Champeaux 1070-1121, Bishop of Chalons did likewise; then Otto of Freising, c. 1150, the uncle of Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, introduced the whole of the *Organon* of Aristotle into Germany.

In 1150, Raimond, Archbishop of Toledo, ordered a Latin translation of the Arabic version of Aristotle's works. But as this was a Latin translation of a Hebrew version of an Arabic commentary on an Arabic translation of a Syriac version of a Greek text, the result was somewhat lacking in accuracy and not only obscure, but in places quite deficient in meaning.

St. Thomas Aquinas, 1227-1274, had special translations of the works of Aristotle made for him by William of Moerbeke, afterwards Bishop of Corinth.

It was not until after the fall of Constantinople and the fall of the Byzantine Empire, that the Greek manuscripts of Aristotle's works were brought into Italy. The chief Latin translation was made by Augustus Niphus, 1473-1546.

It is interesting to recall that an Act of the French Parliament in 1629 forbade attacks on the works of Aristotle.

It was Cousin, who aptly described the relation between the works of Plato and those of Aristotle as follows :—" Plato seems to aspire to go out of the world, Aristotle to plunge into it ; the first has more elevation, the second more extent. Aristotle recognises the world as the work of God, but shuts himself up in it. Plato makes more use of induction, Aristotle of deduction and perfected its instrument by giving the laws of a regular syllogism."

Thus, it has also been said that " Aristotle viewed theology physically, in contra-distinction to Plato who viewed physics theologically. Hence Aristotle, whilst demonstrating the inevitable necessity of a First Cause, omits the consequences of the dogma that there exists a Supreme Being over all from the beginning."

THE ORGANON

It is generally agreed that up to the twelfth century, the Schoolmen were only acquainted with the works of Aristotle, through the Latin translation by Boethius of the Logical Treatises, which came to be known as the Organon. These consisted of the following works :— the *Categories*, *On Interpretation*, the *Prior Analytics*, the *Posterior Analytic*, the *Topics* and the *Sophistical Elenchi*, together with the *Introduction of Porphyry*. Of these translations those of the *Categories* and *On Interpretation* and the *Introduction of Porphyry* alone have come down to us. The other works of Aristotle, which have survived, as we have seen, only became known from Arabic sources in the twelfth century, and it was not until after the fall of Constantinople in the fifteenth century, that the original Greek versions were introduced into Italy.

Aristotle was the first to reduce the laws of thought to a system, and is the father of Logic. These treatises came to be known as the Organon, as being, when taken together, the sole instrument, by the use of which, any knowledge could be properly apprehended.

The form in which these works have come down to us is unfortunately little more than notes for lectures and as such omits all details of the method employed by Aristotle in forming his Logic. At the outset, we have the ten categories merely laid down as self evident, whereas subsequent examination has shown that in some directions they overlap and in others are not complete : still for 2,000 years down to the time of Kant they were never seriously called into question.

To deal with these works in detail would involve, for the most part, a mere re-statement of the material to be found in any hand-

book of Logic, but it may be worth while to take a glance at some of the contents of the several treatises, which combine to form the Organon.

In the *Categories* all knowledge is classified according to the widest general relations under which existences can be known. Everything differs according to that which may be predicated of it. These *Categories* were called by the Schoolmen Predicaments, and remained the fundamental definitions of things; they were ten in number.

“Of things incomplex enunciated each signifies either.”

Ὀὐσία	Substance	Substantia
πόσον	Quantity	Quantum
ποιόν	Quality	Quale
πρὸς τί	Relation	Relatio
ποῦ	Where	Ubi
πότε	When	Quando
κεῖσθαι	Position	Situs
ἔχειν	Possession	Habitus
ποιεῖν	Action	Actio
πάσχειν	Passion	Passio

These are treated at length together with explanations of Opposites, Simultaneous, Motion, and To Have. In connection with the above, the five Predicables may be noted which are set out in the *Topics* and *Porphry's Introduction*. This division is not grounded upon what the predicates connote, but upon the class that they denote. Anything, we may predicate of a thing, must be one of five things, either γένος genus; εἶδος species; διαφορά differences; ἴδιον property; or συμβεβηκός accident.

Whereas Metaphysic is concerned with Being as it exists and with the general conditions of existence, the Being of Logic is not essential but conceptual (esse rationis). The entities of Logic are not actually existing things, but contain certain notions (intentiones) which reason discovers in things, the Predicables genus, species, etc.

These 'intentiones', then, the 'entia rationis', are the net by means of which the objective world is grasped and taken up into thought; abstract forms, which are applicable to all existent things, and Logic is just the study of this conceptual machinery.

From the beginning of the thirteenth century, the term 'intentio,' which was borrowed by St. Albertus Magnus from the works of Avicenna one of the Arabian Commentators on Aristotle (cf. Chapter XIV), passed into general use by the Schoolmen.

'Intentio prima' is therefore the first immediate apprehension of the real object prior to any logical determination as to its nature :

'intentio secunda' is the logical concept the 'what' as already logically determined, as genus, species, etc. These have two objective counterparts 'intentio or substantiva prima,' the thing as it exists and 'intentio or substantiva secunda' being the 'universale in re' inasmuch as it is the objective ground or 'fundamentum' of our universal notion. . . .

Between thought and reality there is a kind of pre-established harmony, for the universal or concept, though a creation of the mind has an extra mental existence in things.

On Interpretation not overlooking that excellent animal *τραγέλαφος* half goat, half stag, to whom Aristotle refers as an example of a word, neither true nor false, it is well to recall the meaning of the proposition referred to as 'de inesse.'

"Of enunciations one is simple, for instance, something of something or from something, but another is composed of these as a certain sentence, which is already composite; simple enunciation then is voice, significant about something, being inherent or non-inherent according as times are divided."

Here also Aristotle enumerates four Modal Propositions, the possible, the contingent (happen), the impossible and the necessary, and deals with their negative forms. However, he regards the "to be" and "not to be" *εἶναι* and *μὴ εἶναι* as subjects in themselves, to which affirmation and negation may be applied. In the *Prior Analytics* these modal propositions are reduced to two, the necessary and the contingent. Though great discussions have taken place concerning the admission of modals into logic, as a matter of fact, they can all be reduced to the pure categorical, by uniting the modal word to the predicate; or to the subject, when the mode only expresses the nature of the matter of the proposition. Modals, in short, do not affect the relations between the terms, but simply the terms themselves.

The Prior Analytics which was first so named in the time of Galen, 131-200 A.D., treats of syllogisms in general in respect of their forms. It commences with a few definitions which it may be well to bear in mind.

A *Proposition πρότασις*, complexum, is a sentence which affirms or denies something of something.

It is :

1. Universal when the being present is with all or none.
2. Particular, when the being present is with something, or not with something or not with everything.
3. Indefinite, when the being present or not being present is without the universal or particular sign, e.g., Pleasure is good.

4. Demonstrative, when one part of a contradiction is assumed.
5. Dialectic, when a contradiction is questioned.

A *Term*, ὑπος 'incomplexum' is that into which a proposition is resolved as for instance, the predicate (passio) or that of which it is predicated, 'subjectum.'

A *Syllogism* is a sentence in which certain things being laid down, something else, different from the Premiss, necessarily results in consequence of their existence.

De Omni et nullo, "For one thing to be in the whole of another and to be predicated of the whole of another are the same thing; it is predicated of the whole, when nothing can be assumed of the subject of which the other may not be asserted, and as regards being predicated of nothing in like manner."

Conversion. A negative universal proposition may be converted universally :

no pleasure is good ; no good will be pleasure.

An affirmative universal and affirmative particular proposition may be only converted particularly :

all pleasure is good ; a certain good will be pleasure.

A certain pleasure is good ; a certain good will be pleasure.

A negative particular proposition cannot be converted.¹

A syllogism is said to be in the *First Figure*. When three terms so subsist with reference to each other so that the last is in the whole of the middle and the middle is or is not in the whole of the first. The *middle* is that which is itself in another, whilst another is in it : the *extreme* is that which itself is in another and in which another also is.

If every B is A
and if every C is B
Every C is A

If no B is A
and if every C is B
No C is A

The major term must be a universal and the minor must never be a particular or indefinite negative.

The *Second Figure* : this is useful for the discovery and proof of differences in things.

When the middle term is present with every individual of the one but with none of the other or is present to every or none of each.

The *middle* term is that which is predicated of both extremes. Syllogisms arise only in the following :

¹ Universal affirmative propositions are generally indicated as A.
Universal negative propositions are generally indicated as E.
Particular affirmative propositions are generally indicated as I.
Particular negative propositions are generally indicated as O.

No N is M
Every O is M
No O is N

Every N is M
No O is M
No O is N

If both premisses are universal one must be a negative and the other a positive otherwise there is no syllogism.

If the major premiss is a universal and the minor a particular the latter must be negative if the former is positive or vice versa and the conclusion will be a negative particular.

No N is M
Some O is M
Some O is not N

Every N is M
Some O is not M
Some O is not N

The *Third Figure* : this is useful for the discovery and proof of examples or exceptions.

When with the same thing one is present with every, but the other with no, individual, or both with every or both with none.

The *middle* is that of which we predicate both.

Every S is P
No S is R
No syllogism

Every S is P
Every S is R
Some R is P

No S is P
Every S is R
Some R is not P

No S is P
No S is R
No syllogism

Some S is P
Every S is R
Some R is P

Every S is P
Some S is R
Some R is P

Some S is not P
Every S is R
Some R is not P

Every S is P
Some S is not R
No syllogism

No S is P
Some S is R
Some R is not P

Some S is P : no S is R : no syllogism :

No universal conclusions can be drawn from this figure.

The *Posterior Analytics* treats on Syllogisms in respect of their matter.

From premisses which are certain 'dignitas' a conclusion 'principia' being formally drawn, demonstration is deduced. Syllogisms of this kind are dealt with in the *Posterior Analytics* and are said to be Apodeictic ; those in which the premisses are merely probable or uncertain are discussed in the *Topics*.

All doctrine and intellectual discipline arise from pre-existent knowledge ; scientific knowledge of anything is possessed, when the necessary connection between a thing and its cause is known ; demonstration is a scientific syllogism, which causes us to know, and must be from things true, first, immediate, more known than and prior to the causes of the conclusion.² Doctrine and discipline

² *Meta* II, 1.

differ only in relation, the former being applied to teaching and the latter pertaining to learning.

The subjects of scientific investigation are four : that a thing is ; why it is ; if it is ; what it is. Definition shows what a thing is, it either explains the name of a thing or shows its cause.

The four causes are :

- The formal
- The material
- The efficient
- The final

these are dealt with at length in the *Metaphysics*, see page 59.

The *Topics* treats of the probable or dialectic syllogism. Dialectic here constitutes the art of disputing by question and answer of attacking and defending a given thesis from principles of probability, *e.g.*, general opinion of the majority or eminent authorities.

The *τόποι* then are general principles of probability, from which premisses may be drawn. The Schoolmen divided these into two kinds : the *Maximæ*, propositions of general probability extending even to axioms : and the *Differentiæ Maximarium*, consisting of one or more words, wherein one maxim differs from another.

Every question about a subject concerns either its genus, property or accident and these are dealt with at length.

There are two species of dialectical argument, the one by induction, a progression from singular to universals, the other by syllogism, which is more cogent and efficient against opponents.

The instruments by which we are bound in syllogism are :

- To assume propositions.
- To be able to distinguish in how many ways each thing is predicated.

To discover differences.

The consideration of the similar.

These give rise to three propositions :

- Distinction of what is predicated in many ways.
- Discovery of differences.
- Examination of similarity.

The *Sophistical Elenchi* treats of false chains of argument, together with some of the methods adopted to conceal them as such.

“ Loquacious trifling is produced from arguments belonging to relative notions or wherein there are habits or passions or some such thing manifested in the definition of the predicate.”

* Certain artifices, which contribute to confutation by an *elenchus* are prolixity, rapidity, anger and contention.”

ISAGOGE OR INTRODUCTION OF PORPHYRY

TO THE ORGANON OF ARISTOTLE

This work of Porphyry, 233–304 A.D. was translated into Latin by Boethius and preserved with his translation of the Organon.

It is entirely concerned with the nature of Genus, Species, Difference, Property and Accident, the five “Predicables” of the Schoolmen.

It was upon the difference of view as to Genus and Species that the great arguments of the Schoolmen from 1000–1150 A.D. arose, which divided them into the separate Schools of Realists, Nominalists and Conceptualists. The Realists affirmed the actuality of genus and species which was denied by the Nominalists of whom the Conceptualists were only a technical sub-division as we shall see later on.

Though it purports to be an introduction to Aristotle yet Porphyry differs from Aristotle. Aristotle in the *Topics*, Book I, Chapters V and VIII, makes every proposition express one of four relations of the Predicate to the subject. Every Predicate which is convertible with its subject, if it expresses its whole essence, τὸ τε ἦν εἶναι, is called “Definition”; if not “Property.”

On the other hand every Predicate, which is not convertible with its subject, if it expresses part of its essence is “Genus” otherwise it is “Accident.”

Porphyry on the other hand introduced Species and Difference but omitted Definition.

THE METAPHYSICS

In addition to the Treatises on Logic, comprised in the Organon, it is necessary for the purposes of our theme also to consider the *Metaphysics* and *Ethics* of Aristotle.

On the other hand, it does not seem necessary to burden this work with reference to his treatises on Natural Science and Politics.

The form in which the *Metaphysics* have come down to us does not amount to much more than notes of lectures and, as such, is sadly lacking in coherence and method of arrangement. We learn from Diogenes Laertius that the works of Plato were annotated with different marks, indicating which arguments were adopted and which were rejected by Plato; it is much to be deplored that Aristotle did not adopt the same plan, as his use of conjunctions

is so promiscuous that his meaning is rendered ten times the more obscure. In view of the different views advanced about the true meaning of much of the treatises, it is thought best to give copious quotations of the exact translation, though the language may seem stilted.

‘As logic exhibits the reasoning power of the mind and thus illustrates its capabilities for the attainment of knowledge,’ to quote Archbishop Whately, ‘so Metaphysics as a science is conversant about the highest and purest deductions from experimental philosophy and its province is to exhibit those abstract notions and fundamental principles which establish the certainty of knowledge.’

Sense and experience merely deal with individual instances, but Ontology lays hold on what is the universal element therein and thus gradually mounts up to be a science about causes and first principles. Thus here we find for the most part Aristotle considering τὸ ὄν Entity or Being in various ways.

Aristotle commences by treating of knowledge. All men are actuated by a desire for knowledge, which is of different degrees among all living things. In the lowest scale they have only sensibility, but when memory is added to this, they become endowed with foresight and again, when understanding is further added, they become capable of instruction; mankind in addition is possessed of art and reason.

Repeated acts of memory about the same thing constitute experience; science and art result from experience, when out of many conceptions of experience, one universal opinion is formed in respect to similar cases.

Experience then is a knowledge of singulars and art or science of Universals, the latter are the more superior, since they have the knowledge not only of the thing, but of its cause and its reason; the why, and the wherefore, and hence can give instruction about it. Such science may not be of such practical value so as to enable the owner to actually perform any work more skilfully and so may be termed speculative, but this has ever been an object of admiration among mankind and has been developed chiefly by those, who have been endowed with leisure, such as the Sacerdotal class in Egypt. All then consider to be an object of admiration that wisdom which is concerned with first causes and principles.

Most fit for pre-eminence, he says, is the science which communicates the knowledge of that, on account of which, each thing is to be done; but this constitutes the good in each particular, but in general that which is best in every nature, for the Good is viewed as a Final Cause. Not only is it speculative, but it is the most liberal and divine. That which is divine is also most worthy of

honour, but such will be so in two ways : that, which the Deity would especially possess, is divine amongst sciences ; and likewise the science of things divine ; but wisdom possesses both characteristics. " For to all speculators doth the Deity appear as a cause and a certain first principle, and such a science God alone or He principally would possess. Therefore, indeed, may all sciences be more requisite than this one, but none is more excellent."³ Aristotle however states that speculations in the past have been largely induced by mere wonder and that order must be established on a different basis.

Having by the foregoing panegyric sought to establish the importance of speculative philosophy, Aristotle proceeds to adduce those four primary causes which he had previously arrived at in his treatise on Physics, these are as follows :

- I. ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ τι εἶναι. The Substance and the Essence. The *Formal Cause*, Substantial Form, or Quiddity.
- II. ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον. The Matter and the Subject. The *Material Cause*.
- III. ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως. The origin of Motion. The *Efficient Cause*.
- IV. τὸ ὄν ἐνεκα καὶ τὰγαθόν. The end and the good. The *Final Cause*.

Aristotle then proceeds to criticise the various systems of former Greek philosophers, which is of great interest, because of the information it gives of their respective tenets, reference to which has been made in Chapter I.

It appears that from the earliest times all the philosophers have sought to find some one primary material cause, but that an efficient cause was not taken into consideration at all before Parmenides. He alleges, however, that in a varying measure they all treated of his four causes just mentioned.⁴

We now come to Aristotle's examination of the Platonic Theory of Ideas and in view of the importance of the effect, which this had upon the Scholastic philosophy, it must here be treated in more detail. Plato's theory of Ideas has been already fully explained in the last chapter, so that it is only necessary to set out Aristotle's arguments against it and in favour of his own system.

In the first place, the introduction of ideas as causes, is like that of first adding to the number of things, in order to be able to count them correctly ; for the forms are not less numerous

³ I, 2.

⁴ I, 7.

than the things, whose causes are being investigated ; since there is a homonymous form for each individual thing ; and in addition to the substances, there is the unity involved in the notion of plurality in these and even in things eternal. Secondly, some of the forms are unnecessary and some unexpected. As to some, there is no necessity in the sequence of reason that a syllogism should arise. For there will be forms of all things, as many as there are sciences, forms of negation and forms of that which has been already destroyed, pertaining to things liable to decay.

Thirdly, some of the arguments for the Ideal theory frame ideas of " things relative " of which no essential genus is alleged ; whereas others speak of a " third man."

Arising out of the theory of Ideas, Aristotle objects that it would follow that the duad would not be the first, but number would be ; and that the relative would be before the essential.

Further, that " if anything participates in the twofold itself this also is a participant in the eternal, but according to accident, for it is accidental for the two-fold to be eternal, therefore the form will be substance."⁵

From a further argument about duads, he says, it would be like one calling Callias and a piece of wood a man, not discerning the lack of community between them.

The theory, he alleges, is useless, for the ideas are neither a cause of any motion nor of any change ; they do not contribute towards the existence of other things, for they are not inherent in that in which they are participant ; unless you call " that white " the cause of a white body when " that white " is mixed with white.

It is also objected, that the copy must be like the model and that the form of the existence of Socrates and the form of the non-existence of Socrates must be the same. So that there would be many forms of a substance, for instance as regards a man, the forms of a man, of a biped, and of an animal. Further as they are not only forms of substances, there must be forms of forms, and the genus as genus would be the form of the species. Wherefore the form and the image will be the same thing. Moreover as substance cannot be separated, forms, in so far as they are substances of things, cannot exist separately from them.

Not content with the above, Aristotle follows this up with six mathematical and geometrical arguments, to enter into which would require a greater acquaintance with the systems of Pythagoras and Eurytus than is here demanded. He finishes off by attacking Plato's theory of recollection as a source of innate

⁵ I, 9.

ideas. In fact as one commentator aptly expresses it, Aristotle seems to think that it was his one object in life to refute Plato.

As a preliminary to the consideration of the subject matter under review, Aristotle propounded a whole string of questions or doubts about causes, principles, substance, genus, identity, priority, accidents, and numbers, in respect of which, he sets out arguments pro and con: all of which emphasize the embryo conditions of such enquiries. What he first lays down is the existence of the science of ontology or metaphysics as a single, though superior, science conversant with entity and the things inherent in it, that is the first principle and causes of entity. And he endeavours to show that metaphysics is but one science, in spite of the variety of subjects, which it covers. From the proposition which he lays down that Entity $\tau\acute{o} \acute{\omicron}\nu$ is identical with Unity $\tau\acute{o} \acute{\epsilon}\nu$, it results that metaphysics has to deal with matters like privation and negation and in general opposites and contraries. He also shows how axioms and the first principles of demonstration fall within this subject. "Let those," said he, "who deny statements such as this, that it is impossible for the same thing to be present and not to be present at the same time in the same subject and according to the same,"⁶ make any statement and as they have sought to destroy all difference between truth and falsehood, they will be unable to maintain the truth of any of their own statements. As to those who want a demonstration of such self-evident truth, they do it from sheer ignorance, for it is nothing more than ignorance not to know of what one ought or ought not to seek a demonstration.

He also deduces six other arguments against the Sceptics and finally refutes the Protagorean tenet, "that truth is only apparent": he points out that this system sprang from different opinions about sensibles, *e.g.*, what appears sweet to one appears bitter to another and that the same thing appears not to be same at different times. So that philosophers like Democritus used to say that "positively either nothing is true, or that if it be so, that to us it is wrapped in obscurity."⁷ This error was further confirmed by the opinion that sense constituted wisdom and prudence, and that the judgment of the senses was decisive in the matter of truth and falsehood. In refutation of this, Aristotle first instances the difference between sensation and imagination; secondly, the unreliability of the senses; thirdly, such a system would lead to nothing, as animated things would have no existence, and so sense would have no existence either.

A similar case of impossibility of demonstration arises with regard to the proposition that "contraries cannot possibly exist at the

⁶ III, 3.

⁷ III, 5.

same time in the same subject, but either, both must be inherent partially, or one partially and the other simply or absolutely. Further, that there is no mean between a contradiction."

The principle, in respect of these matters, is definition and its exact meaning. An example of this is given with regard to the theories of Heraclitus and Anaxagoras, the former affirmed "that all things appeared to be and not to be," and so appeared to make all things true; the latter introduced a certain medium between a contradiction so that all things were false!⁸

The absurdity of these conclusions is that, if applied to themselves, they produce their own refutation.

We then reach the *Book of Definitions* which is here set out *in extenso*.

The Book of Definitions 1. First Principle ἀρχή.

- (a) Origin of motion, *e.g.*, length, way.
- (b) From whence a thing arises best, *e.g.*, discipline, how best learnt.
- (c) From whence is produced the first of a thing, which is inherent, *e.g.*, keel of a ship.
- (d) Not inherent, but outcome, *e.g.*, child from parent, fight from abuse.
- (e) Free impulse, under which things are moved or changed, *e.g.*, dominions, dynasties, kingdoms.
- (f) Arts.
- (g) From whence a thing is first known, *e.g.*, hypotheses, principles of demonstration.
- (h) *All causes are first principles.*

Generally the original from whence a thing *is*, or *is produced*, or *is known*; some inherent and some extrinsic, *e.g.*, nature, element, understanding, free will, substance, final cause.

2. Cause *αιτία* :

- (a) That from which anything as inherent is produced, *e.g.*, silver of a cup, material cause.
- (b) Form and example, *e.g.*, formal cause, art.
- (c) Origin of change or rest, *e.g.*, efficient cause, pilot.
- (d) End, *e.g.*, final cause, object, walk for sake of health.
Ultimately always for the good.

3. Element στοιχείον.

That, from which as an inherent first principle and indivisible in species, something is compounded into a different species, *e.g.*, syllables of a voice, diagrams of a demonstration, first syllogism. By analogy, genera,

⁸ III, 7.

4. Nature *φύσις*.

- (a) Origin of earliest motion, either potentially or actually, in each thing in itself subsisting by Nature, so far as it is this very thing, *e.g.*, growth.
- (b) Primary matter, *e.g.*, wood of wooden vessel.
- (c) That remaining in a state of conservation, *e.g.*, fire, earth, air, water.
- (d) Substance of things which exist by nature. In fact both species and substance, which is the end of production, *e.g.*, both primary matter such as water; and also animals and their parts which exist by nature.

5. Necessity *ἀναγκαιώς*.

- (a) That without which as a co-operating cause it is not admissible for a thing to exist, *e.g.*, nourishment.
- (b) That without which it is impossible for good to subsist or arise, or evil to be avoided or exterminated, *e.g.*, preventive medicine, sailing to Aegina to preserve one's property. (This is an allusion to the retirement from Athens in 480 B.C. in the face of threatened invasion.)
- (c) That which is compulsory, or in opposition to free will.
- (d) That which is involved in demonstration, or axiomatic.
- (e) That which is primary, absolute or simple, *e.g.*, certain things which are eternal and immovable, though there is nothing in them compulsory or contrary to Nature.

6. Unity *τὸ ἓν*.

- (a) That which subsists according to accident (*per accidens*), *e.g.*, the just musician Corsicus.
- (b) That which subsists essentially (*per se*).
 1. According to continuity of which the motion is one essentially, *e.g.*, bundle, straight line.
 2. In respect of the subject, being in species indifferent, or destitute of difference, that is, of which the form is indivisible and the subject is either the first or the last in respect of the end, *e.g.*, wine and oil both composed of water and air; Isosceles and equilateral triangles, both are triangles.
 3. In respect of definition, of that which is essentially indivisible, *e.g.*, surfaces of length and breadth.
 4. In respect of perception, which cannot be separated in time or place or definition, *e.g.*, all substances.

The essence of One is that it is the principle of a certain number: the first measure is the principle of each genus:

that by which as primary we indicate each genus, is the first measure of each genus. *But the One is not the same in all genera.* Everywhere Unity is indivisible either in form or quantity; in so far as it is a quantity, it is a monad or unit. That which is indivisible with regard to position is a point. A body is described as that which in every way and in three directions is divisible.

Those are one in number of which the matter is one.

Those are one in species of which the definition is one.

Those are one in genus of which there is the same figure of predication.

Likewise, by analogy, but in each case those which are one in the lower division, are one in the higher, but not vice versa, *e.g.*, those of the same species are of the same genus, but those of the same genus are not all of the same species.

In Book IX Aristotle puts it this way "the essence or existence of One consists in being indivisible, namely in being of this particular thing and incapable of a separate subsistence, either in place, or form, or in the faculty of thought, or in that which is entire and has been made the subject of definition. And especially as being the first measure of every genus and of the principle portions of quantity, for measure is that whereby quantity is known. Also, as being a first principle of number. But number is a multiple of monads and not that of which unity is a measure.

By analogy, sense is the measure of sense, but Protagoras is wrong in saying "man is the measure of all things" for it is sense, and not he who feels, that is the measure of sense.

7. Entity $\tau\acute{o} \theta\upsilon$.

(a) That which subsists according to Accident (*per accidens*).

(b) That which subsists essentially (*per se*).

Entities, whatsoever, signify the figures of predication, for as often as they are predicated, they signify essence. It is found in any of the ten Categories and in truth as opposed to falsehood both in capacity and actuality. Aristotle lays it down that it is the same as Unity.

8. Substance $\sigma\upsilon\sigma\tau\acute{\alpha}$.

(a) Simple bodies as earth, fire, water, in general bodies, and animals: also those beings that are of the nature of daemons and the parts of these.

(b) That of which things are predicated, but which are not predicated of a subject.

(c) That which may be the cause of being and may be inherent in such as are not predicated of the subject, *e.g.*, soul in an animal.

(d) *The essence of which the formal cause is the definition, e.g.*, the form and the species of each thing, quiddity.

In the *Categories*, Chapter V, substance is defined as that which is capable of receiving contraries.

9. Sameness *τὰ αὐτά.*

Anything is the 'same,' either by accident or essentially (*per se*).

Accidents are simply predicated of singulars, and the 'same' is *per accidens*, when the subject is common, *e.g.*, white and musical may be "same" accidents of Socrates.

The 'same' is "*per se*" when used like "Unity," *e.g.*, of those things of which the matter is one in species, or in number, or in genus, or of which the substance is one.

The Diverse is the opposite to the 'same,' being, however, in some respects the 'same,' not merely number, but in species, genus, or by analogy.

The Different are those of which the genus or species is diverse.

The Contrary are those of which the substance is diverse.

The Similar are those of the same quality and the same in as many contraries as a change is possible.

The Dissimilar is the opposite to the similar.

10. The Opposite *τὸ ἐναντίον.*

Such are contradictions, contraries, relations, privations, and habits and those things, from which ultimate things arise, *e.g.*, generation and corruption. Those things which are not admissible at the same time, *e.g.*, black and white.

Those of a different genus.

11. Priority and subsequence *πρῶτερον καὶ ὕστερον.*

These are used with reference to the first principle in a genus, or according to place, or time, or motion; for that which is more immediate to the first moving power is prior, *e.g.*, boy is prior to the man, to which he grows: or potentiality, for that which is more potential is prior, *e.g.*, that which must follow the free will of another, is subsequent: and the half is prior to the whole. Again, according to reason, universals are prior, but according to sense singulars are prior.

Straightness is said to be prior to smoothness, because a superficies is expressed in terms of lines.

According to generation, the whole is prior to the part, but according to corruption the part is prior to the whole.

12. Potentiality *δύναμις*.

The first principle of change or motion in another thing.

Impotentiality is the contrary to potentiality and implies that the contrary is false, *e.g.*, the diameter is incommensurable; it has impotentiality, because the contrary is false in any case: but 'Socrates is sitting' has not for it might be possible for Socrates to stand.

13. Quantity *πόσον*.

That which is divisible into things which are inherent, of which each can be a particular thing of this sort.

Multitude is a certain quantity, if it may be numerable, and is divisible into non-continuous capacity.

Magnitude is a certain quantity, if it be measurable, and is divisible into continuous capacity.

Of quantities some are essential according to substance, *e.g.*, a line: or according to the passions or habits of a substance, *e.g.*, much and little, long and short, high and low, heavy and light, and great and small.

Other quantities are expressed according to accidents, *e.g.*, musical, white, motion which is imparted to a thing.

14. Quality *ποιόν*.

The difference of substance, and in general, whatever besides quantity inheres in substance, *e.g.*, numbers, heat, colour, weight, good and bad.

15. Relation *πρὸς τί*.

Relatives are denominated:

(a) *As to number*; a multiple to a sub multiple, the excess to the exceeded, the divisible to the divided.

One is the first principle and the measure of number: *i.e.*, six is six times one, rather than thrice two.

(b) *As the Active and Passive*:

Things active and passive subsist according to potentiality, hence things denominated relatives according to number and potentiality, are so called because each derives that which it is from the other, and not because something else is denominated with reference to it.

(c) *As the Measurable to the Measure :*

The object of scientific knowledge to science, and the sensible to sense.

“The measurable, and that which may be scientifically known, and that which is an object of the intellect, are styled relatives on account of something else being denominated in respect of them” (cf. p. 80). It is the investigation of the nature of this relation of the objective to the subjective, which was so closely followed by the Scholastics and eventually gave rise to Kant’s system. It is therefore fitting to set out the exact words of Aristotle with reference to this matter : he says “for also being an object of the intellect, signifies that the intellect is exercised about this ; the intellect, however, does not subsist in relation to that about which the intellect is conversant, for the same thing doubtless would be said twice. In like manner also the power of sight (visibility) is that of something and not of him to whom the sight belongs. This, however, is a true statement, but it is in relation to colour or something else of this kind : yet in that way, the same thing would be expressed twice : I mean that sight is the sight of him, of whom it is the sight.”

Such is the passage containing Aristotle’s view. It is not necessary, in this history of the Schoolmen, to introduce a lengthy comment on this passage, but it is set out here for reference, when the works of the Schoolmen themselves may render it opportune.

16. Perfect τὸ τέλειον.

That beyond which it is not possible to assume anything, or anyone single portion.

Virtue is a certain perfection, for each thing is then perfect, and every substance is then perfect, when in accordance with the species of its proper excellence or virtue no portion of the natural magnitude is deficient (cf. Ethics, p. 91).

17. Termination or Boundary πέρασ.

The last of each thing, beyond which, as first, it is not possible to assume anything, and within which, as first, are comprised all things, and which is the end of everything.

Generally, that towards which motion tends, and not that from which it originates, but not always. It sometimes means the sake, for which other things operate, and the substance, essence, and formal cause of each.

In this sense, every first principle is a termination, but not every termination is a first principle.

18. "The according to which" τὸ καθ' ὃ.

Sometimes indicates substance; sometimes form; sometimes cause.

"That according to itself," τὸ καθ' αὐτο indicates the essential in varying ways."

19. Disposition διαθέσις.

An arrangement of that which has parts, either according to place, or potentiality, or according to species.

20. Habit ἕξις.

(a) Energy of the possessor and the possessed.

(b) Disposition, according to which, that which is disposed, is disposed well or ill, *e.g.*, health.

(c) A portion of such disposition, *e.g.*, virtue of the parts is a certain habit.

21. Passion πάθος.

(a) Quality according to which a thing admits of alteration, *e.g.*, black and white, sweet and bitter.

(b) Energies and alterations of such.

(c) Noxious alterations and motions, particularly those that are painful, *e.g.*, crushing burdens of misfortunes, things fraught with suffering.

22. Privation στέρησις.

(a) Where a thing is not adapted by nature to possess something possessible, *e.g.*, a plant is deprived of eyes.

(b) Where a thing is by nature fitted for possession of something and yet has not got it, *e.g.*, blind man deprived of sight; a mole.

(c) The violent removal of a thing.

(d) As negation, *e.g.*, unequal, deprived of equality.

(e) In the non-possession of a thing in every way, *e.g.*, one-eyed. "Wherefore not every man is good or evil or just and unjust; but also there are shades of character intermediate between these."

23. Possession ἔχειν.

(a) The action of a thing, according to the nature of that thing, or its impulse, *e.g.*, fever,

- (b) In whatever anything is inherent as being receptive, *e.g.*, brass possesses the form of a statue: body, disease.
- (c) That which embraces the things that are comprised, *e.g.*, city, inhabitants; ships, sailors.
- (d) That which hinders, in accordance with its own force, anything from motion or action, *e.g.*, pillars possess super incumbent weights; Atlas the heavens; (cf., our military phrase "contain.")
24. Procession τὸ εἶναι ἐκ τινός.
- (a) The being "from," *e.g.*, statue from brass.
- (b) From whence it springs, *e.g.*, fight from invective.
- (c) Part from composite, *e.g.*, a verse from the Iliad.
- (d) In a derived sense, "of following"; night from day; storm from calm; voyage from the equinox.
25. Part μέρος.
- (a) That into which any quantity is divisible.
- (b) Division without quantity, *e.g.*, species as part of genus.
- (c) Those things which are contained in the definitions, parts of the whole, *e.g.*, leg of man.
26. Whole ὅλος.
- (a) That from which no part is absent.
- (b) That which contains the thing contained, so that they form a certain thing; where each may be one, but one thing arise from these.
- All* is used of such quantities where position causes no difference, otherwise the whole.
27. Mutilation κολοβός.
- In respect of the whole losing a part, the substance of the whole must remain, *e.g.*, a mutilated goblet, the goblet must still exist.
- Number cannot be mutilated, nor anything in which the position of the part makes no difference, *e.g.*, water.
28. Genus γένος.
- (a) Continuous generation that possesses the same species.
- (b) First disposing cause of existence, *e.g.*, Ellenes from Helen: Ionians from Ion.
- (c) Subject in the differences.

- (d) That which first is inherent in definitions, which is predicated in the case of the essence of a thing, the differences of which are called qualities.

In Book IX, 7, it is stated, things contained in the same genus must be compounded of things incomposite in that genus, or they must be of incomposite natures.

29. The False *ψευδός*.

- (a) Impossibility of its being in a state of composition, *e.g.*, commensuration of the diameter.
- (b) Fact of its not being composed, *e.g.*, being in a sitting posture (when standing).
- (c) That which appears, not such as it is, or what it is not.

Things are termed false in respect of themselves, 'not being' (*μη ὄν*); or in respect of the impression that is conveyed from them being that of a nonentity. "A false man is one, who is ready and disposed to admit false assertions of such a sort, not on account of anything that is different, but on account of their being false, and who, in the case of others, is the cause of the adoption of such false assertions; also those things are false which create a false impression."

30. Accident *συμβεβηκός*.

- (a) That which is inherent in something and which it is true to affirm is so, yet not necessarily or for the most part, *e.g.*, to find treasure when cultivating a field. Something which has a subsistence in something, both in a certain time and place, without any reference to, why it was this particular thing, or either now, or here, will be an accident. The cause of the accident is casual, or ordinary, that is indefinite.
- (b) Whatsoever things are inherent in each thing essentially and yet are not contained in the substance of that thing. Such should be eternal, *e.g.*, a triangle to have angles equal to two right angles.

The speculative sciences may be divided into three classes, according to the genus of entity with which they have to deal. Physics, is only concerned with those entities in which are contained in themselves the first principles of motion and rest, and with inseparable substances. Mathematics, deal with entities, which are immovable, but are not separable, though they subsist in matter. Theology, deals with things both immovable (eternal)

and of separate subsistence. Now, *Metaphysics*, deals with all entities, *qua entities*, and in this way will subsist universally and it is its province to enquire respecting entity in general and respecting quiddity or the nature of a thing, and respecting those things that are universally inherent in it.

From the nature of the case, there is no science of accidents, for its cause is not operating always, or for the most part, and therefore no notice is taken of entity according to accident. Plato, is approved of, in making out that the science of the Sophists is nothing but a science of accidents (cf. p. 78).⁷

Aristotle now proceeds to consider entity, τὸ ὄν according to the logical arrangement of the ten Categories or Predicaments, the first of which is οὐσίαι or Substance. One signification of entity is τὸ τί ἐστίν, what a thing is, or quiddity. Now, none of the other predicaments is capable of subsisting essentially, or being separated from substance, e.g., qualities, passions, etc., wherefore, that which is primary entity and not any particular entity, but entity simply and absolutely, will constitute substance.

Substance is generally denominated in four ways, viz. : the essence or formal cause, the universal, the genus and the subject :⁸ the universal and genus are rejected by Aristotle.

I. *The Subject* is that, of which things are predicated, but which is not predicated of other things and substance is especially the primary subject. Now the subject or substance is in one way matter in a condition of actuality, in another form, in another a compound of the two, e.g., in the case of a brazen statue the subject or substance is matter, brass ; is form, statue ; is a compound, a brazen statue.

According to one view, matter is undoubtedly substance, for in it all else inheres, and without it nothing is left ; by matter here is indicated the " being " not even the quiddity. But both a capability of separation in its subsistence, and the subsisting as a particular thing, seem to inhere in substance, so that form, and that which is composed of both, would appear to be substance.

(The modern objection, to this distinction between matter and form, is that here, matter is supposed only to exist as a possibility, before it received its form, which arose from a confusion of the non-specified with the non-existent.)

II. *The Essence or Formal Cause* τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. After a long and subtle discourse, Aristotle comes to the conclusion that the essence or very nature of a thing is inherent primarily and simply in substance, though it may belong to other things, but not

⁸ VI. 3.

primarily. He gives us an example, that a name may imply a definition, yet a discourse about the name, is not necessarily a definition. Further, it is the same in the case of any things multifariously expressed by connection as one thing. But here unity is expressed in as many ways as entity and entity partly signifies this particular thing and partly quantity and partly quality.

A definition then, is a discourse or description of the essence of the nature of a thing, but the essence or formal principle, belongs to the substance only, or at any rate primarily and simply. That the essence and very nature of a thing is the same as each individual thing, Aristotle proves by an argument *ad absurdum*, but this does not hold good of a thing predicated according to accident.

Of things Generated some are produced by Nature, others by Art, other by Chance (see cf. Ethics 92 "and Necessity"). "All things that are produced, are produced by means of something and from something and become something."¹⁰

In cases of Generation by Nature, that is, the physical and natural ones, the generation is from Nature, and they are generated from matter, and the means is something, which has subsistence in Nature, *e.g.*, a man or a plant.

Those generated by Art the form *εἶδος* is in the soul and the thing produced is called an operation, *e.g.*, when a house is built, the form is first in the mind of the builder; such form is the essence or very nature or substance of the house. In a way, a house may be said to be constructed from a house, the first house did not involve matter, and is the thought or conception in the mind of the builder, yet this is the first principle and form, which when applied to matter by the operation of building, produces the the house, which is constructed: likewise, the stones, which are used in and become part of the house are the media. So that it is clear that in every case production cannot take place if nothing pre-exists. That which is produced, is not called that from which it is formed, *e.g.*, a statue is not called a stone, but of stone; and a house, not bricks, but of bricks; because whatever is produced from anything must be changed from that from which it is produced.

So then it is obvious, that it is not the form itself of the house, which is produced, for that is in the mind of the builder, but rather the house, which is the result of the operation of the builder, applying that form to the materials. Hence it is correctly stated that forms are *never generated*.¹¹

In the case, however, of production by Nature, the form of the generator is the form of that which is produced, *e.g.*, man begets

¹⁰ VI, 7.

¹¹ VI, 8, 15.

man. The generator himself, is the cause of the subsistence of his own form in other matter.

From this the peculiarity of substance is to be noted, that there must always pre-exist a different substance which produces, but this is not necessary in the case of quality or quantity, unless in potentiality merely.

The question is next raised as to whether the definition of the parts should be inherent in the definition of the whole.

In some cases it is required, but not in others, a careful examination however reveals the fact that, in the one case, the formal or logical parts are involved, and in the other, material parts.

Now the formal parts are in logic antecedent to the whole, whereas in material usage the whole is antecedent to the parts, and therefore they are not referred to in the definitions.

As to the definition of the whole, whether regard is had to the distinction of genus and difference or otherwise, yet in spite of its possible manifold qualities, the unity of the subject of those qualities, is capable of definition.

III. *Universals*, as to these, Aristotle is quite clear, that they never are Substances, since they are predicated of many and not one thing only (cf. p. 79).

As he has shown forms, themselves, are not generated, but the substance which arises from the conjunction of form and matter is generated, and is corruptible, so that there is no definition of a singular sensible substance, nor for similar reasons of Platonic Ideas. Many things which are thought to be substances, are mere capacities, but they are all mere matter, *e.g.*, earth, fire and air.

Neither entity nor unity are ever themselves substances, so that he argues that Unity cannot be a form of many things, as alleged by the Platonists who, however, he alleges, mix up things corruptible and incorruptible in the same species : but, he adds, "whether we observe eternal objects or not makes no difference to their existence."¹²

Substance, then, is a first principle and a cause, and assuming that a thing is as it appears to our senses, the thing to do is, to accept the fact and not argue about that, but seek the cause of its existence.

From a logical aspect then, τὸ τε ἦν εἶναι or formal cause may be said to be substance and is the principle to be found in definition. Leaving aside other substances for the time being, it results that the substance of sensible things in one way is matter, in another energy and form, and in a third the composition of both, *e.g.*, the Substance of a house may be regarded as matter, the bricks and

stones ; as energy and form, the design and construction ; and as composition of the two, the completed building.

The name attached to a thing may sometimes indicate the energy, or form, or else the material ; a house may indicate a building of various materials put together in a way common to all houses, or it may be regarded as a shelter of some sort which all houses are. Though the same matter be as a first principle of all things generated, yet different material substances may have their own particular matter, as it is necessary to mention the most immediate or proximate cause, *e.g.*, a saw cannot be made of wool, but of stone or metal. That man as a two-footed animal does not involve a plurality of definition is clear when the difference between energy and capacity is considered, and immateriality is ample justification for unity of definition.¹³

Having dealt with substance, which is primarily entity, to which all the other Categories or Predicaments refer, Aristotle now goes on to consider Potentiality or capacity and Actuality.

Potentialities are predicated to one primary potentiality, which is the first principle of change in another body, in so far as it is another body ; that is, something else. Potentiality may be either of action, as a house builder, or of passion that is passiveness, as fat which is combustible. Potentialities being inherent partly in animals and partly in inanimate things, are some, accompanied by reason or rational, and some, devoid, of reason ; the former may produce contraries, but the latter have but one result, 'as that which is hot is capable of producing heat only, but the medical art both health and disease. Further, where reason is concerned it is not essential that attempts should be completely successful.

Potentiality is not the same as energy, as the Megaric School and also Protagoras sought to make out, for a builder does not cease to be possessed of his art just because he happens not to be building, nor a man cease to see because he is not looking. Further, a thing can be capable of " being " and yet not be capable of " not being," but yet exist.

A thing is potential, in which, when the energy is present of which it has the capacity, there will not be anything which is devoid of capacity.

It may be observed that Aristotle's subjective theories of Form and Potentiality are treated objectively in much the same manner as Plato's theory of Ideas, which he is for ever endeavouring to confute.

Energy is combined with actuality, and motion constitutes the energy of a thing to a large extent. Energy is either a transition towards an end, in which case it is motion itself, or, when it has

¹³ VII, 6.

reached its end, it is viewed with respect to the motion which effected such end¹⁴ (cf. p. 79).

Potentiality is not a necessary condition to energy.

With regard to rational potentialities, it requires an exercise of propension or free will to bring them into action.

A thing subsists in energy, as a builder stands in relation to what is being built, or the wakeful to the sleeper, or that which has been wrought by art to the unwrought.

Some things subsist in energy, by analogy as this thing in this, and some relatively to this ; for some are as motion to potentiality, and some as substance to matter.

But the infinite and void subsist both in potentiality and energy in another manner.

Energy is distinct from motion, as continuing after the end is arrived at, as there is energy both in the building of a house and a house when it is built : but motion only in the building.

Where potentiality is the first principle, which is the originator of motion and rest, energy is prior to it both in definition and substance and in some cases time.

For one skilled in building has the capacity of building, therefore the definition and knowledge of the energy "building" must needs pre-exist the definition and knowledge of the capacity.

Now in the case of a particular man, or corn, or horse, existing at present in energy, prior in time are the matter and seed which constitute the man, corn, or horse. Prior, however, to these again, are those which exist in energy, from which they have been generated.

Energy is prior to capacity in substance, for those that are subsequent in generation are prior in form and substance ; as a man to a child and human beings to seed, for one possesses the form and the other does not. Again, everything that is being produced, advances towards an end, but energy is an end, and on account of this is potentiality assumed ; for animals do not seem to have the power of vision, but have the power of vision to see, "matter exists in potentiality, because it may advance onward to form, but when, at least, it subsists in energy, then doth it subsist in form."

Further, things that are eternal are prior in substance to that which is perishable, yet nothing subsisting in potentiality is everlasting. For every potentiality admits of its contradiction, hence, it admits of "being" and "non being" which is subject to decay.

Eternal motion must exist in energy and cannot possibly exist in capacity.

Wherefore, the sun and stars and firmament perpetually energize and there is no fear of their coming to a standstill.

Though contrary potentialities may exist at the same time, contrary energies cannot, for it is impossible to be ill and well at the same time.

Energy is the more excellent, as whichever of contraries is energized, it must be for the Good.¹⁵

But there is a necessity that as regards that which is bad, the end and energy should be worse than the potentiality.

Aristotle, however, lays it down that "there is no evil, which is independent of things themselves, for that which is evil is by the constitution of Nature subsequent to potentiality. Accordingly, neither in those things which subsist from a first principle and those that are everlasting existences is there anything that is evil or anything in the shape of imperfection or ought that has actually been reduced to decay; for a tendency towards decay or corruption belongs to things that are evil." Mathematical figures are discovered existing in energy, for the understanding constitutes energy wherefore from energy springs potentiality.

With regard to potentiality, an assertion about its existence may be true or false, but about energy there can be no mistake, as there is no call for the exercise of the mind as to its reality or unreality. A denial can only be made through ignorance.¹⁶

Returning to the subject of Unity after re-enunciating the definition of τὸ εἷν given in the *Book of Definitions*, Aristotle proceeds to give his proof that Unity is not the very substance of a thing. He refers to the proofs that Universals are never substances.

Unity is opposed to Plurality, in that the former is indivisible, or has not been divided, and the latter is divisible or has been divided.

The concomitants of Unity are sameness, similarity, and equality: and those of Plurality are dissimilarity, diversity, and difference, examples being given as in the *Book of Definitions*.

From a consideration of this he goes on to consider Contraries, that they are the greatest difference possible, from which, he deduces the impossibility of one thing involving more than one contrary, because there cannot be anything beyond the extreme.

(Here it may be noted that Aristotle's theory of Contraries, based on his Logic, produced his theory of Privation, in order to account for existence; since, though both contraries are inherent in every Form they cannot both exist at the same moment.)

The chief Contrary consists in Habit and Privation but every privation is not a contrary, for a privation admits of being subject to a privation in more ways than one, which a contrary does not.

¹⁵ VIII, 8.

¹⁶ VIII, 10.

Contraries are not contradictions, for there may be an intermediate between the former but not of the latter.

Similarly, the equal is not a contrary of the great or of the small, but seems to be a Medium, which a contrary never is.

With regard to the opposition of Unity to Plurality, whilst the one is indivisible and the other is divisible, they are not contraries, but in the state of relation of the measure to the thing measured.¹⁷

(At this point, according to Ludwig Fischer, Aristotle nearly succeeded in ascertaining the interdependence of the One and the Many and that the Whole is Unity in Opposition but was prevented by his definition of Substance.)

With regard to the media between contraries it is necessary that they should derive their being from the contraries and should be of the same genus, *e.g.*, the notes of a musical scale are compounded of the extremes, which are here called, the hypate and the nete, the lowest and the highest chords of a five-stringed instrument.

Diversity of species appertains to the contrary, for they are in the same genus.

But contraries may belong to the same species, as male and female, because some things are proper affections of the genus and some less so; one is form and the other matter; contraries contained in form create a difference of species, but as many as reside in form, when assumed with matter, do not give rise to a specific difference.

Thus according to Aristotle the difference of species of the same genus is due to form and the individuality of the members of the same species is due to matter.

He thence deduces the fact that corruptible and incorruptible natures are of a different genus and therefore in opposition. He advances this objection to the Idea theory, that there would have, in the case of man, to be a corruptible and an incorruptible form, although forms are said to be the same in species with certain particulars and not equivocal in respect of them.

Now metaphysics is concerned with entity in its entirety and not with the various individual ways in which it is predicated.

The individual ways are each predicated of some passion, habit, or motion of entity and, so far as they are predicated in common with any one topic, are the subject matter of a special science; which, however, takes for granted the mode in which the nature of things subsists in each genus.¹⁸

With regard to mathematics, which limits its enquiries into matters of quantity and continuity, in one, two, or three dimensions of entity; also physics which is conversant with the accidents

¹⁷ IX, 6.

¹⁸ X, 7.

or first principles of entity, so far as they are in motion, metaphysics is conversant with these as far as the subject of entities, but not so far as they are anything different or individual.

This brings up again the subject of the Sceptics like Heraclitus, who denied primary axioms or truths such as "a thing cannot be and not be in one and the same period of time"; or like Protagoras who asserted that "man is the measure of all things"; or Anaxagoras who said, "in every thing is contained a part of every thing."¹⁹

As distinguished from physics in which the entity is of necessity in motion, metaphysics covers the case of an entity in a state of separable subsistence, but at the same time immovable, this last case would include theology. So that there are three classes of speculative science of entities—physics as to entities in motion—mathematics as to entities not separable but immovable—theology as to entities separable and immovable; yet metaphysics is the universal science of entities (cf. p. 71).

There is no science of accidents for it is not definite and the causes are inordinate and infinite, whilst entity is always or for the most part something. In any case, nothing which subsists according to action is antecedent to those things, which possess an essential subsistence, nor are causes, so that in any case of Chance "prior as a cause will be Mind and Nature."

The entity is entirely passive, which is contained in the comprehension of the intellect, in respect of Truth and Falsehood; and it is not therefore a possible object of the science of metaphysics.²⁰

In so far as things are generated according to action it is chance which is the cause; further, chance is a cause according to accidents, in those things that are being generated in accordance with free will, for the sake of some thing. Wherefore chance and intellect are conversant about the same object, for free will is not devoid of a connection with intellect.²¹

(Comparison may well be made with Eddington's remarks about chance in *Nature of the Physical World*.)

Motion does not subsist apart from things themselves and is no doubt of as many varieties as there are things, but the chief division of entity in connection with motion is according to Potentiality or Actuality.

Whilst, no doubt motion is a certain energy, Aristotle defines that motion which exists in Potentiality as Energy; also that ἐντελέχεια or Actuality belonging to that which subsists in capacity, when subsisting in actuality it energizes either as that which it is or something else that is movable, he defines as motion. For example in the building of a house, the energy lies in the

¹⁹ X, 6.

²⁰ V, 3; VIII, 10; X, 8.

²¹ X, 8.

plans and in the material, but as it is built, it is in motion that the energy is put into practice; the energy emerges into the *ἐντελέχεια* (cf. p. 75).

With regard to the Infinite, Aristotle defines it negatively as impermeable by nature. Possibly it constitutes an entity, and involves a separate subsistence, not cognizable by sense, having neither magnitude nor plurality.

If the Infinite be a substance and not an accident of a substance, it is indivisible, yet a thing is infinite by addition or subtraction or both. He is clear that it cannot subsist in energy, for the being of the infinite, and a thing which is infinite are the same. He declines to accept the view of the philosophers, that it is a simple body consisting of fire or any other of the elements²² nor that it amounts to unity. It has no motion and no place. It is not the same in magnitude, motion, or duration, as if of a single nature.

Time is only computed in consideration of motion.

From the consideration of the unchangeable Infinite, Aristotle goes back to the consideration of Change and Motion. Change can take place in three ways; from a subject into a subject, from a subject into a non-subject, and from a non-subject into a subject; the last two being tantamount to corruption and generation. On the ground that corruption is contrary to generation, and motion is contrary to rest, Aristotle is led to rule out corruption and generation as constituting motion; and limits motion to change from subject to subject. But he goes on to add that subjects are either contraries, or media, and privation as a thing that is contrary.

Motion subsists according to quality, quantity, and place, this he proves by the absurdity of an infinite progression of causes, were there to be allowed any consideration of a motion *ad infinitum*.

If the Universe be considered as one Whole, then substance constitutes the earliest portion; or if things exist in a sequence, then substance is first, followed by quantity and then quality, not indeed regarding these as entities, but referring to them in the same way as we speak of the "not whole," the "not straight" or the "not white." We may say that all these have an existence, yet substance alone has a separable existence. The Platonists, who made out universals and genera to be substances are wrong. He claims the support of the ancient philosophers, who only regarded singulars as substances, but never a common body (*i.e.*, a universal) as such (cf. p. 73).

There are three kinds of substances. That cognizable by sense, which is Eternal, *e.g.*, the Sun; that cognizable by sense, which is corruptible, *e.g.*, animals; that which is immovable, such have

²² Aristotle thought all metals could be analysed into water (Plotinus).

no first principles in common with others. Some say that mathematical entities and ideas consist of this kind.

Now things cognizable by the Senses are subject to change, which takes place from contraries and media (not from opposites, for there is no change between voice and colour) and this involves something capable of undergoing a change which is matter.

So that there are three causes; Contrariety, Privation, and Matter; and there are four kinds of Change:—

1. According to quiddity as generation and corruption.
2. According to quantity as increase and decrease.
3. According to quality as alteration.
4. According to place as motion.

Further, as entity is twofold in capacity and energy, a change takes place whenever there is a transition from one to the other.

Now neither matter nor form are generated.

In every change something is changed into something by something.

The imparter of Motion is either Art, Nature, or Chance.

The thing changed is matter, and that into which it is changed is form.

The motive or efficient causes have been previously generated, but the formal cause is simultaneously generated with the result.

From a lengthy consideration Aristotle arrives at the conclusion that the first principles or elements of substances and relatives and qualities are different: though by analogy they are the same because "where there is matter, form, privation, and that which imparts motion, in that way the causes of substances are the causes of all things, for if the substance be destroyed there is nothing left."

At the same time, there is no separate existence of a universal cause; for singulars constitute a first principle of singulars, as man is the principle of universal man, who, however, does not exist as the Platonists alleged.

In short the argument tends to show, that in cases which are not merely material, but involve the mind, there is introduced an additional motive principle: this accounts for the fourfold division of Causes but threefold division of Elements.²³

There remains then the question of substances which are immovable.

As he had shown in his argument against Heraclitus and Cratylus, whatever is produced must be produced from something and so *ad infinitum*, hence in order that motion may ever be generated, it must have its origin in that which is immovable: the same is

²³ XI, 4-5.

the case with time, which is either the same as motion or a passive condition of motion. But there is not any motion that is continuous, save that which is local or topical and that is continuous.

From this, he argues, that such immovable substance must not only be eternal, but that it must not be material, but rather subsist in energy.

It must be immaterial, as otherwise it would exist in potentiality, in which case potentiality would be antecedent to energy, which has been proved to be impossible (cf. p 75).

In this doctrine he differs on the one hand from the Theologians, who were for generating all things from Night, or the Natural Philosophers, who said all things subsist simultaneously (cf. p. 31) because there is nothing in such a case to put matter into motion. On the other hand he differs from Leucippus and Plato who maintain the dogma of perpetual motion (cf. p. 38) because there must be something in subsistence, as a thing is moved by Nature or by Mind or by something else. Anaxagoras and others also agreed with the doctrine that Energy is antecedent to Potentiality.

Therefore there is something, which not having motion impressed upon it, yet imparts motion, and it is eternal, being both substance and energy. As an explanation, he instances that which is desirable or which is intelligible, which imparts motion without being moved themselves.

Now as to the final cause, that which imparts motion does so of a thing that is loved, and that must be imparted by the immovable First Cause.

This First Cause, then, must constitute an Entity and subsist in an excellent manner.

What is necessary, subsists either by violence, as contrary to free will ; or as that which does not subsist in an excellent manner ; or as that which could not be otherwise from what it is, but involves an absolute subsistence. " From a first principle of this kind, I mean one that is involved in the assumption of a First Mover, hath depended the Heaven and Nature."

He goes on to depict the course of life of this First Mover, by analogy with our own. To begin with there is the continuous enjoyment of life for ever, then energy or activity itself gives rise to pleasure or satisfaction, also vigilant exercise of the senses and perception in general, together with hope and recollection must also produce pleasure or satisfaction as it does for us.

" The most essential perception is the most excellent, now the mind is cognizant of itself by participation in that which falls within the province of the mind as its object, for it becomes an object of perception by contact and by an act of intellectual

apprehension. So that the mind and that which is an object of perception of the mind are the same (*νόησις νόησεως* thought of thought); for that which is receptive of impression from what is an object of perception and is substance constitutes mind, and when in possession of these impressions it energizes or subsists in a condition of activity." But this seems to be a Divine prerogative and therefore it may be attributed to God. Aristotle adds that Contemplation constitutes what is most agreeable and excellent (cf. *Ethics*, p. 101).

He summarizes the foregoing, that the principle of life is inherent in the Deity, for energy or active exercise of Mind constitutes life, and God constitutes this energy, and essential energy belongs to God as his best and Everlasting Life. The Deity is an animal that is everlasting and most excellent in nature, so that life and duration are uninterrupted and eternal: for this constitutes the essence of God. He dismisses the doctrines of Pythagoras and Speusippus, which rather suggest evolution of the perfect form from the seed, and lays it down that there exists an Eternal Immovable Subsistence, indivisible and without, rather than of infinite, Magnitude.²⁴

From this, Aristotle goes on to consider the other everlasting motions and substances of the Universe and stars, all of which are derived from the First Cause; he quotes the opinions of the astronomers Eudoxus and Callippus in support of his statement, which involves orbital motion in 55 or 47 spheres. "The traditions have come down in the form of a Myth, in a fabulous garb for the purpose of winning the multitude and enforcing the utility that is urged in favour of the laws and general expediency."²⁵

It was, however, quite correct, in his opinion, to assert that these first substances had been made after a divine manner and as such were gods.

Mind being regarded as the most divine phenomena, Aristotle proceeds to consider its nature, and arrives at the conclusion, that inasmuch as understanding is not different from the object of the understanding, in such cases as do not involve matter, the act of perception by the mind is identical with the object of perception, but he leaves the question as to where the object of perception is of a composite nature unanswered; though he suggests, that which is most excellent subsists in a thing, viewed as a certain entirety, being something different from itself. "And therefore the first actual perception by mind of Mind itself doth subsist in this way throughout all eternity"; exactly how this answers his question he leaves unexplained.

In what way the entire creation involves what is Good *τὸ ἀγαθόν*

²⁴ XI, 7.

²⁵ XI, 8.

and whether there is a good which subsists essentially, or whether there is an existence of order or both, Aristotle seeks to explain by comparison with an Army. There, the good condition of the army depends upon the order that is enforced, and the commander, who promotes this obedience, may be regarded as a cause of the excellent condition. All things are co-ordinated according to some mode, but not a similar mode, for these vary in different classifications, *e.g.*, those of birds, or animals, or plants.

“And as in a household, though the free can do what they like, most things are reduced to an orderly arrangement, so too, slaves and wild beasts, who are only indued with a small desire to contribute to the general advantage, are all placed in some condition and are distinguished accordingly; but all participate in some way for the constitution or preservation of the entire.”

Some philosophers insist that all things are produced from contraries, but contraries are mutually impassive, so Aristotle introduces a third, nature. Some make one of the contraries matter, or odd, or plurality, but matter which is one, is not contrary to anything.

All things, except unity, participate in the worthless, for evil constitutes one of the elements.

Some say that neither good nor evil are first principles, but though it is quite clear that good is a first principle, they do not say whether it is an end, moving cause, or formal principle.

He disagrees with Empedocles' theory of Harmony and with Anaxagoras for not having a contrary to Good as well as to Mind.

They do not declare why some things are corruptible and others incorruptible, or why generation is produced. Some produce entities from nonentities, others make all things to be one like Parmenides. The Platonists do not show why matter participates in Ideas. But Aristotle produces his Primary, which does not involve a contrary; for contraries involve matter and subsist in capacity (*cf.* p. 86). So that $\epsilon\lambda\eta$ matter is alone the source of evil. “If nothing existed beyond that cognizant to the senses, there would be no first principle, order, or generation, and the celestial bodies would have no existence; but there is always a first principle of a principle in all systems of the Theologians and Natural Philosophers.”

Having disposed of the Platonic and Pythagorean systems, which would have introduced many principles, he ends up with a quotation from Homer saying, Entities do not choose to submit to injudicious government, “the government of many is not a good thing—let there be one ruler.”²⁶

Having dealt with the different kinds of substance mentioned

²⁶ Homer's *Iliad*, II, 204.

on page 79, Aristotle goes back to deal with the question of whether mathematical entities and numbers subsist as in immovable substances, which was alleged by the Pythagoreans; and then deals with the theory of ideals as alleged by the Platonists. He elaborates his previous argument against the Pythagoreans alluded to on pp. 61 and 82 maintaining that mathematical entities do not reside in Sensibles, to do so would admit of their being two bodies in the same place at once; and also the impossibility of the divisibility of mathematical "body" or its separability from Sensibles, which would involve a multiplication of forms of surfaces, lines, and points making at least four classifications of lines and five ranks of points.

Further, some things are described by the mathematicians as universal, but Aristotle maintains that this would involve their being antecedent to magnitude, to which indeed they are subsequent.

And as he points out that granting mathematical natures to be antecedent to sensibles, it does not follow that they are prior in substance.

Things, that are prior in substance, are transcendent in essence, and things, that are prior in definition, are not necessarily prior in substance.

Definition and demonstration undoubtedly exist concerning magnitude, but not concerning numbers; just in the same way with regard to things in motion, the definition and demonstration is about the things that happen to be moved.

He suggests that surfaces, with which mathematics are conversant, are mere accidents and not things separable, in the same way as animals are male and female, without male and female involving any separate subsistence from animals; and he gives examples from geometry, optics and mechanics. In short he suggests that the separability of mathematical natures is purely mental. At the same time, as against those Sophists like Aristippus,²⁷ he upholds mathematics as being conversant with the "Good" and instances the importance of Order and Symmetry demonstrated by them.

He then once more tackles the Platonic theory of Ideas.

He again shows how the Platonic theory of Ideas arose out of the theory of Heraclitus that all sensible entities are in a state of flux, and that since science must be conversant about things in a state of permanency, if about anything, there must exist, though not cognizant to the senses, a science of things which are not in a state of flux. Though Democritus, he states, only concerned himself with physical research, Socrates had formed a system of moral

²⁷ XII, 2.

virtues and instituted a universal investigation of them, at the same time he had investigated quiddity, or what a thing is, and aimed to form syllogism ; and quiddity as we know is the first principle of syllogisms. To Socrates he ascribes, the first employment of the inductive argument, and the definition of the universal. Socrates did not constitute universals nor definitions as things involving a separate subsistence, it was other philosophers (meaning Plato), who invested them with a separate subsistence and denominated them as the Ideas of Entities.

He then repeats the objections which have been previously mentioned on pp. 59 and 60 and ends up by adducing the argument that though forms are said in the *Phaedo*²⁸ to be the causes of both existence and generation, yet they are not produced unless there is another cause which is efficient ; also that different things are generated as a house or a ring of which they do not say that there are forms at all.

Going back to the question of numbers again, as to whether these form separable substances and as to the forms or ideas of such : first with regard to formal numbers some consider their attributes primary and some consequent, *e.g.*, Genus and species ; according to the former no monad is comparable with another, according to others the monads in a duad or triad are comparable *inter se* only.

He goes on to instance many different deductions and conclusions arrived at by the followers of Pythagoras, Xenocrates, and Plato involving the magnitude of a monad and the like, and ends up by saying all these assertions are to be sure impossible but perhaps one more than another.

This for us may be considered quite sufficient, but he continues to deal with these questions in further detail.

He alleges, that if monads be comparable, ideas will not be numbers ; and if they are not numbers they cannot exist. If monads are incomparable, mathematical number must be ignored, but such mutual difference is absurd, yet the ideas would be numbers. Those who allege that mathematical numbers are the same as ideal numbers, merely double their errors. Though the Pythagoreans do not allege that numbers subsist as a separable substance, yet to say, that bodies are compounded out of mathematical numbers is impossible. This is shown by the difficulties with regard to the magnitude of a monad, the extent of finite number, and the impossibility of Unity being a first principle.

Aristotle in such manner, arrives at the definite conclusion that it is impossible for numbers and magnitude to possess a separable subsistence. But at the same time, he acknowledges that, Plato at any rate is the more correct of those who hold conflicting views,

²⁸ *Phaedo*, 113.

in that he distinguished between formal and mathematical numbers.

In conclusion, as all scientific knowledge is about universals he gets over the difficulty of the deduction that the first principles of entities should therefore be universals and not separate substances, by explaining that, scientific knowledge and also the act of scientific cognition is twofold, of which one subsists in capacity and the other in energy.

The capacity belongs to the universal and is indefinite, but the energy being definite belongs to a definite thing, he instances as an example how the power of vision beholds universal colour because the particular colour as a whole is a colour.²⁹

All philosophers agree in constituting first principles as contraries (cf. p. 83) and this also applies to things that are immovable.

If it is not admissible that there should be anything prior to the first principle of all things, that is without admitting Aristotle's Primary form mentioned on p. 83, a whole series of impossibilities and doubts would arise. For instance, it would be impossible that the principle should be the first principle which must be generated from a contrary : nor could one of the contraries be such. Some, however, make one of the contraries matter, others contrast the unequal to unity or plurality to unity. Others generate numbers from the unequal duads, the great and the small, to all of which he advances strenuous opposition.

He goes on to prove that as to things that are eternal there are not any elements of any eternal substance from which, as inherent, such substance is composed ; and disposes of the theory that the indefinite duad together with unity constitute such elements.

A dilemma is reached if such elements be conceded, that either all things are one or that the *non-ens* is invested with all the opposite attributes, which could arise through the *ens* signifying at one time, a thing which constitutes substance, at another quantity, and another quality, etc. Moreover the eternal does not admit of non-existence.

Likewise the futile questions arise how the entity, which constitutes the nature of some particular thing, is plural, or how relatives are plural and not singular, and so through the other categories.

"Therefore all these consequences are irrational and are at variance with themselves. They appear with respect to these elements, the great and the small to bawl out, as if they were being dragged away by violence for by no means are they able to generate number without doubling that which proceeds from

unity. It is absurd to introduce generation in the case of entities that are eternal."³⁰

As has already been shown, Aristotle ascribes evil to matter alone (cf. pp. 76, 83), he now considered the question as to whether τὸ ἀγαθόν the Good was without generation, or whether it was of subsequent growth, in fact whether it was the product of evolution ; he is clearly of the opinion that the Good is no mere product of growth.

The way in which he puts the question is as to whether the good and fair are elements and first principles, or of subsequent growth, arising out of the principle of progression found in the nature of entities. The difficulty of a solution in the latter alternative, lies in the fact that it leads to the theory that unity constitutes a first principle of things. But that is not the real difficulty, but the fact they made unity a first principle, and a first principle as an element, and number as consisting from unity. He quotes the ancient philosophers like Pherecydes and the Magi and the Sophoi, like Empedocles and Anaxagoras, as all having maintained the antecedents of τὸ ἀγαθόν. He clearly relates that "the original attribute, which is found in the original, and eternal, and most self-sufficient for its own subsistence and conversation of itself, constitutes the Good. Not on account of anything else, is it incorruptible or sufficient to itself, but on account of its existence or condition of subsistence after an excellent mode." Thus the Good exists as a first principle.

He lays it down that for this to be unity, or both an element, and an element of numbers, is impossible. This he proceeds to show, by proving that all monads, and animals, and plants, and their participants, would be good ; and great and small, would amount to an evil, and according to some plurality, and to others the unequal would be evil. Further evil would constitute good itself in potentiality. All these absurdities arise from a combination of the following false theories :

- (a) Every first principle is an element.
- (b) Contraries are first principles.
- (c) Unity is a first principle.
- (d) Numbers, species, and form are first substances and involve a separable subsistence.

He denies that the first principles of the Universe are the same as those of plants and animals, or that, from that which is indefinite or unfinished, there arises always, that which is more perfect. For man begets man, and the seed is not that which is first.

As to numbers being the first of entities, which are alleged to be

compounded of elements, he asks, whether they are compounded by mixture, or synthesis, or in the way a thing derives from seed, to each of which he adduces a refutation. But with regard to unity, some posit it as contrary to plurality, others in equality, as if it subsisted from contraries, in which case there would be generation, yet some things are subject to decay, though not numbers. Further there is no clear explanation of cause, though Eurytus assigned definite numbers to certain things, as fire 3 and earth 2. Such a method, however, would involve the comparison of things of a different genus or kind. Likewise, the causality of numbers is instanced from things that are entirely indifferent.

To take the number 7, there is nothing in common, as a cause, between 7 vowels, 7 chords, 7 Pleiades, 7 years that some animals take to cast their teeth, or 7 warriors who fought against Thebes. Though none of them are causative, yet they do allege that the well τὸ εἶ has a subsistence, and that to the co-ordination in the case of the fair, belong the odd, the straight, the equal, and the powers of certain numbers.

Numbers that are in species, do not constitute causes of things, like harmonics, for equals in species differ from one another as do monads. The consequences only afford additional proof that the Ideal Hypotheses give rise to many errors in respect of their generation, and that their systems are without coherence, since mathematical species do not involve a subsistence separable from sensibles, nor do they constitute the first principles of things.

And thus the treatise abruptly ends.

THE ETHICS

Aristotle in treating of Politics divided it into three parts, Ethics the good of the Individual, Economics, the good of the family, and Politics properly so called the good of the State.

His Nicomachean Ethics, he wrote for the instruction of Alexander the Great, and it is generally held that his Endemian Ethics was but an early draft.

He deals with Ethics solely from a rationalistic point of view and eliminates from consideration any ideal, or absolute standard, of Good.

Beginning from the definition of good as "that which all things aim at," he differentiates between ends, which are energies or activities, and those which are works; likewise emphasis is laid on the fact that the ends of the superior arts are superior to the ends of the subordinate ones.

The end of all that we do and which we wish for, on its own account, must be the good and the greatest Good. This must be the end of political science, for though the good of an individual and the state be the same, the good of the state is more important and perfect both to obtain and to preserve.

All agree that such good is called "Happiness."

Rejecting Plato's theory of a self-existent good, he proceeds, by an analytical method, to reject the opinions of the vulgar, that happiness is pleasure; also those of the active or educated, that it is honour or virtue, the former because the happiness lies, in rather those that give, than in those that obtain honour, and the latter because it may be possessed by one who does not live an active life: likewise he rejects those of money getters, who think it is wealth.

Further, as to the theory of universal good, since good is predicated in substance, quality, and relation, it is both prior and posterior, so that there cannot be a common idea. Moreover it is predicated in all Aristotle's *Categories* as "Being" for it is predicated, in essence, as God and intellect; in quality, as in the virtues; in quantity, as in the mean; in relation, as utility; in time, as opportunity; in place, as habitation, etc. So that it cannot be anything common, universal, or one (cf. pp. 58, 73, 79). In addition, there are many sciences of good in the same category; as under opportunity, there is in war, generalship; and in disease, medicine. It is therefore only predicated good analogically.

Now happiness is the excellence of work peculiar to man, that is to say the work peculiar to man is a certain practical life of a being, which possesses reason; of which one part is obedient to reason and the other possesses reason and exercises intellect. Hence the work of man is an energy of the soul, according to reason.

From this, Aristotle arrives at his definition of the chief good or happiness as "*an energy of the soul according to virtue in a perfect life.*"³¹

The expression, 'in a perfect life,' involve two distinct trains of thought; the one indicating the development of life to the highest degree, the other, consistency from first to last: as he says, neither one swallow, nor one day, makes a spring.

With regard to the origin of happiness, Aristotle says, "if there is any other thing which is the Gift of God to men, it is reasonable to suppose that it is a divine gift";³² as it is the best of human things. But if it is acquired by virtue, and by some kind of teaching or exercise, it is one of the most divine of things. It must be common to many, for it is possible by some teaching and exercise that it should exist in every person not incapacitated for virtue.

³¹ I, 7, 12.

³² I, 9, 2.

He assumes that natural productions are produced in the best way that is possible, and that therefore it is better that people should be happy by these means, than by chance, which he thought would be inconsistent. By the terms of his definition he excludes animals from happiness and even children, except in respect of hope.

‘Though the honourable will bear with equanimity many and great misfortunes, yet he cannot be perfectly blessed, if involved in calamities such as those of Priam.’

With regard to the effect upon the dead of good and ill fortune to their friends, Aristotle lays it down that, if anything reaches them it must be weak and small, either absolutely, or relatively, so as neither to make those happy, who are unhappy, nor to make those unhappy, who are happy.

Happiness is a principle and not a faculty ; it is therefore honourable and called blessed, rather than praised. God and the highest good are of this kind, for everything else is referred to these.”³³

Happiness being an energy of the soul, Aristotle proceeds to analyse the soul and divides it into two parts, the irrational and the rational, without, however, deciding whether there are actually two definite parts, or whether it is only like regarding the circumference of a circle as concave or convex.

The irrational part is divided into two parts ; one the vegetative, or that which pertains to nourishment and growth, and the other the appetitive, which relates to desires and which is amenable to reason.

Should this latter part be called reasonable, then the rational may be said to be divided into two parts, and he finds that virtue is divided on these lines ; for some virtues like wisdom, intelligence, and prudence are called intellectual, and others such as liberality and temperance are called moral.

Intellectual virtue has its origin and increase, for the most part, that is other than genius, from teaching, and requires experience and time ; but moral virtues arise from habit and do not spring up from nature. By this he denies the Stoic theory that they were Innate Ideas, because such could not be altered by habit ; though he assumes that there is a natural capacity, which is perfected by habit. Further, they are not like the senses, where we get the capacity first, for we do not learn to see by practising frequently seeing.

So in another place he says “ for all men think that each of the points of moral character exist in us naturally ; for we possess justice, temperance and valour and the other virtues from birth.”³⁴

³³ I, 12, 4.

³⁴ VI, 13.

Investigation here is not to ascertain what is virtue, but how to become good.

First, we must act according to right reason. Actions with regard to moral subjects admit of excess and defect, but are preserved by the adoption of the mean.

Pleasure and pain are the test of moral habits, he who takes pleasure in abstaining from bodily habits is truly temperate, and he who rejoices in meeting dangers is brave. This is produced by right education. Habits become bad, through pleasures and pain, by pursuing or avoiding improper ones, or at improper times, or in improper ways. Virtue is apt to practise the best, and vice the contrary.

Acts of virtue depend, not on their character, so much as on the character of the agent ; he must do them knowingly, of deliberate choice, on their own account, and on a fixed and unchanging principle.

The Genus of virtue, not being passion or capacity is clearly habit. It is undoubtedly a relative Mean State avoiding extremes. It is possible to go wrong in many ways, and the Pythagoreans conjectured aright, when they allowed it the nature of the infinite, but good of the finite ; for we are good in one way only, but bad in all sorts of ways.

Virtue, then is defined as "*a habit accompanied with deliberate preference in the relative mean defined by reason and as a prudent man would define it.*"³⁵

With reference to its essence and the definition, which defines it as substance, virtue is a mean state, but with reference to the standard of "the best," and the excellent, it is an extreme. In ascertaining the mean between the two vices of excess and defect there are three rules :—

1. To keep away from the more contrary, *i.e.*, from the more erroneous.
2. To keep away from the vice we are the more inclined to.
3. To keep away from what is pleasant.

The definition of virtue involves a deliberation or choice, and this leads to the discussion of the voluntary and the involuntary. Praise or blame are bestowed on the former, and pardon or pity are bestowed on the latter.

A voluntary act is one where the principle is in the doer or agent having knowledge of the particulars or circumstances of the act.

An involuntary act is one, where the principle is external to the agent.

In cases which are of a painful nature, where the doer is put

to an election as to what to do, though the choice and the object of the action depend on the time of its performance, and actions are conversant of particulars, and particulars are voluntary, yet in circumstances which may be held to be more than human nature can support, they may be held involuntary: such as in English Law is called duress.

Further, in the case of actions, done from ignorance of fact, followed by grief and repentance, a non-voluntary act may be held to be involuntary. But the ignorance must be of particulars, and not ignorance of universals, for ignorance of right and wrong, or of law, is ever held to be blameable.

Continuing the analysis of the definition of virtue and having discussed what is voluntary, the meaning of "deliberate preference" is next brought under review. Deliberate preference is more extensive than the voluntary, for children and other beings participate in voluntary acts, but not in deliberate preference, nor is the term applied to sudden unpremeditated acts, which may be voluntary. It is not Anger or Desire for deliberate preference is not exercised by irrational beings. Nor is it volition, for that may apply to things impossible, or things over which the doer has no control; as, that a particular wrestler should win a contest. Further volition is rather of the end, and deliberate preference of the means, as in the desire for help as distinguished from the means adopted for such.

Neither is it Opinion in general any more than Opinion in particular, for Opinion is formed about all sorts of things, and is judged as to whether it is correct or not, irrespective of the subject; whereas deliberate preference is judged as to whether it is for things good, or bad.

What then, says Aristotle, is its genus and what its species? It seems in fact voluntary, but only where the object has been the subject of deliberation, for deliberate preference is joined with Reason and Intellect.

What then is Deliberation and the object of deliberation? Aristotle limits the term Deliberation to those things in our own power as he says, "these are the cases which remain for the principles of Causation appear to be Nature, Necessity and Chance and besides these Mind and all that takes place through the agency of man."³⁶ (Cf. p. 72.)

So, deliberation takes place in the case of things that generally happen, but respecting which it is uncertain how they may turn out, and in which there is indefiniteness. Further, it is means, not ends, which are the subject of deliberation. A physician does not deliberate whether he shall heal, nor the orator whether he shall

persuade ; but they deliberate upon the means, and if it can be done by one means, by what means can that be affected and so on, until they arrive at the first cause, which is the last in the analysis but the first in execution.

Now the object of deliberation is the same as that of deliberate preference, except that in the latter it is restricted in its meaning ; for that which, after deliberation, is preferred, is an object of deliberate preference ; “ for every person ceases to deliberate how he shall act when he refers the principle to himself and his ruling part, for it is this which deliberately prefers : “ *Deliberate Preference* is therefore the *Deliberate Desire of things in our own power* ” ; for having made our decision after deliberation we desire according to our deliberation.”³⁷

A good Deliberation is, later on, defined as that correctness of deliberation, which is in accordance with the principle of utility, which has a proper object, employs proper means, and is in operation during a proper length of time.³⁸ A true example of Aristotle's fondness for definitions, which though of great use, were not always far from removed from the fatuous.

Volition is of the end, as previously stated, and to some it appears to be the good and to others the apparent good. The former are forced to the conclusion that what, is chosen incorrectly, is no object of volition at all ; and the latter that there is no natural object of volition, but only that which seems to each person to be so, and such might happen to be contrary things. But Aristotle solves the question in a different way, by laying down that “ the good man's object of volition is the real good, but the bad man's, anything which he may happen to think good ” : the principal difference between the good and the bad man, is that the good man sees the truth in every case, since he is as it were the rule and the measure of it. But the generality of mankind are deceived by pleasure, for it appears to be the good, though it is not so, and therefore men choose what is pleasant under the idea that it is good, and avoid pain as an evil. It is not to be apprehended from the above where Aristotle speaks of the “ good man as being as it were the rule and measure of truth ” that he is following the doctrine of Protagoras and the Sophists, which we learnt from Plato in *Theaetetus* 23 was that ‘ man is the measure of all things ’ and that truth is purely relative. In Book I, 6, 12, Aristotle had already refused to discuss the good in the abstract in this work on Ethics (cf. p. 88).

Since the end is an object of volition, and the means objects of deliberation and deliberate preference, the action must be according to such preference and voluntary, and the energies of the

³⁷ III, 3, 12.

³⁸ VI, 9, 7.

virtues are conversant with these ; so that virtue must be in our own power and likewise its contrary vice.

As all matters may be divided into those of Necessity and those which are Contingent, and Ethics is only concerned with moral Actions ; it is with the latter alone that Ethics is concerned. Contingent Matter the ' *subjectum materiale* ' is that over which alone one can have any power.

The general dictum referred to and approved by Plato that " no person is willingly wicked nor unwillingly happy " is only partly true, Aristotle maintaining that vice is voluntary. If we have no other principles to which we may refer our actions, than those in our own power, that is, if there is no other principle to render them involuntary, such as was referred to in the discussion of the involuntary (cf. pp. 91, 92), then virtue and vice must both be voluntary. Legal praise and blame has always upheld this view, exception only being made in cases of compulsion and ignorance. Inability may arise from unjust habits but is no excuse, for " *energies of any description make men of such a character.*"

Again, to those who say they aim at apparent good, but have not power over their imagination, and that according to the character of the individual is the end which presents itself to him, the answer is that in some way each is the cause of his own habit and therefore of his imagination. If virtue is a gift of nature, how can it be more voluntary than vice ? Actions and habits are not voluntary in quite the same manner ; for actions are within our power from beginning to end, but we are masters only of the beginning of our habits.

Michelet divides the treatise into three parts, the first dealing with the *Summum Bonum* ends here ; the second relates to the virtues in detail ; and the third to the instrumentals to virtue.

Aristotle then treated in detail the various moral virtues : Courage, Temperance, Liberality, Magnificence, Magnanimity, Desire of Honour, Meekness (the mean between the excess and defect of Anger), Social Virtue, Truthfulness (the mean between arrogance and false modesty), Graceful Wit, Sense of Shame, Justice, and Equity ; Justice being treated as a habit of obedience to law and also as a habit of equality.

With regard to Justice, there is one important point to be borne in mind, as Michelet observes, and that is the difference between the Greek and the Roman theory of legislation.

The Greeks recognized the duty of the state to support virtue by legislation, and moral education formed part of their systems ; from this arose the rule as stated by Aristotle, " What the law does not command it forbids."³⁹ On the other hand, the Roman

³⁹ V, 11, 1.

Law, from which our own is derived, confines itself to forbidding wrong, hence the rule of law is the opposite, "What the law does not forbid it allows."

Now as virtues have been divided into Moral and Intellectual, and the former have been dealt with, consideration has to be given to the Intellectual Virtues.

According to the definition of Virtue, the deliberate preference must be defined by right reason. This involves two principles of the soul, Intellect and Appetite; Sensation not entering into the matter. Here then the preference or choice of the appetite must be correct, and the reasons of the deliberation by the Intellect, true.

Therefore "deliberate preference is either intellect influenced by appetite, or appetite influenced by intellect; and such a principle is man."⁴⁰

Aristotle divides the habits, by which the soul arrives at truth by affirmation or denial, into five; Science, Art, Prudence, Wisdom and Intuition.

Science is conversant with Necessary Matter, about which we have seen there can be no deliberation (cf. pp. 92, 93); it is acquired by learning and is derived from induction and syllogism; it is therefore a demonstrative habit. "For whenever a man is convinced of anything and the principles are known to him, he knows it scientifically, and unless he knows the principles even better than the conclusion he will only possess science accidentally."⁴¹

All *Art* in conversant of three processes, Production, Contrivance, and Contemplation, in order that something may be produced, the existence or non-existence of which is contingent, and the principle of which is in the doer and not in the thing done. Art then is the habit of making, joined with true reason. Agathon's saying that "art loves chance and chance loves art"⁴² is approved.

Prudence is a habit of choosing well, what is good and expedient for living well; it is not science, because the subject matter is contingent; and it is not art, because it is in the nature of practice and not in making, for it makes the means of the means correct; but it is a true habit, joined with reason, practical on the subject of human goods. Further, it is impossible, so Aristotle alleges, to forget; but he adduces no reason or example for this statement: a similar argument in Book I, 10, is likewise without much support.

Intuition is a habit which takes cognisance of the principles of science, e.g., axioms, definitions. But later on Aristotle uses the term, as applied to the principles of morals, as that faculty of

⁴⁰ VI, 2, 6,

⁴¹ VI, 3, 4.

⁴² VI, 4, 4.

seeing right and wrong without the conscious intervention of any reasoning process.

Wisdom in one way, means nothing more than excellence in some one art (proficiency); but some are universally wise. A wise man does not only know the facts deduced from principles, but must also attain truth respecting principles themselves.

"Hence it must be intuition and science together and science of the most honourable subjects having as it were a head."⁴³

Aristotle here uses the word Intelligence *σύνεσις* in the special meaning of that which is conversant about the same matters as prudence, but in whose province it is to decide; whereas that of prudence is to act. Likewise he uses the word Candour *γνώμη* as that faculty, which judges persons, whereas *σύνεσις* judges things.

"Since all matters of moral conduct are principles and extremes, *Intuition* is of the extreme on both sides; for Intuition takes cognisance of the first principles and last results; that Intuition which belongs to demonstration takes cognisance of first principles, and that which belongs to practical matters takes cognisance of the last result of contingent matters, and of the minor premiss, for such are the origin of the motive or principle of action; since universals are made up of particulars."⁴⁴ Of these it is necessary to have a perception which is intuition. Intuition is then the power of seeing what is right and wrong without the intervention of any reasoning process. As practical habits seem not to be the result of teaching, but not of observation, they were thought to be natural gifts.

'The sayings of the old without any demonstration should therefore be attended to, since experience has sharpened their observation.'

It is convenient for reference to summarize these terms to which Aristotle has given special meanings. He employs the same word to imply both a faculty of the soul and the habit which is produced by the exercise of such faculty.

Reason *ὀρθὸς λόγος* that faculty of the soul which takes cognisance of truth and falsehood, both scientific and moral.

Reason *ἐπιστημικόν* is conversant with Necessary Matters.

Reason *λογιστικόν* is conversant with contingent matters and synonymous with deliberation.

Deliberation is investigation, with reason, of contingent matters.

Intellect is a faculty of making a decision about things.

Candour is a faculty of making a decision about persons.

Cleverness is a faculty to be able to do, or attain, good things:

Craft bad.

⁴³ VI, 7, 2.

⁴⁴ VI, 11.

Prudence is a habit of action, of doing, joined with reason ; of good practice about Contingent Matters.

Common Sense αἰσθησις is a faculty of internal perception of the particulars with which Prudence is conversant.

Intuition (a) is a habit cognisant of principles of Science, e.g., axioms, definitions.

(b) is a faculty of seeing right and wrong without reasoning.

Wisdom is Science and Intuition united.

Virtue is a habit with reason which is Prudence, hence not all reasons are prudences and likewise all virtues are not prudences.

According to the division adopted by Michelet, the third part of this work is occupied by the discussion of those things which are instrumental to virtue.

The virtues have been discussed as being theoretically perfect habits, but those states are now brought into view, to which the ordinary man may strive to attain in the first place before acquiring habits absolutely perfect. Aristotle, then, proceeds to deal at length with Continnence and Incontinence and Brutality.

As to Incontinence, he distinguishes it from Intemperance, in that, whilst they are both concerned with the same matters, such as pleasures, which are either bad or indifferent ; in the case of the Intemperate man he makes a deliberate choice in seeking pleasure as the best thing, whereas the Incontinent man does not think that the pleasure is the best but nevertheless pursues it. In other matters, the term incontinent is also used by analogy, or metaphorically, such as incontinent of anger ; of honour ; of gain ; etc.

Incontinence is vice without principle, but as such is less vicious than Intemperance. For as depravity destroys a principle so virtue preserves it.

As Patience is a negative form of Continnence, in that it merely does not give way to desire, so Effeminacy is a negative form of Incontinence.

Reason alone does not teach the principles either in mathematics or in morals ; but virtue, either natural or acquired by habit, teaches to think rightly respecting the principles.

Friendship though not a moral virtue in itself is instrumental to moral virtue in giving occasion for the exercise of those energies, the habits of which are virtues. Likewise it is necessary for the ' perfect life ' of a man, referred to in the definition of happiness, that his amiable and social desires should be appeased.

Aristotle describes friendship as the goodwill, which each has for the other together with the wish for the good of the other, such being mutually known, and either for the sake of what is the good, useful, or pleasant : by the good is not meant abstract

goodness necessarily, but what appears to be good to the friend.⁴⁵ He approves of the proverb that 'the property of friends is common.'⁴⁶

Having discussed the matter in all its bearings, he arrived at the conclusion that the real source of friendship is the feeling of a good man for himself.

As the intellectual part of a soul is held to constitute Self, and that is the ruling part in the case of a good man; the virtuous man agrees in opinion with himself, and therefore desires the same thing with the whole of his soul, whereas the vicious man has no friendly feeling within himself, as one part of his soul is in opposition to the other.

Thus, where the selfish man seeks only to give himself money, honour, and bodily pleasures, the self love of the good man causes him to seek how to excel, in that which is good, temperate, and according to virtue, and desires the same for his friend as for his otherself.⁴⁷

Though the essence of friendship is equality, yet as between those of different position, such equality can only be relative to their respective conditions. So it follows, that in estimating what return one should make for a favour, the proper estimate should be made by the receiver, as to what he considered would be its value before he received it.

Aristotle distinguished goodwill, as being felt towards those whom we do not know and without their being aware of it; similarly affection, he distinguished by its intensity and desire.

Though at the commencement of the treatise, Aristotle rejected the sensual pleasure of the vulgar as a true definition of happiness, yet the consideration of pleasure in a wider sense is inevitably involved in any ethical work. It is of great ethical importance, in the first place, in training the desires, so that they are directed to take pleasure and delight in that which is good, and to be averse to and shun that which is evil.

Aristotle agrees with Eudoxius (*c.* B.C. 366) in considering Pleasure to be a good, but differs from him in thinking it is the greatest good.

Eudoxius thought that pleasure was the greatest good, because it was sought for by both the rational and irrational, and because each finds good for himself, like food; its opposite, pain, all shun; it is chosen for itself; and if added to any other good makes it more eligible.

That Eudoxius himself, was most temperate was evidence that his arguments did not arise merely from his being a slave to pleasure. However, that pleasure renders everything more

⁴⁵ VIII, 2.

⁴⁶ VIII, 9, 1.

⁴⁷ IX, 4.

eligible, is no proof that it is the chief good, for any good added to another good does that.⁴⁸

Similarly, as Plato noted, Pleasure united with Prudence is more eligible than without it, so that Pleasure cannot be the Chief Good, if it becomes more eligible when joined to anything else, which is eligible on its own account. However, Plato went further and argued that it was not a good at all; (cf. p. 46) this Aristotle refuted when dealing with the arguments of those who raised the following objections.

First, that it is an *evil*, but men avoid an evil and choose pleasure, so that it must be in opposition to evil.

Second, that it is *not a quality*, but the energies of virtue and happiness are not qualities.

Third, that it is *indefinite*, because it admits of degrees and that good is definite; but if this applies to the act of being pleased, it also applies to the acts of justice and temperance, etc.; if it applies to the abstract, pleasures are mixed and unmixed, like health, which though definite is subject to degrees.

Fourth, that it is subject to *motion*, but though it is possible to become pleased quickly yet it is not possible to feel pleasure quickly, nor to energize to it quickly. (To be pleased quickly or slowly.)

Fifth, that it is a *generation*, but from what it is generated into that is it dissolved; and since pain destroys pleasure, from what then is it generated. Again pain is said to be the want and pleasure the supply of nature, but this does not apply to pleasures such as those of sight, smell, or mathematics.

As to reprehensible pleasures, they only appear so to the ill disposed, as sweet seems bitter to some sick persons, and all things white to those suffering from ophthalmia.

Consequently Pleasure is not the Chief Good, nor every pleasure eligible, but some are eligible for their own sake, differing in kind and the source from which they are derived.⁴⁹

The above objections, attributed to pleasure, are based on the *σοφιστικα* or Principia of the Pythagoreans (see note, p. 39).

Having ascertained that some pleasures are goods, Aristotle further considers of what genus or species Pleasure is. It is like vision, it is perfect at any period of time, that is, that it is not affected one way or another as to species by the elapse of time. It is therefore not a motion, which takes place in time and has an end in view. In the separate portions of time occupied by a motion, all motion is imperfect and differs in species from the whole motion, e.g., in building a house, the putting the stones together differs from the decoration. Nor is there any motion

⁴⁸ X, 2.

⁴⁹ X, 3, 17.

with regard to place in connection with pleasure, for change of position is not necessarily involved. Further, it is not a generation, which is divisible and not entire, any more than there is generation of vision of a point, or of a unit.

Now every perception energizes with reference to its object, and that energizes perfectly, which is well disposed with reference to the best of all objects, which fall under it ; pleasure moreover is attendant upon every sense and every act of intellect and contemplation.⁵⁰

The most perfect is the most pleasant, so that pleasure perfects the energy ; but not in the same way as the perceptive faculty and the object, but just like health and a doctor are different causes for a person being healthy.

But no human faculties have power of energizing continuously, this gives rise both to the fleetingness of pleasure and to its fading intensity, since the faculties which produce it become jaded. Pleasures are different in kind, according to the different kind of energy upon which they are attendant, and tend to induce a greater degree of accuracy and thus contribute to an increase of energy.

As then, they are intimately connected with objects of different species, so they must be of different species themselves.

Should they arise from other sources, then they may become impediments to energies ; like the proverbial barrel organ outside the study window.

Thus it happens that the pleasure of a good energy is a good, and that of a bad energy is evil.

As the truth is that which appears so to the good man, and if excellence and a good man, in so far as he is good, are the correct measure of everything, then true pleasure is such as that in which a good man delights.

Whether there be one or more energies of the perfect and perfectly happy man, the pleasures which perfect them must be said to be the pleasures of Man, and the rest must be so in a secondary or inferior degree, just as are the energies.⁵¹

Finally, we come back to Happiness, which was laid down at the beginning as the Greatest Good. It has been noted, that it must be an energy, otherwise if only a habit, it might exist in a dormant state ; it must be eligible for its own sake, for it must be self-sufficient. Of this kind acts done according to virtue seem to answer the test.

Amusements, no doubt are sometimes chosen for their own sake, but those who choose them for their own sake are injured, rather than benefited by them. It has been adduced in support of them,

⁵⁰ X, 4, 10.

⁵¹ X, 5, 16.

that those in power pass their leisure in amusements, but neither virtue nor intellect consist in having power, though from these two good energies proceed. But to every man the energy is most eligible according to his own habit, and therefore to the good man that which is according to virtue.

Amusement then is only for relaxation, which is not an end but a means. It is according to virtue, for the better the man the more superior the energy and the greater the happiness.

Now of virtues that of the best part of man must be the best ; therefore that happiness will be best, which is the energy according to the virtue of the Intellect.⁵²

For the intellect is the best part of man, it is the part naturally to govern and rule and to possess the highest ideas upon honourable and divine subjects. Whether it is divine, or the most divine property we possess, the energy of this part, according to its proper virtue, must be the most perfect happiness : and this is Contemplation.

Contemplation is the most continuous, it has been shown how energies fail ; the pleasure attendant on the energy according to wisdom is the greatest both in purity and in stability ; it is of all virtues the most self-sufficient, the moral virtues require friends or enemies for the exercise of their energies.

It consists in leisure, such as the virtue of statesmanship does not possess, though we are busy in order to obtain leisure.

It is the nearest human approach to the Divine. A man ought not to entertain mere mortal thoughts because he is mortal, but as far as possible to make himself immortal by living in accordance with the best principle within him " although it be small in size, yet in power and value is far more excellent than all." ⁵³

Life according to moral virtue occupies a second place in happiness, for the energies accorded to it belong to human nature or even corporeal nature and the passions. With it is associated prudence, which directs the right means to the right end chosen by moral virtue.

" As we may suppose the gods to be pre-eminently blessed and happy, then the contemplative life which they lead must be the most blessed. That it is contemplative is obvious, for we cannot attribute to them moral actions. What dangers can they meet, on whom perform liberal acts, against what bad desires can they by temperance refrain ; it is not supposed that they sleep, and without production what can remain but contemplation. Further if any regard is paid to human affairs, it is reasonable to suppose that they would take pleasure in what is best and nearest allied to themselves. As such qualities belong to a wise man, it is probable that he is most dear to the gods and most happy." ⁵⁴

⁵² X, 7.⁵³ X, 7, 12.⁵⁴ X, 8, 8.

But it is necessary to practise the virtues and not sufficient to know them in theory ; and though the young may be taught, it is the nature of the masses to only obey fear.

It is therefore necessary to promote the education of the young, and also to train men to become good legislators, who will enact good laws to compel the masses to act in accordance with the virtues.

Schwegler in his *History of Philosophy* sums up these Ethics as follows. 'According to Aristotle man is good through nature, through habit and through reason. Whilst Socrates viewed nature and morality as opposed, and made moral action the result of rational insight, Aristotle holding both to be steps of development, makes rational insight in moral things to be a result of moral action. And he regards the Summum Bonum as that happiness, which is perfect activity in a perfect life.'

CHAPTER IV

EPICUREANS—STOICS—NEO-PLATONISTS

ST. AUGUSTINE

OF the post Aristotelean Pagan Philosophers the followers of the Sceptics Pyrrho, Arcesilaus, or Carneades left little trace.

Epicurus 337-270 B.C. was the founder of the hedonist philosophy, which was named after him, and which obtained a wide adherence amongst the Romans after their conquest of Greece (c. 140 B.C.). According to his *Canonics*, borrowed from Democritus, all objects have subtle emanations ἀποστάσει, which impress the senses thus producing corresponding images, which give rise to mental conception.

From the senses only are all ideas obtained, and pleasure is the sovereign good of man and the end of his existence. The Summum Bonum is a state exempt from suffering and the satisfaction of all necessary and natural desires. Whilst he himself recognizes that the pleasures of the mind exceed those of the body, and lived an abstemious life, his followers regarded his doctrines as an inducement to self-indulgence in its most vitiated form. Virtue was regarded as only a concomitant of enjoyment; contracts and the origin of rights were looked upon solely for the purpose of the mutual enjoyment of the parties and their obligation depended solely on expediency. Often regarded as Atheistical he seems to have acknowledged the existence of the gods in a state of felicity without any contact with terrestrial affairs.

Zeno 340-260 B.C. was the founder of the Stoic Philosophy (so named from the *στοά* or Porch at Athens), he was born at Cittum in Cyprus and is not to be confounded with Zeno, called by Plato, Palamedes of Elea who had lived about 500 B.C. and who was the originator of Dialectics (cf. p. 28).

According to the *Stoic Philosophy*, σοφία wisdom is the science of human perfection in thought, knowledge, and action.

Their chief maxim was "to follow nature."

They divided Wisdom into three divisions, Logic, Physiology and Ethics.

As to Logic, especially as developed by *Chrysippus* of Tarsus 280-208 B.C., it was adapted *ad materiam*, as well as to the form of argument: and it was set up as the arbiter of truth.

It rested on the theory of Perception *φαντασία*. Every impression of the senses produces a perception in the mind.

Out of these perceptions, Reason *τὸ ἡγεμονικόν*, the guide, forms our other notions and opinions.

True Perceptions, such as are verified by their correspondence with the object to which they refer, are generally acknowledged (self-evident, like axioms), and constitute the foundation of science. Truth is Right Reason *ὀρθὸς λόγος*.

Those, which do not arise directly from sensible impressions, are ideas, and result from a comparison by Reason and by combining whatever they contain of the Universal; if this is involuntary then the idea is *κοινὸς λόγος census communis* and a criterion of Truth.

It was Chrysippus who developed the Hypothetical and Disjunctive Arguments of Logic.

According to the Stoics, all that is real is corporeal, but they distinguish between solid bodies and incorporeal such as Space, Time and Ideas. Vacuum and Time were pronounced to be infinite.

There are two eternal principles *ἀρχαί* of all things one passive matter *ὑλη*, the other active Divinity, creative Spirit *πνεῦμα*.

God is like a living fire, He fashions, produces, and permeates all things according to certain laws *λόγοι σπερματικῶν*. Matter is subject to Universal Reason, which is the Law of Nature.

The soul is an ardent spirit, being a portion of the Soul of the World, but like every other real individual being is corporeal and perishable.

Arising from the view that God is the Supreme Intelligence and Law, and in consequence of the rational nature of man, the Stoics considered Virtue consisting of Order, Legality and Reason, the only means of attaining the end of their being. Hence their two maxims were to live agreeably to right Reason and to live according to Nature.

Virtue is a system of conduct regulated by the principle, that nothing but the practice of good is good, and that therein alone consists the character of true liberty; vice is the neglect or perversion of reason. Virtue is manifested under the principle forms of Prudence, Courage, Temperance and Justice. It alone can enable one to attain felicity, which consists of a tranquil course of life *εὐρῆα βίον* and cannot be increased by prolongation of life. The virtuous man is exempt from, but not insensible to, Passions. Passions ought not to be moderated but eradicated. The wise man alone is free.

As Tenneman puts it "the system bears throughout a character of extravagant pride and asperity, which is hostile to the cultivation

of moral sentiment. On the other hand we find abundant germs of noble sentiments, calculated to elevate man and inspire him with a sense of his own dignity."

Amongst its followers may be numbered those Romans, Cicero, Seneca and Marcus Aurelius.

Cousin describes how the ardent struggle between the Epicureans and Stoic philosophies was carried to Rome about 100 B.C., "where cultivated without any speculative originality, but carried to all its extremes in practice, by energetic minds, it produced the gross sensualism, which dishonoured the fall of the Empire, together with some sallies of far-fetched and sterile virtue."

It is worth while recording that Aristarchus of Samos *c.* 270 B.C. is credited with being the first philosopher, who fixed upon the sun, instead of the earth, as being the centre of the planetary system and insisted on the diurnal revolution of the earth. The last ancient philosopher to hold this was Seleucus, *c.* 128 B.C.

In order to estimate the extent of the influence of Greek philosophy, it must be borne in mind that Alexander the Great, *d.* 323 B.C., had insisted on introducing Greek Cultivation and founding Greek Colonies everywhere throughout his mighty Empire. On his death this Empire was divided up amongst his generals, when in the eventual distribution Syria and Western Asia went to Seleucus, the son of Antiochus, and Egypt went to Ptolemy.

Between 200–146 B.C., Rome succeeded in conquering all the European portions of Alexander's Empire; by 63 B.C., Pompey had extended the Roman frontier to the Euphrates and in 31 B.C., Octavian, afterwards Emperor Augustus, defeated Antony and Cleopatra in the naval engagement of Actium and Egypt became a Roman Province.

Alexander had founded the port of Alexandria in 322 B.C. and made it the capital of Egypt, it was there that Ptolemy II (Philadelphus), who was a great patron of learning, had founded the Great Library of Alexandria called the Museum, which contained nearly every Greek book ever written. But it was alas destroyed by fire in 47 B.C. at the time when Julius Cæsar was fighting with Pompey and his confederates. It was the same Ptolemy II who caused the Septuagint Version of the Old Testament to be made in Greek.

Thus it is not surprising to find that Alexandria, at the beginning of the Christian Era, was a prominent seat of the learning of both the East and the West.

Some few years before the birth of Christ, there was born in Alexandria a Jew, named *Philo* 20 B.C.—40 A.D., who sought to

combine his Greek knowledge and thought with his Jewish Orientalism.

The Senses may deceive, Reason be powerless, but there is a further faculty in man, that of Faith. Real Science is the gift of God and is Faith : its origin is in the goodness of God and its cause Piety.

Like Plato, he regarded Divinity and Matter as two first principles. He characterized Divinity as Being, Real, Infinite, Immutable, and Incomprehensible to human understanding *ὄν*. Matter he considered as non-existing *μηδ' ὄν*, but to receive form and life from Divinity. As something could not be produced out of nothing, it had to come out of purely negative *μηδ' ὄν*, a not anything being different from nothing *μηδ' ἄέν*.

He represented the Divinity as incomprehensible in his essence, but some knowledge of Him can be obtained through His Word *λόγος*. The Word is God's Thought. This Thought is two-fold : Thought, as embracing all Ideas (in Platonic Sense the Ideal World) *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος* Thought as Thought, secondly, Thought realised *λόγος προφορικός* Thought became the World : that is the image or type after which God formed the World.

There are three hypostases : God the Father ; the Son of God *λόγος* ; Son of *λόγος* the World.

We cannot become acquainted with the nature of God, but by His immediate influence on our minds : hence the doctrine of Internal Intuition.

Philo may be said to be the first Neo-Platonist.

The best known of the neo-Platonic School was *Plotinus* 204-270 A.D. a Roman born at Lycopolis in Egypt, who derived his instruction, together with Origen and Longinus, originally from Ammonius Saccas 200-250 A.D., a Greek Philosopher of Alexandria who, as his name implies had at one time been obliged to fulfil the humble station of a porter. Ammonius, who laid great stress on secrecy, left no writings and we are informed that Plotinus did not make his views known to the public, or reduce them to writing, until after one of his fellow disciples had published some of Ammonius' esoteric views.

Plotinus' works consisted of six books called *Enneades*.

According to the Philosophy of Plotinus, the Subjective and Objective are identified in one Unity (*τὸ ὄν, τὸ εἶν, τὸ ἀγαθόν*) the essence and first principle of all things ; the knowledge of which cannot be acquired mediately through thought or meditation, but by direct intuition (*παρουσία*). The end of his philosophy is an immediate union with the Divine Being.

Everything that exists is one and partakes in Unity, which is not identical with external Nature. Reason likewise is not identical

with Unity, for though it contemplates Unity in a complete manner, it does this from within. Primitive Unity is not one thing, but the principle of all things ; it is pure Existence without Accident ; not a thinking Being, but Thought in Action.

Unity is also represented as Pure Light ; from it, Being, Reason, and Life are derived without deducting anything from its Substance, which is " simple " (without parts) in its nature and not like matter, compound. From it emanates Pure Intelligence *νοῦς*, which contemplates Unity and requires only that for its existence. From Intelligence emanates the Soul of the World *ψυχή τοῦ παντός ἢ τῶν ὅλων*.

This is the Trias of Plotinus.

That which Intelligence thinks, it creates.

It was in the very nature of God's activity that He should create the World.

The Soul is the thought *λόγος* of Intelligence and itself also productive and creative ; its proper activity is contemplation, whereby different classes of soul, including the human, are produced ; the lowest order is Nature *φύσις*.

Nature is also a contemplative and creative energy, which gives form to matter *μορφή* and thought *λόγος* which are one and the same.

Form and Matter, Soul and Body are inseparable.

There is an Intellectual as well as a Sensible World, the latter a mere image of the former.

The Intellectual World is a Whole, Invariable, Absolute, Living, undivided in Space, unchangeable through Time : Unity in Plurality and Plurality in Unity.

The greater the distance from True Being, the greater the Indeterminateness.

The whole of the Sensible World is endued with Life and Reason ; every object possesses Unity and Multiplicity.

The Soul is an essence devoid of extent, immaterial and simple in its nature : with two natures, the superior indivisible the inferior divisible : it is immortal and re-unites with the corporeal substance.

Evil in the external World is sometimes positive and sometimes a negation of good.

His system gives rise to an Optimism combined with Fatalism adverse to Morality.

Unity being Perfection is the end and object of all things, which derives from Him, and can only become perfect through Him.

The human soul can only attain this by Contemplation, by means of absolute Abstraction *ἀπλῶσις*, Simplification from all

compounded things and by ascending to the heights of pure existence.

As Lewes puts it "Plotinus and Hegel shake hands."

Porphyry 233-304 A.D. was born at Tyre, and was first instructed in Athens by Origen and Longinus and then became a disciple of Plotinus in Rome; his labours were chiefly in diffusing the philosophy of his master and attempting to blend the theories of Plato, Aristotle and Pythagoras; and in his attacks on the Christians, after he went to live in Sicily.

His introduction to Aristotle was preserved, by Boethius' translation of it into Latin, for the edification of the West for 5 or 600 years.

Iamblicus of Chalcis, was a disciple of Porphyry, he died in 333 A.D., he answered all the queries proposed by Porphyry to Anebon with perfect assurance, and defined all the different classes of angels, gods, and demons with minuteness. Whether he was the author of a work on the Egyptian Mysteries is open to doubt.

He maintained the doctrine of union with God by theology and theurgy, the practice of mysterious actions supposed to be acceptable to the Divinity.

Proclus 412-485 A.D. of Constantinople, is the last of the Pagan Philosophers whom we need notice: he exalted theurgy above philosophy and attacked Christianity, chiefly objecting to the doctrine of the Creation of the World.

Under Theodosius in 379 A.D. the worship of heathen gods had been prohibited and Justinian in 529 A.D. closed the schools of all heathen philosophers.¹

Damascius was actually the last to teach neo-Platonism in the Academy at Athens.

Christianity, as Lewes points out, had ascended the throne in the person of Constantine 330-337 A.D., neo-Platonism dethroned it and usurped its place in the person of Julian the Apostate 361-363 A.D.: In losing Constantine Christianity lost nothing of its real spiritual power; but neo-Platonism in losing Julian lost its power, both political and religious.

The attitude of the Christian Fathers towards pagan philosophy was by no means uniform, but this is largely accounted for by the different states of civilization which obtained in the East and the West.

Thus we find that *Justin Martyr* 89-165, born at Flavia Neapolis, in Palestine affirmed that the *λόγος* previously to

¹ *The Liber de Causis* translated by John of Cremona, c. 1150 A.D., consisted of extracts from the *Elementatio Theologica* of Proclus, it was often quoted by The Schoolmen.

His incarnation had revealed Himself to the philosophers of antiquity.

Clement of Alexandria, d. 220, considered pagan philosophy an introduction to Christianity.²

Origen 185–253, born in Alexandria, considered happiness consisted in Contemplation *θεωρία* of Divinity, and drew a distinction between the popular acceptance of Religion and the same when thus explained to the learned.

According to *St. Augustine*, d. 430, Bishop of Hippo, it was orally drawn from the pre-Abraham source.³

Tertullian, d. 220, of Carthage, on the other hand, thought its study superfluous and adverse to Christianity; whilst *Cyprian* 200–258, Bishop of Carthage, thought it was an invention of the devil and productive of heresy.

The Christian Church in the East had to deal with more aristocratic and cultivated opponents, who inclined to oriental mysticism, whereas, in the West all civilization was already overrun by the invading hordes of barbarians, some few of whom alone were Arians.

In view of the part played by the teachings of St. Augustine (395–430) in the different schools of thought belonging to the Schoolmen, it may be well just to indicate some of the salient features of his philosophy (as outlined by de Wulf).

Though in many respects his philosophy is moulded by neo-Platonism, which he himself always ascribes to Platonism, especially with regard to investigation by consciousness, the clear cut demarcation of the sensible from the super-sensible, yet he always denied the monist and emanative tendencies of Platonism. Instead of the *Tráid* the emanation of the spiritual and sensible world through the energy of the *νοῦς*, the eternity of the world soul together with the transmigration or metempsychosis of the soul and its ultimate unconscious return to the Deity, St. Augustine taught the equality of the Trinity, the identity of God with the eternal ideas by which He knows the world, creation *ex nihilo*, the substantial distinction between God and His creatures and the personal redemption of the human soul by Grace.

Intellectualism is fused with mysticism, for the aim of the soul is not only to know but to love God, in this respect neo-Platonism which regarded philosophy and religion as one, had a certain attraction.

By his theory of Exemplarism, the intuition which God has of His Own Essence implies the vision of all the limited essences which He can realize outside Himself and which constitute so many feeble and distant imitations of His Infinity. Thus the ideas

² *Appo.*, II, 83.

³ *De Civ. Dei.*, VII, 11.

which according to the common view of Plato coexist with God become God Himself considered in the infinite perfection of His Wisdom and Knowledge ; it also transforms the neo-Platonic theory which made the Ideas the inferior product of the One and the scattering of the *voûs*.

He likened God the Uncreated Light of the Bible with the Intelligible Sun of Plato and regarded "being as light in the measure in which it exists."

Light belongs not only to spiritual beings, angels, and human souls, but in a less degree to bodies ; it is that which is most noble in their reality.

Bodies consist of matter and form, sometimes matter is considered as a chaotic mass but elsewhere he regards it, like Aristotle, as incapable of existing without form ; so that he allows a *quasi materia* to angels.

The soul is spiritual, which is proved by the characteristics of intellectual representations and the knowledge which the soul possesses of itself ; its immortality follows from its spirituality and its participation in the immutable and eternal truth. As to its origin, he appears to have been divided between Traducianism, according to which it is derived from the generation of the child, and Creationism, which teaches the constant creation of souls at the moment of generation.

The soul makes use of the body and governs it, being joined thereto by an intermediary connected with light. The soul is manifested by the memory, understanding, and will. As to the nature and origin of knowledge, St. Augustine maintains with Plato and Aristotle the doctrine of ideological spiritualism, that is the distinction in nature between sensation, the object of which is the particular, the multiple, the changing, and thought, which grasps the abstract, the indivisible, and the stable. The soul is a kind of intelligible light and becomes aware of its knowledge by turning back upon itself, so that knowledge is a phenomenon of pure activity, or as Aristotle says "the mind and that which is an object of perception of the mind are the same."⁴

It is not the body which impresses itself upon the soul by any casual action, but it is the soul that engenders in itself the image of the body.

Ideas are innate and may be either successive Divine interventions as our intelligence develops, or one unique Divine act, which deposits in the soul a storehouse of knowledge at the moment of its union with the body.

Consciousness makes us certain of the reality of the thinking ego and the first principles of the logical metaphysical and moral

⁴ Cf., p. 82.

orders and the intellectual representations of the outside world ; the measure of the truth of our knowledge is its conformity with the Divine Ideas the prototype of such things. So our knowledge is related to Divine Knowledge by way of reflection.

St. Augustine maintains the primacy of the Will over Intellect. The intellect becomes active under its orders and the purity of the Will is a condition of wisdom.

Truth is a good, which must be loved ; adhesion to mysterious truths only comes through an intervention of the Will which above all is free.

Everything is good in the measure in which it has being, evil does not share the realm of being with the good.

God the Supreme Goodness is our last end, and the union of the soul with God will be its supreme happiness, which will be brought about by the Beatific Vision which will exalt personality.

CHAPTER V

LEARNING IN WESTERN EUROPE AFTER THE FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE

WE are not here concerned with the direct connection between the various systems of pagan philosophy and the various heresies which arose at the beginning of the Christian Era.

After the fall of the Roman Empire in the West, Europe became so overrun with the barbarous hordes, which invaded it from the North, that for the most part all learning was obliterated.

The use of Greek in the West declined rapidly during the fifth century, though it remained at places like Bordeaux and other trading centres in the South of France, owing to their connection with the Eastern Empire until well on into the next century.

In the south of Italy, Calabria, Brinthium and Apulia (Magna Grecia) remained part of the Greek-speaking Eastern Roman Empire, and during the seventh century this part of Italy received a great influx of Greek-speaking inhabitants, who had escaped from Palestine, Syria, Asia Minor, and Egypt in consequence of the conquests of the Persians and Arabians.

Though before the rupture between Rome and Byzantium the majority of the Popes from Theodore I (642) to Zacharius (741) were Greek-speaking, yet these inhabitants of the South of Italy never spread their culture freely through the West of Europe. Still there were a few exceptions such as St. Theodore of Tarsus who became Archbishop of Canterbury (668-690).

The general revival of learning in Western Europe must be attributed to the Emperor Charlemagne (742-814) who, had Alcuin (735-804) for his chief adviser.

Alcuin had been taught in the school at York under Egbert, Archbishop of York (732-766). Alcuin became Abbot of Canterbury and first went to the Court of the Emperor Charlemagne as an ambassador for King Offa of Mercia. It was under Alcuin that Charlemagne founded his School of the Palace, according to some this was held in Paris, according to others at Aix la Chapelle, but the majority of historians are of the opinion that the School actually followed the Court of Charlemagne with him from place to place.

It was at this School of the Palace that Alcuin taught the

three Arts the trivium, grammar, rhetoric and dialectic or logic ; also the four sciences the quadrivium, arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy. This method of distribution of the arts and sciences was undoubtedly invented by Alcuin and for centuries remained the recognized plan of instruction.

We find then in the ninth century three Schools at Paris, at the cathedral, at St. Geneviève and at St. Germain des Prés : and it is clear that Alcuin also founded one at the abbey of St. Martin at Tours of which he became Abbot and where he eventually died. It was Alcuin, who compared the Gregorian Sacramentary, sent to Charlemagne in 784 by Pope Adrian, with the Gelasian Sacramentary of St. Denys written about 732, which was then in use in the Gallican Church. Alcuin was also probably responsible for the Capitulary "De Litteris colendis" dated 787 sent by Charlemagne to all the cathedrals, churches, and monasteries in his realm, which after referring to the illiterate character of some of the missives sent by the Church Dignitaries to the Court says : "On reading these letters and considering their lack of skill we began to be afraid lest the writers' knowledge and understanding of the Holy Scripture might also prove to be much less than it ought to be. Wherefore we now exhort you, do not neglect the study of literature, but with a humble effort, well pleasing to God, seek learning with all your might so that you may be able the more easily and correctly to penetrate the mysteries of God's Book. In its sacred pages you will find inserted many figures of speech, turns of rhetoric and such like things and there can be no doubt that the more fully a man has been instructed in literary knowledge the more quickly will he understand the spiritual meaning of what he reads. So let more be chosen for this task as will have the power to learn and also have the desire to teach others."

The schools thus founded were sadly reduced by the invasion of France by the Normans in 855 who devastated Brittany, Neustria, Perche, and Aquitaine. Whilst the Danes, who overran England from 827-871 wrought such destruction there that King Alfred (871-901) was forced to declare at the beginning of his reign that there was not a priest south of the Humber who could read a letter in Latin or translate any portion of the Liturgy.

It was, however, Bruno the Saxon, a cousin of Otto the Great, Archbishop of Cologne and afterwards Pope John XIII (965-973), who collected the Scottish bishop Israel from Treves to teach Greek in the Royal Palace School, he also collected manuscripts from Italy and generally restored the liberal arts, history, rhetoric, poetry and philosophy and likewise revived the monasteries of Reichnau and St. Gall.

But to return to the time of Alcuin it may be well to obtain some idea of what profane literature was extant in Western Europe in his day.

First of all mention must be made of :—

I. The *Timaeus* of Plato.

II. (a) A Latin translation of some of Aristotle's works on Logic, which adopts a Platonic view.

(b) A commentary on the Latin translation by Victorianus of the *Isagoge* or the *Introduction to Aristotle's Logic by Porphyry*, which adopts an Aristotelean view.

(c) *De Consolatione Philosophiae*.

These were the works of Anicius Manilius Torquatus Serverinus *Boethius* (470–524), who after living at the Court of the Gothic King Theodoric was imprisoned and subsequently beheaded at Pavia on a false charge of treason.

III. The “*Satyricon de Nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii et de VII Artibus liberalibus*” a dry abstract of whatever were called the seven liberal arts by Marcianus Minaeus Felix *Capella* of Madura in Africa (c. 474).

IV. “*De septem Disciplinis*” which contained some relics of Greek Philosophy by Magnus Aurelius *Cassiodorus* (480–575), who was born at Squillacci and died in a monastery.

V. “*The Originum seu Etymologicum*” of *Isidore* Bishop of Seville (d. 636), which was much appreciated but about which Lewes is so scathing.

VI. The Works of the Venerable Bede (673–735) also enjoyed a wide circulation.

In addition to the above, it may be of interest to take a glance at those works of the later Latin writers, which were in use as text books at this period.

About 370 A.D. just before the Romans had to withdraw from the outlying portions of their Empire in the West, there flourished at Rome a set of teachers whose works became well known to posterity.

Foremost of these was *Donatus*, at one time a teacher of St. Jerome, he wrote the *Ars Grammatica* which became the mediæval textbook and remained so much so that in Chaucer we find the word “*Donat*” used as an equivalent of a grammatical lesson. There were two editions the larger containing references to barbarisms and figures of speech. Another grammarian was *Macrobius* whose *Saturnalia* contains an immense amount of

miscellaneous information including a long account of the Roman Calendar and the notable days in each month : and a commentary on Scipio's Dream in the *de Republica* of Cicero ; this is of a neo-Platonic nature.

Victorinus, *Servius*, *Charisus* and *Diomedes* were also grammarians of this period.

In connection with these mention must be made of *Priscian* (c. 500) a native of Caesarea in Spain, who wrote the famous " *Institutio de arte grammatica* " in eighteen books, which is a comparative grammar and deals with Greek and Latin equivalents. It was specially prized by such as Bede and Alcuin.

Chalcidius (375-425), a Roman wrote a commentary on the *Timaeus* of Plato. This is now thought to be but a translation of a Greek author of the second century. It contains extracts from various works of Plato besides the *Timaeus*, a statement of various Aristotelean theories, a comparison of the doctrines of Chrysippus and Cleanthus, and some theories of Pythagoras, Philo and Numenius, also extracts of pre-Socratic Greek philosophers. So that it was regarded as a regular source of history of pagan philosophy.

Vegetius flourished about this time, he wrote on the Art of War and is referred to specially by John of Salisbury.

Of historians we have *Eutropius*, *Sulpicius Severus*, and *Orosius*, the latter a pupil of St. Augustine.

In an age not renowned for its learning the books of riddles which attracted the Anglo-Saxon mind, composed by Aldhem, Bishop of Sherborne (d. 709), Huetbert Abbot (c. 730) of Jarrow and Tatwin Archbishop of Canterbury (d. 734) must not be overlooked.

Paul the Deacon (725-799) amongst his extensive works wrote an abbreviation of the " *de Verborum Significatu* " of Festus (c. 350), which is chiefly valuable because it was based on the work of Verrius Flaccus a contemporary of Augustus. The work of Festus itself has for the most part been lost.

Nor must the *Beastiarium* be forgotten ; readers of Tertullian Cassiodorius and Origen understand the prevailing habit at that time of allegorizing not merely everything in the Scriptures but everything outside them.

The world of nature seldom valued for its own sake by the typical Christian was more and more regarded as a storehouse of edifying metaphors. Facts were considered of little worth in comparison to the moral truths which could be supposed to be drawn from them, and it was considered that God had created the lower animals, particularly those that seemed to have no other use, solely for the moral and spiritual instruction of mankind.

Very little of Aristotle's objective spirit was contained in Christian thought at Alexandria, bent as it was in seeing "sermons in stones and books in running waters." Thus between 200-300 A.D. a number of animal stories, some quite obviously fabulous, drawn in part from the great "Beast Epic" of the world, were collected and each fitted with a moral after the fashion of *Æsop's Fables*.

It is doubtful whether any one individual was responsible for the collection as a whole, or whether a complete original text ever existed, though the authorship has been variously ascribed to Tatian, St. Basil, Eustathius, Epiphanius, Chrysostom, St. Ambrose and Isidore.

In the primitive forms each article began with a quotation from Scripture followed by the formulæ "but the physiologus (naturalist) says . . ." then came a description of the real or fancied traits of the animal, from which a moral was deduced, and the lesson to be learnt from it was pointed out.

Later copies separated the descriptions of the animals from the moral deductions so that each article commenced with "The Physiologus says"; in consequence it came to be thought the work of one author called Physiologus.

In later times it became known as the "Beastuary."

Though the then existing form was condemned, together with various apocryphal books of the New Testament by a Synod of Pope Gelasius in 496 as being the work of "Heretics" it remained familiar and influential throughout Christendom for over 1,000 years and there are extant texts of it in a dozen different languages.¹

Mention may for convenience also be made here of the works of the pseudo-Dionysius presented by Michael the Stammerer Emperor of Byzantium to Louis the Debonaire King of France (778-840) or by Pope Paul I to Pepin (d. 768): this Greek text was translated and commented upon by the celebrated John Scot Erigena (d. c. 886).

Though feigned to be the works of Dionysius the Areopagite the contemporary of St. Paul, the *Divine Names*, *Mystic Theology*, the *Celestial Hierarchy* and *Ecclestial Hierarchy*, as the four works were named, are strongly impregnated with neo-Platonism and are thought to have been written by one who had been either a disciple of Proclus (412-485) or even of Damascius (d. 754).

It was Abelard, who after the Councils of Soisson in 1121 being confined in the monastery of St. Denys added to his unpopularity by drawing attention to this literary forgery. But we find them quoted with approval by St. Thomas Aquinas.

Alcuin himself wrote a book *Dialectici*, which became a popular

¹ Cf., O. Shepard, *Lore of the Unicorn*.

textbook on logic, but it is only a collection of phrases gathered either from the *Etymologies of Isidore* or the *Ten Categories* of the pseudo-Augustine, whilst his psychological opinions were derived largely from the 63rd sermon of St. Augustine on the Gospel of St. John. Nevertheless at the Abbey of St. Martin at Tours we find that Alcuin taught not only the grammar of Priscian and Donat but also Cicero, Suetonius, Virgil and Horace in addition to the works of Boethius.

CHAPTER VI

UNIVERSALS REALISTS—NOMINALISTS

It was Aristotle who said that Logic and Sophistry operated in the same circle of ideas as Philosophy. But Philosophy differed from the one by its effects and from the other by the kind of life that it engenders. Logic attempts to know, philosophy knows. Which meant that logic is but an introduction to metaphysics, or philosophy properly so called.¹

But during the ninth and tenth centuries the philosophers were but little more than grammarians and based what philosophy they had on those deductions to which their enquiries into the correct use of words led them. Thus, from their enquiries into the correct classification of objects, through misunderstanding Aristotle's *Categories*, by which such classification should be made, they were led to regard the means as separate objects themselves or else as mere words. From such a beginning they went on to view metaphysics and the whole science of being from what was but a standpoint of the mere means of accurate reasoning.

They had found in the *Introduction of Porphyry to Aristotle's Logic*, as translated by Boethius, the following opening remarks, "Then it is necessary O Chrysaorus to understand the *Categories* of Aristotle and to understand what are genus, difference, species, subject and accident, and since the knowledge of these things is useful for the laying down of definitions and all that concerns division and demonstration I shall try to send you, in a succinct abridgement, in the form of an introduction, what the ancients held on this matter avoiding those questions which are too profound and dwelling for a little while on the more simple ones."

He then goes on to make that classical and historic exception the attempted solution of which occupied philosophers for some six centuries or more. "Thus I shall refuse to answer whether genus and species subsist or consist merely in simple thought, if as subsisting whether they are corporeal or incorporeal, whether in short they exist apart from sensible objects or in these objects and forming with them something coexistent. This is too

¹ Cf., *Met.*, 4, 2.

profound a matter and one which calls for too far-reaching investigation."

Such indeed was the origin from which the problems about Universals first commenced to be discussed.

What is it in reality of which we are speaking, when we call by a common name things that are not individually the same.

The way Porphyry puts it involves three separate questions. By the use of a complete universal like a genus such as animal, or a species such as human, the mind has not to be reminded of how much and of what parts exactly a thing is composed, all of which are enumerated by the use of a single or collective word, which, however, in itself does not represent either this or that group of associated individuals nor either a general or particular number of individuals.

The first question is whether such a complete universal is a true being in itself, a subsisting reality "sive subsistant" or whether it is merely a simple conception of the matter "sive in solis nudis intellectibus consistant."

The second question, if it is admitted that universals, genus and species do in fact subsist, then are they or are they not bodies themselves so as to exist apart from individuals, which alone are apparent to the senses.

And *the third question* is whether this thing, which is the genus or species, really only exists in the mind of the person considering it.

Aristotle agreed with Plato that the particular cannot be named or defined except by means of the Universal. "A thing is proved by facts, that is without the Universal it is not possible to arrive at science."²

With regard to the first question then, if one begins by declaring that Universals have no correspondence in the region of things and are pure notions of the intellect there is no call for examination as to where or how these Universals subsist.

As to the second question if Universals are separate things then they must be composed of matter and form according to the definition of substance. If they are of such composition they must be bodies and it is necessary to find what are the places that such bodies occupy. Or they are incorporeal like souls, and the substance of Angelic Nature, and of God, and thus differ from mere thoughts. Some think so and that they really subsist in the Divine Intelligence.

With regard to the third question it is argued by some that it is unnecessary to ascribe being to Universals, it is sufficient to admit them into the treasure house of subjective certainty. This does

² *Met.*, 13, 9.

not mean that they are really present in the mind of individuals. They are not mere concepts but are something in the nature of things ; they are not things of themselves subsisting apart from sensible objects, but a thing making body with them, in short as coexisting with things, according to John of Salisbury.

Aristotle described them as inherent qualities but not adherent qualities like accidents. For example, Socrates must be a man and he may be white.

We have in previous chapters dealt with the metaphysics of Aristotle, but it must be remembered that during the ninth and tenth centuries these were not available to the Philosophers in Western Europe.

However, to get a clear understanding upon what this question of Universals really depended and to appreciate the way in which its discussion was gradually unfolded, it will be as well at the outset here to indicate more precisely what gave rise to its importance and why it should even now claim our attention.

These problems were not indeed questions of logic, but rather of metaphysics, for as Caird has so clearly summed it up : " In their attempts to explain the nature of knowledge both Plato and Aristotle were confronted with the ultimate question as to what is the ground of unity in things known ; in what way does thought unite the detached attributes of things into a subjective whole ; and what is the nature of the unity which binds things, themselves in a sense units, into classes or wholes, and how comes it that in the judgment subject and predicate are in a sense set at one."

It is true that Porphyry set these questions aside in his *Introduction*, but Aristotle had long before pointed out that the real question is, what is " Being ? " If Being is defined as that which is most general, one must look for it beyond genus and species, which only possess being by participation. It is necessary to rise up to generalisms and amongst such to find the one which comprises all.

That will be the unique being, the perfect being, and strictly speaking the sole object of science.

If being is accepted as anything less general than such, then it is necessary to try and find it below amongst genus, below that in species and only stop at the individual properly so called.

The Realists adopted the former seeing in the supreme unity the substantial foundation, the subject of all lesser number but they appeared to their opponents to endow with reality a pure abstraction.

The Nominalists adopted the other attitude and without disputing the affinity and natural similarity of things of the same classification, they absolutely denied that there was any identity

of substance between them, and appeared in this way to reduce to simple names whatever was said of things in a general way.

Later on, under Abelard, the Nominalists came to be called Conceptualists, because, whilst maintaining that Universals were but concepts of the mind, they rejected that extravagant negation of the reality of all that which serves as a foundation for such concepts, in short they insisted that such concepts were based on reality and not on mere fiction.

It may be well to notice here the objections taken to either view. To take the argument of the Realists, that being is the most general, now if we climb the metaphysical steps with them to what do they attain? They reach that which is simple and without any composition "being in itself," that is to say the *αὐτόζῶον* of the neo-Platonists. But how do they explain, asked the Nominalists, the nature of such a supreme kind, is it determinate or simply indeterminate? If it is indeterminate, it does not produce being in act, but only being in potentiality.³ But as it is defined as the sole source of being, everything that exists participates in its essence, so that there is nothing whatever in action, which is impossible.

This argument arose, as Lewes points out, from a confusion of the non-specified with the non-existent.⁴

On the other hand if it is determined, then, as the principle and foundation of all existence, it extends to the limit of beings determined like it, by it, and apart from it there does not appear to be anything. This first reality contains in effect according to the foregoing, the essence of generalisms, which contains the essence of genus, which contains the essence of species, which contains the essence of individuals: from which it follows that generalisms, genus, species, and individuals subsist not only by this first reality, but also in it, since the mind can conceive nothing outside of it except a negation. Thus all things are integral parts of this being.

To this it was replied by the Realists that such things are but misleading or variable appearances, under which truth hides itself from our imperfect intelligence, which can only conjecture the Unity, but does not know it. However the Nominalists alleged that such is just what Aristotle charged Parmenides with and in fact is the pantheism now attributed to Spinoza.

On the other hand the Nominalists held that being is that which is most individual. This man, this horse, this house, there are three beings. But this man Socrates, has he not something in common with this man Plato? They belong to the same species, humanity; and they with this horse belong to the same genus,

³ Cf., p. 86.

⁴ Cf., p. 71.

animal ; and genus, animal, with all other genus, have being in common. But ask the Realists what is common to all, has it no reality ? If there is no real foundation to all collective definition is not all science vain ? All science supposes an object capable of being defined, that is to be compared under some aspects with other objects which are like it. How can you define Socrates, if what is said primarily of this substance and all others is not real, and if the very existence of Socrates is not real, or indeed is, so far as reality is concerned, only the sound of a voice ?

To this the Nominalists reply that the vocal sound represents an idea, which without being a representation of some universal nature is not all together wanting in a real foundation, since it comes from diverse things of which it represents a perceptible similarity. So that neither species, genus, and that which is the most general is of itself substance, since substance properly speaking is the individual, but yet they are that which is clearly and distinctly conceived as inherent in those individual natures which form collectively a collection of beings.

Again there are three ways of considering the Universal, genus or species, as before, after, or in, individuals or things.

Plato believed in two principles, formless matter and Spirit the artisan of all forms. According to him, God thought of the world before giving it actual forms, or in other words ideas and species were in God from all eternity, and in time by an act of His free will. God had clothed the passive object with certain forms, which are the perishable images of His eternal thoughts. When the forms communicate essence to the subjacent matter they act by *μέθεξις* participation, that is to say that the forms participate in the ideas but are not identical with them.⁵

According to Aristotle followed by Tertullian, St. Albertus Magnus and St. Thomas Aquinas, Plato held that the real Universals or ideas are not simply Divine concepts, but are eternal forms realized outside of the Pure Intelligence and separated from it, constituting a collection of intermediary beings called the Archtypical world, in which the Demiurge has wished to realize his proper ideas before creating our sub lunar regions. But according to Plutarch, the Alexandrines, Plotinus, Porphyry, Jambelicus, and Proclus, followed by Cardinal Bessarion, Marsilius Ficinus and Pic de la Mirandole, Plato was only distinguishing the Divine Intelligence itself from its own thoughts, and Plato did not really consider that the Archtypical world existed. Plato considered that man's intelligence is only a mirror in which are produced very imperfectly the rays of the Eternal Light of the Supreme Intelligence.

⁵ Cf., p. 36.

So that the place of the concept of the Universal is in the human understanding, but the true place of the real Universal is in the Divine Understanding.

In this way Plato held that Universals exist before individuals or things, as principles of generation enjoying as such a proper and permanent existence, whilst individuals being subject to the law of motion have nothing fixed or stable and are simply appearances of being.

Hence for Plato the Universal has a prior existence to the thing, it is "*ante rem*."

On the other hand, Aristotle climbs the ladder that Plato descended. Aristotle begins with substance, which is not so much general as individual. Substance according to Aristotle is superior and is "*primus*"; strictly speaking it is not said of a subject and is not in a subject. It constitutes the personality of each subject; this man exists, this horse exists, Socrates exists, Callias also exists. The form of the substance constitutes the quiddity of the individual object.

Being is not absorbed by such and such an individual, but all individuals possess existence. Hence there is no universal substance. Thus, it is not said of all, it is not a reality of itself, but as said of an individual it is a reality.

Though we can in our mind make a composite of an ideal form and an ideal matter so that there is a composite in act in our mind, yet we cannot say that such is a real composite in nature. Thus species is not a true substance but a secondary substance. It is an accessory being, which apart from substance loses its reality. Yet although Aristotle calls Universals qualities, they are inherent qualities and not adherent qualities like accidents, *e.g.*, Socrates must be a man but he may or not be white.

Hence, for Aristotle, the Universal is not real, but at the same time it is inseparably united to the real substance that is to the individual, so that it is "*in re*."

There remains a third aspect of Universals, generally described as Nominalist, which posits the Universal "*post rem*."

According to this view our senses are the only certain warrant of existence and they only reveal the individual. Universals can therefore be only our own generalizations from observed facts and hence Universals are only concepts in our minds "*post rem*."

Hauréau, himself a pronounced Nominalist, goes so far as to say that "whoever holds the Universal before the thing, in the Divine Mind; whoever regards it as in the things but prior to these things and serving them as subject, as their common support; whoever regards it as after the things in the human mind, as a permanent form and indispensable instrument of thought;

whoever makes one or other of these ingenious and bold suppositions affirms that with which he is unacquainted and points out that which he does not see, which is the true characteristic of the Realists."

We have thus two main divisions of thought the Realists and the Nominalists.

The Realists on the one hand posited Universals in the Divine Intelligence. They regarded things eternal as alone being truly real, for they considered that things temporal are but images which the human mind can but dimly comprehend, and that true understanding is possessed only in so far as the mind is enlightened by the Divine Light.

Yet as it is human reason, which is thus enlightened it must not be disregarded, but treated as a handmaiden to Faith.

The Nominalists on the other hand, following Aristotle, regarded Universals as only to be found in the individual things and that as a classification Universals themselves are but concepts in the human mind with no connection with any reality other than such as is provided by the five senses.

Thus those, who followed the line of thought of Plato and his doctrine of Ideas, became by a paradox known as Realists, whilst the name Idealists or Nominalists was given to those who following Aristotle's teaching, regarded all knowledge as based on that which is perceptible by the five senses alone.

Thus the logical extremists of the Realists were accused of sheer pantheism, as seeing God Himself in every one of His works, whilst the extremists of Nominalism were accused of proving by their own reasoning that they were incapable of any reason at all ; in short that all they knew was that they did not know.

John Scot Erigena (800-877) carried realism to extreme logical conclusions in one direction even as Roscellinus (1050-1125) acquired the reputation of a mad sceptic by his extreme logical deductions as a Nominalist.

During the ninth and tenth centuries the Philosophers were, as has been said, but little more than logicians and were only possessed of the *Timæus* of Plato and parts of the Organon of Aristotle so that generally speaking they were without exception unreflective Realists.

M. Hauréau the great French Archivist, himself a keen supporter of the Nominalists has endeavoured to show that even during this period there were a few Nominalists as such, *e.g.*, Agobard, of Narbonne, Archbishop of Lyons (779-840), Rabanus Maurus Archbishop of Mayence (776-856) and Heiricus of Auxerre b. 841: but Cousin considered that their works contained no more than the germs of Nominalism.

CHAPTER VII

JOHN SCOT ERIGENA, D. 877
ST. REMI OF AUXERRE, D. 876

OF the various schools founded by Charlemagne there continued to flourish under Louis the Debonair and Charles the Bald, besides that of the Palace those at Tours, Lyons, Orleans, Mayence, Fulda, le Mans, St. Gall, Corbie, Corvey, Reichenau, and Ferrières.

It is not known when John Scot Erigena 800-877/886 left Ireland and came to the Court of Charles the Bald, but he was a leading teacher in the School at Paris in 851, when Hincmar Archbishop of Rheims invited him to reply to logical deductions from the Doctrine of Predestination raised by the monk Gottschalk who had been supported by Ratramus of Corbie (d. 868), which had been condemned by the Council of Chiersey in 849.

At the Court of Charles the Bald, Scot in 858, who knew Greek as well as Latin, undertook the translation¹ from the Greek of the pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite first Bishop of Athens (Acts XVIII, 34).

These works were probably written about 500 A.D. by a Greek monk who had come under the influence of Proclus and the neo-Platonists. However, again confusing Dionysius the Areopagite with St. Denys of Paris, d. 272, the founder of the Abbey of St. Denys they were given to its Abbot as the works of the Founder. Various accounts are given as to the way they got there, according to some they were given by Pope Paul I, to Pepin in 757 according to others they were given by Pope Adrian I to Fulfred Abbot of St. Denys in 780, but the more usually accepted opinion now is that they were sent by the Emperor of Byzantium Michael II, the Stammerer to Louis the Pious in 827.

Scot amongst other works wrote *De Divisione Naturae*.² Nature is the manifestation of the Divine Unity under four forms: God which is not created but creates; Creative Idea which is created and creates; the Sensible Universe which is created but does not

¹ B.M.R.L., 7B IX f. 5, *De divinis nominibus*, thirteenth century.

² The original manuscript is still at Rheims, cf. E. K. Rand. *Autographa des J. Scotus* (*Paleographische Forschungen de Traube V. Akad. Wiss.*, Munich, 1912, with photographs of original MS. *De Divisione* at Rheims).

create ; and First Cause or God which is neither creative nor creates. It adopts neo-Platonic doctrines and asserts that God is the essence of all things, that from the plenitude of His nature they are all derived and to Him ultimately return. Scot made *ovvia* substance the same as essence or being and attributed substance even to accidents, *situs* and *locus*.

The mode of being of the subject and what is said of the subject are all one and the same thing.

Everything perceived by the senses or observed by the intelligence is but an accident of an incomprehensible self.

One does not know the essence of God, it is an inaccessible light, but in contemplating the rays of that light one knows that the light exists.

Such extreme form of realism was adduced in favour of the heresy of pantheism by Almeric of Bène, d. 1207, and David of Dinant, c. 1209, and the work of Scot was in consequence condemned by Honorius III in 1226.

He also wrote *De Divina Praedestinatione et Gratia*. Dual Predestination postulates the divisibility of what is simple (without parts) and indivisible : this was condemned both at Valence 855 and Langres 859.

Credence is not now generally given to the account that Scot was invited by King Alfred to Oxford and that he was eventually killed by his pupils at Malmesbury Abbey. It was another Scot, the Saxon, who was brought to England by King Alfred and who was made Abbot of Athelney.

Oudin is of the opinion that the epitaph in Malmesbury Abbey

*“ Conditor hoc tumulo sanctus sophistae Joannes
Qui ditatus erat vivens jam dogmate miro
Martyrioque tandem meruit conscendere coelum
Quo semper cuncti regnant per saecula sancti.”*

was wrongly inserted by Thomas Gale, c. 1681, at the beginning of the work on *De Divisione Naturae of John Scot Erigena*.

It cannot be maintained, as suggested by some, that John Scot Erigena was the founder of scholasticism and it is very doubtful what meaning he himself attached to ‘ *Conficitur inde veram esse philosophiam veram religionem conversimque veram religionem esse veram philosophiam* ’ (De Div. praedestin, C.I.), yet he must ever remain a man of outstanding attainments, and as it has been said the appearance of such a man in such an epoch is, from every point of view, such an extraordinary phenomenon that one might as well expect to find a monument of art in the midst of a sandy desert.

St. Remi of Auxerre, d. 876 Archbishop of Lyons, a pupil of St.

Heiricus taught in the schools of Paris, either in that of the Cathedral, in that of St. Geneviève, or in that of St. Germain de Près and followed the realism of John Scot Erigena rather than that of his teacher St. Heiricus. He presided at the Council of Valence 855 and defended St. Augustine's doctrine of grace and predestination against the attacks of Gottschalk.

He was the teacher of Odo who afterwards became the second Abbot of Cluny and who was, though not the founder, yet the creator of its fame.

He wrote commentaries on Priscian, Donat, and Martianus Capella.³ An *Interpretation of Hebrew Names*⁴ often attributed to Bede is now thought to have been written by St. Remi. A commentary on Martianus Capella and some of Cicero is preserved in a tenth century manuscript, it contains long extracts from the work of Erigena.⁵

³ B.M.R.L., 15 A, xxx, III, tenth century.

⁵ 340, *Bib. Nat.*

⁴ 589, *Bib. Nat.*

CHAPTER VIII

LOGICIANS NINTH TO ELEVENTH CENTURIES

Candide, c. 825—Rabanus Maurus, d. 856—Heiricus, b. 841—
Radbertus, d. 860—Ratramus, d. 868—Gerbert, d. 1003—
Berengarius, d. 1088—Lanfranc, d. 1089—Roscellinus, d. 1125—
St. Anselm, d. 1109—Gaunilon, c. 1060—Odon, d. 1113—
Hildebert, d. 1134—Anselm of Laon, d. 1117—Ralph of Laon,
d. 1138.

Candide, c. 825, who came from Tours was one of the pupils of Alcuin and was both a poet and a theologian. He wrote *The Image of God*, consisting of some twelve sayings presented in a syllogistic form based on St. Augustine and the pseudo-Augustine wherein comparison is made between the Trinity and the powers of the soul, memory, judgment and will.

Rabanus Maurus, d. 856, Abbot of Fulda and Bishop of Mayence was another disciple of Alcuin. He will ever be remembered as the author of the hymn 'Veni Creator Spiritus,' 'Come Holy Ghost our Souls Inspire.' His chief prose work was "De Universo," he also left a gloss on the *Introduction of Porphyry*, and a gloss on the *Interpretation of Aristotle* (the only surviving manuscript of which is bound up with the works of Abelard).¹

In speaking of the value of words, he says, that according to Boethius, the followers of Plato held that words signified certain incorporeal natures, but this is an illusion rightly rejected by the followers of Aristotle. Words are signs of ideas, and ideas are the signs of real and subsisting things. Thus the presence of this arouses the sense and sensation is produced.

Then comes the imagination whose function is sufficiently indicated by its name. Then the intellect extracts the idea from the confused image which it has received. From which it follows that strictly speaking, words signify neither things as they exist, nor things as they are perceived by the senses, nor things as they are reproduced by the images in the mind, but rather things as they are conceived by the intellect.

The opinion of Rabanus seems to follow that of Boethius that individuals alone can be counted as things, and that the Universal expresses simply an idea, not an absolutely chimerical idea, but a legitimate concept abstracted from the special or general

¹ 1310, folio 95, *Bib. Nat. St. Germ.*

similarities, which have the individual alone for a subject. Rabanus also says "to be, is said of all things that have existence, all things which exist are being, entia; but because the word ens is employed to indicate all being is it necessary to suppose that this singular substantive is the name of a unique substance, which contains and absorbs all individuals and all genus?" Aristotle, according to Porphyry, energetically denies this conclusion and Rabanus decidedly agrees with Aristotle.

From this M. Hauréau following Cousin deduces that even at this date Rabanus had founded a Nominalist School at Fulda.

St. Heiricus, b. 841, was another monk of Fulda, who studied there after Rabanus had left, and subsequently studied at Ferrières, in the diocese of Sens, under Servat Loup another disciple of Rabanus. *St. Heiricus* then taught at *St. Germaine d'Auxerre*, where he had amongst his pupils Prince Lothaire the son of Charles the Bald, and also *St. Remi* of Auxerre.

M. Hauréau points out that the "Cogito ergo sum" of Descartes though clearly enunciated by *St. Heiricus* was plainly taken by him from the *De Divisione Naturae* of John Scot Erigena who in turn had culled it from the works of *St. Augustine*.

Though *St. Heiricus* regarded John Scot Erigena, whose works he had studied, as generally his mentor, yet in his gloss on the *Ten Categories*, he is not led by the former's realism, but naïvely follows Aristotle in denying substance to Universals themselves apart from their subject. At the same time by saying that the intelligence conceives the thing, words express the thought, and letters signify the word, which words and letters are of human invention; in other words all questions are derived from three sources as to that which is, that which is perceived, and that which is said, *St. Heiricus* clears himself of any charge of regarding Universals as being "merae voces," "flatus vocis" for which as we shall see Roscellinus by his absurd logical deduction brought himself under such general condemnation.

Paschasius Radbertus, d. 860, of Corbie near Amiens. The school of Tours founded by Alcuin had served as a model for that founded at Corbie and at Fulda. *Radbertus* was the teacher of *St. Anskar* of Sweden. He wrote *De Corpore et Sanguine Christi*,² in which he formulated the doctrine of Transubstantiation adopted by the Lateran Council in 1215.

He opposed the teachings of John Scot Erigena and Pope Nicholas I complained that the opinion contained in the *De Divisione Naturae* had not been submitted to the censure.

² B.M.R.L., 8B XI, circa 1000 A.D., wrongly ascribed to Rabanus Maurus.

Ratramus, d. 868, also of Corbie, disputed with Radbertus and wrote *De Corpore et Sanguine Domini*, which was sometimes thought to be have been written by John Scot Erigena. It having been quoted by Berenagarius *sub nomine* John Scot Erigena, it was ordered to be burnt by the Council of Vercelli in 1050.

He also wrote *Contra Graecorum opposita* against the Encyclical of Photius Patriarch of Constantinople in 866, which had been aimed at Pope Nicholas I. (They afterwards both excommunicated each other.)

Gerbert de Aurillac in his youth studied at Cordova the Mohammedan capital of Spain. He became a professor at the school at Rheims and afterwards Abbot of Bobbio Archbishop of Rheims and of Ravenna and finally Pope Sylvester II, 999–1003. He is accredited with having re-introduced into Western Europe the original version of the *Ten Categories* of Aristotle. At any rate we find him teaching from them, instead of from the *Ten Categories* of the pseudo-Augustine which in fact only professed to be a paraphrase. It may be noted that the Greek text of the *Ten Categories* is still contained in a manuscript of this date in the monastery of Bobbio of which Gerbert was Abbot.

We are not here concerned with the legends of his league with the devil, by which his opponents sought at a later date to explain and belittle his undisputed mental superiority to all those with whom he came in contact.

But as his activities were more concerned with geometry and astronomy than with philosophy his works do not here call for special attention apart from his work *De Rationali et Ratione Uti*. A dispute having arisen about an alleged divergence between the *Introduction of Porphyry* and Aristotle, wherein the former states "All difference, having its predicate in the nearest difference, 'to make use of reason' 'Ratione Uti,' has for its foundation, 'the rational difference' 'rationali'; from which it would appear that the latter is in some way more general and at the same time more remote from prime substance than *ratione uti*" which was contrary to Aristotle.

According to Gerbert this dispute was puerile. The philosopher had alleged that "*ratione uti*" implied a combination of both the act and the power, whilst "*rationali*" implied only the power, so that although the power must be anterior to the act, one cannot say that the predicate of the power and the act, is the power.

In other words, reason, as the power, precedes the act which consists in the use of reason, but it does not contain it, so that it is not the predicate of that which is the act united to the power.

Gerbert followed Aristotle in distinguishing that which is

necessary from that which is merely possible. That which is necessary is always in act, but that which is merely possible only manifests itself in act after having been merely in potentiality. Acts which are not necessary are of two kinds, those which only occasionally proceed from potentiality, "when Cicero sits down" he exercises an act and this act comes from the power of Cicero in being able to sit. Then there are other acts which are not accidentally, but essentially in the subject, even as the act of burning is inseparable from fire.

In this, fire is like the celestial substances, but at the same time distinguished from them, in that the latter are eternally and unalterably necessary, whilst though the act of burning is necessarily united to this flame, which gives me light, yet this flame can and must soon cease to exist. The rational difference is, he says, one of these eternal necessary principles which never lose their substance; substantial differences themselves like species and genus are endowed with a permanent essence. The one, are the forms of things or rather the forms of forms; the other, are acts, they are certain powers. Thus the rational difference considered as an intelligible is necessarily in act. In short, it is not this potentiality which can or cannot become actual, it is under this aspect a permanent immutable and necessary principle. But as these intelligibles, when they join themselves to corruptible things, are changed in the contact with bodies the result of this alteration is to make them return to the condition of potentialities which can become acts.

The rational difference or more generally genus, species, differences and accidents are diversely considered, either as among the intellectuals, or among the intelligibles, or in natural things. Then the rational difference can be diversely considered either in the eternal idea of man, or in the intellectuals, or in the intelligibles, or in terrestrial man. Those above are forms, eternal acts, here the act only produces itself by an eventual determination of the power "Cicero being a man and man being reasonable Cicero is said to be reasonable because he can make use of his reason." Thus the rational difference being inherent in the substance belonging to Cicero or belonging to man, but to make use of reason, being accidental, "ratione uti" is the attribute of "rationali," as accident is an attribute of its subject.

This attempt at eclecticism was put forward in an endeavour to reconcile even at this juncture what were really the underlying differences between Plato and Aristotle.

Berengarius, 999-1088, was educated at Tours and then with Lanfranc under Fulbert of Chartres, he returned to Tours as

Chancellor of St. Martin there. Basing all his teaching on reason, rather than faith, and carrying his logic to illogical conclusions, as Archdeacon of St. Maurice he attacked the mystery of the Eucharist in his book *De Sacra Coena*. He objected to the use of the term substance to indicate that which is real. He refused to admit that substance could represent anything more than a purely intellectual concept, which had no connection with that which is real. In short an extreme form of Nominalism. His heresy was condemned in 1050 by Councils at Rome, Brionne, Vercelli, and Paris at which he made his submission.

Lanfranc, 1005–1089, was born at Pavia and educated at Bologna and Chartres. He became Abbot of Bec in Normandy and afterwards Archbishop of Canterbury. At Bec he attained a widespread reputation as a teacher and he was called upon by Pope Alexander II to refute Berengarius whereupon he wrote his *Eleucidarium*.³ Tennemann attributes to him the honour of having perfected the study and use of logic as applied to theology. But as he was a pronounced realist, Hauréau would deny him even the claim to be a philosopher.

Roscellinus or *Rousselin*, 1050–1125, clerk of Compiègne, Canon of Besançon, in seeking to deny substance to Universals, went to the extreme consequence of terming Universals as nothing but names, sounds of the voice, and without any connection with that which is real. From this point of view, he was led to an attack on the Doctrine of the Trinity. The proposition of Roscellinus was that either the Father, Son and Holy Spirit were three separate distinct or individual Gods, existing like three angels or three souls, or rather one sole God which can be indicated under three names, on account of the diversity of its attributes; but in the mind of whom it is necessary to recognize the distinction of person. Otherwise if they are really three persons, then the Father and the Holy Spirit were incarnate like the Son. This was condemned by a Council under the Archbishop of Rheims and again by a Council under King Philip in 1094.

It was this which drew from St. Anselm his celebrated *De Fide Trinitatis*⁴ in reply. Abelard, who was a pupil of Roscellinus sought to dissociate his own theory of Conceptualism, by reducing the arguments of Roscellinus in favour of the indivisibility of the individual, in which substance is contained, to an absurdity.

Hauréau seeks to defend Roscellinus by trying to show that he was not the author of any new doctrine of Nominalism, but that

³ B.M.R.L., 5 A., XV. f. 626, twelfth century.

⁴ B.M.R.L., 5 F., IX., f. 96, twelfth century.

he was only teaching what Rabanus and Heiricus had previously insisted upon. It was, however, in his endeavour to limit substance to the individual, that he neglected to explain, when opposing the difference of a name to a thing, that he was not opposing a name to an idea.

Since no works of Roscellinus have ever been recorded and we have only the opinions ascribed to him by his opponents it is probably better to accept the statements of John of Salisbury. "*Fuerunt et qui voces ipsas genera dicerent et species, sed eorum jam explosa sententia est et facile cum auctore evanuit*"⁵ and again "*Alius consistit in vocibus, licet haec opinio cum Roselino suo omnino jam evanuerit.*"⁶

Roscellinus was a critic denying the theses of Universal substances. Abelard, coming after him, differed from him, in seeking to examine what could be the value of Universal names. All that he said about Roscellinus was "but I recollect that my master Roscellinus had this foolish opinion that nothing is composed of parts."

A twelfth century manuscript⁷ seems to contain the true opinion of Roscellinus and was probably written either by a pupil of his, or by one of Raimbert de Lille; as this volume comes from Compiègne itself, it may be safely asserted that the author was indeed a pupil of the former. If such be the case, then here is to be found the only statement extant of Roscellinus' opinion, other than that given by his opponents, and from it the description of Abelard is, as was often imagined, proved to have been distorted.

Opinion concerning Universals according to Magister R.

"Different opinions used to be held concerning the Universals, indeed each according to his fancy explained those authors and dealt with them in different ways, as it seems to us destroying authority rather than lending support to it, we on the other hand labouring for the facility of understanding and for the common weal will explain so that we may put things in a new light, not because we hold it from ourselves, but from a sound exposition of the authors. Now according to different acceptations of words subject matters are considered in different ways, so we gather opinion from words.

Yet some think that we, in our consideration, take or give something to things whether they have it or have it not. So which ever way you like, voice can be understood as general, or special, or proper, or appellative, as Priscian says in *Construction*. Now, for example, we understand this voice which is "man."

⁵ *Polycraticus*, VII, 12.

⁶ *Metalogicon*, II, 17.

⁷ 17813, folio 19, *Bib. Nat.*

But when that appellative voice is understood, it indicates some particular individual of men, and points to some Universal nature in them as, animal, rational, mortal, which is common to all of them, which is seen in the passage where Priscian says "the appellative is naturally common to many, as the same general or special substance or quality or quantity affects them."

But that is individual, which names, and does not subject nor predicate, but shows that universal thing, which is in them all and on account of which the very universal is considered.

But that is nature, according to what is indicated by that universal appellative name; it is universal, as it is applied to several and is considered in its own simplicity and not as species. Likewise, that same voice which is man is understood as proper, and signifies that thing in its simplicity and not in its inferiors, and does not refer to any inferior property in it, it names it and treats it as singular, as this "man is species." For this is understood as appellative, and it would follow that some or every man is species, which is unsuitable. And it must be noted that when it is said "man in species," by "species" no property is posited, but it is a figure, of which the following is the meaning. Species is that which is found in all, and so it is something of them. Though through this no property is posited. But if this explanation is not sufficient for anyone saying this to be figurative, let him seek better words for himself which have the same sense.

It must also be considered that man, those things according to his state being understood, because the name is figured by that as proper, is the potential man and figure of all its inferiors. For when we say "it is the potential matter," as we are making a modal, such is the meaning, matter is potential so it can become matter. For being understood in its own simplicity (purity) it has no inferior form. As is seen in the passage where Porphyry says "animal itself, this is nothing" although he is speaking of genus and we of species, because species is similar, as to being understood and in respect of its inferior forms.

Likewise, it being understood according to this state, that which is indicated by that name, as appellative, is mortal animal in act, yet, figuratively, for mortal animal is not in act by itself or personally, but by that particular inferior thing which is proper to mortal animal. To which you must pay close attention.

Man, that thing as it exists under this man Socrates himself, who is different from man by his proper nature, and also actually by his socrativity.

So I say actually, because if the socrativity be removed from man and this man should remain, then he would differ from his own

nature. But what it is, for man to differ from this man by his own nature, has to be considered. In what way they are considered to differ must be shown by a simile.

Substance and quality those two most general things, if imagined without properties, are considered in their proper nature. Likewise in the same way, as this man is the proper matter of actual Socrates, that is as Socrates is in act, yet nature precedes Socrates, because it can be before, without Socrates even before Socrates, existed, and does not concern Socrates, as to this that he exists.

But it is said, that this man is the cause though subaltern of the actual matter of Socrates, since Socrates is born out of it, as out of matter, and out of Socrates also, as out of form; and so in some way Socrates can be called the form of Socrates.

As man is in Socrates, through this man, and in Plato through this other, and is the actual matter of both, through both, namely of Socrates and of Plato by 'this' and by 'this man'; so we have it that the very same thing is the actual matter of Socrates and Plato; actual I say, by figure, because it should be said actually of its own thing; it would be false if the actual matter of both was diverse from the other in the whole, unless in some superior, in which they coincide, in man for example and in animal and in other superiors.

But concerning this species, which is called man, so is it understood both of others and of genus in the same way. But as to them it must be further added that they are never actual matter except as individuals of most special species.

But as we have said, all these other things, which belong to the roads to this judgment, as Boethius says, are like certain steps, we diligently examine the meaning, imagination, reason and intellect. The meaning therefore includes things actually as they are.

We understand by senses, the five corporal senses, viz., sight, etc. Imagination is about the same things, but in this there is added the sense which can operate on the same things, though absent, yet on both in a confused way. But as we, for example, discuss the mode of the actual matter of Socrates, as this man, we say, that sense and imagination comprehend it, according to what is in materiality, as informed by Socracity yet in a confused way, as it is said.

But reason derives the same thing from the senses and comprehends it as existing in its inferiors, indeed as a Universal and indicated by that name in quantity as appellative. But it does not consider it as species, that is as extracted from inferiors; but the eye of intellect being higher and beyond the range of univer-

ality considers it in its purity (simplicity).⁸ And as extracted from inferiors according as it is species, as is seen in the passage where Boethius says "Species is the likeness of substantiality collected from all its inferiors." Yet although that thing, in the mode in which it is comprehended by the intellect, is species; yet the authorities make efforts to deal with it, as being observed and derived from some sort of inferior like a notion, when they say "whatever is predicated universally is predicated similarly of species," and where it is said 'species is predicated of its individuals universally and thus is in many other things'."

St. Anselm, 1033-1109, was born at Aosta in Italy, he became Abbot of Bec in Normandy after Lanfranc, whom he also followed as Archbishop of Canterbury in 1089. He with St. Bernard came to be known as the last of "The Fathers."

He was a skilled logician, he did not seek to understand in order to believe but believed in order to understand, "non quaero intelligere ut credam sed credo ut intelligam."⁹

He believed that many of the virtues taught and revealed by the Divine Wisdom could be accepted without violence by the human wisdom or reason. So that reason should not be held always to be the enemy of faith.

Human reason had been condemned as being responsible for the blasphemies of Berengarius, but he believed it useful to appeal, against this condemnation of reason, both to the human conscience and to the tribunal of orthodoxy. To understand his argument, it is necessary to bear in mind that, according to the system of psychology then in vogue and employed by St. Anselm, all perception produces a phantom or picture; the imagination is a faculty functioning between those of the senses and that of reason; that the memory is full of impressed forms, and that every act of thought is an express thought.

Thus he sees with the eyes of the body individually determined things, and with the eyes of the spirit certain special and general things more or less Universal, which he says are what they are by virtue of their own proper essence.

With the eyes of the body he has received notions which have without doubt some character of truth, but the scientific conclusions, which he has drawn from these notions, have not been able to satisfy him, and all that he truly knows about the

⁸ From this it is clear that the author regarded the "voces," Universals as extracted from something existing, and not as mere sounds, which Abelard stated that his master Roscellinus had done; but even here everything of importance is indirectly stated.

⁹ *Proslogium*, Ch. 1.

real conditions of "being" is that which he has seen in nature with the eyes of his spirit.¹⁰ At the beginning of his treatise *Monologium* St. Anselm raises this question, the cause of all "beings," is it one or multiple? If it is proved that it is one, there would be nothing to discuss except the free and necessary acts of this unique cause. But some seem to think that is multiple. One cannot help recognizing that all things individually determined in the bosom of nature subsist by some internal principle and that this principle is common to them. If it is common to them, it is substantially one in all, or rather, it itself proceeds from a superior principle, which alone is substantially unique and which divides amongst things substantially different, this common attribute, existence. Here then it is necessary to choose between the one in the bosom (or essence) of things, and the one outside of things. But St. Anselm goes on to say, things which differ amongst themselves, exist only by a thing which is not one of them; and that thing alone is 'by itself,' but everything which is owing to the power of another is less than the cause which has produced all beings and which exists 'by itself.' This avoids all suspicion of pantheism.

As to St. Anselm's ontological proof of the existence of the sovereignly perfect being, which is given in the *Proslogium*, though accepted at the time was clearly discarded by St. Thomas Aquinas.

In short, it depends on the theory, that, whatever objects a reasoning man may think about, must have some basis of reality, in other words pure fiction is impossible to the human mind. Here is the passage in which it occurs.

"The sot himself understands what I mean by 'something beyond which nothing can be conceived greater' and what he comprehends is in his understanding, then even he does not comprehend the real existence of it. For that a thing may be in the understanding and that one comprehends that it exists are two different matters. But this thing 'beyond which nothing can be conceived greater' cannot exist only in the understanding alone, for if it were to exist only in the understanding, one could conceive that it exists also in reality; which is certainly a greater thing. If then this 'beyond which nothing can be conceived greater' exists only in the understanding, this 'beyond which nothing can be conceived greater' is not that which one can conceive greater: which is absurd. That which one can conceive greater exists not only in the understanding but also in reality."¹¹

For a long time Descartes was thought to be the author of this argument, but it is now clear that he got it from St. Anselm, who

¹⁰ Cf., Ch. 9, Hugo, *St. Victor*, p. 158.

¹¹ *Proslogium*, Ch. 2.

fully developed it ; though the underlying thought of it is also to be found in the works of St. Augustine.

It is, however, a description of infinity rather than a proof of God. As to the expression "ontological proof" it is a name given by Kant to any proof independent of experience and based upon a simple analysis of concepts. This description does not properly apply here, for the Metaphysics of Aristotle and the Schoolmen has as its object existing being, and not the *a priori* idea of being and the subjective conditions of its mental presence. The ontological argument has nothing in common with ontologism or the vision of the Ideas in God.¹²

Reason then knowing God, as creative cause, sees in this cause the reasons of all things created. "It is altogether impossible that anything be reasonably made by someone, if there were not already in the creative reason, the model or to speak more correctly the form, the image, the law of the thing which is to be created. Before all things were made then, the reason of the supreme nature evidently knew what they would be according to essence, quality and the other categories.

That is why as things which have been made were nothing, that it is clear, that before being produced, in so much at least as they were not what they now are, and as the matter of which they could be made did not exist, yet they were something, 'non tamen nihil erant' in reference to the creative reason, by which and according to which they came to be produced."¹³

These forms are in God the Universal ante rem. and they are in man the Universal post rem.

This more nearly follows the teaching of Plato than the extreme realism of John Scot Erigena or Gerbert.

Gaunilon de Montigny, c. 1064, a monk of Marmoutiers, wrote a *Liber pro Insipiente Adversus Anselmi in Proslogio Ratiocinationem*. (It is found bound up with the works of St. Anselm by Gerberon.)

It exposes the difficulties which beset the ontological arguments of St. Anselm "you tell me about the marvels of an island lost in the ocean and I admire the picture that you make for me. Is that equal to saying that I believe in the reality of this island? No, show it to me, I wish to affirm nothing on your word. The spirit can comprehend the false as well as the true."

St. Albert the Great called this argument of St. Anselm a Pythagorean sophism and it was discarded by St. Thomas Aquinas.

Odon, d. 1113, Bishop of Cambrai came from Orleans and taught

¹² *Wulf*, I, 124, n.

¹³ *Monologium*, Ch. 9.

first at Toul and then at Tournai in which latter place he was a determined realist.

His argument on Original Sin in his *De Peccato Originale* was as follows.

Adam and Eve in Paradise were the whole human species, when they both sinned humanity sinned.

To show that the substance of human nature had sinned in the first man and woman, Odon enquires first of all what is Substance. "It is not, says he, this individual called Peter, for the substance of Peter is that from which being comes to him, life, that is the human species. He is man first and Peter afterwards. One distinguishes Peter and Paul by certain accidents which are in no way substantial, the true substance of both is their common species. The species is common to them but God might have made it otherwise.

Thus God does not wish that there should be two birds at the same time that are phoenix, so He could have willed that Peter was momentarily the sole individual of his species. All mankind would then have subsisted in the person of Peter, as the whole species of phoenix actually subsists in this phoenix.

It is necessary therefore to define species without taking into account accidental diversities. "By the Will of God human nature is subject to participation, yet nevertheless this nature is essentially one. . . ."

When the first man was created, the human soul was first created complete in one single individual, and when it was afterwards divided among several, the essence of the human soul was altogether and wholly in two (or more) persons.

I say altogether, because no part of it subsisted apart from these persons : I say wholly, because each person was lacking in nothing of the human soul.

Notice here three things and keep them distinguished from each other, there was the human soul, the soul of Adam and the soul of Eve : these are three different things. The soul of Adam, then is the individual, the singular thing, the person, that which is not said with reference to another.

Likewise the soul of Eve is individual, the person, the singular, which refers to no one else.

As to the human soul, it is a specific nature, not individual but common, which is said of two persons and divides itself amongst them.

Thus we distinguish these three things and to make this distinction we employ not only our senses but also our reason, for it is only by reason that we can distinguish the individual from the species."¹⁴ (This is quite contrary to Aristotle.)

¹⁴ *De Pecc. Orig.*, 2.

He then goes on to explain, that the individual is a collection of accidents, whose property is such that they cannot be said of another. . . . " If the species is not composed of several but is altogether wholly in one, the species is said of this individual, whilst this individual is not said of another ; as this bird is called the phoenix and this world the world. This bird and this world are only individuals with regard to the Universal : they are not so with reference to the all, the individual being in the all, being part of the all, and the all being divided among several individuals, which cannot be themselves divided on account of their exiguity ; like unity which is part of a number and a point which is part of a line.

Thus the individual is in the Universal which is larger, and in the all it is that which is most small. In other words, different accidents change the exterior surface of the substance, which is the species ; and reason informed by the senses of the accidental diversities attributes the proper names Peter and Paul to certain circumscribed parts of the substantial whole."

We then find a more exact definition of the singular. " The property which distinguishes a thing from all others constitutes that which is called the singular. Not only individuals but also Universals are distinguished thus the one from the other, in short the Universals have their particular property, which achieves their distinction amongst themselves, if not by the senses at least by reason. Then all essence as much individual as universal is singular, and every individual is singular, although every singular need not be individual.

Finally, as to person, it is the name given to every individual endowed with reason, individuals which are lacking in reason are not called persons.

It is the substance that is vitiated by sin, and as in Adam and Eve the whole substance of humanity was comprised, the whole human substance became vitiated."

His doctrine of " Being " is expressed as follows " the prime genera of things receive essence from form ; for even as forms give being to things themselves, so prime genera cannot be except by essence ; and all other forms are the proper forms of their own special things ; common and universal essence is the form of the totality of things. Other forms make their things to be this or that, essence indeed makes all things simply to be. And since all things have their proper form, by which they are formed to be some particular thing, prime genera of things have essence by which they are formed to be. Other forms make their things what they are : and since it is one thing to be something and another to be, these other forms belong to being something and not to being. Although to be something follows to be, nevertheless it is

not by reason of these other forms that they are made to be, but they are made indeed by consequence and not by nature. Essence is primarily in prime genera so that prime genera principally may be, hence by essence in the first place they are caused to be ; then the lower genera derive from their forms to be something, so that the body has substantial being by the corporeal form. Hence forms are the causes of all things : for all the other forms are the causes of their things being something or other, essence indeed is a cause of all things being. And matter in respect of natural substance is prior to form : forms, however, if you regard being are prior to matter since they make things to be."¹⁵

In short prime genera only exists by reason of essence, whereas lower genera exists by essence but are something or other by reason of their particular forms.

From this he deduced that things acquired being as they are thought, so that to every concept of the mind there must correspond some analogous substance in reality. Thus one descends the ladder of "being" as one descends the ladder of abstraction ; the more abstract the concept the greater its reality. But Odon avoided reducing material matters to a state of non-existence, as Fridugise did, by denying that negative concepts have any representation in reality. "Generum et speciarum in essentiis veritas, in privationis vero imitatio sicut et in negationibus."

Hildegard of Lavardine, 1053-1134, first of all Bishop of Le Mans and afterwards Archbishop of Tours. He wrote some of the first essays towards popular theology, *Tractatus Philosophicus : Moralis Philosophicus*. His form of the Sentences was that followed by Peter Lombard. He also wrote *Poemata*.

According to him there is no absolute certainty for man in this life. God alone is the truth, not only because He possesses the sovereign perfection, but also because He sees in Himself that which is true justice, true wisdom, true goodness and true power. To know God would be to have a notion of these principles absolutely, conformable to their immutable reality. But we do not know God, there is no science of God, we believe simply in God by a gift of His Grace, and by faith. Faith is the certainty of things which are not subject to the bodily senses, it is less than knowledge, for to believe is less than to know ; but it is above opinion, for to believe is more than to suppose. That is to say, reason is incapable of rising above this hypothetical conjectural affirmation, which Plato calls true opinion ; and Grace itself is an insufficient light, for it is to perfect knowledge even as this present life is to the future life.

¹⁵ *De Pecc. Origi.*, I,

Faith, says Hildebert, is not contrary to reason but is above reason. If like some philosophers one does not wish to believe what the reason does not comprehend, faith in such case is without merit, the merit is to believe that which, without being contrary to reason, is above it.

The principle object of faith is Divine Essence.

Creatures are not essentially in God, but God is essentially in all creation.¹⁶

In his *Poemata* he expresses it thus :

Super cuncta	subter cuncta
Extra cuncta	intra cuncta
Intra cuncta	nec inclusus
Extra cuncta	nec exclusus
Super cuncta	nec elatus
Subter cuncta	nec substratus
Super totus	praesidendo
Subter totus	sustinendo
Extra totus	complectendo
Intra totus	est implendo

Up to this time no one had separated the Realistic Doctrine from its consequences nor raised it, as Cousin says, to a clear and precise formula capable of upholding and being held by a whole school of thought.¹⁷

Anselm of Laon, d. 1117, studied under St. Anselm at Bec. With his brother Ralph, d. 1138, he founded his celebrated school of theology at Laon. He was referred to as the *Doctor Doctorum*. Though he wrote a gloss on the Scriptures and one of his works is entitled *Flores Sententiarum* they are not philosophical. A copy of his commentary on the Canticles is still in the National Library in Paris.¹⁸

It is remarkable to find what a number of celebrated men had been his pupils, thus in addition to William of Champeaux, Bishop of Chalons and Abelard, we find others such as Guy d'Etampes Bishop of le Mans, Vicelin Bishop of Aldenbourg, Robert of Bethune Bishop of Hereford, Geoffrey le Breton and Hugh of Amiens both in succession, Archbishops of Rouen, William of Corbeil, Archbishop of Canterbury and Matthew Cardinal Bishop of Albano.

This School ceased after the death of Ralph of Laon in 1138.

¹⁶ *Tractatus theologicus.* ¹⁷ *Inedit. d'Abelard*, p. 124. ¹⁸ 568, *Bib. Nat.*

CHAPTER IX

REALISTS

William of Champeaux, d. 1121—Adhelard of Bath, d. 1110—
Walter de Mortagne, d. 1174—Hugh of Montagne, d. 1180.

MYSTICS

Hugo of St. Victor, d. 1141—Atchard, d. 1155—Richard St. Victor,
d. 1173—Walter St. Victor, c. 1180—Alcher of Clairvaux, c.
1150—Alain of Lille, d. 1203.

WILLIAM OF CHAMPEAUX, 1070-1121, Master of the School of Notre Dame, Paris, Archdeacon of Paris, 1103-1108, Prior of St. Victor, 1108, and afterwards Bishop of Chalons-sur-Marne, studied first under Anselm of Laon and then under Roscellinus. Revolted by the extreme nominalism of the latter, he became the reputed founder of logical Realism. None of his writings, which included a gloss on the Interpretation of Aristotle, have come down to us, but the substance of his teaching is explained by Abelard who was at one time his pupil. Abelard in his *Epistola Calamitatum* says "Erat autem in ea sententia de communitate universalium ut eadem essentialiter rem totam simul singulis suis inesse adstrueret individuus; quorum quidem nulla esset in essentia diversitas, sed sola multitudine accidentium varietas."

That is to say, according to William of Champeaux, the Universal is a thing which is wholly, essentially, and simultaneously in its singulars, in whom there is no diversity of essence, but only variety through the multitude of the accidents.

Now in the "*De Definitionis Divisionis*" Abelard says "some say that the differences are taken from special names and are used to indicate species, so that 'the reasonable' means 'reasonable animal' and 'animated' means 'the animated body,' thus the name of the differences should express not only the form but also the matter. This was the opinion of my master William (of Champeaux) he wished, in short, I remember, to push the abuse of words to such an extent, that when the name of the difference indicated the species in a division of genus, he did not consider it as the simple name of the difference, but held it to be the substantive name of the species. In his opinion, one

can call it the division of the subject according to accidents, since he held that the differences were accidental in the genus: So by the name of the difference he meant the species itself."

In *De Generibus et Specibus* Abelard again objects to the thesis of William of Champeaux and reduces it to an absurdity by saying that according to such thesis "Man is a species, a thing essentially one, to which are added accidentally certain forms which make Socrates. This thing, whilst remaining the same essentially, receives in like manner other forms, which make Plato and the other individuals of the human species; and apart from the forms, which applied to this matter makes Socrates, there is nothing in Socrates, which is not the same as that which is at the same time in Plato, but under the forms of Plato."¹

Abelard insisted that it followed from this, that "where Socrates is, there is the universal man, who has the Socratic form bestowed upon all its quantity, since all that takes the universal takes the whole of it, in all its quantity. If then the Universal which wholly affected Socratic form is in Rome, but at the same time is in Plato, who is in Athens, Socrates must be both in Rome and Athens at the same time, which is absurd.

There is something that seems to be the same in Socrates and Plato, they are both men and belong to the human species. William of Champeaux held, that thing which is this species is essentially, integrally, and simultaneously in Socrates, Plato and the rest of mankind. But where Socrates is, there is the integral whole of the human species, which is absurd. Hence each of the individuals do not possess the whole of the species, if Species be a thing."

But what William of Champeaux meant was that the Universal is completely in each individual without being absorbed by any of them.

Further, Abelard objected that if the Universal be the substance of the individual, all the other individuals will be this individual, so that all are one, which is the absurdity attributed to Parmenides by Aristotle (cf. p. 83).

But according to William of Champeaux the individual has no substance. The only real substance is the species, the species provides the substantial support of the individuals, which are considered as its accidents. "The Universal species is the one substance of all its individuals."

The chief objection to this proposition, according to the opinion of Hauréau, is that "it refuses the conditions of 'being' to all that is, in order to attribute them solely to that which is not."

¹ Intro. ined., *d'Abelard*, Cousin, p. 120.

According to Abelard's own account, he compelled William of Champeaux after leaving the school at Notre Dame for St. Victor, to substitute for the word "essentially" the word "individually," or according to the general reading of the manuscripts "indifferently" "indifferentier."

Hauréau gives very cogent reasons, to which Wulf does not agree, for adopting the reading *individualiter*, as though the other thesis *indifferentier* appears to have been generally attributed to Gautero de Mauritano (Walter of Mortagne, 1106-1174), it was originally sponsored by Adhelard of Bath in *De Eodem et Diverso*, dedicated to William Bishop of Syracuse, 1105-1116.

By this change of "essentialiter" to "individualiter" William of Champeaux sought to avoid the absurd conclusions, which Abelard had drawn from his proposition. Instead of saying the Universal is the very thing which is essentially following the totality of its essence in each individual, he changed it by saying "This Universal thing which is the species recurs individually in each of the individuals; or perhaps better still, the essence common to all supports individually the individual attributes of each, and under this individual form it is quite complete, at the same time, in both Plato and Socrates and all the other individuals which participate in humanity."

It is thus not a disavowal but simply a correction, he still maintained his doctrine of the unity of substance.

Adhelard of Bath, d. 1110, to whom reference has been made *supra* was an Englishman, who studied in the Schools of Tours and Laon and taught at the latter place. He then travelled in the East for seven years in Greece, Asia Minor, Arabia, and Egypt, before returning to France. His most celebrated work was *Per difficiles Questiones Naturales*² about various natural history problems. His cosmology was based on an atomism like that of Democritus in which he was followed by William of Conches.

But for our purpose his unedited work *De Eodem et Diverso*,³ dedicated to William Bishop of Syracuse (1105-1116), is that of chief importance. In it is set forth for the first time the realist doctrine of "non-difference" or "indifference."

"By the phrase 'nihil omnino est praeter individuum' they follow Aristotle in regarding the Universal as being *in re*, but they distinguish essence from substance.

Instead of regarding species genus and the rest as inherent attributes of the individual, they regard that which is non-difference or common as the very substance, and all essence as being individual."

² 18081, folio 196, *Bib. Nat.*

³ 2389, *Bib. Nat.*

Now, Adhelard says genus and species are the very essence, and also the names, of things. It is the same essence which is called genus, species, and individual, but considered according to different aspects (*respectus*). As objects of the senses, and as indicated by singular names, and those distinct in number, they are called individual, *e.g.* Socrates, Plato. Considering the same, not according to their sensible diversity, but as man, they are called species, or if as animals, they are called genus.

In considering species, one does not suppress the individual forms, but merely leaves them out of account, since species do not produce such forms.

Similarly with regard to genus, one does not think that species disappear, but merely for the nonce one is not concerned with them. Accustomed as we are to deal with sensible things, which involve dimensions and place, you cannot contemplate a simple sign representing species, if you go looking for its limitation of number or its place, for it has none.

Imagination (that is the mental picture) troubles the reason in the case of mortals, but as to the Divine Intelligence, which has clothed matter with a mantle so light and varied, it conceives directly and distinctly, matter detached from form, forms separate from each other, or all taken together, without being hampered by the imagination.

For before all things, which are perceived by the senses, had been composed or associated they existed "simply" (without parts) in the Divine Intelligence.

That which is the object of the senses being genus, species, and individual, Aristotle was correct in saying that genus, species, and individual are not found anywhere but in things. All of them are in fact objects of the senses, for those who consider them with sufficient care. But for mortals these things called genus and species cannot be contemplated "simply" and in themselves without the aid of imagination. Plato indeed said that they are conceived and do exist apart from sensibles even, that is to say in the Divine Intelligence.

According to the argument of non-difference, individuals occupy the whole universe, but do not these essentially isolated individuals have moral affinities amongst them resulting in needs, instincts, and sentiments like opinions? The *esse* of things, the act, which gives them being is not that which is based on difference, but rather that which constitutes their identity.

Thus no Universal is real apart from its particular. But what is the subject of all reality? What is the first act in respect of which all the other conditions of being are defined as adventitious circumstances? It is not the individual, it is that which consists

of the non-difference amongst individuals, that is to say in the first place substance, then genus, then species.

Substance is the supreme non-difference, which receives the difference of genus, species, and individual, and being the non-difference, in the most absolute degree, it is "per se" and communicates to its inferiors.

In the order of understanding, the individual comes first, according to the order of generation, the Universal and particular come together, for there is no real species apart from individuals, nor real genus, apart from species. But in order of definition the Universal comes first.

In short, the definition of the non-difference gives the permanent substance, whilst the definition of the difference gives only an ephemeral form.

This doctrine is realist, because it defines the Universal *in re*, not as that which is said of all beings, but as that which is said of common being, the common subject of all form.

Likewise, it realizes objectively in the Divine Intelligence all that which corresponds to the definition of the Universal abstracted from things, which the Nominalists held to only subsist in the human intelligence, if a concept can be said to subsist anywhere.

Thus William of Champeaux according to his re-considered views, held that species was not the essence of the individual, but the Universal subject upon which is imposed the form of individuality. Whilst the supporters of the non-difference held that the "embodied one is the non-difference," which constitutes the identity of individuals either in species, genus, or substance; whereby one admits the intelligible "one" as the immediate cause, though Eternal and Divine, of all that which here below possesses the character of the Universal.

Under these diverse formulas lies the thesis of the substantial unity of being.

According to Hauréau, in the former case the idea is enunciated first, *a priori*, and realized in the bosom of things, so that the idea is assumed to be in the intelligence without any examination of how the intelligence conceived this idea: in the latter, the psychological method is followed, the order in the demonstration follows that in which the ideas are formed, it proceeds from notions, gathered by the senses, to those which the imagination transmits to the reason, in order to prove the truth that reason alone knows the truth of things and that it is even capable of reaching beyond things this truth in Divine Intelligence. It was this latter, which was followed by the eclectic realists of the next century.

Walter or Gautier de Mortagne in Flanders, 1106-1174, taught

at the school of St. Geneviève 1136-1144 and became Bishop of Laon, 1155. He is referred to by John of Salisbury in the *Metalogicon II*, Ch. 17. He was the head of the realist party of his day and was generally considered to be the originator of the non-difference theory, which however as has been shown, was first put forward by Adhelard of Bath. In point of fact his "status" is the same as the "respectus" of Adhelard of Bath. But he went so far as to hold that God is essentially in every creature and that every creature is in Him.

The most important of his works are a *Liber de Matrimonio* and a *Liber de Trinitate*, also a Letter against the theology of Abelard and we also have his Letter to Thierry of Chartres (Cf. p. 170).

A special unedited treatise on *Genus and Species* is to be found in a twelfth century manuscript in the National Library at Paris⁴, which is included amongst those given by the Canons of Notre Dame to Louis XV, having formally belonged to the Benedictines of St. Corneille at Compiègne, where Roscellinus came from.

It is based on the doctrine of non-difference and is deemed by Hauréau to have been the work of Walter of Mortagne or one of his pupils.

He begins by saying that there is no common opinion, and therefore to arrive at the right solution each opinion must be refuted. To commence, he deals with the opinion of William of Champeaux, Odon of Tournay and St. Anselm. "Est autem Antiqua Sentientiae" that is the doctrine generally held in the eleventh century and in the twelfth down to the time of Abelard and even after. "Any genus whatsoever naturally precedes its subaltern, for upon it certain forms of the subalterns are added, which diminish the general nature to the subaltern. We can see this in the genus animal, which precedes in nature, and upon which these differences rational and irrational, mortal and immortal supervene, which divide animal and specify the particular division. Some divide and some constitute, since opposite and division and similars all constitute "cohaerentes."

But just as animal is a thing naturally pre-existing before receiving accidents, so that animal nature, if all accidents by which it is reduced should be separated from it, would remain one and the same as before the reception of the accidents. Indeed I say "would," because unless they are absolutely without understanding they do not admit, when all accidents are destroyed by which it is effected, that it remains animal in act. For if rationality and irrationality, etc., which effect animal, be destroyed, of necessity the individual animal would be destroyed, since if

⁴ 17813, folio 16.

that should happen animal would not remain in act, as Aristotle says "the first substance being destroyed it is impossible for anything else to remain."

But since, as was said above, animal is naturally one essence and is also the matter of all subalterns, the whole essence itself essentially exists in each of its subalterns.⁵

Others said that the species was not absorbed by each individual, but that it was in each, but not integrally.

He recognizes this as a beautiful theme, though false ; for first, according to it both God and ass could be said to be at the same time in more than one place. Or that God without accidents would not exist, but in God there are no accidents. Further it would make all man's acts to be those of God. Likewise, a boy would, before he grew up, possess the nature of a man, etc.

He proves that animal is sufficient basis for accidents and that it is the genus. Socrates is animal.

The author then declares his own opinion in favour of "non-difference" in the following terms, which though full of repetitions and some obscurities contain various sound arguments and are included here as affording an excellent example of the writing, language, and methods of the period ; written in the twelfth century the copyist is dealing with contemporary thought.

"Whatever is individual, it is from the effect of things that the truth of a thing is judged in all its aspects. If genus and species exist, they are but as matters of individuals and hence they must be individuals. But a thing itself is individual, genus, species, so that the same essence is genus, species and individual ; so that Socrates is individual and ultimate species, and subaltern genus and ultimate genus. Though quality is discerned through different aspects, yet the aspects of man have no bearing on the essence of things, for the aspect of no one confers on the thing itself either being on that which does not exist, or non-being on that which exists. Hence if anyone regards Socrates, in as much as he is Socrates, that is in all the property of Socracity, he finds it without any agreement, but rather differing from everything else owing to the Socracity which appears in him alone and which can be in no other either as the same or similar. Since nothing is entirely similar to Socrates according to the "state" of Socrates and thus Socrates according to this different state is individual.

Hence this designation which is Socrates if fitly given to himself, indicates him according to such a "state." But in Socrates under this aspect, generality exists and we say that Socrates as Socrates, is genus, by which we mean merely that Socrates is a support of generality. But it is this support and not

⁵ Cf., Ch. IX, pp. 144-145.

generality which seems to be predicated. For if anyone regards this generality, in respect of the simple nature of accidents, he will be able to predicate it of Socrates, but not in respect of that which is subaltern.

In this way Socrates is genus, that is generality inheres in Socrates, which can be seen in a similar way. When there is paternity in some part of Socrates it can be fitly predicated of that part of Socrates, by this name which is father. Yet it must not be predicated in respect of relation, since it is not in that part in respect of relation but in respect of the whole: so although generality is in Socrates, since it is not his proper form, it is not predicated in that respect of subalterns. But Socrates viewed simply, not as Socrates, that is, not in all the property of Socrates but in a certain respect, as that which is animal, rational, mortal, is according to this 'state' already both different and indifferent. He is different from anything else, in this way that Socrates himself, neither according to his 'state' as man, nor according to any other, is essentially anything of anyone else, likewise he is indifferent, in that he is like to some such as Plato and other individual men, in that animal, rationality, mortality, is in each one of them. And note, that Socrates and whatever is indivisible of man, as to that which is in any way animal, rational, and mortal are one and the same.

I do not say essentially, because he cannot be so in his own being, for none of them is anything of any other with regard to this 'state' and its opposite, but they are the same, that is indifferent, as to the "state" of man.

Take the case of Socrates, as to species of man, he is ultimate species, because as to this "state" he coincides with such individual man. Likewise Socrates himself, as to the "state" of animal, is genus and species, for animal is genus of man and species of body. Also Socrates as to "state" of substance is most general genus. Again note that, since Socrates as to the "state" of man is species, according to the same "state" he is in several and the matter of many. I do not say essentially but by indifference, certainly as to his own matter essentially, and that of Plato and that of other individual men by indifference because, since each of them as to the "state" of men is essentially matter of himself, and Socrates is their matter, because one and the same is both Socrates and another individual of man according to the "state" of man.

Likewise, Socrates, as to the "state" of animal is genus and matter of all other animals, of himself essentially, of the others by indifference, because as was said above, since whatever is the matter of others is matter essentially of itself and Socrates is their

matter, as Socrates, and all these are one and the same in that they are animal, that is indifferently.

Likewise, Socrates as to the "state" of substance, is genus of all substances, of himself essentially, of the others by indifference. And this quality must be specially noted, Socrates, as to the "state" of man is his own matter as to the "state" of Socrates. To be sure before the reception of certain forms he is not in man, as he is in any other things which actually exist, and afterwards when he has received them, they become his own matter, even as brass actually exists beforehand and after having received certain forms, which it had not before, is turned into a statue.

Such is not so, as to the "state" of Socrates, as he himself is a man in act and was prior to Socrates, for he is man and Socrates at the same time; though in a certain way he is said to be his own matter even as brass preceded both forms by the reception of which it was turned into a statue. So it is understood that that essence which was prior, at the same time both to Socrates and to man, could be rational, mortal, animal before Socrates and so it seems to me whilst only paternal semen it had the habit before having the form of man as Socrates, before having this rationality, mortality which socratically is the form of Socrates.

Hence Socrates, according to the form of man is prior to himself as the form of Socrates, that is more worthy, since it is determined (limited) and that being destroyed Socrates cannot remain according to the "state" of man.

It would indeed be impossible for such essence as man not to be, and yet for Socrates to be. But whenever Socrates is destroyed according to the "state" of Socrates, that is when one removes the Socraticity, yet the nature of the thing permits that that rational, mortal, animal essence should remain.

Likewise, it must be observed that in this opinion it was accustomed to be said, according to Master W., that in this proposition "Socrates is man" Socrates is predicated of Socrates; and in this "Plato is man," Plato of Plato. But because it was understood Socrates as Socrates, that essence is predicated according to the "state" of man and the same of the others, so that the one is said to be predicated of the many and the different. Because all, that is according to the "state" of man, is one, but according to the individual are diverse. But it seems to us that in this proposition "Socrates is man" Socrates according to the "state" of man is no more predicated concerning Socrates than Plato or any other according to the same "state," and that the "sound" "vox" which is "man" does not refer us to one more than to the other. Such being the case certainly "Socrates is man" always predicates Socrates according to the "state" of

man concerning Socrates and this indeed should follow and it is the true consequence "if Socrates is man Socrates is Socrates" and this "if Socrates is man Socrates is not Plato," yet it would not be true "if Socrates is not man Socrates is not Plato" because if owing to "Socrates is man" the "state" of Socrates is predicated by its own separation, certainly Socrates "Socrates is not man" would remove it, that is to say Socrates according to the "state" of man and nothing else.

For if this should be so, the essence of Socrates being taken away, Plato would never be taken away. And moreover "Socrates is not man" in so far as it removes the essence of Socrates could not be converted simply into this mode "no man is Socrates." For according to this proposition "no man is Socrates" Socrates would remain apart from all other individuals of man according to the "state" of man and consequently this would be false. For it would not follow that if the essence of Socrates be removed from itself, therefore it would be removed from all the individuals of man.

Likewise, if that proposition "no man is Socrates" dealt only with Socrates, both in the subject and predicate, it would be a true consequence, but it would be an abuse to regard "no" which is a collection of many as dealing with Socrates alone. Hence we say, what seems to us better, that when we say "Socrates is man" nothing is predicated concerning Socrates by this nor is Socrates by himself anything of any other. Yet we do not deny that Socrates may be predicated of Socrates, but it is not signified by this proposition "Socrates is man"; rather this name that is "man" refers us equally to Socrates and others, yet to no one "per se" does it refer and such is the meaning: Socrates is some man, but that, which this voice (word) which is "man" here deals with are individuals so far as they are in act. Thus I limit the act of the effective voice (word) itself, because if that voice (word) which is "man" be understood according to the proper construction, forsooth it does not predicate those things so far as they exist nor so far as they do not exist, since "man" directs the mind to rational, mortal, animal equally whether it exists or does not exist is another matter.

But it is objected to these opinions, when the same essence is both genus and individual like Socrates, nothing is inferior nothing is superior.

To which it is replied, when the same essence is both genus and individual in Socrates, that, according to the "state" animal, is superior, because it includes itself essentially and others by indifference; whilst that essence according to the "state" of man or of Socrates is inferior, because it includes the fewer.

Likewise, it is objected, since Socrates according to the "state" of man is species, it must be predicated of several and so be this material of many. The solution of this objection is in the terms themselves of the proposition. For it is said that Socrates accordingly to the "state" of man is the matter of himself essentially, of others by indifference. Certainly since Plato is the matter of himself essentially according to the "state" of man, and Socrates is matter of himself according to the "state" of man, so likewise are Socrates and Plato according to the "state" of species.

Again it is objected, Boethius says "genus are or are not," so that Socrates must be according to the "state" of animal or not. But this must be settled thus, according to the "state" of animal, this is indeed true, since he both exists in this "state" and "state" causes him to exist, for whatever has this "state" is such. Likewise, "according to this state it does not exist." But what is it that is thus understood, that which is in this "state" does not exist, or that "state" implies that it does not exist, which is a false statement. But it may be true that according to the "state" of animal it does not exist, in that it does exist in that "state," and it has not some properties which are implied by this name, which is animal. Or, on the other hand, if that "state" does not provide it with that by which it exists as some individual, or if whilst it is observed to be animal, it is not observed to be so in all its qualifications. Hence according to the simple "state" of animal, it is said not to exist, when nothing is found in act, which is animated sensible substance.

Likewise, it is objected that "every man is animal" is a multiple proposition, as much as it calls one, according to our opinion, Socrates, Plato and the others who are ranged under a general head. This is resolved in this way.

The singulars are certainly ranged under one head, not as singulars, because they are not ranged under one head according to the "state" of Socrates and of the rest, but all according to the "state" of species, according to which they are indifferent, that is the "state" of man, and that is not a multiple proposition but a single one.

Again it is objected, according to this opinion, that they do not make a syllogism properly who say "every man is animal," but Socrates is man therefore he is an animal. Here all individuals of man are brought under one head in the first thesis, in this that they are man by determination, but in assertion, indeed all things are not placed in the same mode, else it would be a false proposition; whereas all things are placed indeterminately and thus a proper syllogism is not made.

The solution is, that, whatever may be the mode of acting, whether determinate or not, since both as to the subject of the first proposition, and as to the predicate of the second, it is concerned with the same given things and according to the same "state," the syllogism is properly made, as it is made in the first mode of the first figure; and (proper) as to the predicate, unless, perchance, the term be singular there, by which a determinate is dealt with. (*sic*) Again it is objected as Socrates according to the "state" of animal is genus, he is predicated of many, that is of all genus, and so likewise since Socrates according to the "state" of Socrates is individual it is predicated of one alone, according to Porphyry, and thus is not predicated of many.

But if Socrates is predicated of many and is not predicated of many, there are two divisions of truth which is impossible. The solution is when we say Socrates, according to the "state" of animal, is predicated of several, this determination, viz. according to the "state" of animal, has reference to the predicate and the meaning is that many coincide in this, that they are animal. When indeed we say that Socrates is predicated of one alone, that determination, according to the "state" of Socrates, has reference to the predicate, and that is the meaning: it is not true that several coincide in this that they are Socrates, and so there are no divisions and both are true, viz., several are animal and several are not Socrates.

Again it is objected, we learn from Porphyry that, in being predicated of many, genus differs from individuals, which as it is said are predicated of one alone. But if in being predicated of many, some property is posited in genus, it is asked in what way does genus differ, by that property from its individual, since it participates in the same property with its own individual, for whatever is based on some superior is based on its inferior and vice versa. And that, they were wont to solve it as follows, that predication, property, and generality, are harmonious properties in their superiors, owing to the nature of superiors with regard to inferiors, and those are actually the same in their individuals and are supported by them, but they are not there owing to the nature of individuals or with regard to inferiors.

But we do not agree with this solution, because if by the above mentioned determination nothing is posited in them nor taken away from them, by this superiors do not seem to differ from individuals.

But if some property is posited by it in the superior, which is not in the inferior, so that superiors should have by this a difference from inferiors, then it will be thought because it would take away

from the inferiors that which is in their superiors for, as it is said, what is in one is in the other and conversely so that their solution is invalid.

We therefore say that Porphyry when he says, that genus differs from individuals in being predicated of many, posits no property in the genus, which is not in the individual, both being of the same genus, of course. He means to place a difference between genus and individuals in this, that genus are posited of many, that is several are harmonious in the general "state," individuals are not posited in several; it is not true that several are harmonious in the individual "state," or some property may be posited in being predicated of several. And it may be said that Socrates according to the "state" of animal differs from himself according to the "state" of Socrates, not by that predication which is essentially in it, but by that which it has by indifference, viz., by that which Plato has according to the "state" of animal essentially; but what Plato has by the "state" of animal Socrates has by the "state" of animal by indifference. But Plato according to the "state" of Socrates has that predication, which is in Plato essentially according to the "state" of animal neither essentially nor by indifference. Likewise it is true that the same property is not in Socrates according to the "state" of Socrates by indifference, for nothing is indifferent to Socrates according to the "state" of Socrates. Or it is solved in another way, the predicated property is both in the genus and in the individual, yet what is surprising, genus differs by that property from the individual, since this is predicated concerning genus in an "adjacent" mode.

Socrates according to the state of animal is predicated of several, and the same may be removed from Socrates according to the "state" of Socrates in to this "adjacent" mode: Socrates according to the "state" of Socrates is not predicated of several. I do not say that property is not to be predicated in so far as it is not in Socrates (*sic*) but simply remove that property from Socrates into the "adjacent" according to the "state" of Socrates, which happens by analogy.

Contrariwise, that property, according as whiteness is contrary to blackness, is in whiteness, because it actually "informs" it and is in substance because substance is its sufficient basis, on account of which it should be seen, because they cannot differ from it. Yet they do differ through it, because it is predicated concerning whiteness in this "adjacent" mode. Whiteness is contrary to blackness and it is removed from substance, in which the property itself is as on a sufficient basis in the "adjacent" way, in this way. (*sic*).

Substance is not contrary and thus they differ.

It is likewise objected according to this proposition, that if this exists, then, Socrates being destroyed according to the "state" of animal, rationality would be destroyed: that being destroyed Socrates, according to the "state" of animal, could remain. Socrates is, according to the "state" of animal, sufficient basis for rationality, indeed it exists in every sufficient basis you like and under any of its accidents you like. But Socrates being destroyed according to the "state" of animal all rationality of Socrates is destroyed. Yet rationality is not absolutely destroyed, since that in Plato would remain, etc. According to the "state" of animal, it appears that Socrates is not sufficient basis for rationality.

The solution is this, Socrates indeed according to the "state" of animal is sufficient and actual basis of this rationality, which is essentially in him, whether he is observed according to this "state," or according to the "state" of rationality, and so Socrates being destroyed according to the "state" of animal, the rationality of Socrates himself according to no "state" of his could either have remained or remain. But Socrates neither according to the "state" of animal nor according to any other "state" is sufficient basis for the rationality which is in Plato, except by indifference.

Hence unless Socrates be destroyed according to that "state," by which he is sufficient basis for that rationality which is in Plato, it exists unless destroyed by indifference, that is to say unless Plato should be destroyed, according to the "state" of animal; and so concerning the others, rationality could not be absolutely destroyed, that is that which is in Plato and in all the others. But should Socrates be destroyed according to the "state" of animal, both essentially and by indifference, that is every animal, being destroyed according to the "state" of animal, rationality would be absolutely destroyed."

Hugh of Montagne, d. 1180, studied with Walter of Mortagne at Reims under Archdeacon Alberic. He became Prior of the Benedictine Monastery of St. Martin de Seez, an offshoot of the Abbey of Saint-Evrault.

According to M. Chossat, it is now clear that he was the author of the celebrated *Summa Sententiae* at one time attributed to Hugo St. Victor (cf. p. 157) and then to Walter of Mortagne, Bishop of Laon.

This work was sometimes catalogued as *De Fide et Spe* and was not published until 1154-1155. It was thus later than the celebrated sentences of Peter Lombard which were written

1140-1150, so that the allegations of plagiarism made against Peter Lombard fall to the ground.

Hugh of Mortagne may even have been the author of the work on Genus and Species just referred to on pp. 148-156.

MYSTICS

Hugo de St. Victor, 1096-1141, was born at Ypres in Flanders and came to Paris about 1133 and died between 1141 and 1143. He was a contemporary Canon with William of Champeaux, when the latter made the Priory afterwards the Abbey of St. Victor celebrated for its dialectics. According to Vincent of Beauvais, after having passed through all the trials of scholastic initiation, Hugo became disgusted with philosophy and took no more interest in the works of Plato and Aristotle.

He objected to their study, as philosophy he considered to be both insufficient and dangerous, though he did not, like Peter Damian, consider profane knowledge as superfluous. He regarded philosophy as insufficient because it relies on reason and understands only things of which the senses give evidence. Reason can only assist one to understand that which faith reveals. Reason without Grace cannot conceive the Divine Essence. This was what was the downfall of Roscellinus Abelard and many others.

He was the founder of a School of Mysticism.

"It is necessary to await the inspiration which God gives through 'the intellect of the heart.'

To know is to believe, to believe is to love.

One loves, then one knows, this is the Divine chain, which unites the creature to the Creator."

His works included the *Eruditio Didascalica* or Six Keys of Learning; humbleness of heart, love of inquiry, peaceful life, silent meditation, poverty, and exile. (To which John of Salisbury, who was infused with his ethical spirit, added Love of Teachers.)

He also wrote *De Sacramentis Christianae Fidei*.

His proofs of the existence of God are based on internal experience, from the existence of an ego which is not always known, he concludes that it has begun to be, and then he infers the existence of a Being to whom all else owes its existence. Also from external experience, the mutability of things leads to the inference that they have begun to be, and thence to the existence of the Creator.

He was a Conceptualist, a follower of Abelard, with regard to Universals. Being no monist his pluralism led him to the startling

theory, as to the composition of bodies, of an atomistic belief not far removed from the doctrine of ions and protons of modern science.

For him, bodies are constituted of atoms the motion of which explains the change of corporeal form, but these atoms instead of being fixed and unchangeable are capable of multiplication and growth. "Qualia sunt corpora simplicia, quae atomos dicunt, quae quidem ex materia, non sunt quia simplicia sunt, sed tamen materia fiunt, qua in semetipsis multiplicantur et augmentum excrescunt."⁶

He held that the soul is not other than the ego and it alone constitutes the human person, and that the body only shares in personality as united to the soul. The faculties of the soul he regarded as manifestations of its being.⁷

Another work of his was *De Contemplatione et ejus specibus*. He distinguished the eye of sense, used for physical objects, from the eye of reason, concerned with what is within, and from the eye of contemplation, which is devoted to God alone.⁸ The last is obscured by sin, and faith has to take its place. Faith is both subjective and objective. "Faith is called the substance of things invisible, because that which as yet is not an object of open vision, is by faith in a certain sense made present to the soul, whilst faith actually dwells in the soul. It cannot exist without a general knowledge of the object, hence it rises to the nature of the object. In this way understanding arises from faith as St. Anselm expressed it 'non quaero intellegere ut credam, sed credo ut intelligam.'"

According to Townsend "his scholasticism saved him from the vagueness and vagaries of the later mystics, and his devout and tender mysticism redeemed his dialectic method from the rigidity and harshness of the later Schoolmen."

He also wrote a Commentary on Erigena's translation of the *De Mystica Theologica* of the pseudo Dionysius in which he manifested his antipathy to pantheism; also a Commentary on the Apocalypse; but in *De Quatuor Voluntatibus in Christo* Hugo maintained that besides the Divine and the rational Wills in Christ, there were a Will of His flesh and also Will of Pity, how one who claimed to be so orthodox thought this consonant with the IV Council of Chalcedon, 451, and the VI Council of Constantinople III, 18, 680 A.D., it is difficult to understand.

Achard became Abbot of St. Victor in 1155 on the death of Gilduin and upheld its tradition as the leading School of Mysticism.

⁶ *Migne*, p. 1, CLXXVI, col. 286. ⁷ *ib.*, col. 408. ⁸ Cf., pp. 136-137.

He wrote *De Septem Desertis*⁹ which in accordance with the tenets of its School, by exaggerating the importance of Faith, denied to reason not merely its assistance but demanded its complete quiescence, thus, he says, from the imperfection of reason proceeds the perfection of faith. Faith knows by Grace that of which reason can gain no certitude by any experience. So that the more feeble the reason the stronger the faith; and reason doing less or rather doing nothing, faith which does the more, which does all, has indeed the more merit. It is necessary that reason should undertake to yield, in order to increase the merit of faith. Yet reason can resign herself to that without envy, for faith does not do what she does for herself, she does it rather for the benefit of reason: faith ought to disappear and reason ought to stay, and to turn to its profit that which she obtains from faith. The merit of reason consists in recognizing the candour of faith, and in not claiming to march in front of her but to follow her.

But then he goes on "He has received you when miserable and will make you happy: that which was perishable He will make eternal; from that which was a man He will have made a god" (cf. Ch. XXIX, p. 617).¹⁰

Richard St. Victor, d. 1173. He was Prior when Achard was at St. Victor. In his *Benjamin Minor Sive de Contemplatione*¹¹ he has set out the six degrees of contemplation.

1. '*In imaginatione et secundum solam imaginationem*,' this is the preliminary operation in which one represents to oneself exterior things by means of images and ideas.

2. '*In imaginatione secundum rationem*,' here are placed the ideas of order and cause which the imagination forms and preserves and of which reason approves.

3. '*In ratione secundum imaginationem*,' these are the notions of invisible things formed pursuant to the principle of analogy: they belong to the reason but the imagination assists in forming them.

4. '*In ratione secundum rationem*,' the soul enfolding herself acquires the knowledge of her own notion (knowing oneself).

5. '*Supra sed non praeter rationem*,' what we believe concerning the nature and essence of God is not communicated to us by reason, but reason does not protest against this belief.

6. '*Supra et videtur esse praeter rationem*,' these are beliefs which are in contradiction to rational notions, but which nevertheless are most sure and most incontestable, the most elevated

⁹ St. Victor, 944, f. 174, *Bib. Nat.* ¹⁰ St. Victor, 944, f. 174, *Bib. Nat.*

¹¹ St. Victor, 632, Cap. I, 9, *Bib. Nat.*, and B.M.R.L., 8 F.1, f. 68, (c. 1200.).

of all, that towards which the faithful soul ought to aim with all its might.

But to a great extent these works are so wrapped up in figures of sacred rhetoric as to be revolting to modern ideas and to serve but as examples for a scornful Freudian.

To Richard is attributed the romantic *Vision of the Monk of Evesham or Eynsham*, recounted by Matthew of Paris as historical, which is thought to have been the material for Dante's *Divine Comedy*.¹²

Walter, Abbot of St. Victor, c. 1180, of Mauretania, in Flanders. He wrote *Contra Novas Haereses*,¹³ he regards all new philosophers as heretics, such as Abelard, Peter Lombard, Pierre de Poitiers, Gilbert de la Porrée and William of Conches. According to him to study philosophy is to be infected with poison, for it has not even spared the author of the *Scholastic History*, Pierre le Mangeur. He is thought to be the original of Cornificus, the enemy of Virgil, in the *Metalogicon* of John of Salisbury.

Alcher of Clairvaux, c. 1150, a Cistercian monk who wrote *De Spiritu et Anima*, often falsely attributed to St. Augustine. He is quoted by St. Albertus Magnus, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Roger Bacon, but not always with approval.

He held that only the intellectual soul is created, not the sensitive and vegetative souls.

Sensation is an activity of the soul "anima per Corpus videt." Intellect is the abstractive faculty. The powers of the soul are not really distinct from its substance. The soul knows itself and by a Divine Illustratio it knows God. As to Universals he concisely describes them as "Abstrahit a corporibus quae fundantur in corporibus."

Alain of Lille, d. 1203, *Doctor Universalis*. Alainus de Insulis came from Lille and was a celebrated professor in the Schools at Paris. He was noted for his mathematical exactness, a method which he employed in his exposition of the mysteries of Faith. In his *De Maximis Theologiae*¹⁴ he employed the argument of God as First Cause given by St. Thomas Aquinas as his second Proof.

He was one of the first in Paris to use the translations of Aristotle emanating from Toledo. He also wrote *Tractatus Fidei*

¹² 2590, folio 50 ; 5732, folio 182, *Bib. Nat.*

¹³ 17187, folio 198, *Bib. Nat.*

¹⁴ *Bib. Nat.*, 935, *de la Sorbonne*, 16297, folio 173.

Catholica,¹⁵ which was often confused with the *De Arte Catholicae Fidei* of Nicholas of Amiens.

Further he, and not St. Bonaventura, is the author of the *De Sex Aliis Cherubim*.

Later, it is said, overcome by the stupendous mystery of the Trinity, he retired to Cîteaux and became a monk.

He then became the most dogmatic, prolific and brilliant expositor of his time of Mysticism. His chief works being *De Planctu Naturae* and *Anti-Claudianus*.¹⁶

The former is somewhat after the style of the *Megacosmos* and *Microcosmos* of Bernard of Tours, in that, under the guise of an allegory, Nature shows the method of Creation and the composition of man.

The *Anti-Claudianus* is even more poetic, as Nature proposes to create a new man less imperfect than the first. In this he showed that he held that matter could exist apart from form and form from matter, and he proved that he remained a realist. In it the Virtues not knowing how to make a Soul, Reason and Prudence are sent to the Supreme God for one, Who alone possesses the treasure of life.

The premises of this fabulous ideology are to be found in the gloss of Chalcidus on the *Timæus* of Plato written about 500 A.D. The two fictions represent that Reason is incapable of reaching the region of the stars, and leaves the conduct of Prudence to Theology. The second is that Prudence, overcome by the Splendour of the sanctuary where God resides is about to faint when Faith comes to her aid. It is Faith alone that leads her to the end of her voyage, Theology herself not having, so it appears, the right to travel so far.

He also wrote a *Liber de Regules Theologiae*.¹⁷

¹⁵ *Bib. Nat.*, 17251, folio 128.

¹⁶ *Bib. Nat.*, 8083, B.M.R.L., 13B. VIII, f. 117, thirteenth century.

¹⁷ 5504, *Bib. Nat.*

CHAPTER X

PETER ABELARD, D. 1142

DE INTELLECTIBUS OF ADAM PULCHRE MULIERIS

Peter Abelard, 1079-1142, was born at Le Pallet, near Nantes, in Brittany. He was Canon of Notre Dame at Paris, 1115, Abbot of St. Guildas, 1125. He was the virtual founder of Conceptualism.

We are not here concerned with his brilliant career in the Schools of Paris, or the tragedy of his private life, or the pathos of his letters to Héloïse, but rather with his arguments against Realism and those with which he sought to establish Conceptualism.

He first studied Nominalism under Roscellinus, and then Realism under William of Champeaux, whose formula concerning Universals "ut eandem essentialiter rem totam simul singulis suis in esse abstrueret individuū" he compelled him to change by substituting "individualiter" for "essentialiter," as we have seen on p. 145.

As William of Champeaux was the first to arrange and to reduce to a definite system the vague and somewhat diverse statements of those realists who preceded him, so Abelard was in a measure the first doctrinaire as Hauréau called him of Nominalism.

His teacher Roscellinus had allowed his extremist arguments against universal substances to lead him to deny the Unity in the Trinity, and to teach that such Unity was nought but nominal, Abelard whilst striving to refute the realistic arguments of his teacher William of Champeaux as leading to pantheism on the one hand, sought by his condemnation of Roscellinus, to establish his own thesis of conceptualism as being free from the heresies of either. Yet Abelard in turn was condemned by the Council of Soissons in 1121 and at Sens in 1141 for holding that the Trinity was but Unity under the three aspects of Power, Wisdom and Love. Thus whereas Roscellinus was condemned for neglecting the Unity of the Godhead, Abelard was condemned for neglecting the Persons of the Trinity.

His chief works were *Sic et Non*,¹ a collection of divergent views.

Dialectica.

¹ B.M.R.L., II, A.V. 73, twelfth century.

*De Generibus et Specibus
Logica Ingredientibus
Tractatus de Unitate et Trinitate Divinae.*

The edition that has been preserved is called *Theologica Christiana*. In it is omitted the expression "ex eo quod Pater est, hoc solum exigit ut sit potens vel etiam omnipotens," which was condemned at the Council of Soissons, 1121.

Introductio Theologica, a developed edition of the *Theologica Christiana*.

Historia Calamitatum.

Glossulae Super Porphyryum.

Most of his logical treatises were never published until collected by Cousin in 1836 in his celebrated work *Ouvrages inédits d'Abelard*.

Abelard formulated a system of conceptualism chiefly in his *de Generibus et Specibus*; but as this takes the form of a long argument against the opinions of his opponents, together with their replies and his rejoinders, it is not easy to indicate precise passages which completely set forth his own doctrine. Before going into this diffuse argument it will be of great assistance if a succinct view of it be first put forward.

To sum up with Cousin the arguments of Abelard against the the two existing schools: from Nominalism he extracted its fundamental principle that only the particular and the individual exist and with this he opposed Realism. To those Realists who said the Universal, genus, and species are the very essence of the individual and that the individual, the form, and the difference is only an accident, he replied with the Nominalists that on the contrary the individual is its own substance in itself.

To the other Realists, who maintain the doctrine of non-difference, and who accepted the principle that nothing exists but the individual, yet held that the Universal, genus, and species were different states of the individual, which beneath all differences are absolutely the same, and are thus the foundations of species and genus, Abelard replied with the Nominalists, that in the individual all is individual and that there is no universal state in any particular thing. Hence species, genus, and Universal are not the essence of individuals, nor are they states nor integral elements.

On the other hand, against the Nominalists who held them to be simple words, Abelard invoked the arguments of the Realists against them. He did not hold that Universals are mere words, for mere words are nothing and certainly Universals are something.

If Universals are neither things nor words, it follows that they must be concepts of the mind. Their reality is there, but such

reality is sufficient. Only individuals exist, and none of these individuals is in itself either genus or species ; but these individuals have resemblances which the mind can perceive, and these resemblances considered by themselves, abstracted from the differences, form classes by themselves more or less comprehensive, which are called species or genus.

Species and genus are thus real products of the mind and so are not mere words, although they are expressed by words, nor are they things either apart from or inside of individuals, they are concepts : such is the system called Conceptualism.²

The arguments of Abelard against the Realists may be traced somehow in the following manner.

Against the thesis that Universals should be considered as integrally subsistent in the individuals, he argued that if the Universal be contained in one individual, it is absorbed by that individual, so that it is either not in another individual, or all other individuals are this one individual, which is impossible. Hence that Universal which is in Socrates is not a Universal essence, a thing, *res*.

But according to another thesis, if it is not a Universal essence, then can it not subsist wholly in singulars ? This essence is indivisibly common to all singulars, which it both supports and contains "indifferenter" incorporated in different things, or "individualiter" different things having the same Universal as a common support (these alternatives it may be noted on examination prove in fact to be the same thing) (cf., p. 145).

The general idea draws its origin from the singular notions acquired by means of the senses, and apart from the *a priori* statement of a universal essence, serving as a support for all singulars, the mind necessarily compiles the Universal from the collection of individual things, so that the concept cannot but conform to reality, since the Universal represents in the mind that which is real in the thing, and its name is the one substance, the non-difference, in which all the differents participate.

Abelard seizes upon the expression, "all singular is Universal" of William of Champeaux, and says this must mean that such and such singular, without ceasing to be singular is wholly Universal. He went on to state that, if a species subsists totally in such an individual, Socrates who is an individual is a species. If Socrates is a species, Socrates is a Universal, and if he is a Universal he is not an individual, so that he is no longer Socrates. But this argument contains a fallacy and the response was that, this thing which is Universal is like species or genus communicable to several and several receive it, but they receive it without ceasing

² Intro, Ined., *Abelard*, p. 155, Cousin,

to be several and without ceasing to be individuals. But says Abelard again, the Universal is the contrary of the particular, and two contraries cannot simultaneously exist in the same subject, Boethius clearly laid that down.

To which Adhelard of Bath or rather his followers reply the axiom of Boethius does not apply to this case. It is perfectly clear that the Universal and individual meet in the same subject, since there are individuals of the same species and genus, and they are alike according to species or genus, in respect of something subsistant which is non-different between them. That which is non-different between beings is a Universal nature, to which is inherent the individuality of these different beings. So that it is legitimate to extract the Universal from the consideration of one thing alone, since this individual, more or less universally considered, contains, like all the other individuals, without any difference these indivisible common natures which answer to the names of Substance, Genus, and Species.

Abelard retorts, everything might in that case be said to be man, since it contains something that is non-different in respect of man.

Judgments come from comparison, and comparison presupposes at least two things. Boethius in the *Categories* says, "genus and species do not result from the consideration of one thing alone, they are concepts which the mind gathers from all the individuals taken together." What Boethius means by this is that, the word man represents a kind of essential being, or, as he says, an essence which is not drawn from Socrates alone, but from all men considered collectively. But those who claim that Socrates, in as much as he is a man, is an essence, are extracting the species from a single individual, which according to Boethius is not legitimate.

But this leads the Realists back to the proposition that all genus form only a unique genus, in respect of that which is non-different amongst them "Omnia illa Generalissima Generalissimum unum dicuntur quia indifferentia sunt,"³ and this amounts to the proposition of *Unity of Substance*. Abelard, however, insists that the science of being is the science of beings, the title or name of being belongs exclusively to this man, this horse, to the atom, the prime substance of Aristotle. A being is that which the eye sees. As to the principle modes of being, necessary to all being, species and genus, as the mind alone can rise to the rank of divisible wholes after having conceived the naturally indefinite limit, it is a great error to take them as the prime object of science.

Abelard, as is shown in his *Glosses on Porphyry*, foresaw that

³ *De Generibus*, 1310, f. 43, *Bib. Nat.*, Cousin, p. 519.

non-differentism might lead to forms having so little relation with matter, which serves as their subject, that as they disappear, matter no longer differs from other matter, without any relation, so that all individuals become reduced not only to unity but also to identity. (It will be remembered that Aristotle attributes individuality to matter.)⁴

This would then lead to a great heresy, for according to this the Divine Substance is all substance, in short pantheism would be established. The same objections would also apply to the spiritual identity of souls as advanced by Averroes (1120-1206).

With regard to that section of Realism, which posited in God the real Universal types, after the manner of Plato, Abelard adduced the following arguments.

Genus and species are either Creator or creature. If they are creature the Creator was before the creature, so that God existed before Justice or Power, which some do not hesitate to posit in God as something other than God. So that God existed before being either just or powerful. However, some do not consider that as a proper division and claim to substitute for it "All that exists is either begotten or unbegotten." But these Universals are unbegotten and consequently eternal. From this it would follow (*Horribile Dictu*) that the soul is subject in nothing to God, being co-eternal with God and having its origin of itself. So that God has not made anything, Socrates being composed of two co-eternals with God, he is only a new collection, there has been no creation of Socrates. For both the matter and the form is Universal proceeding co-eternal with God. How far that is from the truth it is easy to see.

This argument accepted by the Nominalists of course is vitiated by the application of time to the timeless Deity.

According to Abelard, these Universals have no place, they are nothing, they do not exist. God without doubt thought of the world before He made it, He made it in such fashion as He willed, but this knowledge of the free intelligent Will of God is sufficient as a reasonable and even orthodox account of the mystery of creation.

Why localize in the Divine Intelligence this multitude of permanent and so to speak corporeal ideas, whose origin and nature one does not know how to define, without altering by such definition the pure idea of the Essence which is God? In such terms did Abelard signify his denial of the eternal species.

On the other hand as against Roscellinus, Abelard sets out to show that species and genus are more than words, words being only signs, the signs of what? Undoubtedly they come from

⁴ Cf., p. 77.

things, but it is also clear that things do not themselves prescribe for words the sense that they contain. Between things and words there is an intermediary, the intellect, which judges things and gives them names by means of words. But it is not contested that there exists in nature objects or at least individual phenomena, which of themselves come under the object of the senses.

These phenomena, perceived and considered by the intellect, are transformed in the understanding into individual and particular notions.

Further, the intellect has power to deal with notions gathered from several things, and to form more or less general notions therefrom, according to the number of the objects, which it conceives to be endowed with similar properties and manners of being.

These notions thus generalized are wholly intellectual and are the Universals.

This proves the intellectual existence of the concepts, species, genus, and substance, but Abelard refused to conclude from that, that these universal concepts are universally subsisting things.

The conclusions that Abelard himself arrived at may be gathered from the following extracts taken from *De Intellectibus*, which though considered by Cousin to be a genuine work of Abelard, is now thought to be of a later date by one of his followers called *Adam Pulchre Mulieris*.

“Concepts by abstraction are those in which a nature of a certain form is taken independently of the matter, which acts as its subject, or in which any nature whatever is thought indifferently, without distinction from the individuals to which they belong. For example I take the colour of a body or the science of a soul, as to that in which they are proper, that is to say in so far as qualities, I abstract in some way the forms of the substantial subjects, in order to consider them in themselves, in their proper nature and without paying attention to the subjects united to them. If I thus consider indifferently the human nature, which is in each man, without paying attention to personal distinction of any man in particular, I consider simply the man, so far as he is man, that is to say as mortal, rational, animal and not as such and such man and I abstract the universal from the individual subjects.

The abstraction then consists in isolating the superiors from the inferiors, the Universals from the individuals, their subject of predication, and the forms from the matters the subject of their foundation.

The subtraction will be the contrary.

It occurs when the intelligence subtracts the subject from that which is attributed to it, and considers it in itself; for example when it strives to conceive independently of any form the essential nature of a subject. In both cases, the concept abstracted or subtracted gives the thing differently from what it is, since the thing only exists in conjunction with that which is considered separately."

The intellectual abstraction does not give the composite, it gives the form isolated from the matter; for it is the matter already determined, which is the principle of individuation.⁵

If you take away the matter, the individuality disappears and the Universal is left alone. But with the individual matter the reality is removed, it no longer remains, with the universal form there remains no more than the very opposite of concrete reality, that is to say abstract concept.

Thus any existence of the universal *post rem* cannot be alleged as proof of the universal *in re*.

Some mention must now be made of the celebrated work *Sic et Non* of Abelard. It remained undiscovered throughout the Middle Ages until brought to light by Cousin, though mention of the existence of two manuscripts of it had from time to time been made. It had always been thought of as too sceptical, but this was not meant to be its intention. Abelard having founded his system of conceptualism proposed to apply it to all the doubtful questions of theology. As a preliminary then, he drew up his *Sic et Non* in which he quotes extracts from the Scriptures and the writings of the Fathers, giving contrary opinions or views in respect of each of the questions, one hundred and fifty-seven in all. In no case does he in this work give any decision. But having completed this work, he then undertook a *Summa Theologica* which embodied the results of his application of Conceptualism to each of the questions raised in the *Sic et Non*, and thus formed the basis of his own conclusion. This must have been written about 1121.

But about this time, if not a year earlier, Abelard wrote his *Tractatus de Unitate et Trinitate Divina*, in this he argued vehemently against the opinions of Roscellinus, which in short denied the doctrine of the Trinity, alleging either three Gods, or, if the Godhead be taken separately, four Gods or, in the alternative, but one God.

Abelard in stressing the Unity of God neglected to give due acknowledgment to the several Persons of the Trinity, regarding them only under the aspects of Power, Wisdom and Goodness. This was the work what was condemned to be burned at the

⁵ Cf., p. 166.

Council of Soissons in 1121 and was long thought to be non-existent, though a copy has now been discovered at Erlangen by Remigius Stölzle.

It is now clear that the *Theologica Christiana* is but a revised edition of the *Tractatus de Unitate Divina*, from which the expression specially animadverted upon at the Council of Soissons has been deleted, this was the statement "ex eo quod Pater est, hoc solum exigit ut sit potens vel etiam omnipotens." It was probably written about 1123-1124.

The *Introductia Theologica* was a more developed edition of the *Theologica Christiana*, but the first two books were apparently written some ten years before the last two. In this work he stressed the aspect of Christ as the Word and exemplarist of morals; and the manward aspect of Christ's work was made the centre of Abelard's doctrine of the Atonement, the purpose of the Crucifixion was to pour charity into our hearts.

It was for this and various other reasons in which he disagreed with the generally accepted doctrines (such as that of original sin) of the Church that this work was also condemned at the Council of Sens in 1141, which was confirmed at Rome in 1142.

Exception was taken by St. Bernard and William of Thierry to the use of the word "existimatio" to express faith, but as such was above opinion and less than complete knowledge, it would appear to come within the subsequently generally accepted definition.

CHAPTER XI

REALISTS

Thierry of Chartres, d. 1155—Bernard of Chartres, d. 1129—
Bernard of Tours, d. 1167—Gilbert de la Porrée, d. 1154—
John Beleth, d. 1182—Robert of Melun, d. 1167—Nicholas of
Amiens, d. 1190.

Thierry (Theodoric) of Chartres, d. 1155, was the younger brother of Bernard of Chartres. He was Chancellor of the School at Chartres, which had been brought into prominence by Fulbert, its Bishop, d. 1029. He was one of the teachers of John of Salisbury. Amongst his works are found *Heptateuchon* or *Course of Studies*,¹ a commentary on the rhetoric of Cicero, said to contain the earliest references to the new translation of the Organon of Aristotle, and *De Sex Dierum Operibus*.²

According to him, the ideas of all things, which ought to be born, that is which were going to be created, are referred to as the nature of these things.

The property of all natures is unity, so that two or three natures are the same number of unities. These unities have again their equality of unity and they all emanate from the first unity, from which they do not differ in essence. Between the principle of equality, which makes these unities equal, and the eternal unity of which they participate, there is no substantial distinction.

The first unity is God the Creator.

The unities, which consist of numbers and which subsist by participation of the essence of the first unity, are not simply what are called the form of things, they are the very existences of things "creaturarum existentiae sunt."

God the true unity created plurality, but all the same there is no plurality in God, there is no number in Him.

But all that is not God can be numbered and measured, so that the first unity rules all by the eminence of its nature.

Numbers multiplied by themselves produce equality, but equality drawn from the very substance of unity is substantially identical with it. So that not differing substantially from unity, equality precedes number and likewise time, hence it is eternal.

¹ 10057, *Duke of Burgundy, Bib. Nat.*

² 647, 3584 and 18096, folio 45, *Bib. Nat.*

But two eternal substances cannot exist together, hence the unity and the equality are the same, diversely defined according to their diverse properties. These properties, two in number, are said to be two hypostases or two persons in one substance, which is the eternal Deity. Thus the first unity is said to be the Begetter and the Equality the person begotten. But it must be understood that these are two persons, not two subjects, there is only one principle of being.

Moreover, as the unity is the first being and only being of all things, and as the equality of being is the equality of unity, this equality of unity is the equality of the existence of things, that is to say, the mode, the definition, and the eternal determination of all things, outside of which nothing can exist.

In short the Divine thought, where these ideas, reasons, and determined causes of things reside is the Divine thought from all eternity. There is not between heaven and earth a third world, peopled with ideas, which has been created in time.

Thus Unity is nothing else than the Divinity, and one rightly says that the Divine Wisdom precedes forms, the measure of things.

Thus religion and philosophy agree in recognizing that the reason of the existence of things is their very presence, having regard to the unities distinct amongst themselves, in the bosom of the first unity, variously called the equality of unity, providence, the supreme wisdom or more simply still God.

Such is the name given to Him, this unique subject containing the ideas of all things.

These ideas are by Him, they are in Him, born of Him, inseparable from Him, and all the part of the existence, which in our base world belongs to individually determined substances, is the very part which they have received from their eternal form.

He goes on to say, with William of Champeaux, Species is the whole substantial being of its individual.

As to how far this thesis involved the unity of substance, upon a comment of Walter de Mortagne, Bishop of Laon (cf., p. 147) as to his teaching concerning the ubiquity of the essence of God, Thierry expressly states at folio 7.

"The Unity is the Divinity itself, but the Divinity is the essential form of all things; for even as a thing is luminous because it receives light, hot because it receives heat, so all things draw each one their being from the Divinity. That is why it is truly said that God in His entirety is everywhere essentially 'Unde Deus totus et essentialiter ubique esse vere perhibetur.' A unity then, is the essential form of all single things, so that it is rightly said, that all that is, is such through being one. But

when we say that the Divinity is the essential form of all things, we do not say that the Divinity is a certain subsisting form in a certain matter, like a triangle, a square, or any other such thing. We say that being in its entirety, the unique being of each creature, is the Divinity present in each, and that the matter itself exists only by the presence of the Divinity, without claiming, however, that the Divinity draws its essence from the matter or subsists in it."

Therefore, when we say that the unity is the essential form of all things, it must be understood in this way. Likewise, when we say, simply without any limitation God, this term relates to the Divinity itself, but if we add any determination, or if we use the word God in the plural, in order to signify a certain God or Gods, then this term God relates to all those who participate of the Divinity.

Bernard of Chartres, d. 1129, Canon and Chancellor, if not Dean of Chartres, succeeded his younger brother Thierry (q.v.) as a lecturer at Chartres in 1119, where he established a great reputation.

John of Salisbury (q.v.) after studying rhetoric under Thierry in Paris went to Chartres to study under William of Conches some eight years after Bernard had died, but such was the renown of Bernard that we find John of Salisbury in after years giving a full description in his *Metalogicon* not only of the teaching of the followers of Bernard, but also a vivid picture of the method and manner of instruction employed by Bernard himself. Bernard wrote a *Commentary on the Aeneid of Virgil* and *De Expositione Porphyrii*. It may be well to quote here what John of Salisbury says in the *Metalogicon II*, 17, that his followers held.

"They support the ideas of Plato, apart from which they hold that there is no species or genus. But the idea is according to the definition of Seneca, the eternal example of natural things, and as these examples are neither subject to corruption, nor altered by the movements which move the individual and which follow each other almost every moment making them to issue without ceasing as something different, these ought properly and truly to be called the universals. In short individual things are considered to be unworthy of being given a substantive name.

Never stable, always fleeting, they don't even wait for the time for they change their qualities so much, of time, of place, and of a thousand kind of properties, that all their existence appears to be, not a lasting state, but a mobile transition. We call being, says Boethius, that which neither increases by application nor diminishes by shrinking, but preserves itself, always maintained

by the support of its own nature : that is quantity, quality, relation, place, time, habit, and all that in some way makes with the body a one. Things joined to the body appear to change, but remain immutable in their nature, thus the species of things remain the same in the individual passenger, as the water which flows in the current in movement remains a river, for it is the same river : whence this strange dictum of Seneca arises ' we descend and we do not descend twice in the same river.' But these ideas, that is to say the exemplary forms are the prime reasons (definitions) of things and they receive neither increase nor diminution : stable, perpetual, though all the actual world perish they could not die. The whole number of corporeal things subsist in these ideas and, moreover, St. Augustine seems to establish it in his book on *Free Will*, as they exist always it truly happens that, though corporeal things perish, the number of things neither increases nor lessens. What these doctors promise is great without doubt and known by philosophers who are friends to high contemplation ; but as Boethius and many other authors witness nothing is further from the opinion of Aristotle for he, as it is clear from his books, is very often refuting this thesis. Bernard of Chartres and his followers have taken great pains to make Aristotle and Plato agree, but I think they have come too late and have toiled in vain to reconcile after death those who all their lifetime contradicted each other."

Hauréau points out that the teaching is not clear. Universals are first ideas, which are outside of nature, then they are the only things in nature which do not change, then they become again isolated from the world and idea is defined as the unity, which supports the multiple ; the being which does not perish serving as hypostatis for the perishable beings, but Hauréau puts no blame on John of Salisbury for this.

Cousin sums up the doctrine of Bernard of Chartres somewhat as follows. The two primitive and eternal elements are matter and idea. Providence applies the idea to the matter which becomes animated and takes a form.

The exemplars of life were in the Divine Intelligence to start with, as were also eternal notions, the intelligible world and the presence of those things which must happen some day. But that which is in the Divine Intelligence conforms to it and the idea is Divine in its nature. In the formation of things Providence has gone from genus to species, from species to individuals and from individuals it returns to their principles in a perpetual circle. The world is eternal it knows neither old age nor decrepitude. From the intelligible world there has arisen the sensible world, a perfect production of a perfect principle. That which produced

was itself full and its fullness had to produce fullness. The world is complete because God is in it, it is good because God is good, it is eternal in its eternal exemplar. Time has its roots in eternity and returns to the bosom of eternity.

It is time that derives number from unity, and movement from stability. Time is the very movement of eternity. The world is governed by time, but time is governed by order. All that is apparent, is the production of the Divine Will and the eternal exemplars which it carries in its bosom.

That this doctrine inculcated pantheism seems not to have occurred to either Thierry or Bernard nor was its unorthodoxy suspected by their contemporaries.

Bernard of Tours or Bernard Silvestris, d. 1167, was a friend and follower of Thierry and Bernard of Chartres, he was a strong Platonist. His chief work was *De Mundi Universo* or *Mega Cosmos* and *Micro Cosmos*, partly in prose and partly in verse in which metaphysical concepts are anthropomorphised and, under the guise of Greek goddesses, he describes the construction of the first human being. It will be remembered that Plato, in the *Timaeus*, has described how the Supreme Being left the actual construction of the inhabitants of the earth to Gods and Goddesses (cf. *Timaeus*, 16).

It is full of neo-Platonist and Pythagorean doctrines and teaches Monism and Emanationism.

Gilbert de la Porrée, 1070-1154. Gilbertus Porretanus or Pictaviensis, Bishop of Poitiers, was the most learned man of his day. He is mentioned by Dante. Having been first a pupil of Bernard of Chartres and then of Anselm of Laon, he taught in Paris and then became Chancellor or Head of the Cathedral School at Chartres and finally Bishop of Poitiers in 1141.

According to John of Salisbury (*Metalogicon II*, 17) Gilbert attributed universals to "born" forms and strove to prove the conformity thus produced.

But a 'born' form is but an example of the original, it has no place in the Divine Intelligence, but is inherent in the things created. It is to the idea in the Divine Mind as but an image to the original. Sensible, in the sensible object, it is conceived in the mind as insensible, being singular, in singular things, but universal in all.

This differing from the purely Platonic view of Bernard of Chartres is not, however, the true meaning of Aristotle, which it claimed to be as being founded on a view of the *Organon* and not on the *Timaeus* of Plato.

Besides a *Commentary on the Psalms*³ and on the *Epistles*⁴ Gilbert wrote *Sex Principiorum Liber*⁵ (Note.—Printed Texts, including Migne, follow the text of Hermalao Barbero, Venice, d. 1495, which is a paraphrase or translation), which became so celebrated that it was included in some editions of Aristotle himself and was interpreted in subsequent ages by St. Albertus Magnus and others.

Aristotle in his book of the *Categories* had dwelt at length on the first four, and had only given a summary consideration to the other six.

Gilbert considered that Aristotle thereby meant to convey that in fact the *Categories* should be divided into two classes. The first class included, besides substance, that which is absolutely inherent to substance; whilst the others indicated some external mode which just changed the condition of the substance without becoming united to it, and are said of one subject by comparison with another. Calling them all forms, Gilbert alleged that these latter were supported by the subject not as inherent but as assistant forms.

The first four *Categories* of Aristotle, it will be remembered were, Substance, Quantity, Quality, and Relation, whilst the other six were Where, When, Position, Possession, Action and Passion.

Now, Substance is both the sole being of the individual and also that which is said of all beings; in the first sense it is "being" and the second "to be," since it is common to all beings to be. What is common to them is to be some quantity, quality, relation, etc. This was the difficulty, those general attributes, which are not beings, but which are said of beings, do not themselves come from beings, which are different beings from those of which they are said. For example "being is said of Socrates according to the first category, but that which is Socrates is himself and no other; Socrates is only said of Socrates and is only in Socrates. But when Socrates is said to be great, according to the second *Category*, this *Quantity* of greatness which is said of Socrates is not a being, does it not come from a being, or to speak more accurately from a comparison made between Socrates and another? In such a case, the attribute Quantity would not be inherent in Socrates, but would be adjacent to him." But Gilbert taught that one does not see, nor conceive of, a substance, which does not give itself its own quantity, whence it follows in logic that quantity is said absolutely of substance and not relatively.

Similarly Gilbert does not admit that the *Quality* of Socrates, as Socrates is wise, is said of a subject by comparison with another. The same applies to *Relation*, *ad aliquid*, which is a general term

³ 439, 456, *Bib. Nat.*

⁵ Original text, 6575, *Bib. Nat.*

⁴ 656, *Bib. Nat.*

and is not said in respect of any particular other. Plato defined it, as that by which a subject is the cause of another ; whilst Aristotle described it, as that thing whose existence consists in its connection in some way with something else.

As to the other *Categories*, Gilbert deals first with *Action*, which supposes two terms, subject and object. What Socrates does, implies that his action affects another, which is passive in respect of Socrates, who is active.

This establishes that this *Category* is *relative* as likewise must be *Passion*, for there Socrates is passive and another is active. Similarly *When* is said of adjacent time ; and *Where* of surrounding place, which both involve a second term time and place and hence are *relative*. So likewise *Have*, the object of the possession is not the same as the subject possessing. With regard to *Position, situm esse*, it signifies the disposition of the parts in a whole or in a place, and if this form of substance is more inherent to it, it is without contradiction amongst the adjacent forms, as that which just adheres to the substance in a most intimate manner.

Gilbert also wrote a *Commentary of the Creation and The Two Natures and One Person in Christ*⁶ attributed to Boethius ; also a *Commentary on the four books on the Trinity* falsely attributed to Boethius.⁷

These were a collection of works which in no way bear out the title given to them.

There is a reference to Book I by Alcuin ; another to Book II by Hincmar ; Book III is purely neo-Platonic and non-Christian ; Book IV is against Eutychus and Nestor before they were condemned by the Council of Chalcedon, 451 A.D., some twenty years before Boethius was born.

Various manuscripts of parts of this commentary by Gilbert, bearing different titles, have from time to time been wrongly taken as being separate unedited works of his.

In this Commentary, he reduced to a more definite state the whole system of the Realists School of thought which had been commenced by William of Champeaux, and improved by Adhelard of Bath.

The Realist thesis of Gilbert is evolved somewhat as follows :

All phenomenal matter is composed of matter and form, the general acceptation of the word form is that which is outside "foris manens" and such is an essence simple, immutable and contingent to the composite, but when one speaks of form not considered absolutely forms fall into four classes.

The first form is the very essence of God.

⁶ 18094, *Bib. Nat.*

⁷ 1407, 1408, *Bib. Nat.* and 2178, *De la Sorbonne, Bib. Nat.*

The second belongs to true substances (the elements as they were then considered to be) fire, air, water and earth, these are called true substances, or ideas, because they are not united to matter, and in order to distinguish them from concrete sensibles, which appear to us as igneus or terrestrial.

The third forms are the essential principles of substantial things, as corporeity is the form of all bodies.

The fourth form is the proper figure of all individual phenomena.

Only the first two are real forms and are naturally separate as the exemplary is from its image.

The other two forms are images, they are forms born of form, and one can say of them alone that they are in sensible objects or better still that sensible objects are in them.

The essence of the sensible object is the form of that object, but such form is only a part, of the form, or to put it in another way, of the essence, which discovers itself in the same relation to all other subsistent objects, and this lower form has its origin in the form of its superior order. What is said of essence applies also to quantity, quality and relation, they are united to things and such things are in them rather than the other way about.

The pure forms then, are the only true forms, the others are in composition with matter like corporeity, and as to the figures of sensible objects they are only called forms as by a surname.

Thus, whilst pure matter and pure form are in rest, yet in formed matter, which can be called materialised, form is in motion.

Though the first object of the human reason is informed matter, yet it can proceed of itself to abstract and consider abstractively these degenerated (freed from matter) forms, which in their natural state are joined to bodies. To abstract is to disjoin, thus by means of this work of disjunction the abstraction disengages two ideas, the idea of that which is a body and the idea of that which is a form.

Such form is not the true idea itself but is the representation of such in the human understanding.⁸

Thus reason sees first of all by means of the senses, the "born" or *native* forms united to bodies, then they are separated intellectually from the body and reason conceives them as permanent forms. But this conception arising from abstraction does not conform to the nature of things.

The true name of the science which affords us the collection of these abstract conceptions is not that of physics, it is one of

⁸ Cf. Ch. XVIII, p. 245.

the branches of mathematics (cf. *Polycraticus VII*, of John of Salisbury).⁹

From such critical idealism reason rises to transcendental idealism and contemplates these ideas in their principle, in their eternal exemplary.

Arrived at this supreme degree of knowledge reason is at last satisfied, she has risen to truth, to the very truth, if one may so express it, crossing the limit of the contingent to attain the necessary, the absolute, the eternal.

Following this exposition of his teaching, Gilbert goes on to establish the proposition that the general precedes the particular and communicates being to it.¹⁰

From the genus of quality comes the species of rationality, then this species, by joining other species such as animal and risibility, constitutes the human species. So that there are simple species and composite species; simple being those of which the genus is one of the ten predicaments.

Under the species are found individuals. Every individual is a singular, one thing and not another, *hoc, aliquid*. If it happens that several individuals resemble each other in some manner, *secundum aliqua eorum*, what they have in common does not destroy their individuality, but constitutes their similarity, and this similarity is consubstantial with each. This is the argument about conformity referred to on page 174.

Man and sun are common names, but whilst the name man is in fact common to all men, the name sun is only common in potentiality, because there is only one sun (for this globe). So that the community of name does not arise from the fact but from the potentiality. On the other hand, that which is truly proper to an individual can belong to no other, though all the parts which go to form such individual may be common to other individuals and are or may be conformed to all individuals. If such constituent parts be found in other individuals they can be justly said to be common or conformed. The proper of the individual is in no other, but all the parts of such may not be individual. Such an individual is called this assemblage of parts, conformed to which no other assemblage can be identical.

Then the soul of Plato, whose whole form is part of the form of Plato, is not truly singular: also although it may be the substance of a reasonable determined nature, one cannot say that this soul is a person; the person, *persona, per se una* is the individual properly so called.¹¹

Hence, it comes to pass that the "the born" form is

⁹ Cf. "Theory of Groups," *New Pathways of Science*, by Eddington.

¹⁰ Cf. Ch. XXVI, p. 551.

¹¹ Cf. Ch. XXI, p. 377.

singular in each individual, and is universal in the totality of the individuals.

These parts are the very being of Plato, and if you take them away there is no Plato left, whilst on the other hand, if you take Plato and all his kind away, only the pure form God and ideas are left. So that the Universals exist in the particulars as essences, they are indeed properly speaking all that which in the particulars responds to the notion of being. As to the particulars they are first of all, as to substance, a certain part of essence; separated from a common universal basis, they are besides considered otherwise as "substants, substantes" because they are subject of accidents.

It is important to understand the meaning of the language here employed. That, which for its being has not to rely on accidents, subsists; so that genus, species, and subsistences general and special, truly subsist, but they are not truly substants since genus and species are not by themselves, nor in this condition do they support accidents. Likewise individuals subsist, for like genus and species they do not rely on accidents for being. But they are also subsistent since without them accidents could not exist. Considered as subjects of accidents, individuals are said to be their causes, their principles of being.

The manner of being of individuals is as follows, they are the subjects of accidents and support accidents and are thus well termed substants. But before possessing a manner of being, it is necessary to be, "esse"; individuals are that by the essence, which they have by participation, and that is from above and not from below, or rather they are in that they are, by the essence and in the essence, "in esse."

What is proper to such and such an individual is to support such and such accidents, and what is common to all individuals is to be some sort of essence.

But essence being divisible into four forms as mentioned above, it is of the fourth that individuals partake by participation, and this form which the mind gathers, *post rem*, from the individual similarity or conformities is, *in re*, absolutely such as the mind conceives it to be. So that it is the essence of all the individuals.

The common, "the conform," of Gilbert is the same as the non-difference of Adhelard of Bath.

But the latter is founded on a negation, the definition beginning with what differs in Socrates and search being made for what does not differ; whereas that of Gilbert commences with an

resides wholly in each individual, it is not so, to say that it resides with all universally and individually with each.

Gilbert distinguished the essence or form common to all, from the pure forms which do not communicate themselves; and claims to show that these latter exist, and where they exist, and how these reasons of eternal being become the actual causes of ephemeral phenomena.

It is a complete system as Hauréau says, "it is in accord with psychology, it responds to all its demands. In short, to the notions acquired by means of the senses, there corresponds the modes of being of informed matter; and to the general and universal conceptions that reason abstracts from things, there correspond the forms separated from things, the exemplaries of Plato, placed by Gilbert outside the Divine Intelligence but emanating from it. Further all the logical degrees represent degrees of being, or in other words, there is nothing in the subjective which may not be in the objective."

Wulf on the contrary, objects that it looks upon certain transcendental attributes of individuals such as unity, as proper *subsistentia* instead of not really distinct from being itself.

But two Archdeacons Calon and Arnould took exception to the teachings of their Bishop, and complained to Pope Eugenius III, in 1146, denouncing him as an artisan of novelties; they also went to Clairvaux to enlist St. Bernard in their cause.

It would appear that it was the objection taken to what Gilbert taught concerning forms which led them to suspect him of heresy.

Gilbert said, that forms are not in things but things in forms. The principles of being are forms, diverse forms, associated by the will of the Creator, are attributed to certain parts of matter and things are thus produced. So that things are not in themselves they are in their genus, by their genus and principally by the first of all genus Essence.

The strongest objections made by the theologians against the Nominalists had always been this: To say that individuals do not partake of a common essence or in other words that the whole hypothesis of a common essence ought to be rejected, is to teach in logic that theology is false in holding that there is one God under three Persons and that thus one of its most important dogmas is in consequence but an absurd chimera.

The Nominalists were able to reply that supernatural things differed from natural, and that it would not be a mystery if philosophy could explain it according to reason. Logic does not claim to control dogma.

The Realists on the other hand habitually mixed up logic with

theology, they believed, or at least always maintained the accord of one with the other.

Gilbert therefore found no difficulty in defining God.

God, said he, is like Socrates, an individual of the genus of substance, and as the principle of Socrates is humanity which lives in him, even so one ought to distinguish that which is God, this God, from His essential form, which is the Divinity.

But to whom is due the worship and adoration ?

Not to "this God," but to this form at least, however, what is expressed by convention for the facility of speaking, to what one calls by the name of God, the Divinity, the essential form.

With the same reasoning the Divine Persons are distinguished from their essence, although they participate not only of the same essence, but also of the same subsistence.

One does not apply to them the principle "*Diversorum subsistentium diversae subsistentiae*," faith says in effect that they are in the same subject and that they subsist under the same form, Divinity: that, however, does not affect the principle "*Diversarum personarum diversae proprietatis personales*," the unity of the essence does not exclude the diversity of the personal properties, when they are several persons.

What are in fact these properties ? Relations.

But it does not appertain to the nature of such a determined personal relation, as it does to the nature of essence, to be communicable indifferently to divers "substance."

Thus the essence in the Father, in the Son, in the Spirit is the form absolutely one, which makes them to be the same thing ; but one does not say indifferently of such or such Divine Person that He is the Father, Son or Spirit.

Then that by which these three Persons differ between themselves is in them a principle of formal distinction, and further this incommunicable principle formally distinguishes the essence which they receive by participation.

Such were the ingenious and new terms that the Bishop of Poitiers employed in his argument concerning the mystery of the Trinity.

In spite of the foregoing analysis of the Essence of God, Gilbert throughout insisted that faith precedes reason, so that on the one hand God is the Supreme Abstraction, of whom we can predicate nothing, though as the Fullness of Being, He sums up and unites that which in the Universe exists only in division and variety.

The effect of this was to render unmeaning some of the phraseology concerning divine things, which possessed only a partial or temporary truth. The result was that the generality

of his readers failed to distinguish from falsehood the difference of this partial truth, because it was "truth within time."

The doctrines of Gilbert were eventually brought before the Council held by Pope Eugenius III at Paris in 1148. St. Bernard of Clairvaux undertook to attack them. As he had done in the case against Abelard, the night before the trial, he collected at his quarters many of the Council and after a violent harangue against Gilbert, sought their approval of certain statements of dogma, which the writings of Gilbert were said to infringe. He did this hoping that by gaining their approval of these that they would condemn the works of Gilbert without further consideration the next day.

But Archdeacon Robert of Blois upset the whole plan by insisting, that in view of the authorities, which he adduced, that these very statements of dogma produced by St. Bernard were themselves of very doubtful orthodoxy.

This division of opinion led to this meeting being made known to the Council in general, and St. Bernard was not esteemed for having attempted to, in fact, preside at a Council in the place of the Pope who was present himself.

Gilbert, presented with various quotations from his works, declared that taken apart from their context he had no interest to support them and agreed to their being burnt.

Some days after the statements of dogma edited by St. Bernard were offered him at Rheims for his approval; these he suggested were unintelligible and asked St. Bernard if he himself understood what they meant, and offered very different statements drawn from the most renowned authors.

After great concessions on either side, the Pope ruled that :

"No reasoning in theology should make a division between Nature and Person, and that the Essence of God should not be predicated in the sense of the ablative case only but also of the nominative."

This decision led to great controversy, for if no distinction between Nature and Person was to be drawn, it is difficult to see on what grounds the Council of Chalcedon, 451, which enunciated the two Natures and one Person of Christ, was led to condemn the Nestorians.

Though the worship of Christians is undoubtedly due to the Persons and not to their essential forms, *i.e.*, Divinity, Pity, Wisdom, Perfection, etc., and thus the doctrines of Gilbert must have in certain ways erred, yet the attack on them by St. Bernard was clearly made in the wrong way and the opposition was supported by ill-considered arguments.

John of Salisbury was present at this trial of the doctrines of

Gilbert de la Porrée, and relates in his *Historia Pontificalis* how St. Bernard asked him to arrange a meeting for further discussion with Gilbert, but that the latter said that he must decline, as it would be useless.

If the Abbot desired a full understanding of the works of St. Hilary, he must first get better instructed in liberal learning and other matters pertaining to discussion.

We also have an account of the trial by Bishop Otto of Freising (q.v., p. 198).

John Beleth, d. 1182, was a disciple of Gilbert de la Porrée. He wrote a *Summa De Divinis Officiis*,¹² the copy made in 1195 in the National Library in Paris is a genuine copy, but the work was edited and rewritten by Corneille Laurimann in 1553.

It was utilized by Garnerius of Rochefort, a Cistercian monk, who became Bishop of Langres, d. 1215, in his anonymous treatise *Contra Amaurianos*.¹³

Robert of Melun, d. 1167, was an Englishman, who taught at Paris and Melun, and eventually became Bishop of Hereford. He was a Realist, who was careful not to let his philosophy lead him into heterodoxy. He was a friend of St. Bernard. And he taught John of Salisbury dialectics in Paris. Of his writings a *Summa Theologica*¹⁴ and *Questiones de Divina Pagina* and *Questiones de Epistolis de S. Pauli* have come down to us.

His own *Summa* is, in the opinion of Robert, less open to criticism than that of Peter Lombard, whom he attacks and whom according to John of Cornwall he victoriously refutes.

According to Hauréau, the logical deduction of the realism of Thierry is contrary to Christianity, for it amounts to this: Being in general exists in nature, as the mind measures it, or in other words the general idea of substance is the true representation of a universal substance, outside of which nothing subsists of all that the senses perceive or the intellect conceives. Such indeed would amount to pantheism.

But Robert of Melun in his little known *Summa* bravely denies this consequence in the following terms.

"It is true that God is in all that He has created; nevertheless it is not true that God or the Divine Essence can be predicated of any of His creatures. In fact in this phrase 'mundus est' the word est does not signify nor express the Divine Essence. These words est and ens have the same meaning according to all philosophers, whence it follows, that in the expressions 'mundus est ens,' and 'mundus est,' the different terms mean the same

¹² 994, *Bib. Nat.* ¹³ Cf. Ch. XVI, p. 218. ¹⁴ Codex. vict. 478, *Bib. Nat.*

thing. However, who would be sufficiently blinded by folly of ignorance as to assert that one of these terms *essentia*, *est*, *ens*, taken in the sense of pertaining to creatures signifies God or the Divine Essence ?

If, in short, these words *est*, *ens*, and *essentia* pertain in the same acceptation and under the same relation of predication to the Divine Essence and to creatures, the creatures would be immutable, or the Divine Essence would be subjected to the law of change.

Hence the term *essentia* is not taken in the same acceptation so as to signify the manner of being of the Creator and of the creature. The same applies to the word *substance*, the Creator and the creature are different substances."

He does not follow Thierry and Bernard so that there is no unique being which includes the plenitude of all matter and form and all manifestations of life all creatures and their Creator : he cannot be accused of pantheism.

In attributing Power, Wisdom and Goodness respectively to the Persons of the Trinity, though closely following Abelard, he did not fall into the latter's error of confusing the Persons.

In dealing with the subject of the Universal *ante rem*, he says "angels have been created, angels whose reason of being, like that of other creatures, was existing from all eternity in the Wisdom of God. That which has been made was in His life.

However, no creature has had the Wisdom of God as reason of being, which is not a reasonable creature, who alone, by intellect, knowledge of truth, and love of good, can imitate the Wisdom of God ; for a reasonable creature has the property to discern the true from the false and to seek the good and shun the evil. This is why man alone amongst all corporeal beings is defined as created according to the image and in the resemblance of God. Indeed, it is one thing to have the Wisdom of God as one's image, but another thing to have one's image in the Wisdom of God ; just as it is one thing to have one's image reproduced in a mirror, but another thing to be made in the image of that mirror.

Some imagine, that every creature of God has for its image the Divine Wisdom and has been made in its resemblance. Indeed, as things were in the thought of God before being produced in act, so they exist to-day in time. It is added, that the eternal reasons of being are the exemplaries of all things, and that consequently things have been created in their image and in their resemblance. But the eternal reasons of things are in the Wisdom of God ; then since all things have been created in the image and in the resemblance of these reasons, one can believe, not without cause, that they have been created in the image of the Divine Wisdom.

But that is not to be found in Holy Scriptures and is not approved by reason.

If man has it, in common with other creatures, that he has been created in the image of God, why does Holy Writ, when it speaks of the manner of being of corporeal things, attribute this honour to man alone? It is inexplicable, unless Holy Writ has only mentioned man in preference to the other creatures, because the image, the resemblance of God, is reproduced with less perfection in the other creatures than in man. Indeed, it often happens that there is specially attributed to a thing that quality which it has in common with several others, for the simple reason that it possesses it in the highest degree. However, in my opinion, that is not the reason why Holy Writ mentions man alone as having been created in the image and in the resemblance of God; and one ought to recognize that man has not this in common with any other corporeal creature.

Indeed, there is nothing to make one believe that things devoid of reason have been made in the image of God, because they have been made in the image of the eternal reasons which are the Wisdom of God? Because a thing has been made in the image of a statue of brass, does it follow that this thing has been made in the image of brass? Yet the statue is brass.

So the Wisdom of God is the power, in the image and in the resemblance of which man has been created, yet one reads nowhere that the human or any other creature has been created in the image of this power.

The reasonable creature appears thus to have been alone created in the image of the Divine Wisdom. But this world, which is not a reasonable creature, has it been made in the image of a reason of being, of an exemplary, other than the Divine Wisdom? No single one of the forms, which occupy the thought of God, appear to be the reason of being, the exemplary of the totality of all things.

If this form used to exist, the world would necessarily be one of the things, which are contained in the world; which is in no way true, the property of the world being to contain all the things, whose reasons of being exist eternally in the Wisdom of God. On the other hand, how could this world and any of the creatures which it contains have the same reason of being, the same exemplary? Indeed if the world and the reasonable creature had the same exemplary, the same reason, they would constitute only one same thing.

It does not appear, therefore, that they both have the same exemplary, the same reason of being, that is to say the Wisdom of God.

It is necessary to explain by means of some distinction how the Wisdom of God can at the same time be the exemplary, the reason, of both the world and the reasonable creature.

It is said that the Wisdom of God is the reason and exemplary of the world, because the Wisdom of God contains in itself the universality of all the exemplaries of things ; and that apparently the world includes in itself the universality of things made in the image of these eternal reasons.

But, it is not on that account, that the reasonable creature has the Wisdom of God as its reason of being and exemplary, it is because it can by means of its intellect and knowledge of things discern the true, love the good, and in that way, that is to say, in discerning the true and loving the good, it can imitate the Wisdom of God.

Indeed, the same thing can under divers relations be in several. Thus this man can, at the same time, be like to another man in respect of his colour, to another in respect of science, and yet one would only admit, that though the former and the latter are alike to the same thing, that there is nothing to show that thereby the former is like to the latter.

In the same way the reasonable creature and this world have not the same reason, the same exemplary, because the Wisdom of God, is, as has been said, the exemplary and reason of both."

These explanations are not very clear ; there is a resemblance of cause in effect, but no identity.

Nicholas of Amiens, d. 1190, is said to have been a pupil of Gilbert de la Porrée and was a moderate Realist. He wrote *De Arte Catholicae Fidei*¹⁵ or *De Articulis*, which sometimes has been attributed to Alain de Lille, in which he expressed his hopes to convince by reason those who disdain to believe in the Prophets and Evangelists.

In some respects he had Nominalist views, such as that no material subject could be in act without a form nor form without matter. But at the same time, he held, that forms which were joined to matter to constitute substance, had proceeded from another substance, by which he meant the Archetype form.

He was careful to avoid any question of heterodoxy in respect of the Divine Attributes, as had been alleged against Gilbert, by reproducing faithfully the declaration made by St. Bernard at the Council at Rheims.

"Deus est potentia qua dicitur potens ; sapientia qua dicitur sapiens, caritas qua diligens : ceteraque nomina quae divinae naturae dicuntur competere, de Deo licet improprie praedicant divinam essentiam."

¹⁵ 16084, fol. 192 ; 16297, fol. 167, *Bib. Nat.*

CHAPTER XII

THEOLOGIANS

Peter Lombard, d. 1164—Robert Pullen, d. 1154—Arnauld, c. 1150—Honorius of Autun, c. 1150—Geoffrey of Auxerre, c. 1150—Hugh of Amiens, c. 1150—John of Cornwall, c. 1150.

Peter Lombard, 1100–1164. *Master of the Sentences* was born at Lumelognio near Novara in Lombardy, and after studying at Bologna came to Paris to finish his education. He became a Professor of Theology in Paris and was afterwards made Bishop of Paris.

He is reckoned by some as the First of the Schoolmen.

Thoroughly versed in the philosophy of his day he as “*l’Histoire littéraire*” says “strove to banish from theology all useless and often dangerous questions and to indicate the bounds, beyond which the human mind should not go.”

Between 1145 and 1150 he wrote his celebrated *Sententiarum Libri Quattuor*¹ in which he proposed rather to amplify than simplify the canon of the mysteries by arranging the sacred problems in fair order. For this purpose he made a collection of the opinions of the Fathers upon the various questions of Theology, thus following the form used by Hildebert Archbishop of Tours q.v., p. 141. This work is divided into four books and in each book the subject matter is treated first of all in the form of a Question or Point to which an Answer is given then Objections are raised against it and Replies given; each of these, however, is often divided into many sub-divisions which are termed Distinctions.

- Book I. Contains 48 Points on the Trinity, Divinity, Fore-knowledge, and Free Will.
- Book II. Contains 44 Points on Angels, humans, the nature of man and sin.
- Book III. Contains 40 Points on the Incarnation, Whether Christ has virtue, and Whether the soul and flesh were separated in Christ from the Word.
- Book IV. Contains 50 Points on the Sacraments and the Future State.

¹ B.M.R.L., 9B. VII, thirteenth century.

The Fathers bore witness of the Faith, which had no need to be elucidated according to the principles of the *Timaeus*. Though he relied not on philosophical arguments in support of Faith, yet he shows by the method he employed, the good use that he made of his logical training.

He was equally renowned for his wisdom and prudence, and established a regular School, the followers of which were indifferent on the question of philosophy.

His book had not the kind of success for which he had hoped. Designed, as it was, to put an end to theological controversy, it became the textbook of theology in the University of Paris, where it received the special support of Peter of Poitiers, d. 1205; and it was introduced into Italy by Bandinus Gandulphus of Bologna, c. 1150.

It was later the subject of an enormous number of Commentaries; in England alone there were upwards of one hundred and sixty, in France there were more than that, besides there were those in Germany, Spain and Italy. But that which is commented upon becomes the subject of dispute.

As the author of this noted work he became known as the *Master of the Sentences*.

In dealing with the Doctrine of the Incarnation, in the third Book of the Sentences, he was attacked by John of Cornwall, on the points Whether a Person or a Nature assumed humanity, and Whether the Nature of God was Incarnate. As to this he stated "Deus non factus est aliquid": the Son did not become anything by the assumption of human nature, in consequence of the immutability of the Divine Nature. (This became known as nihilism.)

By the Council of Chalcedon 451, it is established that the Catholic Doctrine is that in Christ two Natures and two Wills were united in one and the same Person.

John of Cornwall argued that, as Christ is described as a man, God did become something, but he only argued that the Divine Person and not the Nature became man, and human nature became Divine personality, but not Deity or Nature.

The matter was considered by the Council of Tours under Pope Alexander III in 1163, when the expression "Deus non factus aliquid" was condemned: and nihilism was condemned at the Third Lateran Council, 1179.

The whole question is fully dealt with by St. Thomas Aquinas in his *Summa Theologica*, Part III, Q.2., cf., p. 393.

At a later date the Council of the Lateran, under Pope Innocent III, 1215, upheld the doctrine of the Trinity as set out by Peter Lombard, against the attack made on it by Joachim of Flora. Peter

Lombard taught that it was not theologically correct to say that the Son is generated, or the Spirit proceeds from the Divine *Essentia*, but that the Son is generated of the Father and the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. To Joachim of Flora this looked like a doctrine of quaternity, but it was a carefully guarded Modalism, which went back to St. Augustine.

In point of fact the arguments of Joachim came nearer to Sabellianism than those of Peter Lombard which he attacked for being such.

Book IV was "a crystallization of the doctrine of the sacramental system by the definite assertion of the seven sacraments and an acceptance of a definition of a 'sacrament' not merely as a 'sign' of a sacred thing but as itself 'capable of conveying the Grace of which it is the form.'"

St. Thomas Aquinas describes it as "An invisible Grace taking a visible and outward form."

Robert Pullen, Cardinal, 1150-1154, whose name appears under some thirteen different forms, succeeded Gilbert de la Porrée as a teacher at Paris in 1141, where he obtained the reputation of being a clever and ingenious Professor, not less firm than discreet.

Afterwards he returned to England and lectured at Oxford.

He was one of the teachers of John of Salisbury, and well known to William Thierry and St. Bernard.

He wrote eight books of *Sentences*², they are dogmatic dissertations, given in good order and written in an easy and clear style.

It would appear that he adopted the teaching of Abelard, and though he did not rely on philosophy in his teaching, yet, by the way in which incidentally he dealt with genus and species, he showed that he remained an adherent to the Conceptual School, which in his opinion, would not lead to any conclusions contrary to faith.

Though he denied being a philosopher, yet he undoubtedly used his acquaintance with philosophy for we find him in Chapter I, Book I, of his *Sentences* answering the question "What is God?" in the following manner :

"God is not an accident, for all accident is in a subject. Is He then a substance? Aristotle teaches that one of the principal properties of any substance is to receive contraries. But this property, this manner of being, can certainly not pertain to the particular nature of Him who never changeth. If God is not an accident and if He is not a substance what will He be? He will be that which cannot be defined, that which cannot be named."

² Printed Mathoud Paris 1655.

But such answer did not prevent him writing at length on the relations of the Divine Persons, on the intrinsic attributes of God and of the power of His intellectual faculties.

Having regard to the criticism of the system of Gilbert de la Porrée, whom he succeeded as a Professor at Paris, he is very guarded as to the doctrine of the Trinity. "It is inexplicable," said he, "for if one supposes that the three Persons are three modes of a unique substance, then one believes that one understands that which is not understood and thereby one is easily led astray. No other supposition is of any value.

So likewise, it is even dangerous to reason about the nature of the human soul, one can say what it is not, but one cannot say what it is.

There are mysteries both in this world and outside of this world and the human reason is not less incapable to penetrate the one than the other."

(He at any rate was not a Realist.)

Arnauld or *Ernaud*, c. 1150, Abbot of Bonneval in the diocese of Chartres was a friend of St. Bernard and strongly opposed to the Platonic Realists.

Many of his works were wrongly attributed to St. Cyprian of Carthage.

According to this learned theologian as stated in his *Paradise of the Soul*³ "There is no confusion in the works of God; nothing unformed was produced in the beginning of things; matter from the time it was created received the specific forms which appertain to it. All the assertions of the philosophers about the eternity of the world, about $\epsilon\lambda\eta$ unformed matter, ideas, this soul of the world, which they call $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ are ruined and confounded by the first chapter of Genesis.

What futility and absurdity to suppose an unformed globe and the author of this globe have existed together from all eternity, and that this mass has remained there useless serving no purpose, as if God had not been able, had not from the first wished to divide it and form it, when to wish, to be able, and to do, are absolutely the same thing with God."

According to John of Salisbury who supported Arnauld, the latter explained that there never was unformed matter, but that when we divide composite matter to consider matter and form, we are simply making mathematical abstractions, for in no time or instant did any matter subsist without form, or any form without matter.

But all the theologians who took into account this doctrine of

³ 1925, *Bib. Nat.*

unformed matter, have alleged it as much in support of Genesis as of the *Timæus*, like Honorius his contemporary.

Honorius of Autun, Honorius Augustinus, c. 1150, who wrote *De Imaginē Mundi*, did not quote the *Timæus*, but Genesis, as supporting the view that the creation of the world was made at four times, that is to say in four phases.

First, God created the archetypal world, secondly unformed universal matter, thirdly genus and species, and fourthly this man, this horse, all composite substances. Thierry of Chartres and his brother had also declared that the mystery of the Creation was in fact explained in the same way both by Moses and Plato.

He also wrote a *Dialogue on the matter of Angels*. The *Commentary on the Timæus* contained in 1095, Bib. Nat. is thought by some to have been written by him and not by William of Conches.

Moreover, he and not John Beleth wrote *Gemma Anima*⁴ an explanation of the ceremonies of the Church.

About this time, 1150, there remained a considerable number of theologians, who, not content with refusing to employ philosophy, attacked those who did on every conceivable ground of heresy. Amongst these were *Geoffrey of Auxerre*, Abbot of Igny at one time secretary to St. Bernard. *Hugh of Amiens*, d. 1164 (Rothomagnis), Archbishop of Rouen, and *John of Cornwall*, who attacked Peter the Lombard and Walter St. Victor.

⁴ 17293, Bib. Nat.

CHAPTER XIII

JOHN OF SALISBURY, 1115-1180, HISTORIAN

Pierre Helie or Peter Helas, c. 1150—William of Conches, d. 1154
—Richard l'Evêque, d. 1182—Adam du Petit Pont, c. 1150—
Otto of Freising, c. 1150.

John of Salisbury, 1115-1180, Bishop of Chartres, 1176, went to France about 1137 and first studied under Abelard, then at the pinnacle of his fame at St. Geneviève Paris, next under Robert of Melun afterwards Bishop of Hereford. Then, under William of Conches, some time tutor of Henry II of England, at Chartres he studied the trivium, grammar, rhetoric and dialectic or logic; also the quadrivium, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music under Richard l'Evêque, afterwards Bishop of Avranches.

John afterwards studied divinity under Gilbert de la Porrée, afterwards Bishop of Poitiers and under Robert Pullen, who afterwards was a lecturer and subsequently became a Cardinal.

It was through the latter that John about 1146 became a clerk in the Papal Court, where he was employed in drawing up official documents: he drafted the Bulls of Anastasius IV. He was certainly at the Council held by Pope Eugenius III at Rheims in 1148, which tried the case of Gilbert de la Porrée, who was accused of heresy by St. Bernard of Clairvaux.

By the latter he was introduced to Theobald Archbishop of Canterbury, to whom he eventually became Secretary in 1154, a position he continued to hold under Theobald's successor Thomas à Becket whose fortunes he followed in his quarrel with Henry II.

After the murder of Thomas à Becket, John became Canon and Treasurer of Exeter, but appears to have remained at his original post as he took an active part in the Consecration of Richard as successor in the See of Canterbury to Thomas à Becket.

Finally, he was offered the Bishopric of Chartres by King Louis VII of France, which he accepted.

John of Salisbury was undoubtedly a great mediæval churchman, the four of his works which have come down to us, besides his Correspondence, which has also been preserved were:

I. *Policraticus*¹ which perhaps may be rendered the statesman's book.

¹ B.M.R.L., 13 D, IV, f. 2, 1167-83.

II. *Metalogicon*.² A defence of logic.

III. *Eutheticus* or *Eutheticus*. The name given to two poems, one which served as an introduction to the *Policraticus*, the other the *Eutheticus de Dogmate Philosophorum*, an outlined history of philosophy and an invective against certain English politicians in the reign of King Stephen, under names borrowed from the pseudo Plautine comedy *Querolus*.

IV. *Historia Pontificalis* a continuation of *Sigabert's Chronicle* for the years 1148-1153.

The *Policraticus* is inscribed to Thomas à Becket it has a second title *De Nugis Curialium et Vestigiis Philosophorum*. "Concerning the toys of Courtiers and the traditions of Philosophers." The first six books deal with the former, the first condemning hunting, gaming, music and acting: the second, is about omens and dreams and astrology: the third book is against flatterers as enemies of the State: the fourth and fifth books are about the good prince and the ruling orders: the sixth is mostly about soldiers and the guerilla warfare conducted by the Welsh.

The seventh book, gives a summary of ancient philosophy; he has a great contempt for the logicians, who spend their lives on controversies, which turn on a few hard words in the logical text books. Incidentally he refers to the current controversy about Universals.

Pure Nominalism expired with Roscellinus though others, meaning his old tutor Abelard, who would be ashamed to call themselves followers of Roscellinus, are really Nominalists making out Universals to be, not indeed mere "voces," but what comes to much the same thing "sermones." To rise above such controversy one should use the six keys of learning as taught by Bernard of Chartres, humbleness of heart, love of enquiry, a peaceful life, silent meditation, poverty and exile, to which John of Salisbury added a seventh taken from Quintillian, love of one's teachers.

He goes on to inveigh against the covetousness of ecclesiastics and against hypocrites amongst the religious orders.

The eighth and last book is a censure on the followers of pleasure, the characters being taken from the Eunuchus of Terence, Thraso the swaggering soldier and Gnatho his toady and parasite.

In detailing instances of tyranny he mentions King Stephen, who confiscated the copies of the Roman law books belonging to Archbishop Theobald and silenced Vacarius the first teacher of Roman Law in England.

As Mr. Webb says "it is interesting to observe this view of the

² B.M.R.L., 13 D, IV, f. 161, 1167-83.

Roman Law as a sacred thing. It is connected with John's deep sense of the spiritual significance of the international unity of Christian civilization under the universal Roman Law ; and the universal spiritual jurisdiction of St. Peter's successor, as a divine ordinance, against the separatist tendencies of the different national kingdoms, the ultimate sanctions of whose authority was to be found in force rather than in reason and revelation."

Metalogicon, the first book contains a eulogy of rhetoric and grammar. Some have a gift of nature and grace for eloquence, because some men acquire it without taking pains, it is wrong to say that such pains are thrown away by others. By nature, John meant that generative power implanted in all things in virtue of which they can act or be acted upon. Such a power is liable to corruption and hindrance, but it may be repaired or assisted by the taking of pains : It is the same with regard to Grammar in which he included the study of literature, without which no man can be lettered.

The second book passes on to logic, which is the investigation of truth, the beginning of all philosophy and virtue.

"The Peripatetic School held that the knowledge of truth is the supreme good of human life and enquired into the nature of all things, with a view to discriminating the good from the evil therein. But that this enquiry demands a preliminary discipline, by which the errors due to unskilful reasoning may be avoided, was made plain by the extravagances, into which for lack of it the Epicurean and Stoic Schools ran, in the atheistic atomism of the former and in the doctrine of eternal matter and an equality of sins embraced by the latter. The necessity of such a discipline over and above the substantive sciences of Physics and Ethics taught by Pythagoras and Plato had already been perceived by Plato, and it is to this preliminary discipline that we give the name of Logic.

Of this, Aristotle, the founder of the Peripatetic School, became the great exponent and legislator, having discovered its principles and reduced them to rules in a series of treatises."

John of Salisbury is the first mediæval writer to display acquaintance with all the works of the Organon. The *Categories* and *de Interpretatione* were, of course, well known.

The Topics and Prior Analytics though but names to Abelard, had been taught him by Thierry of Chartres, but the Posterior Analytics were only introduced into Europe in Germany by John's contemporary Otto of Freising the uncle of the Emperor Frederic Barbarossa, the chief translator being Burgundio a Judge of Pisa.

John then goes on to detail nine views with regard to Universals,

three more or less nominalist and six more or less realist. According to John of Salisbury's own view Universals are what he thinks Aristotle taught, not so much things as objects of thought. They are not even words or propositions or meanings, but exist only in the particulars, apart from these they are but phantoms of our minds, the traces of real similarities or conformities of things left in the mirror of the soul. But they are not thoughts of nothing, the understanding in taking them for its objects is not "cassus" empty of content; the process of abstraction by which they are constituted is "fidelis et quaedam officina omnium artium" an expression of truth and so to say the workshop in which all arts are forged.

For the principles of these are all concerned with what particulars have in common, and not with their unique individuality.

Things have only one way of being, but many ways of being understood. Their manifold similarities are the archetypes of our conceptions of the real kinds of genus and species, accordingly God is described in Scripture as 'creating things after their kind.'

He hints that the Nominalists depart further from genuine Aristotelianism than the Platonists, and though he does not follow the Platonic doctrine respecting Universals, the Platonic assertion of Ideas, has, he admits the support of St. Augustine and other Christian thinkers, so that the real being of the Ideas as eternal archetypes of all existing things must be affirmed to be in the mind of God.

In the third book of the *Metalogicon* he proceeds to an analysis of the whole of the Organon.

The remaining chapters contain a discussion on the nature of truth.

He distinguishes the various senses and contexts in which the word true is used. Then he contrasts, the Primal or Divine Reason for which error is impossible, together with that which belongs to Angels, who are also exempt from error, though their intelligence has not the universal range of that of the Creator, with that of man exposed to a variety of opinions, some true and some false, in consequence not only of the original infirmity of his nature, but of the added penalty of his fall from purity in which he was created.

Truth is the light of the mind and the proper object of Reason, as light in the literal sense of the word is the proper object of sight, or solidity of touch.

In creatures the object and correlative faculty are two different things, but in God they are one; so that the Eternal Reason or Word can say of Himself, "I am the Truth."

The *Entheticus* or *Book of Instruction* consists of some 1,852 verses, it is full of personal references, but contains little that is not

dealt with in his prose works : but it does include some warnings against the dangers and temptations that beset travellers, in his day, at the inns, hospices and even monasteries, where they had to break their journey on the way.

The *Historia Pontificalis* opens with an account of the proceedings at the Council of Rheims, 1148, held by Pope Eugenius III, the chief business of which was the indictment of heresy brought by St. Bernard, the great Cistercian Abbot of Clairvaux and former teacher of Pope Eugenius III himself, against Gilbert de la Porrée, Bishop of Poitiers, in respect of his work *De Sex Principiis*, a commentary on the four books on the Trinity attributed to Boethius. The case apparently never reached any formal conclusion the Pope ruling that "no reasoning in theology should make a division between Nature and Person and that the Essence of God should not be predicated in the sense of the ablative case only but also of the nominative." (Cf. Ch. IX, p. 182.)

John of Salisbury, who was present at the trial, describes St. Bernard as an eloquent preacher mighty in the Scriptures ; but with no profound acquaintance with other theological literature. Whereas Gilbert de la Porrée was the most learned man of his day and better versed in the writings of the Fathers and especially in those of his own predecessor in the See of Poitiers, St. Hilary, which were admittedly the most difficult of all.

St. Bernard attempted to prejudge the case by securing the prior condemnation by a private assembly of prominent members of the Council of an unauthorized summary of Gilbert's views.

On the other hand, there was considerable jealousy felt by many of the Cardinals of the immense influence exercised by the great Abbot in public affairs generally, and his ascendancy over the mind of the Pope, his former pupil.

Of John of Salisbury's correspondence much has been preserved which throws interesting lights on the history of his times but only the earlier part has been edited by Dr. Poole.

Pierre Helie or *Peter Helas*, c. 1150 was a grammarian of considerable renown at this time. He taught John of Salisbury rhetoric about 1138, and was the author of an often quoted *Commentary on the Grammar of Priscian* and a Glossary of rare words. But he eschewed all philosophy.

William of Conches, d. 1154, was a grammarian. At one time he was tutor of the future Henry II of England for whom he wrote *Moralium Dogma Philosophorum*.³

³ 2513, *Bib. Nat.*

He became the successor of Bernard at Chartres and afterwards taught for a long time in Paris where he died : whilst at Chartres he had been a teacher of John of Salisbury. He wrote a *Commentary on the Timaeus of Plato*⁴ and was a Platonist though, as he did not accept Plato's doctrine of Ideas he can scarcely be termed a realist. Though he agreed with Aristotle that man cannot reason without having had sensation, yet he adopted a system of psychology brought from the East or perhaps Greece by Adhelard of Bath, as translated by a monk named Constantine from the Arabic.

In the head, he held that there were three cells, the one in front is the visual, where the soul sees and conceives forms and colours ; the middle one is the reason, where they are distinguished, where the soul appreciates the quiddity of the object ; the cell at the back is where the memory is stored. The world soul co-exists in every man with his own soul.

He wrote a *Commentary on the Consolatio of Boethius* but his great work was his *Philosophia Magna Mundi*⁵ in four books of which his *Philosophia Minor* or *Dragmaticon*⁶ was a revised edition. He wrote an abridgment of the *Dragmaticon* called his *Secunda Philosophia*⁷ a dialogue between master and disciple on anthropology.

Also he wrote a *Tertia Philosophia* a similar dialogue on cosmography likewise drawn from the *Philosophia Minor* based on an atomism like that of Democritus following Adhelard of Bath.

The reason of the *Dragmaticon* or revised edition of his *Philosophia* was that in the latter and in his Commentaries on the *Timaeus* and the *Consolation*, that he had identified the Holy Ghost with the natural force or soul of the world and had likewise identified the Father with Power, the Son, Wisdom and the Holy Ghost as the Will without giving due attention to their respective Persons.

Objection had been taken to this both by William and Walter St. Victor who communicated with St. Bernard on the subject.

There was no Council held on the matter as William of Conches retracted these heresies and wrote the revised edition *Dragmaticon*.

As a theologian he borrowed from theology just so much as was necessary to elucidate his description of the genesis or order of the universe, but beyond this he did not care to go.

Richard l'Evêque, d. 1182. Archdeacon of Coutances and Bishop of Avranches in Anjou, 1171, was a contemporary of

⁴ 1095, *de St. Germain, Bib. Nat.*

⁵ 11130, *Bib. Nat.*, and B.M.R.L., 9A, XIV, f. 257, thirteenth century.

⁶ 6415, *Bib. Nat.* and B.M.R.L., 4A, XIII, f. 112, thirteenth century.

⁷ 6588 and 6683 *Bib. Nat.*

William of Conches and was also one of the teachers of John of Salisbury at Chartres. He was in fact the last of the Masters of the School of Chartres.

Adam du Petit Pont, c. 1150, afterwards Bishop of St. Asaph, acquired his name from the bridge in Paris upon which he set up his school to teach logic. Though known to John of Salisbury with whom he exchanged books and ideas, it does not appear that he was ever his teacher. He wrote a work called *The Art of Reasoning*, which in itself was made purposely obscure it is said for mercenary reasons, in order that scholars might be attracted to his lectures, rather than acquire the learning he transmitted to his pupils, without paying for their attendance at his lectures. It was simply a recrudescence of logical sophistry. He was brought forward to uphold the indictment against Gilbert de la Porrée at Paris and Rheims in 1148.

Otto Bishop of Freising, c. 1150, uncle of the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, introduced the completed works comprised in the Organon of Aristotle into Germany at this date.

He also wrote a *Biography of Frederick Barbarossa* which includes an account of the trial of Gilbert de la Porrée.

CHAPTER XIV

THE ARABIANS

Al Kindi, d. 850—Al Farabi, d. 950—Avicenna, d. 1036—
Al Hazen, c. 1025—Avempace, d. 1125—Algazel, d. 1111—
Avicbron, d. 1050—Abubacer, d. 1190—Averroes, d. 1206—
Moses Maimonides, d. 1204—David (Liber de Causis), c. 1200—
Costa-ben-Luca, c. 950—Isaac Israeli, d. 933—Ibn Thabet,
d. 902—Note on Translators.

IN Chapter III, p. 50, the various translations of the works of Aristotle from those possessed by the Arabians have been traced.

But to understand the objections that were raised in the thirteenth century to their study, beyond the logical works contained in the Organon, it is necessary to take a cursory view of the other works of the Arabians and to consider those of their philosophical doctrines, which were introduced into Western Europe at the same time.

The Arabians, after their capture of the Persian Kingdom of the Sassanians in 651, eagerly absorbed the literature and civilization which they found at Bagdad. The Moors who had been won over to the Moslem Faith in 709 invaded Spain in 711, and established an independent Caliphate there, with Cordova as its capital in 755: they likewise became great patrons of all the wisdom and art that came from the East.

The first Arabian with whom we are concerned is *Al Kindi* of Basrah, d. 850. He was the son of the Governor of Coufa under the celebrated Haroun al Raschid 786–808.

He studied at Bagdad and Bassora and became famous under the Caliphs Al Mamoun, 813–833 and Motassem, d. 841 for his works on philosophy, astronomy, mathematics, medicine, politics and music; and was selected to translate the works of Aristotle. He is credited with having written a treatise to show that Philosophy could not be understood, without a knowledge of Mathematics upon which it was based. He wrote *De Intellectu*; also *De Somno et Visione*; and *De Quinque Essentia*; and *Judicia* an alchemical work translated by Robert of Chester the friend of Herman the Dalmatian at the request of Peter Abbot of Cluny.

Al Farabi of Balah in the province of Farab, d. 950, who had studied at Bagdad lived at Aleppo and Damascus. His chief

writings were Commentaries especially on the Organon and he wrote *De Scientiis* and *De Syllogismo*.

Avicenna 980-1036, was a Persian who taught at Bagdad. His chief work was his *Medical Canon*, which was the text book of European Schools of Medicine for centuries, Scaliger in the sixteenth century asserted "no man can be an accomplished physician who has not mastered Avicenna."

His great philosophical work was *Assephae, i.e., Liber Sufficientiae* its original name was *Al-shefa* meaning the Cure. It is to Avicenna that the Arabs and the Schoolmen owe the classification of the faculties into the exterior (the five senses), interior, motor, and rational.

He also translated and commented on the works of Aristotle, from whom he often deviated either through misunderstanding or through thought to improve.

He was prolific writer, over one hundred works being attributed to him.

It was he who alleged that the mutable cannot proceed directly from the immutable; and that things emanated from the first principle before time existed; and that all that emanated from the first principle is numerically one as the First Intelligence.

St. Thomas Aquinas denied his propositions that infinite multitude is an accidental possibility: that "one" added something to substance: that Plato's ideas exist in the Active Intelligence: or that intelligible species being derived through the senses is the reason why the soul is joined to the body.¹

Sir Arthur Eddington in *New Pathways in Science* page 23 remarks "I would not like to commit myself to the opinion that the twoness of 2X is just like the twoness of two apples."

Avicenna held that God transcended being and that therefore the proof of His existence could be the subject matter of metaphysics, though a science cannot prove the existence of its own object. But God and His attributes belong to theology alone.

Al Hazen, c. 1025, was a celebrated mathematician, who also wrote on optics. Kepler is thought to have borrowed his views from Al Hazen.

Avempace, d. 1125, a Spanish Mohammedan wrote on mathematics, medicine and made Commentaries on Aristotle.

Algazel, 1072-1111. Born at Tous, became a professor of theology at Bagdad. After prolonged study of philosophy, he

¹ Thomas Aquinas, S.T.I. 2.

became a mystic and ascetic, who recognized what he called Prophetism as being as much higher than Reason as Reason was higher than understanding. He denied the argument of causality ; a thing only happens habitually ; but there is no immutable law of nature which binds the Will of the Creator.

Algazel contended that philosophy could not be a mode of revelation, it could not enunciate first principles, nor at once explain the origin of things and be compatible with orthodox (Mohammedan) belief. Reason could serve religion only in the way of exposition, just as it might be open to any special science or in the management of ordinary affairs. He wrote *Metaphysica* which was frequently translated.

Avicbron. Ibn Gebirol, 1021-1050, was a Spanish Jew, born at Malaga in Spain. He wrote *Fons Vitae*, which is neo-platonic in its outlook and is based on two propositions.

First—all things consist of matter and form, species being a variety of a universal matter and a universal form.

Second—Between the Primal One and Intellect *νοῦς* there is interposed the Divine Will : things are form and matter but the cause of their union is Intellect.

It was adopted later by Duns Scotus in his arguments against St. Albertus Magnus and St. Thomas Aquinas.

The proposition that the spiritual and immaterial form, by issuing forth alone, can act on something else was rejected by St. Thomas Aquinas.²

Abubacer, d. 1190, was born in Andalusia and died at Seville. He was renowned at the court of Almohades, where he became the successor of Avempace, for his skill as a physician and poet and for his mathematical and philosophic learning. He wrote *De Magnis Conjunctionibus* an introduction to astronomy, in which he differed from Ptolemy as to the principles of celestial motion. He also wrote a romance *Philosophus Autodidactus*, in which he endeavoured to trace the development of a human intelligence unbiassed by society, and he makes his hero Hai to be born on a desert island as the result of spontaneous generation. As it acquired immense popularity throughout Western Europe, it may be well to outline the scheme of this novel, which is indeed philosophical. "From the simple knowledge of sensible things, he gradually arrives at a conception of the world and its physical laws. Later he recognizes the unity that underlies the variety. Things, though multiple in their accidents, are one in their essence. Thus he

² S.T.I., 3.

arrives at matter and form ; the first form is species, but all forms are united by corporeity, *i.e.*, corporal form.

Contemplating matter and form, he enters the spiritual world. Since what is produced must have a producer, there must be a Producer of Forms. As to the celestial bodies, their variety cannot be infinite. They are as one individual, thus the whole universe is an entirety. He thinks it is eternal but is uncertain. Anyway he recognizes an agent which sets the world in motion and perpetuates its existence. Such agent is neither a body, nor a faculty of a body, it is the form of the Universe. All beings are the work of the Supreme Being.

Man's mind, contemplating the beauty of the work, necessarily ascends to its Creator, His goodness, and perfection. All forms are in Him and issue from Him, so that there is in truth no other existence.

Looking inwards, Hai finds his intellect is absolutely incorporeal, since it perceives things divested of all quality, and this neither the senses nor the imagination are capable of doing.

Therein lies the real essence of man, which is neither born nor dies. The intellect is troubled by matter and endeavours to disengage itself by giving to the body only such care as is indispensable to existence. Its beatitude and its pain are in direct ratio to its union with God or its distance from Him.

By ecstasy man unites himself with God.

Then the universe appears to him as only God, whose light is shed over all, but which manifests itself in greater splendour in the purest being.

Multiplicity exists only for the senses, it disappears before the intellect, which has disengaged itself from matter."

Such is the epitome of this work given by Mr. Lewes.

Averroes, 1120-1206, was born at Cordova and died in Morocco, he was greatly befriended by Abubacer at the court of Yousouf who succeeded Almohades ; and who was followed by Yacoub Almansour. His works initiated the Schoolmen into the works of Aristotle other than the Organon.

He wrote three Commentaries on Aristotle.

I. *The Great Commentary*, which gives each paragraph of the text and then commentary.

II. *The Middle Commentary*, which merely cites the first words of each paragraph. It was this form which was used by St. Albertus Magnus.

III. *The Third Commentary*, which consists of paraphrases and analysis.

According to Averroes, the transcendent or absolute being is

thought or intellect ; movement is the fragmentary attainment of its actuality in successive instants of time. The intellect is one and continuous in all individuals, it is the eternal and universal nature of true intellectual life.

His doctrine was not, as interpreted by the Schoolmen, one soul common to all mankind.

Aristotle in his treatise on the Soul, Book III, Ch. V, did not express himself very clearly about the two different modes of the intellect ; the active mode and the passive mode, as he used the term " separated intellect " (*i.e.*, apparently separated from the world and separated from the body) in order to qualify the active principle in chief.

Most of the Greek and Arab Commentators regarded the essence of this external principle, as penetrating by infusion, or irradiation, into the passive intellect the human understanding, awakening it, enlivening it, making it to act or, as it was said, actualizing it. Some defined this principle as God Himself, others as the Universal Soul emanated from God, the Soul of the World subsisting outside the World.

Avicenna had held that the intellect is in final act and a pure substance free from all mixture, a form substantially assistant, which moves and determines matter without receiving any determination (which can be considered as an attempt to convey the notion of personality). He at any rate insisted that each individual possessed an intellect, which was not that of another individual, and is not therefore a common intellect.

Averroes on the other hand, being imbued with certain neoplatonic theories, maintained, as is explained by Munk, that " there must be some connecting link between the separated intellect and the (material) human intellect, as between form and subject, so that there must be an 'acquired intellect' which perceives the 'active universal intellect,' for if the latter perceived the individual human intellect, there would be in it a new accident. But an eternal substance, like the active universal intellect, cannot be the subject of new accidents, so that it is this, that is the human intellect, which perceives the universal intellect, that is to say that the human intellect must be able to raise itself up to the universal intellect and identify itself in some way with it, at the same time remaining a perishable being.

It is this perishable element, the acquired intellect, that then effaces itself : for at the moment, when the acquired intellect is drawn by the active universal intellect, the latter must act on man in a different manner, than at the first time, at the time of the junction of the two intellects : and when the acquired intellect mounts up it effaces itself, loses itself entirely ; and there remains,

so to speak, only the bare table of the passive intellect, which being determined by no form can receive all forms. There is thus born in it a second disposition to make it perceive the act of intellect."

The reason, he gives, for this is that in the first place the material intellect cannot receive intelligible forms, but the acquired intellect that is born with it can. But when this acquired intellect does perceive the active universal intellect it is absorbed by it.

The faculty of identifying itself completely with the active universal intellect depends on three things: on the primitive strength of the material intellect: on the perfection of the acquired intellect, which requires speculative effort: and on the infusion more or less prompt of the form destined to transform the acquired intellect. In short, one arrives only at this perfection by study, speculation, and renouncing all the desires, which affect the interior faculties of the soul, especially sensation. It is necessary to perfect the speculative intellect. This happiness of the highest intelligence only happens to man in this life by both study and work; those to whom it is not given to reach this in this life, return after death either to nothing or to eternal torments.

Though the general notions which emanate from the active universal intellect are imperishable in humanity, as a whole nothing remains of the individual intelligences which receive them.

As to the proof of the existence of God, as a science cannot prove the existence of its own object, Averroes handed over such proof to physics. Averroes wanted to place all Moslem theology except the dogmatics of the Prophets revelation in the domain of metaphysics.

As these ideas had a great influence on many of the Latin Masters in the Schools in Italy, it has seemed not out of place to take some notice of what Averroes himself held.

St. Thomas Aquinas' objection was that even if the *intellectus agens* is God, to affirm the unity of the *intellectus possibilis* is to deny the individuality of a man.

St. Thomas denied that the *intellectus agens* was the *intellectus passivus* in act, but rather that it was that whereby the object is made to be in act in the passive intellect.

Averroes also wrote a work called the *Destruction of Destruction* against the opinions of Algazel, in which he sought to establish the supremacy of reason over authority and faith. Such doctrine was accepted by Boethius of Dacia and Sieger of Brabant, but was condemned at the Council of Paris under Archbishop Tempier in 1277. It was this, which was the background of the contests

between the philosophers and theologians at Paris between 1200 and 1300.³

Moses Maimonides, 1131-1204, was a Spanish Jew, born at Cordova, who became the pupil and friend of Averroes. He became the chief physician to the Sultan of Egypt.

He wrote a work entitled *The Guide of the Perplexed*, containing explanations of Scripture. He dealt with some of the same objections to Aristotle that confronted the Christians. He regarded God as the Prime Mover, and sought to establish the proof of God from Possibility and Necessity.

He was profoundly versed in the learning of his age and was quoted with approval by St. Thomas Aquinas as to the Names of God and the extent of Providence.

He was called the Mother of Philosophy by Thomas of York.

Note.—It has now been made clear that the work on theology attributed to Aristotle by the Arabians was in fact Books IV, V and VI of the *Enneads of Plotinus*.

David, c. 1200, was a Jew who lived about this time, according to St. Albertus Magnus, who compiled the *Liber de Causis*. It was eagerly accepted as being a genuine work of Aristotle with a gloss; it was also variously ascribed to St. Augustine, or Al Farabi, or Avempace, or Gilbert de la Porrée.

It was in fact a collection of excerpts from Aristotle, Proclus, Avicenna, Algazel and Al Farabi, with a gloss written by David himself.

There are three other writers whose translated works were often referred to.

Costa-ben-Luca (Constabulus), c. 950, an Arabian doctor, a Nestorian, who wrote *Differentia Spiritus et Anima*, translated by John of Spain, 1150, and quoted by Richard Middleton and Thomas of York.

Isaac Israeli, d. 933. According to Fabricius he was a doctor named Isaac ben Soleiman Israeli, surnamed Abou Jacoub, an Egyptian by birth. He wrote *De Elementis de Definitionibus*, translated by Gerard of Cremona, 1178.

Ibn Thabet, 835-902. He wrote *Liber Prestigionium*, translated by John of Spain, c. 1150, and *De Motu Accessionis et Recessionis*, translated by Gerard of Cremona, 1178.

³ An interesting summary of the errors of the Arabians is contained in an anonymous book written in the thirteenth century entitled *Tractatus de Erroribus Philosophorum*. (16195, Ch. X, *Bib. Nat.*)

TRANSLATORS

For convenience of reference it may be found useful at this point to include a general list of the translators of the ancient Greek Philosophers.

Henry Aristippus, d. 1162. Archdeacon of Catania, translated *Phaedo* and *Meno* of Plato into Latin for Mais the great admiral of Sicily and Hugh Archbishop of Palermo.

Burgundio, c. 1150. A Judge of Pisa, translated the *Fountain of Knowledge*, by St. John Damascenus, 690-754, also *De Fide Orthodoxa*⁴ and the medical works of Galen.

Gerard of Cremona, d. 1178, translated many Arabian works, and those of Aristotle the *Posterior Analytics*, *Physics*, *De Coelo*, *De Generatione et Corruptione* and the first three books of *Meteorologica*; also the *De Elementis* of Isaac Israeli and the *Liber de Causis* of David.

Gondistator or Gundissalinus or Gándisalvus, 1150. Archdeacon of Segovia, translated with John of Spain, the *Fons Vitae* of Avicbron, also the *Metaphysics* of Algazel. He himself wrote *De Creatione Coeli* and *De Anima*.

James of Venice, c. 1128, a translator of the whole of the *Organon* of Aristotle, including the *Analytics*, *Topics* and *Sophistici Elenchi*.

John of Spain (John Avendeath), c. 1150, a Jew translator with Gondistator of the *Fons Vitae* of Avicbron, of the *Liber de Differentia Spiritus* of Costa-ben-Luca (Constabulus) and other Arabian works, including the pseudo Aristotelian *Secretum Secretorum*.

John Sarrazin, c. 1160. Abbot of Vercelli, translated afresh the works of the pseudo Dionysius and the *Analytics* of Aristotle; he was a correspondent of John of Salisbury.

Raimond, c. 1150. Archbishop of Toledo. He ordered the translation of the Arabic version of Aristotle by the Jews. This was a Latin translation of an Arabic version of a Syrian version of the Greek text.

Michael Scott, d. 1230. Educated at Oxford, Paris and Toledo. About 1217 translated, together with a Jew named Andrew, the *De Coelo et Mundo*, *de Anima* and *Historia Naturalis* of Aristotle.

Herman the German, d. 1272. Bishop of Astorgia, translated at Toledo the *Politics and Rhetoric* of Aristotle and the *Middle Commentaries* of Averroes.

William of Moerbeke, d. 1281-6. A Domincian monk, sent in 1242 to Greece to work for the union of the Greek and Latin Churches.

In 1274 he became Chaplain and Confessor to Pope Gregory X and afterwards Archbishop of Corinth.

⁴ B.M.R.L., 7B, IX, f. 83, thirteenth century.

Between 1260–1280 he translated the works of Aristotle for St. Thomas Aquinas; and also translated the works of Proclus, Simplicius, Galen, and Hippocrates.

He was attacked by Roger Bacon in his *Compendium Studii Philosophia*, under the name of William the Flemming.

Lastly mention must be made of the following:

Aurispā and Traversari, 1438, who first brought the complete works of Plato from Byzantium.

Cardinal Bessarion, 1403–1472. A Greek who became an Italian. The author of *In Calumniatorem Platonis*, who tried to establish that Plato and Aristotle differed in form rather than in the contents of their teaching. He was followed by Fernand of Cordova in his *De Laudibus Platonis*.

Ficinus (Marsilio Ficino), 1433–1499, who under the patronage of Cosmo, Piero and Lorenzo de Medici at Florence, made a Latin version of the works of Plato.⁵ His best known follower was Giovanni Pico Count of Mirandola, 1463–1494.⁶

Augustus Niphus, 1473–1546, who made a complete Latin translation of the works of Aristotle that have come down to us.

Note.—About the time of Adhelard of Bath, 1120, Robert of Retines and Plato of Tivolo, with the help of some Jews, translated into Latin a certain number of Arabic works on mathematics, astronomy and medicine.

⁵ Printed Paris, 1651.

⁶ Works Printed Basle, 1601.

CHAPTER XV

CANON LAW AND THE UNIVERSITIES

IN the Western Church there was at first no single code of law and no clear distinction between the Councils, which were universally binding, and the decrees of provincial councils, which were only of local authority. Besides the decrees of these Councils, there were numerous letters from the Popes to various Bishops, which were known by the name of decretals.

The earliest collection of the Canons of the various Councils is known by the name of *Prisca* and was formed in Italy some time in the fifth century, but the earliest collection of Canons and Decretals was formed by a Scythian monk at Rome called Dionysius Exiguus, who calculated the method of fixing Easter which was finally adopted ; this was in two parts, the first contains a translation into Latin of the Apostolic Canons and the Canons of the Councils of Nice, Ancyra, neo-Caesarea, Gangra, Antioch, Laodicea, and Constantinople and the original Latin of those of Chalcedon and Sardis and the Acts of the Synod of Carthage, 419, and other African Synods.

The second part is made up of Papal Decretals from Pope Siricius, 385, to Anastasius II, 498, arranged in chronological order. A copy of this collection, with some additional matter, was presented to Charlemagne during his first visit to Rome by Pope Hadrian I, in 774, and was sanctioned by the Synod of Aix la Chappelle in 802, as the *Codex Canonum* of the Frankish Empire. This expanded collection is known by the name of *Dionysio-Hadriana*.

Another collection attributed to Bishop Isidore of Seville, d. 636, was formed of Greek, African, French, and Spanish Canons, together with the Decretals from Pope Damasus, 366–Gregory I, 604. This is known as *Hispana*.

Between 840 and 860 another collection was made by a Frankish ecclesiastic, Isidore Mercator, in the dominions of Charles the Bald, which purported to be that formed by St. Isidore.

This is known as the *False Decretals*.

After the preface and some minor apocryphal documents the first part contains fifty of the Apostolic Canons extracted from the *Hispana* and sixty spurious decretals of the Popes from

Clement I, 88-97, to Milchiades, 314, chronologically arranged. The second and third parts consist chiefly of Canons extracted from *Hispana*, together with thirty-five fictitious decretals.

A supplement is appended to some MSS. containing *inter alia* a series of regulations regarding processes against bishops, these are called *Capitula Ingilramni* (a bishop of Metz), and are thought to be older than the original collection.

This collection was believed on all sides to be genuine for some six hundred years, until Nicholas of Cusa, d. 1464, threw doubts upon them; whereupon after critical examination Pope Nicholas V, 1447-1455, published the fact of their lack of historical authority.

Though collections of extracts had been made by Anselm II, Bishop of Milan in the ninth century and by Regino, Bishop of Prum in the Eifel, in the tenth century, according to subject matter neither were in any way complete.

The first extensive collection according to subject matter was that of Burchard, Bishop of Worms, in twenty books compiled in the eleventh century called the *Decretum or Collectarium of Burchard*, which came to be the normal text book of Canon Law at that time.

During the papacy of Leo IX, about 1050, an anonymous *Collection in 74 Titles* appeared, derived chiefly from the *False Decretals* and the writings of Gregory the Great.

It is not a complete manual, but with the addition of extracts from Councils it had a wide circulation.

Other collections which appeared under Gregory VII, 1073, were a *Capitulare of Cardinal Atto*, which was only chronological and a collection by *Cardinal Deusdedit*, which though divided into four books concerning: 1, the Primacy; 2, the Clergy; 3, The Property; 4, The Privileges of the Church, was also only chronological. But the collection of Bishop Anselm of Lucca was divided into thirteen books according to subject matter, it used both Burchard and the *Seventy-Four Titles* as well as the *False Decretals*, but abandoned nearly all the latter provincial Councils, whilst adding much new matter, in fact it only included what was thought to be Roman or conformable to Roman tradition.

Ivo Bishop of Chartres, d. 1115, seems to have been responsible for three collections. First *Tripartitia* or *Collectio Trium Partium*, an abstract from the *False Decretals* and the *Decretals of Gregory the Great*, then a *Decretum* in seventeen parts which had but little vogue, as the author himself did not care for it, finally his celebrated *Pannormia*¹ in eight books, which became the popular text book in the first half of the twelfth century.

¹ B.M.R.L., 7 B, V, thirteenth century.

All the preceding works culminated in the *Decretum of Gratian*, 1142, which included the Papal Decrees down to 1139.

The work consists of three parts: the first part treats of the sources of Canon Law, of ecclesiastical persons and ecclesiastical offices, and is divided into 101 distinctions which are sub-divided into "Canones."

The second part is divided into thirty-six *causae*, cases proposed for solution subdivided into *questiones*, under each of which are arranged the various Canons (Canons and Decretals) as authorities on the matter; but *Causa 33, Questio 3, De Poenitentia* is divided like the first part into seven *distinctiones*, each containing several Canons.

The third part entitled *De Consecratione* gives in five *distinctiones* the law bearing on Church ritual and the Sacraments.

Those fifty notes headed *Palea* are supposed to have been written by *Paucapalea*, a pupil of Gratian.

The University of Bologna was founded by Pepo in 1076 and Innerius in 1113 founded the School of Roman Civil Law there. It was Gratian, known as the Father of Canon Law, a Camoldensian monk of Bologna who first founded the School of Canon Law there and taught it as a separate science; for up to this time Canon Law had been considered as a branch of theology.

In the following century various compilations of the Pontifical constitutions, which arose through the struggles between the Empire and the Papacy, were made the most important of which was first, the *Compilatio Prima* the *Breviarium Extravagantium* of Bishop Bernard of Pavia.

The Decretals subsequent to Gratian were known as *Decretales Extravagantes* (i.e., *extra decretum Gratani Vagantes*).

This *Breviarium Extravagantium* is noted as having been the model of all subsequent collections; it was divided into five Books *Judex, Judicium, Clerus, Connubia* and *Crimen*, dealing with ecclesiastical officials and judges, procedure, rights, duties and properties of the clergy, law of marriage, and criminal law and ecclesiastical discipline.

Subsequently the *Decretals of Gregory IX* digested into a code the *Decretals from Gratian* to 1234.

The *Liber Sextus* (*Le Sixte*) contains the Decretals from 1234 under Gregory IX to 1298 under Boniface VIII.

The *Clementinae*, the Court having transferred from Rome to Avignon, were published by Clement V in 1313 and revised by John XXII in 1317.

The *Extravagantes Joannis XXII* and *Extravagantes Communes*

bring the period down to 1484 and the *Correctores Romani* were authorised by Gregory XIII in 1582.

From which time there was no authoritative Roman code until that one published by Pope Benedictus XV in 1916.

THE UNIVERSITIES

St. Anselm of Bec, d. 1109, may be said to be the last of the great monastic teachers.

In the twelfth century the seats of learning became centred round the great Cathedral Schools, the head of which was the Chancellor or Scholasticus.

Around them were gathered large concourses of students ranged under their different masters, who gradually formed themselves into Guilds.

Theology and Philosophy held the first place, the latter being comprised in the term Arts, to which must be added Law and Medicine.

There were four of these studia generalia, Paris, Bologna, Salerno and Oxford.

At Bologna the study of both Canon and Civil Laws was developed as mentioned above, whilst Salerno in the south of Italy attained a world wide reputation for medicine.

S.T.P. meant SANCTI THEOLOGIAE PROFESSOR and inception into the Guild of Masters or Teachers was necessary in order to obtain a license to teach and become an S.T.P.

But it was a long time before the Guilds became organized into Universities. Paris is said to have received a charter in 1200 and its first Proctor in 1209. It was first recognized as a legal corporation by a Brief of Pope Innocent III in 1211.

The programme of study for the faculty of Arts was laid down by Cardinal Robert de Courçon the Papal Legate in 1215; and it was not until 1245 that the first Rector of the Faculty of Arts was appointed. About 1250 the secular students were formed into four "Nations" France (Ile de), Normandy, Picardy and England.

Immediately on establishing themselves in Paris in about 1220, both the Dominicans and Franciscans sought to occupy chairs of theology in the University, without being subject to its regular discipline. This led to various turbulent disputes, but the Dominicans secured a Chair in 1229 and a second one in 1231, about which date the Franciscans also secured a Chair. Nevertheless these disputes broke out again in 1253 and 1256 and did not finally disappear until about 1291.

At Paris the minimum course of study for Arts was six years, and for theology another eight ; thus the minimum age at which a man could commence to teach Arts was twenty, and to commence teaching theology it was thirty-four.

As it was found that philosophy was not sufficiently taught in the six years Arts course, it came to pass that those who taught theology went on teaching philosophy at the same time.

About 1200, the students had begun to form groups for common living, 'socii,' and their houses were called hospitia and the heads of such the pedagogi.

Foundations then began to be formed for the benefit of poor scholars. In 1258 one for theological students was started by Robert Sorbonne, and in 1314 the College of Navarre was founded.

In 1457, living out of College by students was forbidden ; and by 1500 there were upwards of sixty colleges.

But the Civil War in the next century emptied Paris of its students ; and the Revolution of 1789 brought most of the French Universities to an end.

The new translations of Aristotle and of the works of the Arabian philosophers were the source of certain heresies of David of Dinant and Almaric Bène, more particularly referred in the next chapter, which were condemned at a Council of Paris in 1210. As a consequence Cardinal Robert de Courçon the Papal Legate in the Statutes, which he gave to the University in 1215, forbade the study of the Metaphysics and the Natural Philosophy of Aristotle, together with the works of David of Dinant and Almaric and the Spanish Moors. But the rule of the Chancellor of St. Geneviève on the left bank of the Seine was not so strict.

In 1231 Pope Gregory IX appointed three celebrated theologians, William of Auxerre, Archdeacon of Beauvais ; Simon de D'Anthie, Canon of Amiens ; and Stephen de Provins, Canon of Paris, directing them to examine the works of natural philosophy interdicted by the Provincial Council of Paris and to expurgate any suspected passages so that the rest might be studied.

In the end it came to pass that in 1366 two Cardinal Legates of Pope Urban V decreed that no one should be postulated without the study of Aristotle's Logic, nor admitted to an examination for a licence without having studied the Physics and Metaphysics of Aristotle.

In Italy the *University of Bologna*, as we have seen, was started by Pepo in 1076 and Irnerius started the Law School there in 1113. In 1158 Frederick Barbarossa granted the students special privileges, special immunities and protection, which were incor-

porated in the celebrated "Authentica Habita," which became part of the Civil Law of the Empire.

About 1250 the University was divided into fourteen *Consiliariae Ultramontanorum* and the three Roman, Tuscan and Campanian *Consiliariae Citramontanorum*. The right to become Professor or Doctor was at first reserved to citizens of Bologna, and then became hereditary; but the students under their Rector acquired predominance over their own Professors.

The *University of Sólerno*, near Naples, in the south of Italy, claimed to derive its origin from an independent tradition of classical learning which had continued to exist in Italy. According to others, it arose from the teaching of medicine at the Benedictine Monastery of Monte Cassino, but Bertharius and his monks were all massacred by the Saracens in 883. The School appears to have been entirely secular and open to Jews both as students and teachers.

The Saracens were famed for their medical skill, and after they had settled in Sicily their learning appears to have been brought to Sólerno by the Jews.

In addition to the translations of Hippocrates, d. 357 B.C., and Galen, 130 A.D., Avicenna's Medical Canon, 980-1036 A.D., became the text book of European Medicine for centuries.

In the course of the eleventh century under the teaching of Constantine the African, d. 1087, the celebrity of Sólerno spread throughout Europe. It survived as a University until abolished by Napoleon in 1811.

The *University of Oxford*, though referred to as an ancient academy in a deed of Pope Martin II in 802, remained only a School, but in 1110 Theobald Stampensis appears to have gathered some 60-100 students around him there. In 1130 Robert Pullen, who afterwards became a Cardinal (1150-1154), came from Paris and lectured at Oxford (cf., p. 189); and in 1149 Vacarius a Lombard came from Bologna and introduced the study of Civil Law there.

Strengthened in numbers by the Edicts of Henry II, 1167, "that all clerks do return to England as they loved their revenues" about 1175 Oxford became recognized as a *Studium Generale* and their first Chancellor was Robert Grosseteste (q.v.) who was appointed in 1214, though it was not until 1248 that Henry III granted it a Charter.

University College was founded in 1232, followed by Balliol in 1263 and Merton in 1264.

The *University of Cambridge*, apart from claims of the foundations of Schools there by Sigebert, King of the East Angles in 630, which after the Danish Invasions were restored by Edward

the Elder, 915, did not get a Charter for the University until Henry III granted one in 1230.

We know that Thomas of York was sixth Regent at Cambridge in 1256, but all the early Cambridge records were burnt by the rebels in Wat Tyler and Jack Straw's Rebellion in 1381.

Peterhouse the first college was not founded until 1284, followed by Clare (1326), Pembroke (1347) and Caius (1348).

At the *Universities of Padua and Siena*, which arose about 1220, Aristotle and philosophy were only studied as preparatory to the study of medicine.

The following is a list of those Universities founded in the Middle Ages, apart from the foregoing.

1212 Palencia	1391 Ferrara
1220 Salamanca	1405 Aix
1220 Montpellier	1407 Wurzburg
1224 Naples	1409 Leipsic
1229 Angers	1413 St. Andrews
1230 Toulouse	1419 Rostock
1244 Court of Rome	1422 Dole
	(migratory)
1250 Valladolid	1425 Louvain
1290 Coimbra, Portugal	1431 Poitiers
1303 Rome	1437 Caen
1303 Avignon	1441 Bordeaux
1306 Orleans (law)	1444 Catania
1308 Perugia	1450 Glasgow
1318 Treviso	1454 Treves
1332 Cahors	1455 Greifswald
1339 Grenoble	1455 Freiburg im Breisgau
1343 Pisa	1459 Valence
1348 Prague	1459 Ingoldstad (now Munich)
1349 Florence	1459 Basle
1361 Pavia	1460 Nantes
1364 Cracow	1464 Bourges
1365 Vienna	1474 Saragossa
1365 Orange	1476 Mainz
1385 Heidelberg	1476 Tübingen
1388 Cologne	1477 Upsala
1389 Budapest	1478 Copenhagen
	1494 Aberdeen

CHAPTER XVI

EFFECTS OF FURTHER WORKS OF ARISTOTLE

Simon, c. 1190—Alexander Neckam, 1157-1217—David of Dinant and Almaric Bène, d. 1207 (Heresies Council of Paris, 1210)—Peter le Mangeur, d. 1197—Peter the Chanter, c. 1200—Peter of Poitiers, d. 1205—Peter of Capua, c. 1219—Praepositivus, d. 1209—Stephen Langton, d. 1228—St. Edmund Rich, d. 1240—William of Auxerre, d. 1231—Geoffrey of Poitiers, c. 1231—Roland of Cremona, d. 1244—Hugh of St. Cher, d. 1263—Odo Rigaud, d. 1248—Philip of Greve, d. 1236—Robert of Sorbonne, d. 1274.

Simon, c. 1190, Canon of Tournai, a moderate realist, was one of the most noted teachers of his day. He was one of the first after Alain of Lille to read the translations of Aristotle that emanated from Toledo. He is found quoting the *Physics* of Aristotle and also the works of Alexander of Aphrodisias and John Scot Erigena, as well as those of Boethius, St. Augustine and St. Hilary.

His success caused him many enemies and probably, from some hasty remark to those who had not followed his arguments one day, followed by an illness probably a stroke the next day, he was accused of blasphemy and his illness pointed out as a just retribution. To quote from some of these unheard of works of Aristotle was in itself sufficient to cause some to support their own ignorance by accusations of this kind.

Though his works have not been published, yet his *Summa Theologica*¹ and *Expositio Symboli Athanasii*² are very clear and certainly quite orthodox.

Whilst knowing some of Aristotle's works, in the translation from the Arabic, he does not allow them to invalidate Christian Theology in any way, he says.

“The teaching of Aristotle is about those things the reason of which makes faith, but the Doctrine of Christ is of those things of which faith makes the reason. Many, through not paying heed to this distinction between the teaching of Christ and that of Aristotle, have fallen into various errors, mixing up that which belongs to the natural faculties and the teaching of Aristotle, with Christian Theology.”

¹ 3114, *Bib. Nat.*

² 3203 and 14886, *Bib. Nat.*

He was a moderate realist and in some ways a follower of Gilbert de la Porrée.

He objected to Plato's three principles of things God, matter and form, and Ideas. Matter and form did not exist before this world, and things composed of matter and form have but one sole principle, the Will of God.

All creatures are subjects, he taught, distinguished by accidents which come from without, they receive such accidents and make them subjective. In God there is nothing accidental. Goodness, justice, and power, which are improperly called His attributes, are nothing but intrinsic qualities of His Essence. He is essentially all goodness, justice, and power and is indeed the unity of all His perfection "quidquid in Deo Deus est."

He is careful to avoid all charge of pantheism so frequently levelled against the realists, for he explained "God is said to be everywhere, not that He is in every place, but every place is present in Him, in His understanding, since He is not even patient of place "cum ipse non suscipiatur in loco."

He distinguishes the soul from the person, on the ground that it is not individual for logical reasons, thus: "The soul is not the same as person. According to Boethius, Person is an individual substance of a rational nature. Person is not entelechy, that is form, but is a substance having in it forms and accidents of various kinds. The soul is a substance of rational nature, but is a part of the person. Soul is not individual but single.

Plato is an individual by his proper quality, and as Plato, differs from each part of himself and from everything else. The soul and any part of Plato differs from Plato by the participation of no property. For the property of the part is the property of the whole, though not conversely. Hence no part is individual. Hence the soul though a substance, is not individual. Hence the soul is not the individual form of the individual, nor is it individual by reason of place, as it is infused in every part of the body.

Person therefore is a substance, and thus differs from forms; it is individual, and thus differs from soul so far as they are parts of persons; it is of rational nature, and thus differs from inanimate things, and also from animate things which lack reason.

So that a substance of rational nature, which is individual, by participating in an individual form is a person."

He knew some of his Aristotle, even if he did not follow him.

Alexander Neckam (Necem even Nequam), 1157-1217, a foster-brother of Richard Coeur de Lion, was a monk of the Augustinian order of St. Albans, Master of Dunstable, Professor at Paris, and afterwards Abbot of Cirencester, 1213. He studied

under Adam de Petit Pont and became a professor in Paris in 1180.

He was much interested in natural philosophy, and wrote two works *De Naturis Rerum* and *De Laudibus Divinae Sapientiae*, the latter of which deals with the problems of celestial and terrestrial physics. He quotes from the Posterior Analytics, Topics, Heaven and Earth, and Soul of Aristotle and the writings of Algazel and Isaac. But the treatise *De Differentia Spiritus et Animae*, 114, Corpus Christi, Oxford, which bears his name is said to be by Costa-ben-Luca.

He was a definite realist for he says "We conceive genus and species as being the common nature of things; nothing would be white unless white existed, nor would there be any man, without there was this common nature, humanity."

About this time lived one *David of Dinant*, of whom nothing is known, except that he is mentioned as belonging to the Court of Pope Innocent III, 1198-1216. But, he wrote two books, *Quarterni or Quarternuli* and *De Tomis or De Divisionibus*, which are quoted by St. Albertus Magnus and St. Thomas Aquinas and condemned by both as heretical, for he carried his arguments of unity to the extreme length of pantheism.

He began by considering nature, or the collection of beings as a grand whole, and descending from the one to the multiple, he divided into as many "tomos," or sections, or parts of it, as there are genus, species and distinct individuals.

According to St. Thomas (*Sentent*, II, 17, 1) it was the same error, as that of Xenophon or Parmenides, combatted by Aristotle in his Metaphysics, of holding that there is one essence common to God and to all things.

"They suppose, in short, that all things are one single being and only differ, as Parmenides said, by simple appearances to the judgments of our senses. (Cf., p. 83.)

This opinion of the ancient philosophers has been followed by some modern ones amongst whom David of Dinant can be mentioned. Indeed, he divided things into three categories, bodies, souls, and separated substances.

He called $\epsilon\lambda\eta$ the first indivisible, which is the foundation of body; and $\nu\omicron\delta\varsigma$ or 'mens' first indivisible, which is the foundation of soul; as to the first indivisible amongst eternal substances, he called that God. He said, in short, that these three things are one and the same thing, and consequently that all things are one single thing essentially."

That is to say, that the three principle divisions of being are matter, intelligence, and God. But under these three diverse forms, our mind only observes imperfect being. The perfect

being is the unique being in the heart of which all diversities are blended; it is the truly fundamental essence in which matter, intelligence and God are no longer distinguished.

This is in fact the argument adopted by Spinosa.

It has been thought that this David based his work on the *Fons Vitae* of Avicbron, but St. Albert mentions a little book of Alexander a pupil of Xenophon.

Hauréau traced this to a book of some manuscripts bearing the names of Boethius, Algazel and a philosopher Alexander: but its contents are no more by Alexander than Boethius or Algazel, it was in fact composed by the translator Gundisalvus the Archdeacon of Segovia!

In later times, Giordano Bruno, 1548-1600, appears to have followed the complete pantheism of David of Dinant. Matter is God and everything lives with a Divine Life.

Almaric Bène, d. 1207, came to Chartres about 1190, and taught the Arts and Sciences and later on theology there.

He became tutor to Louis, afterwards Louis VIII, the eldest son of Philip August King of France.

He was full of jesting at the expense of the other professors, but his doctrines became so heretical that he was forced to go to Rome to explain them.

He lost his cause and was compelled by Pope Innocent III to publicly disavow his theology and all his heretical propositions. He came back to Paris and did this, and died soon after, and was buried in the cemetery of St. Martin des Champs.

His heresies continued to have considerable vogue, which led to their condemnation by a Council of Paris under the presidency of Peter of Corbeil, Bishop of Paris in 1210, to which further reference is made below.

The most we learn from his teaching is from an anonymous manuscript, *Contra Amaurianos*,² written by Garnerius of Rochefort, Bishop of Langres, 1192 (cf., p. 183), or by Rudolph of Namur.

The form of his heresy was pantheism carried logically to an impossible, blasphemous, and ridiculous extreme. Starting from statements in Scripture that God is everywhere, "that God may be all in all" (I Cor., xv. 28) and "by Him all things in Heaven and earth visible and invisible were created" (Col. 1, 16) he advanced to the proposition "Omnia unum, quia quidquid est, est, Deus." That is substantial unity.

According to Martin of Poland, d. 1278, the historian, who had been chaplain to five Popes, "Innocent III condemned Almaric

² 1301, *Bib. Troyes*.

for asserting that ideas which are in the Divine Mind, create and are created, whilst according to St. Augustine there is nothing in the Divine Mind which is not eternal and unchangeable.

He also said that God is called the end of all things, because all things must revert to Him, in order to find an eternal repose in Him and to form with Him a single individual of unalterable permanence.

The nature of Abraham being no other than that of Isaac, but the same nature being common to both of them, so, said he, all beings make up only one being, and all beings are God. In short, he maintained that God is the Essence of all creatures, the very being of all that is. He added that as light sees not itself, but in luminous space, so God will be seen by Angels and men not in Himself but in His creatures."

According to the *Contra Amaurianos* he taught that there is only one substance in God, it is God Who does in us what we call good or ill. We do not know good or ill, so there is neither merit nor demerit, resurrection of the body or last judgment.

To believe that God does all that we do, is to know the truth ; and paradise in this life belongs to those who know this.

As members of Christ, he taught that God the Father was incarnate in Abraham, as God the Son was incarnate in Christ, and that in its turn God the Holy Ghost must be incarnate. Humanity was born under the rule of law, regenerated by the infusion of Grace, and approached the turn of its destiny, and was about to be animated by the breath of the Spirit for a most pure life.

Finding, that though not in Paris, this heresy had numerous followers, after the death of Almaric, in the dioceses of Sens, Langres, and Troyes, a Council was held at Paris in 1210 when these doctrines were condemned ; Almaric's bones were disinterred and thrown away, and some eight who obstinately refused to give up their heresy were burned. At the same time the reading of natural philosophy was prohibited for three years, and the books of Master David and the books of theology written in French were condemned in perpetuity and burned.

This heresy of Almaric's was also formally condemned at the great Council of the Lateran in 1215.

Both the heresy of both David of Dinant and Almaric Bène, together with the works of John Scot of Erigena, upon which they were said to be founded, were again condemned by Honorius III in 1226.

It is not known what the French books were, that were condemned by the Council of Paris, but contemporary historians relate that the natural philosophy referred to the books

recently found and translated at Toledo, under the name of Aristotle.

But the doctrine of Substantial Unity, on which Almaric's heresy was based, is not to be found in the works of Aristotle, it is rather of neo-platonic origin and may have been drawn from the neo-platonic work so long mistakenly attributed to Aristotle, *De Secreta Secretorum Aegyptiorum Philosophia*.⁴

Peter le Mangeur, d. 1197, Dean of Troyes, a Chancellor of Paris, wrote *Historia Scolastica*,⁵ a collection of Biblical Scolia, *Commentaries on the Gospels*, *Magistralia*⁶ and many sermons, nearly all of which end "Liberet nos. . . . Jesus Christus Dominus qui venerit judicare saeculum per ignem."

Peter the Chanter, c. 1200, Dean of Rheims, wrote a Commentary on the *Apocalypse* and *Acts*⁷ and *Summa de Sacramentis*,⁸ which includes many decisions on Canon Law, also *Questiones scolares*.

Peter of Poitiers, d. 1205, Chancellor of Troyes, Archbishop of Embrun. He wrote *Sententiae*,⁹ c. 1178, violently censured by Walter St. Victor (cf., Ch. IX); *Distinctiones Commentaries on the Psalms*,¹⁰ and a well known sermon *Scrutemur vias nostras*.¹¹

Peter of Capua, c. 1219, wrote a *Summa* against the Catharists, largely based on the Works of Peter of Poitiers.

Praepositivus or *Praepositinus*, d. 1209, of Cremona, Chancellor of Paris, 1206-1209. The first to discuss whether Adam was created in Grace. He wrote a Commentary on the *Psalms*¹²; *Questiones*¹³; and *Summa Contra Hereticos Catharos*, largely based on the works of Peter of Poitiers. He is quoted by St. Thomas Aquinas in the *Summa Theologica*, I, 2, and by St. Albertus Magnus.

Stephen Langton, 1146-1228, a Chancellor of the University of Paris, became a Cardinal and Archbishop of Canterbury, 1207. He divided the Bible into chapters afresh, a division which after being adopted in Paris, soon came into general use. He wrote a *Summa Theologica* which, however, did not deal with any of the

⁴ B.M.R.L., 5 F, XIV, f. 89, fourteenth century.

⁵ 5504, *Bib. Nat.*

⁶ 446, *Bib. Nat.*

⁷ 682, *Bib. Nat.*

⁸ 9593, *Bib. Nat.*, *St. Ger. des. Prés.*

⁹ 13576, *Bib. Nat.*, B.M.R.L., 7 F, III, 265-6, (1191-92 A.D.)

¹⁰ 455, *Bib. Nat.*

¹¹ 14593, fol. 308, and 3705, fol. 129, *Bib. Nat.*

¹² 454, *Bib. Nat.*

¹³ B.M.R.L., 9 E.XIV., f. 143, thirteenth century.

philosophical questions of his time. He was thought by some to have been the author of the *Veni Sancte Spiritus*, but it is doubtful whether it was he or his friend and contemporary Pope Innocent III; by some it is even attributed to Robert I, King of France, the son of Hugh Capet, d. 1032.

He also wrote a Commentary on the *Minor Prophets*¹⁴ and on *Judith* and *Esther*¹⁵; a copy of the Commentary on *Judith* is in the Bodleian Library at Oxford, 149.

St. Edmund Rich, d. 1240, was born at Abingdon near Oxford, and after studying there he went to Paris, but subsequently returned to Oxford as a lecturer, when he introduced the study of Aristotle's works, not included in the Organon.

He founded a Hall at Oxford which became St. Edmund's Hall in 1269.

The only work known to have been written by him was *Argumenta Sophistica*, mentioned by Roger Bacon. He is thought to have been a logician rather than a philosopher.

He was Treasurer of Salisbury whilst the present cathedral was being built and subsequently became Archbishop of Canterbury. He shortly before his death resigned his Archbishopric and went to France to the monastery at Pontigny, where he died and was buried.

He was canonized in 1246.

William of Auxerre, d. 1231, Archdeacon of Beauvais. He was one of the Commission at Paris appointed by Gregory IX to examine and expurgate the works of Aristotle.

He wrote *Antisciodorensis*, a commentary on the *Anticlaudianus* of Alain of Lille (cf. Ch. 9), and a *Summa on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*,¹⁶ in which he utilized the Metaphysics of Aristotle and the Commentaries of Averroes.

Godfrey of Poitiers, c. 1231, a master of Paris and *Roland of Cremona*, d. 1244, a master of Bologna and a Dominican who studied at Paris, likewise *Hugh of St Cher*, d. 1263, his follower and *Odo Rigaud* Archbishop of Rouen, 1248, were all supporters of Peter the Lombard, who made some use of the modern translation of Aristotle.

It must be noted that Roland of Cremona held the first Dominican Chair of Theology in the University of Paris.

¹⁴ 12019, *St. Ger. des Prés.*, Bib. Nat.

¹⁵ 15564, fol. 59-62.

¹⁶ B.M.R.L., 9 B.V., 1231 A.D.

Philip of Greve, d. 1236, was a Chancellor of Paris. He wrote a *Summa Theologica* or *Summa de Bono*, in which he stressed the goodness of God, and the natural goodness of different creatures, and the moral and supernatural goodness of man in the state of Grace.

He quoted at length from Aristotle's Ethics and gives reference to Averroes and Avicenna. His work was much used by Alexander of Hales (q.v.).

Robert of Sorbonne, 1201-1274, was Chaplain to Louis IX; he was the founder in 1253 of the most celebrated secular college in the University of Paris, which still bears his name.

CHAPTER XVII

THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

WITH the recrudescence of learning in the time of Charlemagne in the ninth century, the chief topics of discussion were matters of logic and the general application of the *Organon* of Aristotle. But the general division of opinion between Realists and Nominalists may be said to commence with Roscellinus at the beginning of the twelfth century, who was shortly followed by Abelard, who introduced Conceptualism, which, however, is little different from the Nominalism of Roscellinus reduced to sane proportions. To Abelard was opposed William of Champeaux, supported by Adhelard of Bath, and followed by the School of Chartres and Gilbert de la Porrée. Whilst the Victorine mystics relegated reason to a more and more subordinate place in the scheme of true Wisdom.

St. Anselm, the last of the Fathers, had died at the beginning of the twelfth century, and Peter the Lombard, the Master of the Sentences, and the First of the Schoolmen, properly so called, died in 1164.

From the time of Peter Lombard the general trend of thought, instead of being confined to logical arguments concerning universals and the possible subjects of intellectual activity, became more and more concerned with the question of what dogmas were open to the support of reason.

Then the end of the twelfth century was startled by the translations of the further works of Aristotle, which first emanated from Toledo; when the question became rather what arguments could be adduced from reason in support of Christian dogma.

With the avidity any new knowledge is so readily seized upon, and reduced to logical sequences, before its effects are fully appreciated, or the validity of its postulates duly weighed, there arose at the outset various fanatics who seriously endeavoured to maintain a variety of wild and erroneous propositions.

Whilst rightly appreciating the advantages accruing from the light shed upon learning by these beams from this most highly developed wisdom of the Greeks, they failed to recognize that at the time when such wisdom had been reached, mankind in general

had not been the recipient of the Divine Revelation of the Incarnation involving as it does that of the Creation also.

Thus Aristotle basing his metaphysics upon things sensible, the subject of experience, had been led into some false conclusions both as to the foundation of the world, which he held to be eternal, and as to the intellect. As to the latter, the matter was further involved by the inaccuracies both in script and translation; Averroes at any rate insisting on the doctrine of a Common Soul involving all loss of individuality after death according to general opinion. (Cf. p. 203.)

Hence it came about that the very study of Aristotle's further works were interdicted in Paris, as has been mentioned in Ch. XV in 1210, 1215 and 1230. But a revised text became available in Paris about the middle of the thirteenth century, and by the middle of the fourteenth century the study of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* had become compulsory.

Beginning with William of Auvergne, who first reduced to a succinct form the difference between essence and existence of intelligible substances, and proceeding gradually through Alexander of Hales, Robert Grosseteste, and St. Albertus Magnus, the metaphysic of Aristotle more and more replaced that of Plato.

It is obvious that after centuries of argument as to the true construction of the initial works of Aristotle's *Organon*, that it was only natural that the rest of the *Organon*, together with Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and other works should be examined most carefully. But why was the teaching of Plato more and more discarded for that of Aristotle? At first sight, it would appear that within the confines of their own limitation, that the Idealistic system of Plato rather than the more materialistic system of Aristotle would seem more consonant with the Revealed Religion of Christianity.

Apart however from the fact that up to that time only a few of the works of Plato were known in the West, it became more and more apparent that the system of Aristotle, based on things subject to human experience and ascending to a First Mover, was indeed more consonant with the Revelation of a single Creator and quite in keeping with the words of St. Paul contained in Romans i. 20, "for the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made."

St. Thomas Aquinas, *Doctor Angelicus*, accordingly produced that system in which he adopted the whole of the philosophy of Aristotle instead of that of Plato; but by introducing the knowledge and true wisdom derived from Divine Revelation he

adapted the pagan philosophy of Aristotle to the support by reason of the dogmas of Christian Theology : maintaining at the same time that the whole of the latter were capable of a reasonable explanation, except of course those mysteries of Revelation which must *ipso facto* ever transcend finite capacity.

As M. Gilson has put it "this does not result in the rationalization of a mystery, but in the rationalization of reality, carried out by reason made acquainted with the mystery of Faith."

Although St. Albertus Magnus was a Dominican, who had studied the works of both Plato and Aristotle, it was his disciple St. Thomas Aquinas also a Dominican, who became the leading authority for his Order.

Alexander of Hales was the first teacher of philosophy that the Franciscans had in Paris ; whilst Robert Grosseteste, the first Chancellor of Oxford, was their first teacher there.

Though St. Bonaventura, *Doctor Seraphicus*, became the head of the Franciscans in 1257 and published a great many works, he was more of a mystic than a philosopher, and wrote no special work on philosophy, though he argued like a metaphysician.

The philosophic teaching of Henry of Ghent, *Doctor Solemnis*, one of the principals of the Sorbonne in Paris, though not a Franciscan was, however, adopted by the Franciscans ; who likewise adopted that of John Pecham, a Franciscan who afterwards became Archbishop of Canterbury.

It was indeed originally from the difference of these two on the one hand, and St. Thomas on the other, that the philosophical disputes arose between the Dominicans and the Franciscans, which was to last for the next two or three hundred years.

It rapidly became general, after the heresy of David of Dinant that Ideas were co-eternal with God had been condemned, to posit in the Mind of God the ideas of things, so that the arguments on the strict line of divergence between Realists and Nominalists ceased to be of primary importance. Henry of Ghent held universals to be *ante rem* in the potentiality of matter whilst St. Thomas held them to be *in re* in potentiality and *post rem* in the mind.

The Franciscans soon followed the Dominicans in their adhesion to Aristotle in the place of Plato ; especially as it was not until the fifteenth century that the works of Plato, as we now have them, reached Western Europe. It was thought that Plato had held that ideas existed independently of the Demiurge, but according to the Christian doctrine of the Schoolmen they are gathered up in the thought of the Creator, so that His thought becomes the locus of the ideas. But even in this there was a slight

divergence, for whilst St. Thomas reduces them to God's knowledge of His Own Essence, St. Bonaventura reduces them to the expression of this essence considered in its possible participations, and Duns Scotus, also a Franciscan, takes them as the creatures themselves creatable by God and existing in Him in virtue of their concepts as possibles.

The Greeks made no special distinction between essence and existence, regarding potentiality as being bound up with matter and considering all immaterials to be pure Act. But it was generally agreed in the thirteenth century, that God alone is Pure Act; and with the exception of Roger Bacon and Geoffrey of Fontain, they followed William of Auvergne and distinguished essence from existence, as potentiality from act.

Whilst with regard to matter in its philosophic meaning, it gradually became more and more divorced from all idea of the substratum of all material things. Thomas of York, following St. Augustine and Avicbron, held that matter was not created in time but with time, and that it could not exist without form; whilst St. Albertus Magnus and St. Thomas Aquinas, following Averroes, held that the form was educed from the potentiality of matter by the efficient cause.

In this way, St. Thomas Aquinas employed the term matter to express, not indeterminate matter, but *materia signata*, which amounted to quantitative determination, and regarded such *materia signata* as being subject to only one substantial form, and such *materia signata* as the cause of individuation; whilst the Franciscans regarded such matter as capable of a plurality of forms, and form itself as the principal of individuation.

These distinguishing features became fixed tenets of the Dominicans and Franciscans and their followers, with but few exceptions.

If this pervading difference be followed out in detail, it is found that Alexander of Hales and Thomas of York first recognized a matter which was spiritual, which was not patient of place, nor did it admit of contraries.

Robert Grosseteste and Roger Bacon held to the neo-Platonic emanation of the object to the subject, which was more allied to the waves of light than to radiation, but they together with Thomas of York and Archbishop Pecham further supported the theory of *lux*, which was first introduced by Robert Grosseteste, this in short amounted to a sort of ether created first of all by God and employed by Him in the creation of things. This ether or matter, it will be observed, though somewhat analogous to the ether of modern science was nevertheless far removed from sensible material.

Further Aristotle had defined Potentiality, as the first principal of change or motion in a thing. Now Robert Grosseteste taught that potentiality should be regarded as "not being this"; and such became a tenet of the Franciscans.

Then Roger Bacon, who held universals to be *in re*, regarded potentiality for change as Active; and potentiality to receive change as Passive; and at the same time with Pecham regarded potentiality as Privation of perfection not yet attained. Richard de Middleton followed, by holding that Passive Potentiality did not differ from matter, whilst Active Potentiality he held to be an appetite by which the educible form is educed and that such appetite is concreated with matter.

It was in consequence of their theories of potentiality that Robert Grosseteste and Pecham took up the view that Form is an extension rather than a determination of matter.

With such extended view of matter and potentiality, it is not difficult to understand that the Franciscans following Averroes and Avicenna came to the conclusion that Form was the principal of individuation.

St. Thomas and the Dominicans on the other hand, adhered strictly to what, on the ground of numerous quotations, they considered to be the true view of Aristotle that Individuation was due to Matter.

In consequence of this opinion St. Thomas was forced to the conclusion that each angel is of a different species, which was condemned by the Council at Paris under Archbishop Tempier in 1277.

St. Thomas also held that while the soul was the form of the body, that matter could have only one substantial form, as more than one such form could only be predicated accidentally; and this led to the difficulty as to what was the form of the corpse after the death of a man.

On the other hand, for those who held that form was the principle of individuation, the doctrine of plurality of substantial forms followed naturally, though at first somewhat hesitatingly.

Robert Grosseteste was the first to enunciate a plurality of forms and he was followed by Bacon, William de la Mare, Pecham and Richard de Middleton; though this indeed was one of the charges brought in 1283 by the Franciscans themselves against Olivi who was also a Franciscan. Both Pecham and Olivi appear to have regarded the "Forma Corporeitatis" as subordinate to the "Forma Intellectiva."

As enunciated by Pecham the actuality of the soul is not exhausted as form of the body, nor is the reality of the body constituted solely by serving as matter for the soul.

Later, the Franciscans took this up very strongly, alleging a plurality of substantial forms especially with regard to the "forma corporeitatis" in addition to the soul. For when the soul is separated from the body at death, the corpse cannot be said to receive a new form, for in that case there would be no continuum between a man and his corpse. Some went so far as to insist that in such a case the corpse could not be said to be numerically nor specifically identical with the living body. The full effect of the theory of a new form taking place in the body at death is not brought into prominence, until it is considered with respect to the Resurrection of Jesus Christ. For if the corpse was matter the subject of a new form, it could not be said to be His body which was raised up to life, since the matter of the body had acquired a new form when it became a corpse and was therefore something without a connection with the individual.

In the same way a further difficulty was held to arise in the case of the Eucharist (cf., Ch. XXV, p. 516).

The question arose again with regard to the vegetative sensitive soul or souls, Pecham quotes Fishacre who summed the matter up roughly as follows: (a) some regarded them as one substance with varying operations, e.g. St. Thomas and the Dominicans. (b) Some as one substantial soul having forms ordered to different things, e.g. Pecham and most of the Franciscans. (c) Some as one soul consisting of three substances like a hand which consists of nerves, bones and flesh, e.g. Henry of Ghent, Bacon and Middleton. Further, St. Thomas held that souls, though separate creations were originally all alike and were individualized in respect of their bodies, but Richard de Middleton and Geoffrey Fontain held that they were individuated as separate creations.

And so it was argued by the respective opponents, that if matter were the principle of individuation, all men would have but one soul; whilst on the other hand if form were the principle of individuation, all men would have the same matter.

Again St. Thomas by his theory that the intellect and reason were but one power or faculty of the soul, as they both involve a "spiritual change," and like eyesight were not diversified by their objects, was forced to attribute all operations of the soul to its powers; that is to say that he held that the soul acts through its powers and not by its essence.

In support of this he argued that operation is not of the genus of substance and so the operations of the soul could not be effected by its essence.

It is God alone, whose operation is His Own Substance.

John of Paris, another Dominican, however, differed from him

in holding that the Active Intellect is created directly in the soul and does not spring from its essence like a power.

One of the Franciscan objections to this was that St. Thomas had left nothing to the essence to consist of.

Henry of Ghent, however, held that the soul does act by its essence, and Grosseteste held that the soul has no parts, but regarded the intellect and will as characteristic activities of the soul.

Roger Bacon and Pecham regarded the Intellect and Will as "virtually" parts of the soul, whilst Gilles of Rome held them to be accidents of soul.

St. Thomas Aquinas and the Dominicans regarding the proper object of the Intellect as the Truth, and that of the Will as the Good, whilst showing the priority in "being" of truth to good, maintained throughout the supremacy of the Intellect over the Will. They clenched the argument by stressing the fact that the ultimate essence of the Beatific Vision rested upon the accomplishment, the function of the intellect, rather than upon Desire, which is the function of the Will. They therein departed from the conclusion of St. Augustine.

The Franciscans took the opposite view that the Will has priority over the Intellect, for though it cannot act without the Intellect, yet the Will has the directive power without which the Intellect cannot operate, except to seek to present objects to the Will under the aspect of the Good. They considered such Voluntarism was more nearly in accordance with the ethics of Christianity and their emphasis on personal responsibility, sin and the necessity of redemption.

Finally, as more imbued with neo-Platonism derived from the influence of St. Augustine, the Franciscans for the most part adhered to his doctrine of Illumination, in that it was a separate Spiritual Power above that of the Intellect directly actuated by God; such was held by William of Auvergne, Grosseteste, Thomas of York, Bacon, Pecham and Richard de Middleton.

But St. Thomas and the Dominicans held that in this life the soul understands supersensibles by an analogy only, and that Divine Grace only operates in the soul by strengthening its existing powers of Intellect and Will.

The thirteenth century had been one of high adventure, of crusades, Gothic Architecture and stained glass, and the same spirit is shown in the bold way in which the Schoolmen grappled with the new materials of Greek Wisdom, which became accessible to them, ever striving each in their own sphere towards the greater Glory to God, which indeed is the perfection and end of all His Creation.

CHAPTER XVIII

EARLY WRITERS OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

William of Auvergne, d. 1249—Robert Fishacre, d. 1248—Alexander of Hales, d. 1245—John of Rochelle, d. 1253—Bartholomaeus Anglicus, c. 1240—Robert Grosseteste, d. 1253—William Shirwood, c. 1250—John of St. Giles, c. 1250—Thomas of York, d. 1260—Richard of Cornwall, c. 1250—Richard Marsh, d. 1226—Adam Marsh, d. 1258—Gilbert of Tournai, c. 1250—Peter of Tarantaise (Pope Innocent V), d. 1276.

William of Auvergne, d. 1249, studied at Paris, where he became a professor and was made Bishop of Paris in 1228.

His great works¹ were *Magisterium Divinale*, written 1223–1240, comprising *De Primo Principio*, *De Universo Creaturarum*, *De Anima*, *Cur Deus Homo*, *De Fide et Legibus*, *De Sacramentis*, and *De Virtutibus Moribus*; and that called *De Universo*, written 1231–1236, which was divided into two parts, the material and the spiritual universe.

But in the former it is observed that the totality of being is envisaged under the most general aspects, whilst the latter deals especially with intelligent creatures.

He quotes from the *Timaeus* and *Phaedo* of Plato, but regretted that he had not the rest of his works. He also possessed translations of the *Metaphysics*, *Soul*, *Heaven and Earth*, *Physics*, *Meteors*, *History of Animals*, *Sleep and Awakening*, and the *Ethics* of Aristotle; also a large number of the works of the Arabians whom he named, and the four neo-platonic works attributed to Mercurius Tresmegistus.

He did not write *Immortality of the Soul*,² which was the work of Gondisalvus, but which was printed with his works.

He was a true metaphysician after the manner of St. Anselm. The vast world which he brings under review, is regarded by the eyes of intelligence, but an intelligence enlightened by faith rather than by reason. He is an optimist, that which is, is that which ought to be, and as the human wisdom is a ray of the Divine Wisdom, it is less important to study the mysteries of nature or to examine passing and perishable facts, than to rise by abstraction

¹ Printed by Ferroneus, Orleans, 1674.

² 16613, *Bib. Nat.*

to the most general ideas and to seek to find that harmony, which is the perfect bond of such ideas.

William held that there were two kinds of perceptible objects, phenomena of which the senses receive impression, and intelligible substances with which the mind alone can deal.

Objection is taken to his arguments on the ground that, admitting that there are intelligible substances, as for example God, Angels, and souls, it is inconclusive to say that because there are intellectual concepts of such, that therefore they have a real existence.

Aristotle had considered the soul under two aspects, Active and Passive, and had regarded the active intellect as reducing into act those ideas, which were already in potentiality in the passive intellect.

This was interpreted by Alexander of Aphrodisias and others to imply that the Active Intellect was a separate Substance from the Passive Intellect. Thus the Active Intellect was likened to the intelligible sun of our souls, which reduces the intellectual forms, the general ideas, into act, as the visible sun produces the colours which beforehand had been in potentiality in coloured bodies.

(William thought that it was Aristotle himself who meant this.)

This came to be variously construed into meaning that the Active Intellect is God Himself, or the soul of the world ; and the Passive Intellect is the soul of the animated substance.

Such was widely held in Paris, but more widely still in the Schools in Oxford.

William will have none of this thesis, which he thought was that of Aristotle, who had perverted Al Farabi and Avicenna.

He declares that sensation, comparable to intellection in many ways, results in a simple relation between two terms, sense and object. It is not necessary to suppose between the organs of sense and the sensible objects any intermediary by which these organs, sensible in potentiality, may be reduced into act. No, to produce the emotion of our sensible organs, the presence of the objects is sufficient, any intermediary is superfluous. Now intellection is the reception of an impression of an intellectual : so there is no room for the admission of any conjecture as to the manner of being of an active intellect, considered as an eternal mover of the thought. There is no active intellect subsisting by itself, either as the soul of the world, or as the illumination of individual souls. To say, that the knowledge of things is the product of an irradiation of which the external agent is the cause and the internal agents the means, is indeed to deny any moral personality to the individual,

The soul has no parts, it has powers or faculties which are inherent to it and suffice for all its operations.

There is therefore no need to explain how an idea is made, or to run about looking for some external or internal mover.

William said that, the Active Intellect was no part of the Soul, nor did he hold that it was something external to the soul, as Roger Bacon, who only heard him twice, would have us believe.

What William said, in addition to its being no part of the soul, was that it was simply a state of the soul, or to put it better in another way, that it was the first and most noble of its virtues.

Having got rid of the Active Intellect, he did not think that the organs of the senses were all the faculties of the soul.

He admitted that the soul cannot acquire knowledge of corporeal things without the organs of the body, but he added that the substance of the soul is that which it is in itself, independent of the body ; even as Orpheus will always be Orpheus, an excellent musician, even when his lyre is taken from him ; this means that he was far from limiting the power of the intellect to the simple operations of sensibility.

When he defines the soul as a substantial whole, endowed with two energies sensible and intellectual, he means that these two powers of the one subject are brought into action by objects of a diverse nature.

So that as sensation proves the existence of sensible things, intellection will prove likewise the existence of intelligible objects.

William does not admit that the perception of an intelligible form has been necessarily preceded by the perception of a sensible form. Indeed, in the absolute repose of the senses, and without the assistance of the imagination, mind can conceive the intelligible ; so that whilst the ravishment of the ecstasy lasts, the senses are not aware of the presence of any external objects ; the imagination is quiescent, yet the Divine light illumines with its rays the intelligence towards which it has been sent, and supernatural things, that is to say, the most pure of the intelligibles appear to this intelligence even as they will be during eternity.

Further, he says, that if intelligibles were in potentiality in the passive intellect, before being produced into acts by the active agent, the intelligence would be the sole situation of the intelligibles, whether considered in potentiality or in act ; which is exactly what Aristotle meant to convey in the *Metaphysics*.

But William argues against this, an idea is an image of that which is really true.

The place of objective intelligibles, that is of forms really and absolutely true, is not in the intellect, which possesses but simple

images, purely subjective similitudes. The ideas received by the intellect are true, but only because they represent the truth.

In the mind of God alone ideas are not examples but exemplaries (models), not copies but originals.

To conclude, a similitude is true because it is an image of the truth.

But, when the intellect considers in itself the ideas which it has received, second ideas are born, which are themselves images in respect of the first ideas, and with regard to these second ideas the first ideas are truth.

As for intelligible objects they are no more in the mind after having been intellectualized than before so.

The impression produced by intellectualization is caused by an agent, which is a nature ; and what is a nature is an entity of the genus of substance. So that intelligible objects possess in themselves the conditions of real existence.³

According to Hauréau, William of Auvergne found that Avicenna pronounced against the reality of Universals, after having admitted the distinction of the Active Intellect from the Passive Intellect. William then attacked the distinction of intellects, in order to prove more easily the reality of the universals. He is a realist, because the analysis of the understanding gives him general ideas : the general idea, whose presence in the understanding is not contested, such is the basis of his system.

So whether received a posteriori or conceived a priori, all intelligibles attest the reality of their object.

But it seems to him, that in the Aristotelian system the reason of being of general ideas, subjective in potentiality, objective or subjective in act, has always the subjective for its foundation.

(N.B.—“ Aristotle did not contest the non ego, but held that the intelligence, having acquired the notion of the non ego, collected legitimately and necessarily universal ideas, though he rejected all hypothesis of nature conformed to those ideas.”)

But, according to William, general ideas ought to be placed in the category of problematic ideas, if it is not admitted that they come from things which resemble them. And if experience does not demonstrate the reality of these things, it is because experience is not capable of attaining to all truth. The intellect being a mirror, where all the forms of existing things are reproduced, in order to know truth, it is only necessary to assist attentively at the representation of the great world in the little world. All science is acquired by means of intuition.

St. Thomas Aquinas, sometimes accepted the idea of being, as proof of the being, but he was always careful to distinguish

³ *De Universo*, Lib. II, P.I.C., 15, 16.

those conceptual intelligibles, which correspond to spiritual substances.

But William did not do that, and thus subscribed to all the conclusions of realism.

William considered that Aristotle arrived at his definition of the Active Intellect, as the intelligible sun of our soul and the torch of our intelligence, because he could not really get away from the archetype world, or the world of first form, of Plato.

He suggested that it was not necessary to have less confidence in the relation of the intellect to intelligible, than in the relation of the senses to things sensible. Since the evidence of the senses obliges us to recognize the sensible world, the fatherland of sensible particular singular objects, so for a stronger reason, the evidence of the intellect ought to compel us to admit the world of intelligibles, that is to say, the world of the universals of species. And William added soon after, "As for the archetype world which is the reason and exemplary of the universe, learn that according to the doctrine of Christians this is the Son of God, Very God Himself."⁴

Hauréau points out, that in thus localizing so to speak the primordial ideas and platonic exemplaries in the bosom of the Word, William strove to protest against that impious fiction of the *Liber de Causis* of David, and the *Anti Claudianus* of Alain of Lille, according to which the world of ideas would be co-eternal with God, yet separated from the Divine Essence. As Bishop of Paris, William had judged and condemned in 1240 some books in which this blasphemy had been reproduced.

William defined species, as being not some constituent individuality of an integral whole, nor a thing really distinct from individuals, but that in potentiality it is in each individual, the reason and the definition of species being complete in each of its individuals. The thing species is not integrally with all its parts in each individual, yet when one does not look at this thing, but when one only considers the parts of reason and of a definition of species, it is integrally in each of its individuals.

From this it is clear that William holds the substantial unity of species, reserving only for the individuals, parts of an undivided substance.

So that in the individual, the species is the whole being and what does not come from species is pure accident.

He carries this to the extreme of maintaining the substantial existence of whiteness and of all qualities.

Thus William of Auvergne is one of the most convinced realists.

⁴ Lib. II, c. 14.

It remains to be added that though the distinction between essence and existence expresses the radical contingency of essence in all that is not God, the technical formula embodying this fundamental proposition only appears clearly for the first time in the works of William of Auvergne.

“Quoniam autem ens potentiale est non ens per essentiam, tunc ipsum est ejus esse quod non est ei per essentiam duo sunt revera, et alterum accidit alteri, nec cadit in rationem nec quidditatem ipsius. Ens igitur secundum nunc modum compositum est et resolvable in suam possibilitatem et suum esse.”⁵

Robert Fishacre, d. 1248, the second Theological Master of the Dominicans at Oxford, who succeeded John of St. Giles, their first Master there, in his *Commentary on the Sentences*,⁶ detailed the opinions about plurality of forms which were held at Oxford in his day.

“There is much difference of opinion about the soul, for some think that the vegetative, sensitive and intellectual souls are one and the same substance, though they vary according to their operation; even as the sensible soul is a single substance having many operations, as to see and to hear and such like.”⁷

Against the validity of this, it is advanced that every single action has one formal cause and every substantial form has one single action. Therefore, if actions are essentially different, either they will be actions of essentially different forms, or at least of essentially different organs. Now if to feel, digest, and think are essentially different operations, as it is clear that they do not differ on account of the organs by which they are caused, the forms will be essentially different.

But this is not the same as seeing and hearing for these operations do not differ essentially but only by reason of diversity of instruments. For the same soul acts in the eye, when the eye sees, as that which acts in the ear, when the ear hears; nor does this action differ from that of the sun which both melts and dries up by one and the same action.

Hence others placed a substantial single soul, single in number in man, having nevertheless forms ordered to things different from one another.⁸

The action of digestion arises from one form, and that of feeling from another, and that of thinking from a third; so that the form nearest to matter is that by which digestion is formed, and the

⁵ De Trin, c. 7, p. 86.

⁶ B.M.R.L., 10 B, VII, f. 156, thirteenth century.

⁷ Cf. *St. Thos. Aquinas*, Roger Bacon.

⁸ Cf. Pecham, Ch. XXV, 512.

form superimposed on it is more dignified, being that of feeling, and the most dignified is that of thinking; so that there are two forms preceding this most dignified one as material dispositions; and they seem to have such habits, because that which is the genus depends on the form, by which it is perceived reasonably, so indeed according to the difference of genus is the more dignified form superimposed upon it.

In opposition to this it is argued with regard to the ultimate form, this does not happen of necessity, unless there is a natural preceding disposition.

Hence, when a man or an angel attain their ultimate form, which is that by which they think, in both man and angel there will be a material disposition.

But in angels there is no vegetative or sensitive form preceding that by which they think, therefore there are no such forms as material dispositions to the form by which they think.

And to the confirmation from the nature of genus and difference on which I relied, it can be further said that, that form by which they think is not an animal difference, or angels would then be animals, for in whatsoever the difference occurs so also the genus.

Therefore in the third place they suggest that there are three substances, and these three are something in man which gives rise to three operations; not because there are three souls in man, but one soul consisting of three essentially different substances, like one hand consists of nerves, bones, and flesh which are essentially different.⁹

This is clearly contradicted in the book of Augustine, *De Definitionibus Rectae Fidei*, Cap. 13, for there it is stated 'neither do we say that there are two souls in one man, as Jacobus and some Syrians write, one an animal which gives life to the body and may be contained in the blood, and the other spiritual which supplies the reason. But we say, it is one and the same soul in man which both gives life by its presence to the body and is the very same that provides for his reason, having in itself freedom of Will to choose subjects in its pondering as it pleases.'

But which of these three may be the truer I dare not define. Whether one can say this, that there is something common in the said three vegetative, sensitive, and rational souls according to the third opinion, or that there is a single substance of soul according to the first and second opinion."¹⁰

Alexander of Hales, d. 1245. *Doctor Irrefragabilis*. First studied at the monastery at Hales in the county of Gloucester,

⁹ Cf. Olivi.

¹⁰ Brit. Mus., MS. Reg. 10, B. VII, f. 156, and MS. Bail. Coll. 57, f. 131.

and after becoming an Archdeacon he went to Paris to complete his studies. He was very successful as a lecturer there, and in 1222 he joined the new Order of Minorite Friars founded by St. Francis of Assisi. Up to that time the members of this Order had been without any particular note for learning, so that they begged him to continue to lecture in a School, which they organized, and from that time they came to be recognized as one of the learned Orders.

He is known to have been a teacher in Paris of both St. Bonaventura and St. Thomas Aquinas. Duns Scotus, d. 1308, though following his teaching, was of course later, and could not have been his pupil as was sometimes alleged.

He was one of the first in Paris to become acquainted with the works of Aristotle, and though it is now proved that he did not write the gloss of the *Metaphysics* attributed to him, he did write a *Summa Universae Theologiae* at the instance of Pope Innocent IV, which was subsequently approved by Pope Alexander IV, who had it submitted to the examination of seventy-two theologians. Some additions were subsequently made to it at the suggestion of Alexander IV, by William of Meliton, who held the Franciscan Chair at Paris immediately before St. Bonaventura.

In this work he perfected the scholastic method of treatment, which from him became the classical form; the statements being embodied first in a Proposition, to which Objections are made, upon which a Solution is given, followed by a Criticism of the Objection.

As he had the permission of Pope Gregory IX, he was at liberty to cite the ancient philosophers, a permission of which he frequently availed himself.

Alexander of Hales was a realist, who posited Universals in the mind of God and goes so far as to say that they participate in the Divine Substance. He expressly avoids positing them outside of God, at the same time denying that Plato himself had in fact ever postulated an intermediary world peopled with his Ideas.

With regard to the Creation, he endeavours to avoid any expression of God being under a necessity to create; He created things by a necessity of goodness, but it is not proper to say that He created them by a necessity of nature. Granted that the goodness and the nature of God are the same thing, yet if a thing is said to be done by the necessity of nature, it sounds as if He were subject to the same necessity as that to which natural things are.

Avicenna had advanced the proposition that since God is simple, there is no liberty in God; because He is perfection itself, whilst liberty strictly is the most noble privilege of an

imperfect nature. However, Alexander would not accept this ; whilst St. Thomas, in his Works, insisted that God caused the Creation according to His Intellect and Will which were absolutely free. Duns Scotus later still, held that God wishes necessarily His goodness, but He does not wish it by the necessity of "Coaction," He wishes it by necessity of immutability.

In human language as God is given as Simple, His Volition is part of His Simplicity ; it would therefore indeed appear to be a limitation of the Simplicity, which is given, to introduce any term of necessity.

Viewed from this standpoint, this whole question about which so much argument was made by the Nominalists against the Realists cannot arise ; for no argument can vary what is given.

Alexander of Hales taught that God is in all things, but not essentially included in them.

He exists in a threefold manner, essentialiter, praesentialiter et potentialiter, these in fact do not differ in themselves but only in our idea of them. He likewise endeavoured to distinguish a threefold Love in God : His love for His Creatures ; His love for Himself ; and His love for the Persons in the Godhead.

All other beings are outside God and are substantially distinct from Him, and whether spiritual or corporeal are really composed not only of essence and existence, between which there was a real distinction, but also of matter and form or potency and act. Spiritual matter is not subject to locomotion, nor does it admit of substantial transformation (contrarity).

He taught that man was originally created in a state purely human, and that the Divine likeness was afterwards added, being thus an accidental and not essential portion of man. This shows a distinction between a state of nature and a state of Grace, even in primeval man. Grace was not created in man, but was reserved until by reason he had become fit to receive it.

So all men are found alike to be corrupt.

No man can make himself fit for Heaven.

God wills, according to His highest love, to save men, to communicate to them Himself ; but it is presupposed that there is a recipiency so far as this is grounded on the moral powers still remaining to man.

The light shines everywhere, but its rays do not find everywhere a material susceptible of illumination. No one can render himself susceptible for the reception of Grace, unless God makes him fit for it by His own inward operation. But if man only does what it depends on himself to do, the Divine Grace ensues, by which he is prepared for the reception of Grace.¹¹

¹¹ Neander, *Church Hist.*, VIII, 305.

In this connection, it may be mentioned that he defined *Fate* as the co-operation of all causes, of which free will is one, directed by a higher law.

As to intellectual knowledge, he adopted the Augustinian distinction of "ratio intellectus" and "intelligentia" having as their respective objects knowledge for the former of the corporeal world and the judgments connected therewith, and for the latter of created spirits, and of the "rationes aeternae" and the first principles.

The sphere of abstraction is limited to the corporeal world, the "rationes aeternae" or the deductive knowledge of creatures viewed in the Divine Essence (exemplaries) and also the first principles are innate thanks to the special illumination on the part of God.

John of La Rochelle (Rupella), d. 1253, became a Doctor of Paris in 1236 and in 1238 followed in the Chair of Alexander of Hales. Many works are attributed to him, but they are all unedited except his *Summa de Anima*.

It is learned from St. Thomas Aquinas, that John sought to establish the existence of God as being self evident. "The desire of man naturally tends towards God as man's ultimate end, hence the existence of God must of necessity be known of itself." This is denied as a proof of the existence of God, as it is only a proof that the principles of the First Cause are innate, according to St. Thomas Aquinas.¹²

John wrote amongst others the above mentioned treatise *De Anima*,¹³ the manuscript of which is at Oxford, which dealt at length with the mediæval ideas of psychology, based on those of St. Augustine and Galen, by which he sought to determine that the content of a concept was a form and not a notion.

Like other Franciscans he was a realist.

Bartolomæus Anglicus, c. 1240. A Franciscan, thought by some to be the same as Bartolomæus of Glanville, taught at Oxford, Paris, and Magdeburg. His chief work was *De Proprietatibus Rerum*, a veritable encyclopedia, the general plan of which is on a philosophical basis.

He held matter as a chaos of the four elements, and form or determining principle as the sum of properties.

The soul he regarded as a substance complete in itself, independently of the union with its body. He quotes Alexander Neckham, Alexander Hales and Albert the Great, but does not

¹² *Con. Gent.*, I, 10.

¹³ 41, *Corpus Christ.*, Oxford.

distinguish the opposition between Aristotle, Plato and St. Augustine.

Robert Grosseteste, 1175–1253, was born at Stradbroke, Suffolk. He became a Master at Oxford in 1208 and the first known Chancellor of Oxford in 1214. Between 1229 and 1235 he was the first Reader in Theology to the Franciscans.

Having held the Archdeaconries of Chester, Northampton, and Leicester, he was made Bishop of Lincoln in 1235.

At one time he was tutor to the sons of Simon de Montfort.

Whilst at Oxford he had Adam Marsh for a pupil and possibly Roger Bacon.

Whilst Bishop of Lincoln, he attempted various reforms amongst his clergy and created no small stir by insisting on the right of visiting his Chapter, which brought him into conflict not only with the Chapter, but also with the King.

Later he entered into the lists on behalf of the clergy even with the Pope, and combatted the alliance between King Henry III and Pope Innocent IV, whereby some 70,000 marks were annually paid to alien nominees of Rome. According to some Robert died excommunicated by Innocent IV.

Though he was greatly interested in Natural Science, holding that mathematics alone is able to provide an explanation of physical phenomena, we are not here concerned with his works on that subject; but in addition he was a leading philosopher, whose translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle was used by St. Albertus Magnus and St. Thomas Aquinas.

It appears that earlier in the century there had been a translation of Books II and III, which was known as the *Ethica Vetus*, and subsequently of Book I, which was known as the *Ethica Nova*, also parts of Books VII and VIII were known to St. Albertus Magnus.

Grosseteste's translation contained a revision of these, together with a translation of the rest of the ten Books and Grosseteste's own Commentary thereon.

Accompanying this, was a translation of the Greek Commentators, parts, in fact, by Aspasias, c. 150 A.D., and Michael Metropolitani of Ephesus, c. 1050, a pupil of Psellus, and the rest by Eustratius or Eustathius, Archbishop of Thessalonica, c. 1150, whose name these Commentaries generally bore.

This translation by Grosseteste came to be known as the *Antiqua Translatio*, or *Conversio*.

The complete commentary of Grosseteste has not come down to us.

In addition to the translation of the *Ethics*, he wrote

Commentaries on the *Posterior Analytics*, Boethius' *Consolation*, and on the mystical works of Dionysius, on the *The Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs*, and on the *De Fide Orthodoxa* of John Damascene; lastly what is known as the *Hexameron* is his Commentary on the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle, which unfortunately has been lost. Further he wrote *Distinctiones*, *Summa Articulus Fidei*.¹⁴

Of him Matthew Paris in his *Chronicles* wrote "in mensa refectionis corporalis dupsilis, copiosus et civilis hilaris et affabilis; in mente vera spirituale devotus, lacrimosus et contritus; in officiis pontificali sedulus venerabilis et infatigabilis."

PHILOSOPHY

Robert Grosseteste as first reader to the Franciscans at Oxford influenced their attitude in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries to the new Aristotelian learning to a very great extent.

Following St. Augustine, he regarded "becoming" as inherent in all things, potentiality is therefore especially stressed as being manifested in participation in existence, mutability and the power to seek the good. At the same time like all other Franciscans he gave preference to Will, regarding it as prior in every way, except formally, to Intellect.

ACT AND POTENTIALITY

The metaphysical notion of "becoming" gives rise to two factors, potentiality and act; potentiality being the aptitude of a thing to receive perfections, and the actuality being the thing perfected by the acquisition of such perfection.

Thus potentiality is often called the material cause of change. Grosseteste did not regard the use of this term as meaning other than the potentiality of matter from which a thing is produced, and objected to its use as meaning matter in which the change is accomplished. Such potentiality he regarded really as a form, or ens actu; but if the ens is termed matter it is either, propinqua, as flesh the matter of an animal, or, remota, as one of the elements. Matter is really the remote "yle ($\psi\lambda\eta$)" or primordial matter, a "determina concreta" one by privation of form, possibly in the mind of God before the creation of things.

He regarded, like St. Augustine, potentiality as being both passive and active; passive in the sense of a thing being the subject of action, but active in reference of what it is to become.

He held that potentiality is not "quod nihil habet actu, sed quod non omnino habet actum," which continued to be one of

¹⁴ Bodlean, 109; Merton Coll. Oxford, 257; 1203 St. Ger. des Près. *Bib. Nat.*

the chief Franciscan tenets, that potentiality was not a mysterious nothingness, but that it was merely "not being" in the sense of not being this or not being that.

The form of the formal cause he uses in the proper Aristotelian sense "*quo res est*," which uniting with matter produces the composite and originates magnitude. Further he regards the potential existence of form as an existence in the efficient cause.

As to the change which actually takes place, Grosseteste displays his acceptance of the Plotinian doctrine of the emanation of force.

EMANATION OF FORCES

The natural agent emits its species or *similitudo*, in fact its virtue of power in all directions from the surface and every part of the agent: as to its variation according to direction, reflection and refraction, he insists "*utilitas considerationis linearum, angulorum et figurarum est maxima, quoniam impossibile est sciri naturalem philosophiam sine illis.*"

When the species comes in contact with the recipient assimilation occurs, due to the species informing the matter of the recipient either gradually, where the agent and that which is produced are of the same nature, or suddenly, if the change is between contrary natures.

As to light he held that its propagation was a *mutatio* rather than a *motus*.

LUX

Grosseteste held that God first created unformed matter out of nothing, and then brought into existence *lux* or light, which he distinguished from ordinary *lumen*, which he considered to be the source of all subsequent beings. Such sequence was however one of origin and not of time, since matter and form are inseparable.

Such *lux*, as the first form, originates space and is the source of a corporeity in a matter, which being unqualified cannot of itself have dimensions. Such production or firmament is so noble and perfect that it resembles the separate forms or intelligences.

But it is corporeity, though of the highest type, and highly simple approaching spirit. Considering then that *lux* is the instrument, by which the First Mover brings all corporeal things into existence, he held that the superior bodies are the species and perfection of inferior bodies, and that all bodies exist virtually in the first body. So that *lux* is not only the form of corporeity, but also the principle of action in all things. Herein he is following

the teaching of John of Damascus, that lux was both substance and quality.¹⁵

In this way lux has been compared to the modern scientific description of ether.

Though Grosseteste was specially interested in natural science, we are not here concerned with his convictions, being based as they were on Ptolemaic geo-centric principles and regarding earth, air, fire and water as the physical elements.

SOUL AND BODY

Passing over this, it is most important to examine the connection which he posits between the soul and the body in man.

After noting that in man the form comes from a "forma non situális," i.e. God, and that it is unlike that of vegetative and sensible forms, in that its operations are not co-extensive with the body, since every part of the body does not understand or will, he goes on to say that the elements, which in nature derive their movements directly from the heavens, are in the human microcosm unified and vitalized by the soul, which moves its nerves and muscles by means of lux.

He quotes from the pseudo Augustinian work *De Spiritu Animae* "lux igitur est per quam anima in sensibus agit et quae instrumentaliter in eisdem agit." Thus lux in this case corresponds to the pneuma of the Neo-Platonists.

However, whilst saying that the part of the soul called the intellect is not the act of the body and does not use the body as an instrument, he goes on to state that the rational soul is not merely united to the body as its motor, but understands by means of the virtue (function) of the body. Nevertheless though it understands by the phantasms, which are the acts of the sensitive power, yet whilst incorporeal substances can act in bodies, as the more noble in the less, the converse that corporeal things can affect incorporeal substances does not hold good, for the less noble cannot act upon what is more noble.

Whilst maintaining the dualism of the soul and the body, regarding the soul as only the form of the body, in the sense that all its acts come from and are controlled by the soul, yet he clearly refuses to locate the soul in the body, but says: "as God is everywhere in the universe so is the soul in the body. It is by essence everywhere in the body, it vivifies the whole and not only in such parts in which its power operates as the heart or brain. The soul being incorporeal is 'in corpore sine situ praesens sine loco ubique tota.'"

¹⁵ *De. Fide. Orth.*, II, 7.

Such being the case it may be reasonably deduced that Grosseteste was the first, at any rate of the English School, to introduce the theory of plurality of forms.¹⁶

With regard to the powers of the soul, intellect and will are its characteristic activities.

SENSES

The senses, which he regarded as being controlled by the *vis apprehensiva* have self preservation for their end or main object. The senses themselves, with the assistance of common sense, the imagination, and memory, may become the occasion, but never the cause of knowledge, since the inferior cannot modify the superior (cf., *supra*) nor can they apprehend universals, the materials of knowledge being confined to singulars. But it is from the materials of sense that the intellect elicits the universal. After stating that the universal is not a mere figment, but that it is a certain one thing in many, and that it is like *lux*, he goes on to say "if we understand universals, according to Aristotle, as the forms discovered in the substance (*quiddity*) of particulars, by which they are what they are, then the universal is nothing but that which is common in any one of its particulars and singulars: that is that the universal is *in re*."

The eliciting of such universals actualizes the potentiality of the first principles in the mind.

It is clear that we have not first principles in act to begin with, nor have we forgotten all about them, but they are in us "in potentia" to start with and are brought in us from potentiality to act: thus their "habit" in us from the first is both possible and material, passive but not active.

Such universals when elicited become the material for demonstration, the (Aristotelian) method of scientific knowledge; there being no scientific knowledge of changing singulars or things caused by accident.¹⁷ How the unchanging universal can be derived from corruptible and changing singulars Grosseteste explains, not with Aristotle, but with St. Augustine, by positing them as ideas existing in the mind of God.

In this way the word "form" and the universal, that by which a thing is what it is, comes to acquire a further meaning of exemplar in the eternal mind of God.

Thus the view of the universal as being posited in the mind of God, led Grosseteste to adopt the *ante rem* opinion of the Platonic realists in preference to the *in re* view of Aristotle.

¹⁶ *Contra*, p. 73-74.

¹⁷ Cf. p. 58.

SAPIENTIA

Though the senses occasion knowledge, yet Grosseteste continues to regard them as restricting knowledge: for he speaks of the intellect as obscured and burdened with the weight of the body, yet he holds that even in this life, without attaining the goal of absolute knowledge so as to know God other than inferentially, the mind when in a state of Grace can transcend the state of consciousness and become subject to a kind of radiation from God the First Cause, which illuminates intelligible things and imparts to the mind a clearer understanding proportionate to its penetration. Such method of knowing, which is called *Sapientia* gives us the utmost certitude. Ontological truth, truth as applied to the thing, consists in "rectitudo et conformitas Verbo, quo aeternaliter dicuntur"; whilst logical truth, as thought by us, is "in adaequatio sermonis interioris et rei."¹⁸

In the first sense the Truth is one, in the second it is many and incomplete; the simpler the more perfect, as contrasted with the many and imperfect.

POWERS OF THE SOUL

Grosseteste does not deal with the problem of precedence or dependence of the Will on the Intellect, and it can only be inferentially concluded that he regarded the powers of the soul as identical with its substance. He certainly preserved the simplicity of the soul, by regarding the faculties as modes of action rather than parts. He merely distinguished the rational faculty from the irrational, by pointing out that the former is the same in respect to opposites, whilst the latter are diverse in respect to different opposite acts.

The faculties of the soul definitely signify that it is composed of potentiality and act, and since he regarded matter and potentiality as interchangeable terms (*supra*, p. 241) he must have attributed matter to the soul. God alone is Pure Form and Pure Act. In this he followed Boethius and St. Augustine, for by them only "materia signata" was denied as $\psi\lambda\eta$ to souls and angels.

ANGELS

Above the human soul, the highest natural form, comes those of the intelligences or angels.

Created before all else or rather "cum aeternitate" in distinction to post aeternitate they rank next to God, they are incorporeal in that their specific acts of willing and understanding

¹⁸ Cf., Ch. XI, p. 177.

are accomplished "sine mediante virtute corporis," and thus can be said to be "per se entis vel per se stantes." But they being created are composed of act and potentiality in respect of existence, operation, and change.

As regards their knowledge, Grosseteste follows St. Augustine; they contemplate God directly and the causal ideas in Him, and thus know singulars; their cognitive power is in a measure like that of God, for in knowing themselves they know other things. Angels are also regarded as "virtus separata" by which the heavenly bodies are animated and from which their movements are derived.

MAN'S KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

With regard to man's knowledge of God, this can be but inferential, since God is pure simplicity without diversity, His nature as it is in itself cannot be comprehended by us.

Being uncaused, God cannot be known by definition, for all definition or expression of knowledge is by explanation of the essence of a thing, which involves its causes.

Such knowledge of God, as we derive from revelation and His creatures, is only negative, by a denial of imperfection, thus He is described as without beginning or end, immaterial, unchangeable, uncircumscribed, incomprehensible.

Of His qualities which we ascribe to Him as attributes, He is them, and not as commonly said to have them.

Grosseteste follows St. Augustine and Boethius in regarding God as Ultimate Being, having existence per se, whilst all else have existence through an efficient cause.

God is Pure Form as is shown by reason.¹⁹

Being pure form, God is perfectly simple without composition of essence and existence, act and potentiality, form or matter, or specific or individual characteristics. His essence is His existence. God is the "forma omnium" of His creatures but not as though united to them as an essential principle, but in the sense that He possesses the exemplary form of all things, in the sense of an artist possessing the likeness of a statue he is making; He also causes the subsistence of beings. He has knowledge of all singulars "in puritate essentiae suae non concomendo eam cum accidentibus."

He sees beyond Himself things which are after Him since He is the cause.

¹⁹ "Forma est qua res est id quod est. . . . Deus autem a seipso est id quod est, Seipso enim Deum est quia deitate Deus est et deitas Deus est. Qua propter cum id quo res est id quod est forma sit Deus forma est." As form is synonymous with perfection God must be form, for He is "perfectio perfectissima, completio completissima, forma formosissima et species speciosissima."

NON-ETERNITY OF CREATION

At the time of Grosseteste, the question of the eternal creation of the world was a prominent one, because it was on the ground that Aristotle taught this, that the reading of Aristotle's *Physics* and *Metaphysics* was interdicted at Paris in 1210, 1215, and 1231.

Some tried to find in Aristotle a temporal beginning of the world, and some held that an eternal creation was not impossible.

Grosseteste objected to the arguments of the latter, that there was no common standard between the Creator as a complete principle, and creation which has its first and complete cause in God.

Moreover the omnipotence of God would be impugned, if matter were supposed to exist besides Him from all eternity.

Lastly, if time is infinite, the number of separated souls is infinite, or all souls are one, or the same soul returns to other bodies, or souls are mortal, each of which alternatives is impossible.

From the very term of infinity, it was held that there could not be an infinite number of created things.

He then showed that all the expositors of Aristotle had held, that Aristotle did teach the eternity of the world.

But Grosseteste proceeded to prove, that eternal movement and time are impossible; after rebutting Aristotle's proofs, he points out that the world and motion both came into existence together with time, and that time and eternity are not even in the same genus.

William Shirwood, c. 1250, was born at Durham, and educated in Paris, and became Chancellor of Lincoln, 1267, in the time of Robert Grosseteste.

Roger Bacon, who had been a pupil of Grosseteste's, must have been greatly influenced by him in his youth, for he placed William Shirwood as a philosopher even before St. Albertus Magnus.

It is known that he wrote a book of Sentences, which however have not come down to us. His book of Distinctions shows him to have been a first class logician, who may be compared in type to Peter Helias, c. 1150 (cf., Ch. 13).

Oudin identifies him with William de Montibus the author of several other works, but this is doubtful.

John of St. Giles, c. 1250, was another friend of Robert Grosseteste's. He was a celebrated doctor of medicine to Philip Augustus, King of France, and an esteemed doctor of theology in Paris. He has sometimes been confused with John de Barastre, Dean of St. Quentin. Bale and Pits mention that he wrote some unedited Commentaries on Peter Lombard and on Aristotle,

also a treatise entitled *Being and Essence*, but they have not survived. He became a Dominican and returned to England in 1235. Some sermons of his are to be found in the National Library of Paris.²⁰

Thomas of York, d. 1260, became a Franciscan before 1245, in which year he is found studying the *De Natura Rerum* of Rabanus Maurus and the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle at Oxford.

He lectured at Oxford until 1256, when he succeeded William de Melitona as sixth regent at Cambridge. He was personally known both to Grosseteste and to Adam Marsh.

His chief work was called *Sapientiale*, based on the new found works of Aristotle and the Latin translations of the Arabian philosophers. Thus, as to the Divine Attributes he quotes Aristotle, Algazel, Avicenna, and Averroes; as to the incorporeality and composition of the soul, he quoted Avicenna; and as to angels, Avicenna. But he rejects the opinions of Algazel, Avicenna, and Maimonides, that in generation forms come *ab extra*, and noted that Aristotle only treats of the soul in its natural aspect.

ACT AND POTENTIALITY

In identifying act and potentiality with form and matter Thomas of York ascribes this solution to Rabbi Moyses and Averroes.

Matter, in its true relation to form, should be regarded as privation, rather than as potentiality.

Privation can only be regarded as a principle of change, in as much as it is a *sine qua non* for subsequent actualization. According to Averroes, Aristotle taught that privation was only a principle *per accidens* and not *per se*, for when a new form is received, privation is corrupted wholly, or *per se*; whilst matter is corrupted *per accidens* through privation. Privation and matter are not two actualities 'secundum subjectum,' but they are not absolutely identical, the matter continues to exist, when privation is corrupted by the generation of a new being; so that matter is a 'principium essendi' and privation only a 'principium transmutationis.' Privation not being an *ens per se* does not add being to the $\psi\lambda\eta$. He is not clear what mode of being is to be ascribed to privation because without it 'nihil fit omnino ex non ente simpliciter,' so he thinks that being cannot be limited to act, since both matter and privation have some being, but matter is nearer than privation to "being in act."

He further stresses this, by pointing out that matter must have

²⁰ 338, *Bib. Nat.*

many potentialities, in order to produce multitude so that in some way there must be duality in matter itself.

He quotes Avicbron as declaring that since form is multiplied and divided through the divisibility of matter, matter itself cannot be simple, and further since all that can be divided by the intellect is composite, and intellect distinguishes essence of matter from its potentiality, matter must be composite.

CREATION

Of types of becoming there are but three by generation, by composition and by creation.

Creation is not a becoming from potentiality to effect, but a production out of nothing.²¹

The only priority of matter over form, which was created simultaneously with it, is explained by St. Augustine as one of origin. The first two forms which divide the composite are corporeal and incorporeal, and these have corresponding matters, 'materia situialis' and 'materia non situialis.' He thus attributes to the incorporeal a definite matter 'materia non situialis.'

GENERATION

In generation, a pre-existing agent together with matter, which has an aptitude for the form to be realized, is implied together with certain action of the celestial spheres to actualize material forms. With regard to the aptitude of matter in generation, it is only fulfilled progressively, the present form receding before the new form, but the susceptibility of matter is never exhausted by any form, so far is it removed from perfection and permanence that its very nature desires one form after another.

Nature is the power of the active potentialities, called by St. Augustine 'radices' or 'rationes seminales' and by Aristotle 'potentiae activae naturales,' or incomplete forms in a being to develop themselves, when the appropriate conditions have been set up by an efficient cause.

Hence, as Averroes supposes, things will have a passive power by which they can be acted upon, and an active power by which they can act, the former being reducible to matter and the latter to the incomplete form.

"Artificial Generation" is the term he applies to anything 'secundum quid utpote accidentum,' such as a picture.

²¹ Gundissalinus is quoted "exitus forma ab ejus (creatoris) sapientia et voluntate et impressio ejus in materiam. Unde prima materia et prima forma nihil prius est nisi creator eorum."

MATTER AND FORM

He sets forth the seven arguments of Avicbron, which appear to him to be sufficient proof that matter and form are the two roots of all things.

1. *Per consideratione creationis in creante et creato.*

Since the first recision is from unity to binary, and the creator is only one, the creature to differ from him should have two factors. These could not be two matters, since existence comes from form, nor two forms, since form cannot exist apart from matter. It is natural that the Creator being perfect, should wish creation to resemble Himself and give it 'materia sustinens' and 'forma sustentata.'

2. *Per naturam resolutionis eorum quae sunt in se simplicia vel principio.*

If things were resolved into one principle only, it would need to contain a diversity of things, therefore there must be two principles.

3. *Per diversitatem et convenientiam ipsarum rerum.*

There must be something in which they agree and something by which they differ. This means that matter and form must be the constituents of things.

4. *Method of understanding by genus and differentia.*

This depends on our division of things into formed and form, and since we can only apprehend the finite, since the finite means form, which in its turn implies matter, whatever the intellect apprehends must have both form and matter.

5. *Per comparationem extremorum.*

If there is continuity from the lowest to the highest beings, and the lowest (corporeal substances) have matter and form, because they have three dimensions, the highest creature and all mediate beings must have matter and form.

6. *Per proprietates materiae et formae universalis.*

We know things by their inseparable properties. Those of materia prima are freedom from existence in another unity of essence, sustaining a diversity, and giving to every creature its essence and name; those of form are subsistence in another, and the perfecting and actualizing of the essence of that in which it exists.

Since these properties are found in all things, universal matter and form exist in all things.

7. *Per viam inductionis.*

By the induction of all sensible and intelligible substances and

the abstraction and composition of their form with matter (*sic*) we come to the esse of Universal matter and form.

Matter, though it does not exist apart from form is distinct from form, and whatever is made has existence.

He agrees with Avicbron, that if matter is made by God, it must have its own proper idea in the Mind of God.

But there are two kinds of being, 'esse in potentia' and 'esse in actu,' the former applies to matter 'per se' and to form 'per se,' while the latter is applicable to the composite of both.

He quotes Gundissalinus as saying, that if matter moves towards form, it must have its own being, even prior to form; also that if things are composed of being in potentiality and being in act, the first as part of the composite must contribute something; in short, matter must be a substance in the sense that it is an 'ens', not inhering in a subject: since it sustains form it cannot be an accident.

Were it not a substance, there would be no diversity of substance, for form being undivided does not give diversity.

Avicbron showed that matter must have essence, for if it can receive all form, none will be in it essentially; and clearly if a susceptibility to contrary form be found in matter, both of these forms cannot be the same as its essence.

Matter then, has its own being but is not in actuality.

St. Augustine says it is unformed and almost nothing; Plato, Averroes, and Gundissalinus, as something between pure being, and non-being, the latter calling it a possibility of being.

Matter therefore can not exist in corporeal place alone, and when forms are said to exist in matter, spiritual rather than corporeal place is implied, as when something existing in the Will is mentioned.

He agrees with St. Augustine and Avicbron that matter is not in time, for in that case it would have been generated from something which is not matter, but matter is ingenerable, because there is nothing lower from which it can be generated; also Aristotle held that, if matter were generated, it would not be simple but composed.

(This, however, scarcely agrees with what has been said above (p. 249), when Thomas of York was led to express the view that it was composed and not simple.)

Since it is ingenerable, it is not corruptible 'per se,' but only 'per accidens,' that is through the privation which exists in it. But though incorruptible, it need not be eternal, for it came into being like form from creation.

Since it is created by God it must of necessity be good, for as Aristotle says, a thing cannot produce its contrary, hence all

matter and being is good, and matter has in consequence a desire for goodness, and what is deficient in being is deficient in goodness.

Matter is one and the same entity in all corporeal things it is one 'secundum subjectum,' but as Averroes points out such unified matter exists only in the soul (mind) and not in nature, for matter without form cannot exist, and so cannot be one.

As mentioned on pages 249-251 the priority of matter over form is only one of origin or dignity as they were created simultaneously with time.

Form, then is the good and perfection of the appetite in matter, and the last end on account of which movement occurs.

FORM ONLY CORRUPTED "PER ACCIDENS."

He thinks that form is neither generable nor corruptible 'per se,' but like matter is only so 'per accidens': he agrees with Aristotle that only the composite is corrupted. He gives four proofs.

I. That, out of which a thing is made, suffers transmutation which is matter, if form alone were generated matter would not be transmuted. But since all generation implies a transmutation of matter, what is generated is the composite and not the form alone.

II. The agent does not produce a thing *in aliquo* but *ex aliquo*, else it would produce it *ex nihilo*, therefore the production is formed *ex materia* and form alone is not produced except 'per accidens.'

III. What is generated, is not generated from what is simple, because in simple things, there is no potentiality, therefore what is generated is not simple but composed of matter and form.

IV. If form were generated, it would be made *ex aliquo* and therefore from neither matter nor form, but from the composite, for what is generated 'ex quo non est ex materia solum.' Hence form if generated would be generated from matter and form and so on *ad infinitum*.

A form is not generated 'per se' nor corrupted 'per se,' but only 'per accidens,' and in the latter case receding into the potency of matter and never perishing.

Averroes gives three ways in which new forms come into being: (a) 'ab extra,' during the process of generation; (b) 'ab extra,' from some donor or creator; (c) as Aristotle holds, only the composite is generated 'per se.'

As to generation 'ab intra,' since generation is a 'transmutatio in substantia,' this cannot be because it would be merely an alteration.

As to generation 'ab extra,' Algazel held that it required a celestial body to confer the aptitude, and a separate substance to confer the form; whilst Avicenna followed by Avicbron and Rabbi Moyses held, that terrestrial forms come from the last intelligence.

Thomas of York comes to the same conclusion as Aristotle, that there is no need for a giver of forms.

Moreover, nature as the intrinsic principle of movement of things, is really the same as that which is movable, it is the incomplete form.

UNIVERSAL

Thomas of York agreed with Aristotle in considering the universal to be *in re*. If the universal does not exist in the thing itself, then it is merely in our mind or *post rem* as the conceptualists had it. Without the universal, knowledge would be restricted to singulars and would cease with their corruption, so that there would be no permanency of true knowledge. From this Aristotle deduced that if the specific form or universal does not exist apart from the mind, there is nothing eternal or immutable.

To meet opposing opinions, Thomas of York thought he had found a solution by distinguishing "this from such," and by stating that the universal was not in the singular in act, but in potentiality.²²

INDIVIDUATION

As to the various theories of individuation, Aristotle held that form was responsible for the division of genus into species, and matter of the individualisation of singulars in the same species according to quantity.

Others like Averroes and Avicbron held that plurality of things was due to their form; form is the limitation of magnitude, and the cause of diversity in quantity; matter is one in number and the subject of form which divides; *materia prima* receives universal form and ultimately by mediation of other forms the individual form.

A third view supported by Porphyry, Boethius, and Avicenna, held that individuation was due to accidents. To this it is objected that they are posterior to the substantial form of the individual, form alone cannot sustain accidents, for these need matter also.

Thomas of York inclines to the second view, on the ground of potentiality, matter is one according to substance, but not so according to potentiality: there are many potentialities in matter, but these are not reduced into act except by many forms.

²² Cf., *Richard of Middleton*, Ch. XXV, p. 524.

Matter is not identified except by form, hence will not be the cause of identification of form ; matter on account of its receiving, is 'being in potentiality,' but on an account of its bestowing, is 'being in act.'

If form is the principle of individuation, it must give unity to the composite, this it can do, being created by the Unity, and endowed not only with indivisibility, but also with power to effect multitude. Matter which receives form, contributes to the unity of the composite, for it is not only multiple 'per se,' but also divisible 'per se,' whilst form is only divisible 'per accidens.' In this way immaterial intellect like intelligence can be multiplied.

PLURALITY OF FORMS

Inferentially Thomas of York may be said to have followed Robert Grosseteste in allowing a plurality of forms in one individual.²³

As to the composite, before the union of matter and form, the esse of both 'per se' is 'esse in potentia,' and since nothing passes from potentiality to act by itself, there must be something to actualize them.

To actualize involves an act and the act requires an agent, so that there must be a composer or 'being in act' to bring about the union of matter and form, which make up a composite. In the case of the union of first matter and first form this is the Creator.

As to the intrinsic causes of the union, as to matter, it is its appetite for the goodness and perfection conferred by form, for it is only through form that matter approximates to the First Unity : and as to the form, the cause of union is the ability in form to actualize matter and communicate itself.

In addition, there is obedience to the Creator, for the First Will penetrates all and is like a writer acting by means of form as its instrument on matter as the "tabula."

Thomas of York held that while 'ens,' being, may be actual or potential, esse, existence must be actual. Esse, even though some beings have more or less, according as they participate in goodness, is not an accident : but esse is rather an essential perfection of 'ens' giving to it actuality and unity.

Accidents, or 'entia propter substantias,' as Aristotle calls them, attach to the composite.

They are in the composite chiefly through the matter, because, quantity the mediator of all accidents is chiefly due to matter ; form is regarded as the cause, that moves matter to possess the 'potentia propinqua' for accidents.

²³ Cf., *contra*, pp. 73-74.

Avicbron and the ancients called form light. Form is comparable to light, because the farther it is from its source, the weaker is its action; but unlike light, the farther it withdraws the more manifest it is, because the less simple and hidden is its action (cf., p. 242, *supra*).

Through its activity form is comprehended and becomes the quiddity of the thing signified by definition.

SOUL

We now come to an examination of the nature of the soul, and find that Thomas of York commences by proposing as proof of the existence of the soul various arguments advanced by Avicbron.

First, actions are accidents and involve a principle or agent; they do not exist 'per se,' but body cannot be, according to Avicbron, an agent 'per se.'

Hence there must be some factors in bodies to account for the growth and generation of plants; the additional powers of feeling and moving of animals; and also the additional powers of understanding and discoursing of human beings, such power is the soul.

If a body were moved by its parts, something would have to move that part, and so on *ad infinitum*, thus movement in a body cannot be explained without positing an incorporeal principle.

The highest grade of soul can be deduced from a consideration of the adaptations of the body to many diverse operations. Such adaptations show that the body is essentially an instrument and does not exist "propter se"; neither the complex and contradictory actions of will, nor the acquisition of knowledge, would be possible for a body with its corporeal nature.

Soul must be a substance, because no accident is "per se" and agent.

Then he goes back on what he had indicated before, saying that the body as a subject of the soul does not remain the same, when the soul has receded, but acquires a new form and other accidents; though he had previously recognized a plurality of forms in one individual (cf., p. 254, *supra*).

Further, according to Aristotle, one of the signs of substance is that it should cause the essence of a thing, and that it should not arise out of the subject. Now the soul is the former,²⁴ because it makes the body to be truly a body and the latter because Intellect comes from without.

The soul cannot be a corporeal substance, because two bodies cannot occupy the same place, nor can one body enter another

²⁴ Cf., pp. 64-71.

without dividing it or being divided, but the soul conserves the body in being.

Further, if a corporeal body, it could only produce motion in one direction, for nature is thus limited, whereas growth is in all directions; nor a celestial body whose movement is circular.

Nor is any body having life a living body "secundum quod est corpus simpliciter sed secundum quod est tale corpus."

Hence a body is not "tale corpus" unless through some principle which is not corporeal, else all bodies would be living. Hence the soul is not a body.

SPIRITUAL MATTER

Though the soul is incorporeal, Thomas of York held, that it contained spiritual matter, since matter is synonymous with potentiality, and owing to change the soul must have potentiality.

Avicenna and Boethius thought thus, the former since the essence of form cannot receive, whilst the latter thought that form without matter cannot be a subject; whereas the intellectual faculty is a subject, since it receives intelligible forms.

Further it is not simple, for it can receive successively, it is not identical with that which it possesses, and it is subject to accidents, *e.g.* knowledge.

It must have matter, for souls are many in number in the same species. Moreover, it is only the First Mover who acts 'per se totum.'

Against the argument that since matter 'per se' is unintelligible and that the soul is intelligible, hence the soul cannot have matter, which was put forward by St. Augustine, he replies that even matter of bodies cannot be understood 'per se,' but only "per formam et per mutationem," yet this does not make them unintelligible; and even if matter is unintelligible to us, it is not so to the First Mover.

Again to the argument that since nothing is understood unless abstracted from matter, and since the soul 'per se' is understood, it must be without matter, he answers that abstraction need only be made from sensible and not from intelligible matter.

The other objections he dismisses, as being based on the idea that matter must be either a privation, or subject to place and dimension, neither of which meanings could apply to spiritual substances: it is only in the sense of potentiality for existence and change that matter is posited in spiritual being.

Thomas of York is thus led to deny that the soul is the form of the body, but rather is it related to the body as a pilot to the ship.

Since matter itself is unknowable, it remains for the form of

a corporeal being to be the object of knowledge. The form that exists in the sensible world, giving actuality, unity, and action, becomes the exemplar or universal in the soul; so we are concerned with the one form under the two modes of being. In matter, the universal is a principle of being, but in the soul it is a principle of knowing. The exemplar in the soul could not correspond to the particular form of the individual, as that, on account of its inseparability from matter, is always subject to change and therefore cannot provide the perpetual elements involved in knowledge.

The intellect abstracts this potential universal or specific form from the phantasm, which when it predicates it, causes the potential to become an actual universal.

MODES OF UNIVERSALS

Like Avicenna and Averroes he ascribes to universals three modes of being: (a) a potential and inseparable existence in the individual; (b) an existence in the mind that is neither singular nor plural; (c) an existence in the mind when considered in relation to the many. The species abstracted from the phantasm is not to be regarded as the same as the species of the object, because that is the species of the whole composite.

DIVINE ILLUMINATION

Thomas of York, also recognized another type of knowledge due to Divine Illumination.

In this light, which is the formal essence of the soul, made in the image of God, all knowable species exist like colour in material light. He regarded the species in the intellect, partly *ab extra* with Aristotle, partly *ab intra* with St. Augustine and partly both, the usual Christian explanation.

MAN'S KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

Thomas of York held that there is an innate idea of God in man, because the soul is an image of God. *A posteriori*, He can be deduced from the nature of His creatures and the Order of the World. He also advances the ontological argument of St. Anselm, that the greatest conceivable being must exist in effect; also the argument of St. Augustine as to eternal truth, of which our first principles are an effect, *e.g.* $2 \times 2 = 4$.

He held that we could arrive at the Unity of His substance; and agreed with Plato, that what is made bears likeness to its maker, and also that if there were two Gods they would be indistinguishable individuals in the same species.

ANGELS

As to intelligences, Thomas of York follows Avicbron. If there is a mover that is not moved and something moved without being a mover, there must be an intermediate both moved and mover. Likewise, if there is a first intellect that imparts without receiving, and an opposite like the human intellect, which receives without imparting, there must be an intermediate intellect which both imparts and receives. Such will receive only from the superior and impart only to the inferior.

He also advances another group of neo-platonic arguments taken from Avicbron. That the more remote things are the less the agreement; the First Cause and the Corporeal are extremes, therefore there must be an intermediary to reconcile the extreme: that the soul in the minor world as a particular mover is joined to its body by an animal spirit, therefore the First Mover must be united to the major world by an intermediate spirit: that the First Cause can only produce its like, hence the need of angels as incorporeal forms, as being nearer to simple form.

Between a being in time, according to substance, and one that is in eternity, according to its complete disposition, there must be an intermediate one, whose substance falls in eternity or rather above time, and whose action is in time.

Thomas of York, as indicated before, accepted the doctrine of spiritual matter, of which therefore angels must be possessed, and though he relates arguments for and against, he does not in terms give his own replies to the arguments to the contrary.

DIVINE CHARACTERISTICS

With regard to the Divine Characteristics deducible from reason, he only gives three, that God is a Simple Being: Immutable: and the Creator of the Universe. His simplicity implies both a necessary existence, that is identical with His Essence, and a complete absence of matter, being Pure Form.

CREATION 'EX NIHILO' IN TIME

With regard to the possibility of eternal creation, in the proof of which the Franciscans were particularly interested, Thomas of York argued that Creation could not have been made out of something immutable, for then it could not be changed, nor could it be made out of something mutable, for that would have to have been made out of something else, and so on *ad infinitum*; therefore the Creation was made out of nothing. It is contradictory to say that the world was made out of nothing and yet 'ab aeterno,' for an eternal being must have been always in

existence and could never have been preceded by non-being. Further, the world must have been created in time, but the present is the end of the past and the beginning of the future, so that all time is finite.

GOD'S KNOWLEDGE

The problem of creation leads to that of God's knowledge, since according to Rabbi Moyses nothing is willed that is not known. That which God knows is the eternal exemplar or idea used in the production of the world. Plato gives the example of the artist having the form of the thing to be made: Aristotle maintains that things are in the knower not according to their material and corruptible being, but according to the mode of the knower; and further, since the form of the moved is in the mover by reducing the four causes material, formal, efficient and final to three namely matter, privation, and mover, Aristotle identifies the form with the efficient cause.

He supports his view, that Plato posited his Ideas in the mind of God, from the passage in the *Timaeus* that the world is of incomparable beauty and since the exemplar must be more beautiful still, if produced, than the world, which would be impossible in the world, hence it must be in the Mind of God. He quotes Seneca, Trismegistus, and St. Augustine in support of this view. He therefore thought that Aristotle's attack on Plato's ideas as substances existing 'per se' could not have applied to Plato himself, since the latter posited them in the Mind of God.

On the ground that singulars are often evil, a knowledge of singulars was often denied to God, but Thomas of York maintained that, if man had a knowledge of singulars God must also have such knowledge.

Further, he maintained that all the objections of Aristotle to a knowledge by God of externals, or other things than Himself, was nothing more than an objection to a discursive method of knowing in the Deity, as First Being, Immutable and Perfect.

Further, as Averroes pointed out, since God knows creatures, as they have their source in Him, the distinction between universals and particulars does not arise, since for these, it is necessary that the cause of knowledge is "ens."

The positing of these ideas in the Divine Mind, does not give rise to any form of plurality, for even in the human mind, the thing known and the mind are one. Moreover, God's knowledge as well as His Will is identical with His Essence and Being. Pure Act, His Will is not moved by any previous appetite for what it lacks, and since God is good it might be said that He Wills of necessity the good.

Richard of Cornwall, c. 1250, a Franciscan, was educated at Paris and Oxford. He lectured on the Sentences of Peter Lombard in Oxford in 1253 and succeeded Thomas of York as Master there in 1256.

Like many others he was scorned by Roger Bacon.

Richard Marsh, d. 1226, a Chancellor of King John, a Franciscan, became Bishop of Durham, 1217. He was the uncle of Adam Marsh (see below), who was the tutor of Roger Bacon at Oxford.

Adam Marsh, 1200–1258, a Franciscan, was the nephew of Richard Marsh, the Bishop of Durham. He was a pupil of Robert Grosseteste's and tutor of Roger Bacon at Oxford.

Gilbert of Tournai, c. 1250, a Franciscan, was a follower of Grosseteste, and a mystic like the "Victorines."

At the request of King Louis IX of France, he wrote *Eruditio Regum et Principum* and *De Modo Addiscendi* was written by him for John, the son of the Count of Flanders.

He also wrote *De Pace et Animi Tranquillitate*.

Peter of Tarantaise, 1225–1276, was a Dominican who taught in Paris from 1259–1269. He became Archbishop of Lyons, then Bishop of Ostia, and subsequently Pope Innocent V.

He wrote *Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, *De Unitate Forma*, *De Materia Coeli*, *De Aeternitate Mundi* and *De Intellectu Voluntate*.

It was he who held that Confirmation was instituted by the Apostles, and is quoted by St. Thomas Aquinas.²⁵

"He stresses the practical side of theological science, combats the eternity of creation, but hesitates between the hylomorphic composition of immaterial substances and their simplicity; the former is 'planior facilius' but the latter 'Subtilior.'"

He was inclined to adopt rationales seminales though holding the real distinction between the soul and its faculties.²⁶

²⁵ *Summa Theologica*, Part III, 3.

²⁶ *Wulf*, I, p. 391.

CHAPTER XIX

ST. ALBERTUS MAGNUS, 1193-1280—HUGH RIPILIN, c. 1275

St. Albert Magnus, 1193-1280, known as *Doctor Universalis*, a Realist, was born at Launingen in the diocese of Augsburg in Swabia of a distinguished military family named Bollstädter.

He studied at Padua, where he joined the Dominican Order of Friars Preachers in 1223. An alternative date of 1206 for his birth, though supported by Mandonnet, would appear to have been relinquished by the most modern writers in favour of the original date of 1193, chiefly on account of his age being definitely given as that of 87 at the time of his death in 1280.

Most of his life was spent in teaching, and it is thought that as soon as he had completed his theological studies, that he was appointed Lector in turn at Hildesheim, Freiburg, Regensburg, or Ratisbon, Strasbourg, and Cologne before he went to Paris.

He took his Doctor's degree at Paris in 1245, having come from Cologne, to which he returned in 1248, and then he founded a Studium Generale modelled on Paris.

It was also in 1248 that he signed a report on the Talmud undertaken by Odo of Chateauroux, the Papal Legate, at the Order of Pope Innocent IV.

He was elected Provincial of the German Province of his Order in 1254, which he resigned in 1257. In 1256 he defended the cause of the Mendicant Friars before Pope Alexander IV at Anagni, in consequence of the troubles that had arisen in the University of Paris; following this, he was for some time Master of the Sacred Palace, when he undertook a public disputation against the Averroists, and also lectured on the Gospel of St. John to the Cardinals at the Curia.

From 1258-1260 he was Regent of Studies at Cologne.

In 1260 he was appointed to the Bishopric of Regensburg, which he resigned in 1262, having restored order and peace in that diocese and repaired its finances.

From 1262-1263 he preached the Crusade in Germany at the bidding of Pope Urban IV.

In 1269 he went to Paris to combat the Averroist teachings of Gerhard d'Abbeville and Siger of Brabant.

In 1274 he attended the General Council at Lyons, and in 1277

he again went to Paris to defend the works of St. Thomas Aquinas, who had died in 1274.

He died on the 15th November, 1280; he was first called Magnus in the next century; he was beatified by Innocent VIII in 1484, and canonized by Pius XI in 1931.

WRITINGS

The thirty-eight volumes of his writings, which have been printed, together with various others which are known to exist but have never been published, contain in all some seventy works, and show an extraordinary wide field of knowledge.

From time to time some sixty-eight additional works have been attributed to him, but these are no longer thought to be his.

He wrote on Astronomy, Meteorology, Climatology, Physics, Mechanics, Chemistry, Alchemy, Mineralogy, Anthropology, Zoology, and Botany in the realm of Natural Science. Of these the last two are the best known, that on Botany, being based on the pseudo-Aristotelian work *de Plantis*, was the only scientific work on the subject from the time of Theophrastus (d. 287 B.C.) the disciple of Aristotle, down to Cesalpini (1583 A.D.).

His zoology *De Animalibus*, based on that of Aristotle, replaced the quaint volume, the *Physiologus* (cf., Ch. V, p. 116).

With regard to his scientific researches, it is said of him, in the decretal letter of his canonization by Prus XI, that he did not let his mind dwell merely on the consideration of the external world, but observed due order in all things, he passed from natural things to the spiritual and co-ordinating and subordinating the various spheres of knowledge, he proceeded by a real progression from things inanimate to things living, from living to spiritual creatures, and from the spiritual he mounted to God the Author of all."

In the realm of philosophy, he wrote the treatise *Liber physicorum*, to render all the works of Aristotle relating to Physics, Metaphysics and Mathematics intelligible to Latinists! also a *Summa de Homine* on psychology.

In the realm of Theology, his chief works were a *Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard* and an unfinished *Summa Theologica*; and though he is said to have written a Commentary on the whole Bible, only Commentaries on the Psalms, the Major and Minor Prophets, the Four Gospels and the Apocalypse and the Book of Job have survived; of these that on St. Luke and that on the Prologue of St. John stand conspicuous.

He also wrote *Liber de Muliere Forti* on the Church, an exposition of Proverbs, Ch. XXXI.

There are also known to exist a Commentary on the Canticles

and one on the Ave Maria and thirty-two *Sermones de Eucharistia*, which are still extant.

On Ethics he wrote the *Summa de Creaturis*, of which *De Bono Sive Viva Tutibus* is still unprinted.

On Mysticism he wrote *Libellus de Adherendo Deo* (though his authorship is perhaps not certain) and a Commentary on the works of the pseudo Dionysius.

Well may he have been called Doctor Universalis !

CHARACTER

His character appears generally to have been summed up as magnanimous in the sense employed by Aristotle. He seems to have been specially noted for the greatness of his soul, in its noblest application and widest confirmation, a greatness of soul, that had as its object not a single good nor a single great thing, but what is great in general, the good wherever it may be found.

He was possessed of that true greatness of soul, which is not content with merely observing the good, but passes on to its realization, if its own exertion be needed. It was his task to demonstrate the harmony between natural truth and revelation and to teach this to others.

He was not jealous of his great pupils even when they surpassed or differed from him: to mention only three, Ulrich von Strasbourg (q.v., Ch. XXIII, p. 465), whose *Summa* belonged to the neo-Platonic School; Thomas de Chantimpré, a learned writer on bees; and greatest of all, St. Thomas Aquinas (his pupil from 1248-1252), whose works he defended in Paris in 1277 after their author's death.

PHILOSOPHY

Though to the early Schoolmen the *Organon* was the only work of Aristotle which was known, yet as has been shown, some knowledge of his other works had, owing to the Crusades and the works of the Moorish philosophers, gradually spread to Christian Europe in the twelfth century.

It was St. Albertus Magnus however, who recognizing the intrinsic merit of the Stagyrite's philosophy, introduced the whole body of Aristotle's works to Christian Europe. In this he followed on the lines of the Arabian Avicenna (d. 1036) reproducing the expressions, as well as the ideals of Aristotle, but not unfrequently departing from his conclusions.

As the text from which he worked was but a Latin translation from Hebrew or Arabic versions of a Syriac version of the original Greek, it is not surprising to find that it often proved to be very corrupt, and in some places even unintelligible. Though others

had reviewed the works of Aristotle, it was St. Albertus Magnus who first took in hand the whole Corpus of Aristotle's works, and it was he who first essayed to utilize its philosophy for the benefit of Christianity.

But since the Latin Christian Fathers had all followed St. Augustine, who had adopted, for that purpose, the neo-Platonism which was current in his day, St. Albertus, whilst recording the differences of Aristotle from Plato, in many points preferred to rely on the older opinions of the Fathers. Yet to him must be given the honour of being the first to collate this enormous mass of material, and to appreciate the advantages of bringing that, which was the highest form of human thought in the past, to the aid of reason in supporting and expounding the Christian religion.

Though without doubt it was his pupil St. Thomas Aquinas, who brought this project to its full fruition, yet St. Albertus was the first to do all the spade work in bringing into cultivation this rich new soil.

That the matter was the more urgent, was stressed by the fact that the humanists were seizing upon the atheistical commentaries of the Arabians upon these works of Aristotle, to advance their contentions; so much so that to combat their heresies, the study of Aristotle at the University of Paris was for a time suspended by the Pope (cf., Ch. XV, p. 212).

The object of Metaphysics is being, in its most general acceptation of the term, and not such and such being. If as the Realists maintained a being itself, in such and such particular being, is a substantial entity, then it was alleged that the Creator and the creature, both having being, will be in the same category, and it was alleged that the logical outcome of such doctrine led to pantheism, as the Essence of God would be in all creatures as an object of worship. St. Albertus protested against this, and maintained that being was not a thing in common, but a common term.

It is not wrong to say, The One is identical with Being, provided that such Being be determined, be limited to this being.

In other words, the essence of a thing is the first act, which determines it, whilst the Realists allege that which determines being lessens it, their first being not having a term or limit; or to put it in another way, individual being is a part of one whole being according to the Realists, instead of being merely a common term applied to all individual things.

He said "The universal is that which responds to 'this' the one of all. But the one of all is not in the category of really subsistent things, for if it were, one and the same thing would

be the subject of diverse individuations, or rather of all individuations; which cannot be. Hence it is necessary that the one of all, be said to be the one separated from all. But this can only be by the action of the intellect, and this is how I prove it. Two forms of the same kind cannot be identical in the same subject. Let us consider the man of Socrates and the man of Plato, omitting all question of their individual accidents, these are or are not two forms. If they are two, and if the intellect conceives of them as being identical, two forms of the same kind are then in a same subject, which as we have said is impossible. If they are, on the contrary one and the same, then the forms of all individuals would likewise be merged in this same form. Hence this same is a singular one and the same in the intellect, though abstracted from many. To conclude the universal only exists in the state of an intellectual concept."

With regard to Metaphysics, St. Albertus broke away from the prevailing Platonic opinions, and followed and expounded the doctrines of Aristotle, in various ways, three of which are specially noted by von Hertling. First with regard to the question of the universals. Instead of attributing their existence to one mode only, he adopted each of the three modes supported by the different schools of thought: prior to the thing, as held by the Platonists and Realists; in the thing, as held by Aristotle and the Nominalists; or posterior to the thing, as held by the Conceptualists. He held that the universals existed in each of these three ways, but in different manners. That is to say, they exist prior to the thing in the Divine Intelligence; they exist in the thing, as being that by which the thing has precisely its own proper nature of itself; and posterior to the thing as they exist in the human understanding, which arrives at them by abstraction from the thing as the necessary and therefore the proper science thereof. St. Albertus extended Aristotle's definition of the Universal, which was the why and the wherefore of a thing; by defining it as "The Universal is of many things and in many things."¹ But he agreed with Aristotle, that though the individual is first substance and the Universal second substance, yet the "Universal per se" being not in act, but in potentiality, is antecedent to the individual which is in act. Nevertheless, as he posits a primordial universal in God, he can be said to be a Conceptualist.

A second fundamental problem was the knowledge of God. St. Albertus refers the relation of God to the world to the three causes, Efficient, Formal, and Final.

Earthly things are, for him, composed of matter and form.

Lastly *Materia Prima* is the substratum common to all material

¹ Cf. Sent. I. 19. 15.

things, an entity needing no further determination, yet not existing without "this" determination, nor without the form postulated by it. It is by reason of its form that the thing is what it is. From its form the thing gets its existence and finally life and potentiality.

He then goes somewhat beyond Aristotle, for in addition to saying that form is not something added to *materia prima* from without, he further states that, form is educed from the *materia* by the efficient cause, which calls into being those characteristics, which are proper to the thing, from the potentiality of the *materia prima*.

This extension of Aristotle is probably due to the Commentaries of Averroes.

This adoption of an idea from one of the Arabians, apart from showing the extent of his learning in all directions, makes it clear that St. Albertus was satisfied to adopt all sound arguments in support of truth, from whatever quarter they might arise. He utilized all the material which in that age was of value.

SOUL

He adopted, after considering the question in the light of all the ancient philosophers, the proposition of Aristotle that the soul is the form of the body, not indeed without qualification, but only under a definite aspect.

In the *Summa de Creaturis* he rejected the theory of the pre-existence of the soul before it is united to the body, but he attempts another interpretation in the *Summa Theologiae*. Likewise he rejects the Platonic view of the transmigration of soul, but in another place he endeavours to give it an allegorical meaning.

He held the soul to be separate from the body in essence, but to be formally joined to the body through its powers.

INTELLECT

The ascent of the intellect to the Highest Intelligence, supported by the neo-Platonists and the Platonic Arabians, made special appeal to him as a Mystic, and he clearly taught that the *intellectus assimilaturis* may be so called, in so far as man rises by his intellect to the Divine Intellect up to the limit possible and permitted to him. This takes place, when the intellect in act, rises step by step through self knowledge and through the light of the Intelligences (or Angels) to the simple Divine Intellect.

As to the true cognitive intellect (*intellectus possibilis*) he objects on the one hand, to Alexander of Aphrodisias, who would have the intellect to be but a compound of the elements and thereby perishable with the body, and on the other hand to Averroes,

who regarded the intellect not as a faculty of the individual but as a transcendental cosmic universal potentiality.

Grabmann says of him "that he seems to have been the first, among the theologians of the thirteenth century, to disprove the Averroistic monopsychism by philosophical argument, based on a thorough and detailed investigation." Nor would he agree with Avicbron and the Franciscan Platonists that the perceptive faculty was of the nature of primary matter.

He regarded the possible intellect, the human understanding (the place of human ideas) not mewed up with the body but separate, that it was impassable and not a subject.

The active intellect he regarded as a separate form of the soul, separate that is to say from the body, but never from the soul nor a separate substance from it like the soul is separate from the body.

Both the part that feels and the part that thinks are equally impassive in potentiality, but are reduced into act by external agents, the former by the senses and the latter by intelligibles. The last has also been moved into act by God directly, in that it is possessed of the verities which are the axioms of all intelligence.

CATHOLIC DOCTRINE

In the *Summa de Creaturis* and the *Summa Theologia* there is to be found the catholic doctrine of man's mission and destiny, which is aptly epitomized by Wilms "God, eternal perfection, is man's goal and at the same time the highest norm of his actions, both of them indeed beyond the confines of his nature. Man, raised up again by the grace of redemption, can and must conform his will to the Divine Will. It is by this conformity that the degree of perfection of the rational creature is measured. The natural law and the positive commandments set before man this Will of God. Conscience is the judge in the individual case. Man's mission is consummated by Grace. The good exercise of this assists the growth of virtue; inconstancy disfigures the soul. Grace is dispensed principally by means of the Sacraments instituted by Christ. The final end of the good is eternal happiness, and of evil damnation."

In his Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, he only followed the arrangement of the material in the original, the form of the teaching was his own; the method of the treatment however, in articles, divisions, sub-divisions, and distinctions became in some places extremely involved. It represents St. Albertus' attempt to make Aristotle's principles applicable to the development of theology as a whole.

The *Summa Theologica* was intended for teaching brethren and

those of them who took part in scientific discussions. In this later work he is much more conservative, and more prominence is given to the tradition of the Church, and the exposition is more dispassionate.

The *Summa de Creaturis* is of importance chiefly with regard to moral philosophy. He employed the Ethics of Aristotle, but by giving them a deeper foundation, wider development and sharper delimitation, he was able to oppose the rationalistic views such as the oneness of the intellect, and the denial of immortality, which were being put forward as derived from Aristotle.

At the same time the study of the works of Plato and Plotinus which had recently been made known to Christendom, enabled him in many ways in his later years, to support the teaching of St. Augustine, who had had only a slight acquaintance with them from the works of those neo-Platonists on whom he depended.

For many of the objections raised against this portion of St. Albertus' work, the reply is now given that satisfactory answers are to be found in the three unprinted parts in the MSS. belonging to the Bibliotheca Nazionale Marciana in Venice examined by Grabmann in 1912, but which have not hitherto been published.

NATURAL SCIENCE

We are not here concerned with St. Albertus' work in the realm of natural science, but it may be noted that he in no way slavishly followed Aristotle; two examples need only be given: first as to the movement of the stars "each star in turn is moved by a pure intellect, each having its own heavens with its particular motion"; here he did not agree that the stars are concentric as Aristotle on the authority of Eudoxius (366 B.C.) taught, but eccentric as in Ptolemy's system (150 A.D.).

This Platonic and Arabian motion of stars being moved by their own intellects was, however, rejected by St. Thomas Aquinas.

Again, Aristotle held that man had eight ribs on either side; whilst St. Albertus said that a man had seven true ribs on either side and five false ones, which is what is now recognized.

MYSTICISM

St. Albertus' place in the domain of mysticism must be judged by the fact that he commented on all the works of the pseudo-Dionysius, namely *De Celestis Hierarchia*, *De Ecclestica Hierarchia*, *De Mystica Theologia*, and *XI Epistolae*, also *De Divinus Nominibus*. John Scotus Erigena had translated the *De Mystica Theologia*, which had been commented upon by Hugo St. Victor and Walter St. Victor, and also by Alexander of Hales and Bonaventura, but

St. Albertus was the first to comment on them all, though his Commentary on the *De Divinis Nominibus* whilst still extant, has never been published.

St. Albertus believed with all others of that age, that the pseudo-Dionysius (c. 500) was indeed the Dionysius the Areopogite, the disciple of the Apostles (cf., Acts XVII, 34).

St. Albertus had the vision to recognize the importance of these works and attempted to make the truth they contained accessible to others. In this he had a harder task than he had when dealing with the works of Aristotle, for if possible the thoughts were more lofty, the mode of expression more obscure, and the danger greater, owing to the fact that the author was steeped in neo-platonic mysticism.

A good example of how St. Albertus endeavoured to extract the best out of his author, may be taken from that passage in the first chapter of the *De Mystica Theologia* so often quoted by the 'Quietists': "if thou beloved Timotheus dost wish to prepare thyself to enter the highest possible plane of mystical experience, leave aside the senses and also the activities of the intellect, forsake whatsoever happens under the senses, and whatever may be perceived by the intellect, whatsoever is and is not, and raise thyself with manly thought to intimate union with Him Who surpasses all being and knowledge."

In his Commentary St. Albertus raises the following objection and reply.

Objection: Without intellectual activity there can be no knowledge. Accordingly Dionysius should not constrain Timotheus, to whom he wishes to impart a piece of knowledge to abstain from intellectual activity; he must rather exhort him to take it up boldly.

Reply: "the exhortation of Dionysius to let intellectual activity alone, refers to our natural intellectual operation, and not to that which is in us by virtue of the divine light."

Thus "quietism" is ruled out by personal and natural as distinguished from mystical activity. *Gracia operans*, is distinguished from *gracia co-operans* (cf., Ch. XXII, p. 437).

Throughout St. Albertus makes it clear that no one in any mystical vision enjoys a direct vision of God: this is beatitude reserved for the world to come. But this does not preclude the favoured soul from perceiving the working of God, even exceptional workings.

Where Dionysius preferred to clothe his teaching in obscurities in diction and picturesqueness in description, even at the cost of lucidity, St. Albertus with decision and inexorable logic set forth the pertinent definitions, and though much mysterious charm

vanished what was perceivable by the mind of man was clearly stated.

DOGMA

The task of scholasticism was to bring into one system the truths of faith and the perceptions of reason.

This was the ground for philosophical speculation, which is its main characteristic.

By applying the principles of philosophy to the truths of faith, it was sought to win a greater insight into such truths, to make them more accessible to the human mind and to defend them against objections.

This St. Albertus endeavoured to do in the realm of dogma.

Taking as his theme the quotation "In God also the Divine Love induces an ecstasy," from the pseudo-Dionysius, St. Albertus gave his great exposition of the Procession of the Holy Ghost. He made a special study of this dogma, as at the Council of Lyons, which he subsequently attended in 1274, efforts were to be made towards a re-union with the Greek Church.

It was on this question, that the Greeks held that the Latin Church had departed from the doctrine of the Primitive Church.

With regard to man's first state, Praepositivus (q.v., Chap. XVI, p. 220), was the first to hold that Adam and the angels were created in sanctifying grace.

St. Albertus in the Commentary only accepted the new view as regards angels, but in his *Summa*, while stating the old view, said that he accepted the new one both as regards the angels and also Adam. But it is to St. Thomas Aquinas that the general acceptance of this dogma is due.

As to the nature of original sin, Peter Lombard, following St. Augustine, had transferred it to concupiscence, but St. Albertus, following St. Anselm and Alexander of Hales, placed the material element in concupiscence, and the formal element and nature he referred to the "carentia debitae iustitiae," the privation of original justice.

St. Albertus bases his contribution to the doctrine of Grace, on the fact that everything tends towards God, although by its creation out of nothing everything is afar off from God (*sic.*). Man by reason of his spiritual nature is stamped with the image of God, and thus the predisposition to the most intimate closeness to God and familiar intercourse with Him is his, though only the possibility is present in the passive disposition.

The realization postulates the temporal mission of the Divine Persons and bound up with this, their indwelling in the soul. Grace brings about the conditions necessary to their indwelling,

the "effectus in creatura" with which the "missio temporalis" is bound up.

Grace is definitely beyond man's capacity and can never be acquired by him unaided; it is bestowed by God Himself, by means of a kind of creative act. Following Aristotle's definitions, St. Albertus describes Grace as an accident, but later influenced by the neo-Platonism of St. Augustine and of Alexander of Hales, he gives it the bare concept of "perfectio."

He shows in a Platonic rather than Aristotelian manner how the soul is purified, simplified, and exalted through Grace, and enters into a special relation with the Divine Persons, and how the image of God is in this life a relative one and reaches ultimate perfection in glory. To use the words of St. Albert, "man is raised by grace and glory to a state which first imperfectly and then perfectly gives him the capacity to escape all deprivation and finally in glory to possess himself in a single eternity.

Thus grace becomes the means by which he is liberated from the impotency arising from sin. . . . Herein lies at the same time the leading back to God, responding to the action of the rational will and approach to Him."

In his *Mariale*, St. Albertus witnesses to the conviction of his age on the dignity and influence of the Mother of God, he speaks of general mediation of every grace in the sense that, all grace which flows to men by the merits of Christ, comes to them through Mary. As all have a part in the Grace of Christ so too this comes to them through Mary.

Hugh Ripelin of Strasbourg, c. 1275, a Dominican, was a disciple of St. Albertus Magnus, and held the Augustinian opinions of his master.

The work for which he is noted is a *Compendium Theologiae Veritatis*.

CHAPTER XX

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, DOCTOR ANGELICUS

St. Thomas Aquinas, Doctor Angelicus, was born at the Castle of Rocca Secca in Italy in 1225, and died at Fossa Nuova, Terracina, in 1274, and was buried at Toulouse.

He was educated at Monte Cassino and Naples, at which place he joined the Order of the Dominican Friars, much against the wishes of his family. Then he went to Cologne, where he became a pupil of St. Albertus Magnus, whom he followed to Paris in 1245. In 1248 he returned to Cologne with St. Albertus, and became second lecturer and Magister Studentium.

Of a silent and somewhat stolid disposition, he acquired the nickname of the Dumb Ox among his fellow students, but his real capacities for learning very soon became evident to his master St. Albertus, who declared that "His bellowing will fill the world."

He took his degree of Doctor at Paris in 1257 and visited London in connection with the business of his Order in 1263.

He was sent by his Order to Rome in 1256 to represent their interests after the student riots in Paris mentioned in Chapter XV, and succeeded in obtaining a Bull from Alexander IV in their favour.

He sat on the commission on the text of Aristotle, which had been originally appointed in 1231 by Gregory IX, after the study of Aristotle had again been suspended in Paris in 1245.

In 1268 he was lecturing at Rome and Bologna, in 1271 at Paris, and in 1272, at the request of King Charles, he became a Professor at Naples.

As mentioned, he died at the early age of 49, in 1274, whilst on his way to the Council of Lyons, to which he had been summoned by Gregory X. He had to leave his great *Summa Theologica* incomplete, but this was finished by Rainaldo of Piperno, though some say by Henry of Gorcum.

He was Canonized in 1323 by John XXII, and made the fifth Doctor of the Church in 1566 by Pius V (the other Doctors of the Church being St. Augustine, St. Ambrose, St. Gregory and St. Jerome).

His teaching was again confirmed by the Papal Encyclical of Leo XIII, 1879, Pius X, 1903, and Pius XI, 1923.

From 1245 he spent his life in teaching and writing, refusing both a Cardinal's hat and the Abbacy of Monte Cassino in order to carry on his work. He had a special translation of the works of Aristotle, made for him by two Dominicans, William of Moerbeke and Henry of Brabant.

The extent of his writings can best be judged by the subjoined list: in the *Summa Theologica* alone there are 612 questions; 3,120 articles; 2,753 quotations from 176 sources, not including all the numerous ones from Aristotle and St. Augustine.

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS'S WORKS

List given by Professor Etienne Gilson.

I. Philosophical Commentaries

1. In Boethium de Hebdomadibus.
2. In Boethium de Trinitate.
3. In Dionysium de divinis nominibus.
4. On Aristotle. Physics.
5. " " Metaphysics.
6. " " Ethics.
7. " " De Anima.
8. " " De sensu et sensato.
9. " " De memoria et reminiscenta.
10. " " Politics.
11. " " Analytica posteriora.
12. " " De causis.
13. " " Metereologica.
14. " " Perihermeneias.
15. " " De coelo.
16. " " Generatione et corruptione.

II. Theological, Philosophical and Political Treatises

17. In IV lib Sententiarum.
18. Compendium theologiae ad Reginaldum.
19. Summa Theologica.
 - Prima pars.
 - Prima secundae.
 - Secunda secundae.
 - Tertia pars.
 - Unfinished the supplementum is by Reginaldo of Piperno.
20. Summa Contra Gentes.
21. De Rationibus fidei contra Saracenos, Graecos et Armenos.
22. Contra Errores Graecorum.

23. De Emptione et venditione.
24. De regimine principum ad regem Cypri.
(Only the first and second books inclusive up to Chapter IV are by St. Thomas).

III. The Minor Philosophical Works

25. De principiis naturae.
26. De Ente Et Essentia (containing De Principio individuationis).
27. De Occulis Operationibus Naturae.
28. De Aeternitate Mundi Contra Murmurantes.
29. De Unitate Intellectus contra Averroistas.
30. De Substantiis Separatis.
31. De Mixtione Elementorum.
32. De Motu cordis.

IV. Questiones

33. Quaestiones Quodlibetales (disputations held twice every year at Christmas and at Easter on Questions of any kind).
34. Questiones Disputatae (more detailed discussions on theological and philosophical problems: generally once every fortnight).
 1. De Veritate.
 2. De Potentia.
 3. De Malo.
 4. De Unione Verbi incarnati.
 5. De Spiritualibus Creaturis.
 6. De Anima.
 7. De Virtutibus.

Also other authentic works exegetical, philosophical or relating to politics or monastic life rarely used in expositions of the system of St. Thomas.

PHILOSOPHY

St. Thomas gave a system of philosophical conclusions based on theology, but deduced from purely rational premisses, turning to reason only to draw out the content of faith and protect it from error.

A true philosophy taken absolutely in itself owes all its truth to its rationality and to nothing but its rationality. But the constitution of such philosophy could not be achieved without the aid of revelation, acting as an indispensable moral support to reason.

The content of Christian philosophy is that body of rational truths discovered, explored, or simply safe-guarded thanks to the help that reason receives from revelation.

St. Thomas regards it as fitting for God to reveal philosophical truths, which are in fact accessible to reason, so far as they are necessary to salvation, otherwise they would only be understood by the educated.

But, for St. Thomas, there is no philosophical conflict between Faith and Reason, for revelation enlightens reason. Intellect, of which Reason is but a part, seeks the truth and the Will seeks the Good.

The Intellect offers the Will a vague truth of the object of faith as a value. The Will assents and in assenting commands the Intellect to think belief, which is faith. As this is continuous in the soul, there is a dual action of the Intellect, the prime action which has not reached its end and therefore goes on offering other partial truths to the Will as values; and the action of the Intellect controlled by the assent of the Will to the object of faith, which is faith. Hence arises the conflict of thought.

It seems a misnomer to speak of conflicting thoughts, as if one of them were the Will itself, instead of thought subject to, or to use St. Thomas's phrase, prisoner of the Will. Faith is thought commanded by the Will. Religious faith arises when the Will is actuated by Grace and accepts the value of revealed religion.

As Dr. Little says, "the fundamental change which he introduced into scholastic philosophy was the assertion of the primacy of the Intellect over the Will and of the True over the Good; in opposition to the hitherto accepted Augustinian doctrine.

He probably came nearer than any other thinker before or after his time to establishing harmony between reason and religion and reconciling the rival claims of philosophy and theology."¹

Though Christianity is a religion and a way of salvation and more than a scheme of knowledge, it is in fact True Wisdom and as such though it renders Greek Wisdom as an inferior Truth, "folly": it is not so much adverse to but a completion of Greek Thought.

Having regard to Romans, I, 20, "for the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made," St. Thomas maintained that all knowledge is based on the experience of the senses.

Fresh translations of Aristotle's works, which also based all reason on the experience of the senses, being then available, to use the words of Pope Leo XIII, "he broke from the prevailing Platonic tradition and boldly accepted the principles of Aristotle,

¹ *Camb. Med. Hist.*, Vol. VI, p. 743.

but instead of permitting them to establish a pagan philosophy, he built up a vast closely interrelated system, which included within it the whole teaching of the Church."²

In consequence of the Revelation of God, as Creator, contained in Genesis, Ch. I and St. John, Ch. I, and that He is the "I Am" as stated in Exodus, III, 14, St. Thomas carried the metaphysic of the Greeks from quality to existence, and was able to extend the concept of the Demiurge of Plato, who was supreme in degree only, in the order of Being, also the concept of the First Mover of Aristotle, in whom essence and existence were not identical, to that of the concept of "The Unique Being per se," the Infinite Creator of everything and not merely an architect already provided with material or matter.

Thus St. Thomas was able to extend Aristotle's conception of being by positing that "God alone is Being" and that all else has but contingent Being, that is contingent on God's Will both for creation and preservation. The contingency, in the order of intelligibility and becoming, of the Greeks never attained contingency in the order of existence; in addition Aristotle's infinity, outside which there is always something, is transposed into an infinity, outside of which there is nothing. St. Thomas, as became usual in the thirteenth century posited both Plato's ideas and Aristotle's forms in the Mind of God.

Since but for God's Grace, man has no knowledge of his true Final End or Object, Eternal Life, or the Beatific Vision, St. Thomas was able to enlarge the Final Cause, which for Aristotle had been but Happiness, to God.

In a similar way, he extended the value of beauty and virtue, which Greek Ethics had regarded as objects of value in themselves, to the value of moral acts and habits directed to God Himself as their end.

The doctrine of intellectual illumination is applicable also to moral illumination since rules of action, which are cognition, like the rules of knowledge also derive from God. Socrates and Aristotle regarded all wickedness as due to ignorance. But when a human Will revolts against the Divine Will the sin consummates the suicide of a moral person created for beatitude and rejecting it. There lies the true heart of malice; nothing remains but the inevitable consequence or the Atoning remedy provided by God. Man has destroyed the rectitude of Will, which he did not create and cannot re-create, but what God has given God can restore.

It was by the application of such basic principles as the foregoing, that St. Thomas laid under contribution the works of Aristotle for the production of his *Summa Theologica*.

² Papal Encyclical, "Aeternae Patris," 1879.

(But it must be remembered that only those few works of Plato mentioned in Chapter V, of all those that have now come down to us, were available to St. Thomas; the others having not spread to Western Europe until the fifteenth century.)

If God is Being how can there be anything other than Himself. The starting point of the Christian Metaphysics according to St. Thomas, is man and the world, not the idea of God in the mind of man as St. Anselm had maintained.

Beings, which are given as facts, have no sufficient reason save in Being. Something of the Being of the cause passes into the Being of that which undergoes the effect "causa importat influxum quemdam ad esse causati." Cause can only give what it has, and establish itself in another in virtue of what it is; hence Being is the ultimate root of causality.³

"For medaeval thinkers." according to Gilson, "the verb 'to be' was essentially an active verb signifying the very act of existing: to affirm their own actual existence was much more than to affirm their present existence, it was an affirmation of the actuality that is to say the very energy by which their 'being' existed; so that if 'being' is act, the causal act must be rooted in the very 'being' of the cause."

First act is the being of the thing, of that which is called being in virtue of the very act of existing exerted, "ens dicitur ab actu essendi."

Second act is the causal operation of this being, the intrinsic or extrinsic manifestation of its first actuality by the effects it produces within or without of itself.⁴

Each being is capable of being a cause in exact measure in which it is a being. God Who is Being alone is capable of creating being. Contingent being only participates being, it has its being but is not its own being. Contingent being is therefore only second cause since it is only second being.

Hence any pantheism is definitely excluded, for there is no common measure between two quantities not of the same order.⁵

Being is Pure Act. God alone, Who is Being, is Pure Act. The understanding of God is as much God as the Will of God. To admit Will without an end, would be to admit blind necessity or irrational contingency, which are both imperfections and hence incompatible with Pure Act.

Hence the end of the Divine Will is the Divine Being. "Universa propter semet ipsum operatus est dominus" (Proverbs xvi, 4).

Being is not an aspect of Good, but Good is an aspect of being, Good is Being as desirable.

³ I, *Met.*, V. 1.

⁴ S.T.I., 48.

⁵ S.T. I., 48.

The primacy of Good, as Greek thought conceived it, compels the subordination of existence to the Good, while on the other hand the primacy of Being, as Christian thought under the inspiration of Exodus conceived it, compels the subordination of the Good to existence.

PROOFS OF GOD

St. Thomas rejected St. Anselm's Proof of God, the ontological argument of "Greater than anything we can conceive" on the ground that it was not based on experience of the senses, but postulated the absence of difference between thought and things.

The judgment "God exists" is for us not analytic but synthetic: considered of itself it may be regarded as "per se notum" but "quoad nos" it requires demonstration.⁶

The five proofs advanced by St. Thomas are :

- (1) From Motion. First Mover.
- (2) From Efficient Cause. First Cause.
- (3) From Possibility and Necessity. First Necessity.
- (4) From Gradation. Maxima ens.
- (5) From Governance of the World, due to design. Prime Intelligence. (Teleological argument.)

These are dealt with in the next chapter.

In view of the abolition of the geocentric opinions prevailing in the domain of physics at the time of St. Thomas, Dr. Matthews has most finely treated the last argument from the following point of view.

"The apparent contradiction that the world is a sphere in which the divine purpose is realized, and yet that we need to be saved from the world, vanishes, when we realize that a part of the divine purpose is the creation of man and that this is a continuous process. Man as he stands is incomplete, an unfinished creation. To reach his true being and to become what in the cosmic purpose he is to be, he must be taken up into the new life which has appeared in Christ."⁷

And here it may not be out of place to remark that as far as possible all reference to biology, physics, and astronomy has been eliminated both from the works of St. Thomas and all the other Schoolmen here recorded.

It does not undermine the principles of St. Thomas that sensible things prepare the materials for higher things, that the idea of Being can be drawn from Contingent beings. The use of sensibles is for the most part extracted from common experience, and where scientific explanations are advanced, for

⁶ S.T. I., 2, 1.

⁷ *The Purpose of God*, p. 145.

the most part, they are expressed as only possible or problematic conclusions.

It may be safe to add that knowledge "based on sensible things" may be taken from the natural effects of objects on the senses, which do not vary, rather than from the increasing scientific knowledge that may be acquired through the microscope, telescope and laboratory.

FORMS

We now come to some of the leading features of metaphysics maintained by St. Thomas.

"Substantial form and accidental form resemble one another in one way and differ in another. They resemble each other in that each is an act, and that in both cases something is produced in act of some sort. They differ under two aspects. First the substantial form gives simple being and it has for a subject being in potentiality, whilst accidental form does not give simple being, but being determined by quality, by quantity, or in some other way, and has for a subject being in act. Whence, it results that the priority of the act "actualitas per prius" belongs to the form and not to its subject. But as in every genus that which is prior acts as the cause, the substantial form causes the 'being in act' in its proper subject. On the contrary, the priority of the act belongs to the subject of the accidental form, in comparison with this form; hence the actuality of the accidental form has as cause, the actuality of its subject, in such a way that if the subject in potentiality is apt to produce the accidental form, it is nevertheless only produced by the subject in act. And I speak here of accident proper to the subject which comes to it. As to accident which comes from without, the subject receives it but it is produced by an extrinsic agent."

St. Thomas denies that matter is prior to form and goes so far as to state, that the existence of undetermined matter is of such a contradiction that God could not create it.⁸

He then divides separated forms into three classes God, angels and demons, and human souls.

Are then human souls prior to their bodies? St. Thomas is quite clear that they are made at the same time: "Cum anima sine corpore existens non habet suae naturae perfectionem nec Deus ab imperfectis suum opus inchoavit, simpliciter fatendum est animas simul corporibus creari et infandi."⁹

"The soul as an intellectual substance is incorruptible, nor is it corrupted by its body, wherein its perfection consists, nor by any contrary act, since by its possible intellect it is cognisant and

⁸ Cf., S.T. I, 66.

⁹ S.T. III, 6.

receptive of contraries, nor through corruption of its subject, for it is a form independent of the body, as to being, nor by failure of cause, since its end is directed to God as its First Principle."¹⁰

The human soul is identical in each human individual, but once brought into act in the composite, the soul remains an individual incorporeal substance and as such immortal. However, human souls are individualized in respect of their bodies, and not as though their individuality were caused by their bodies.¹¹

UNIVERSALS

To know is a natural desire of all men, but a thing is proved by facts ; that is, without the universal, it is not possible to arrive at knowledge, so said Aristotle.¹²

The question is what is the universal.

Some adopt the Platonic view, which is rejected by St. Thomas, that the universal is *ante rem* and possesses by itself and in itself a permanent existence ; others, that its place is outside the particulars in the human mind ; some holding that universals are innate ideas "universalia nobis innata et concreta," others, that they penetrate accidentally into the soul, like a ray of light emanating from the intellectual agent, meaning God or some superior intelligence.

Others again say, that they exist *post rem*, being naturally formed by the human intelligence endowed with power to extract unity from diversity.

But according to St. Thomas none of these theories is truly that of Aristotle. According to St. Thomas, the universals exist truly in the particulars 'in multis' (in potentiality), but they also exist in the intellect, which separates them (in act).

As being in the intellect, in the reason, the universal is defined as a predicable of many ; as being in things, it is a sort of nature, which is not universal in act, but in potentiality ; it is the second substance, which differs from accidents, in that it always inheres and never adheres to its subject.

Let the principal object of all human understanding should be deemed to be a mere concept, St. Thomas adds that, "if the universal derives from reason alone all that which belongs to its definition, it is not indeed the essence of the universal which resides in the understanding, it is the similitude, the image, the species of this essence, which is not itself an arbitrary creation of the reason, nor a pure subjective notion. The foundation necessary for every universal concept is the assembly of several particular concepts.

¹⁰ *S.T.* I, 75.

¹¹ *C.G.* II, 75.

¹² *Met.* XIII, 9.

Further, no concept is truly universal unless it fulfils the condition of representing many objects, which are outside the soul, such as the soul conceives them to be. Moreover, so little is it that the understanding creates the universal, that every universal concept is distinct in the understanding and consequently in the individual. But since it does not derive this character of universality, which is proper to it, from the understanding, it is evident that it derives it from things, although it may not have in things that sort of reality which alone affects the senses of the body."¹³

Thus the essence of the universal is in the things, but it is not there as universal essence, but as matter of the universal conception. The essence is in effect in the things, but it is after the things as the one which is said of many, that is the universal.

Hence the universals by themselves in their proper quiddity are not true substances, but conceptual names.

Such abstract notions, however, are considered as second substances inherent in the particulars. For in nature the generic form of the individuals is essential to them, and in the intellect the concept of this form represents the very essence of the individual.

But these second substances must never be confused with those universals which represent inferior accidents, since they signify nothing substantial, *e.g.* snub nose.

Further, in order of generation, the universal is clearly posterior to the particular, but if in the work of Providence the "operatio" be distinguished from the plan "intentio," though Socrates is clearly made before universal man, which must include both men born and to be born yet, as to plan, it must be recognized that Providence has conceived man before creating Socrates.

Hence it may be said that in "intentio" the universal is prior to the particular.

The quiddity of the material thing, which the intellect abstracts from matter, being of quite a different order to immaterial substances, it is impossible to reach by knowledge of material things the perfect intelligence of immaterial substances. Nevertheless, the perception of sensible things produces some kind of knowledge of supersensible things of which the soul cannot have a complete notion here below.

This knowledge is formed by analogy. By analogy, according to St. Thomas, reason conceives matter separated from form and form separated from matter, and above all inferior forms that from which all proceed, God.¹⁴

¹³ Tract. I, *De universalibus*, unedited, cf. Hauréau II, 411-2.

¹⁴ S.T. I, 84-88.

INDIVIDUATION

Aristotle never considered that matter and form, the two elements of sensibles, are really separable from the things themselves. That which individualizes a thing is the act by which it is produced, as regards any external principle, there is but one and that is the producer.¹⁵

The universals are not principles, it is the individual which is the principle of individuals, universal man could come from universal man, but universal man does not exist. What exists is the father, who is the principle of the son (the efficient cause). Internally "this matter" after being realized exists only in the individual; whilst the form exists in several the matter has more the character of individuality than the substantial form, in respect of inherent and adherent forms of the composite.¹⁶

In another place, Aristotle states, "all that is multiple has necessarily a matter, for the definition is single and is the same for many, as for example man in general, although Socrates is but one man. But as to essence, that is to say as to the first principle, it is not matter, since it is the entelechy" (actuality or distinctness of realized existence).¹⁷

There is a passage in the *De Coelo*, Ch. IX, 3, in which, in stressing the fact that the whole of the universal is contained in each individual, in answering an objection, Aristotle assumes the possibility of the universal having a separate existence, merely for the sake of argument. "If, says he, the heaven, which we see, is an individual substance; the manner of being of this heaven and of that heaven taken by itself absolutely would be two different things: for this heaven and heaven in general are two different things, heaven in general being a form, an idea, and this particular heaven being a thing determined in the bosom of matter."

This passage was used by the Arabian Commentators to raise the question, is it form or is it matter which determines a particular thing? Then it was claimed on the one hand, if matter individualizes, all humans have but one universal soul; whilst on the other, if form individualizes it was claimed that all individuals would have the same matter! (Cf., Ch. XXI, pp. 328-329, 339 and Ch. XXII, p. 416).

St. Albertus Magnus had attributed individuation to matter, but as he had recognized the prior claim of the individual, and as he had energetically denied the Averroist doctrine of a Universal Soul, all that he said of matter as the principle of the individual, can be referred to the internal not external principle.

St. Thomas Aquinas accepted the doctrine of Aristotle and

¹⁵ *Met.*, VII, 8.

¹⁶ *Met.*, XII, 5.

¹⁷ *Met.*, XII, 8.

St. Albertus Magnus as to individuation in general, but in ascribing it to "materia signata" his opinions have not always met with the same construction.

In his *De Ente et Essentia* he says :

"The principle of individuation being matter, it appears that the essence, which includes at the same time both matter and form, is simply particular and not universal. So that the universals are not included in the definitions, since all definition signifies essence. But it must be observed that it is not matter in general 'quomodolibet' which is the principle of individuation, but only matter which is specified or determined 'materia signata' and I call that specified matter which is considered under positive dimensions, 'certis dimensionibus.'

But it does not refer to this matter, in the definition of man, in so far as he is man, but in the definition of Socrates if one is going to define Socrates. In the definition of man it is necessary to suppose indeterminate matter 'non signata,' since in the definition of man one does not speak of these bones nor this flesh, but of bones and flesh in general, which are the indeterminate matter of man."¹⁸

Again in the same work, he says, "The essence of a composite substance and of a simple substance differ in that the essence of a composite substance is not only form or matter, but matter and form taken together ; whilst the essence of a simple substance is the form alone. From which two differences arise. On the one hand, the essence of a composite substance can signify either the whole, or a part of the whole, which comes as we have said from the determination of matter ; also the essence of a composite thing is not said of this very thing, whatever it be, for one cannot say that a man is his own quiddity, whilst the essence of a simple substance, which is its form can only signify the whole, since in this case it is only a form which is in some way the recipient of the form.

On the other hand, the essences of composite things, received by determined matter and multiplied according to the divisions of this matter, are one as to species, although they may be divided as to number.

But the essence of simple substances, having no dealings with matter, are not susceptible of multiplication. Moreover there are not in these substances several individuals of one and the same species, but as Avicenna has definitely stated there are as many individuals as species." (Cap. V.)

This question again arises in connection with the Mystery of the Blessed Sacrament and St. Thomas deals with it at some

¹⁸ *De Ente et Essentia*, Ch. II.

length in his *Summa Theologica*, Part III, Q.77 (cf., Ch. XXII, pp. 455-460). He says there as follows : " The first determination of matter is the dimensive quantity (magnitude) : that is why according to Plato the first differences of matter are largeness and smallness. But matter being the first subject, in consequence all other accidents only adhere to the subject by the interposition of dimensive quantity, as for example the first subject of colour is the surface. This is why certain philosophers have claimed that according to the first book of *Metaphysics* of Aristotle magnitudes are themselves substances of bodies. . . . Since the subject is the principle of the individuation of the accidents, it must be supposed that the subject of some accidents may in some way be their principle of individuation ; it pertains in fact to the definition of the individual not to be able to be in many. But that is understood in two ways.

First, it is natural to the subject not to be in something ; thus immaterial separated forms, which subsist by themselves, are also themselves individuals. Secondly, all form, substantial or accidental, which is naturally in something, is not however in many things ; thus this whiteness is in this body. Hence as to the first point, matter is the principle of all forms, which are inherent in it : in fact the forms of this species being, according to the law of their nature, in a thing which fulfils for them the office of subject, as soon as one of them is received by a matter, which cannot be in another, this form itself would, in this condition be in another. As to the second point it is necessary to say that the principle of individuation is the dimensive quantity. Whence it happens indeed that a thing is born in order to be one single thing. Whence it is indivisible and divided from all other things. But the division of substances takes place in respect of its quantity as is stated in the first book of the *Physics*.

Therefore the dimensive quantity is in some way principle of individuation, for the forms of this species, in so far as they are forms diverse in number, are in diverse parts of matter."¹⁹

St. Thomas's thesis, then, would appear to be that it is not matter in general, but only " this determined " matter, which receives the form, by which the composite is brought into act, and that such matter has previously been determined, from matter in general by quantity. Such also was the exposition of Giles of Rome. (q.v. Ch. XXIV, p. 486.)

ESSENCE

Essence, generally speaking, is that which has existence and existence is that being which essence has by participation.

¹⁹ *S.T.* III, 77, 2.

There having been very strong criticisms that St. Thomas left nothing to essence, the following is a translation of an extract taken from Roland Goselin in the *Bibliothèque Thomiste*, Vol. VIII.

“Essence can be considered as part of real being or as a whole ; considered as a whole it can be taken as in its individual being, in Socrates, in Plato, or in the mind, or in itself absolutely, *i.e.* apart from any relation to things or thought.

But essence can only be called genus, species, or difference, when it is considered as a whole and in the mind. For it cannot be *attributed* as genus, etc.

This is the principle of the solution of this double point of view.

Essence as part of real being is, in material things, the composite of matter and form abstracted or separated from the whole individual element. If, in short, I only consider in Socrates the essential composite, neglecting on purpose all that in the composite which makes it Socrates and not Plato, the essence thus considered is only a part of Socrates.

I can besides indicate this essence by the physical concepts soul and body, or man, or by the logical concepts rationality, animality, humanity. The result is the same, in both cases I cannot say nor think that Socrates is mankind or humanity, Socrates is soul or rationality. For the whole is not the part, nor the part the whole. No more could I say that Socrates is his soul, or his body, or his essence.

It will be the same if I consider the essence “animal,” separate it absolutely from the difference, which has just determined it, to form the essence man or body and soul. I neither could attribute one to the other by saying animal reasonable, or body animated.

Since an essence or nature can be attributed as genus, etc., only when viewed as a whole, it must contain in itself in a certain manner, all the elements which compose the subject. I can only say Socrates is man, animal, or reasonable, if such contained in them all that Socrates is.

But this inclusion is only possible, if the abstraction, by means of which I can see these essences does not exclude from it absolutely that which is left unexpressed. Animal does not signify man, but it cannot exclude him positively from its concept, nor man exclude Socrates. Let us say then, that essence, as a whole and not as a part, contains implicitly that which it does not signify explicitly. It is only in this manner that essence can be attributed as genus, species, or difference.

However genus, species, and difference are not certain specific attributes, but universal, that is to say that they can apply truly

to an infinite number of subjects. But essence taken as a whole, can be taken in itself absolutely, apart from relations to the individuals in which it is realized and which it includes implicitly, and apart from relation to the mind which thinks of it in this state of abstraction. From this point of view the essence is attributable to each real individual, but about it one can say nothing else : it is what it is : one cannot attribute to it existence, unity, universality without being bound to indicate that in itself absolutely it exists, or it is one, or it is universal ; that which would exclude it radically from any possibility of existing in individuals or being attributed to several.

On the other hand, taken in its individual reality, realized either in Socrates or Plato, that cannot be attributed to one individual alone which belongs to several.

It remains that that essence to be attributed universally must be essence considered in the thought. St. Thomas uses the strong expression of Averroes " it is the intelligence which makes the Universal."

In truth essence is only thought by each individual mind, from this point of view it has no existence or reality except in some soul or other, and it participates in the individuality of the mind which thinks about it.

Far from being inconvenient, this state of things ought to be upheld with tenacity against Averroes, who in order to safeguard the universality of the idea argued in favour of a unique intelligence for all men.

Each man has his own intelligence and ideas. But several minds can conceive the same essence, and the latter be universal in each of them, because several concepts individually distinct can represent the same reality, can be like to one same nature, and each concept be considered by each intelligence in the universality of its relation to the subjects, which really possess or can possess this nature.

Thus the universality is based on the resemblance of the essence, conceived by an individual mind, to the essence realized or realizable in multiple individual subjects.

This same relation of resemblance tells us that when we attribute as genus or species to a given subject the essence conceived by the mind, that this attribution has its last reason, its principle, in the real individual essence.

This principle besides is not the same for each logical attribution. Matter is the principle of genus, form the principle of the difference, which determines the genus so as to constitute the species, hence matter determined by its dimensions is the principle of the individual.

And now one sees how the principle gives birth to the logical attributes and in what way it is distinguished.

Matter is not genus, because it cannot be attributed like genus to the composite; but if I can truly say man is an animal, this attribute indicates the genus of the human species; it is, on the one hand, because the human composite has matter for a living body, endowed with sensibility, and, on the other, because I conceived this matter (and implicitly this form) as being able to be attributed universally to every man.

And if I can add, man is a reasonable animal, indicating by that, the species, it is, because the intelligent soul is the form of the human composite, and because animal already contains implicitly 'reasonable,' and because I am considering essence thus defined in its universal relation to all men.

Hence in the attribution to the individual, if the universality disappears and with it the necessity to consider the essence in the mind and not absolutely, the process remains the same; in saying this individual Socrates is man, I suppose in this individual the realized human essence, and I consider "man" as pre-containing implicitly all the individual characters of Socrates.

The only difference is that genus becomes species by a formal determination, whilst the progression of the species to the individual is made by material determination. . . .

Of spiritual substances we know neither the genus nor the difference nor the proper accidents; of material substances we are unaware of the essential differences and we can only indicate them by their effects, that is to say by their accidental differences. Accidents themselves are not always manifest in their own principles, we must be content to indicate them by their effects: such for example the different kinds of colour, which we define by the effects of concentration or dispersion of a light more or less intense."²⁰

Elsewhere St. Thomas says: being *per se* has a twofold meaning, one which is divided by the ten categories, the other which signifies the proposition of truth. "Sed sumitur essentia ab ente primo modo dicto: unde Commentator (Averroes) in eodem loco dicit quod ens primo modo dictum est quod significat essentiam rei. Et quia ut dictum est, ens hoc modo

²⁰ "Secundo modo invenitur essentia in substantiis creatis intellectualibus, in quibus est aliud essentia quam esse earum quamvis earum essentia sit sine materia.

Unde earum esse non est absolutum set receptum et ideo limitatum et finitum ad capacitatem naturae recipientes set natura vel quiditas earum est absoluta et non recepta in aliqua materia. . . .

Et ideo in talibus substantiis non invenitur multitudo individuorum in una specie, ut dictum est, nisi in anima humana propter corpus cui unitur." *De ente et essentia*, Cap. V, l. 46.

dictum dividitur per decem genera, oportet quod essentia significat aliquid commune omnibus naturis per quas diversa entia in diversis generibus et speciebus collocantur, sicut humanitas est essentia hominis et sic de aliis.

"It may be necessary to understand that 'essentia' signifies something common to the ten categories and not only to the diverse substances. This extension is given to it immediately, showing clearly from it alone that the term 'essentia' is not the perfect equivalent of *οὐσία*."

"Et quia id per quod res constituitur in proprio genere vel specie est hoc quod significatur per definitionem indicantem quid est res, inde est quod nomen 'essentia' a philosophia in nomen quiddatis mutatur: et hoc est quod Philosophus frequenter nominat 'quod quid erat esse' (*τὸ τι ἦν εἶναι*) id est hoc per quod aliquid habet esse quid."²¹

PSYCHOLOGY

St. Thomas in the main closely followed the teaching of Aristotle, and though further details must be gathered from the relevant passages contained in the next chapter, yet it may be convenient to summarize here some of the leading features of his doctrine.

First of all the human soul is joined to the body as its form. The soul is the life of the body, it is a substantial, incorporeal, incorruptible form, the whole of which is in every part of the body, it is the act of the body and forms with it this composite living person; it possesses and confers substantiality, and stands in relation to the essence of the composite as act to potentiality. A man is a being composed of a corporeal matter organized by a form, and of an intellectual substance, which informs and organizes this matter.

The intellect and reason are but one power of the soul, St. Thomas differs here from Aristotle, who regarded intellectuation as though the soul operated by its essence and did not enter into the composition of a man's individuality.

A *person* is an individual substance of a rational nature according to Boethius and this is accepted by St. Thomas.

But the actuality of the reasonable soul, intellect being its power, in communicating itself to the body, determines the existence of an individual, who is a person so that the individual soul possesses personality as by definition.

However, human souls are individualized in respect of their bodies, and not as though their individuality were caused by their bodies.²²

²¹ De ente et essentia, Cap. I,

²² C.G. II, 75.

Human nature is regarded by St. Thomas as either a rational living thing ; or the essence of a man ; or natural inclination to good in a man ; or the gift of original justice received as Grace. *Synderesis*, Common Sense, is said to be the law of the mind, because it is a habit containing the precepts of natural law, which are the first principles of human actions. Conscience is not a power but an act.

IDEAS

“ God knows all things by His essence, and not by means of ideas ; which are unnecessary as He knows immediately.

But if one posits ideas in God, as the principle of knowledge, and also of production, as St. Augustine did, this may be done, if by ideas is meant the forms of certain things existing apart from such things, either as exemplary of the thing of which it is said to be the form, or as principle of knowledge of a thing, in the sense that the forms of objects which are known, are said to be in the subject knowing. Under both these aspects they may be admitted. In all things which do not come from chance, the form is the end of the generation of the being. But the agent would not act with a view to the form, unless some image of the form were in him. This happens in two ways. In some agents, it happens in a condition of realized existence, as in the case of agents acting in accordance with the impulse of their own nature, like man begetting man, and fire producing fire. In others it happens in a condition of intelligible essence, as in the case of agents, who act by means of their intellect, like the image of a house pre-existing in the mind of an architect, which may be called the idea of a house.

But the world not being a matter of chance, but being made by God, God acting by means of His Intellect, it is necessary that there were in the Divine Thought a form in resemblance of which the world was created. Thus it must be replied to the first argument that God does not conceive things by means of an idea apart from Himself. Such was the doctrine of Plato about ideas, which Aristotle refuted, that the ideas existed by themselves and not in the Divine Intellect. To the second argument, it is necessary to reply that if God knows Himself and other things by His Essence, His Essence is the principle of production with regard to other things, but not with regard to Himself. So that He possesses the idea which is compared to other things, but not the idea which is compared to Divinity. To the third argument it is necessary to reply that God, as to His Essence, is the image of all things, so that the idea is only in God as the Essence of God.”²³

²³ S.T., I, 15.

INNATE IDEAS

God alone knows all things by His Essence. The proper essence of the human mind is simply like a bare table. St. Thomas strenuously denies the Platonic doctrine of Innate Ideas, the human mind does not know or recognize anything by reason of any innate knowledge of its species. He clearly stated, "Since the form is the principle of action, it is necessary that the things be, with regard to the form, the principle of action, what it is with regard to the action itself. If for example, to rise up, comes from lightness, it is necessary that that which rises up solely in potentiality be only light in potentiality, and likewise that which rises up in act be light in act. But we see that at a given instant, a man is knowing only in potentiality, whether in respect of his senses or of his intellect. The act supervening, the man acquires the sensations which procure for him the presence of sensible objects, then he enters into possession of intellectual notions, which are communicated to him or which he acquires himself. Whence it follows that the soul whose property it is to know 'anima cognoscitiva' is in potentiality as much with regard to the resemblances, which are the principles of sensation, as with regard to the resemblances, which are principles of intellectualization. Thus the opinion of Aristotle is that the intellect by means of which the soul knows, does not possess certain ideas, species given by nature 'naturaliter inditas,' but that it is in potentiality capable of possessing all ideas. But as that which possesses the form in act can sometimes be prevented from acting, according to the virtue of the form, as for example a light object can be prevented from rising up, Plato supposed that the intellect is naturally endowed with all intelligible species, but that its union with the body is an obstacle to the manifestations of its actuality.

This supposition does not seem acceptable. First if the soul has naturally perfect knowledge of all things, it does not seem possible that it should lose the memory of all this natural knowledge to the extent of forgetting that she had ever possessed it. No man indeed forgets that which he knows naturally, such as that the whole is greater than the part, etc. The saying of Plato is still more unreasonable, if it is admitted as has been declared above, that the natural essence of the soul is united to the body. It is indeed inadmissible that the natural operations of a thing may be prevented by its own nature.

Secondly, what demonstrates in the most evident fashion the falseness of this thesis, is that, by the privation of a sense, one is deprived of the knowledge of things which are perceived by the means of that sense, as for instance a man born blind has not the least notion of colours. But that would not be so, if the

ideas of all intelligibles were furnished by nature to the intellect of the soul. Hence it is necessary to say that the soul does not know corporeal things by innate species.

Likewise, intelligible species are not imported into the soul by separated forms, for by the intervention of such, the understanding, the personal reason, would be totally suppressed.

As to whether the human soul knows things in their internal reasons, the human soul in this life cannot see them as though reflected in a mirror, but only as things can be known from another as its principle of knowledge. As it is said that one sees in the sun that which one sees by the sun.

In this sense the soul will know all things in their eternal reasons being in communication with them. But as to acquire the knowledge of material things we want beyond the intellectual light, these intelligible species which we receive from things, it follows that the knowledge of all material things is not given to us simply by participation but by communication of eternal reasons.²⁴

INTELLECTION

Intellect is a power of the soul if these were identical the unity of the species of humanity would be endangered.²⁵

Reason and intellect are not distinct powers, they are distinguished according to functions and habits, but they are one power involving "spiritual change," even as sight is not distinguished according to what is seen.²⁶

To understand is to apprehend intelligible truth; to reason is to advance from one thing understood to another so as to know an intelligible truth.²⁷

With regard to sensible objects these are not directly and primarily intelligible. The senses reproduce the effect of the objects upon them in the phantasm.²⁸

From the phantasm the active intellect extracts the species which are intelligible whereby the external object is understood. Error may always arise from the actual effect of the object on the senses not being in complete accord with the object.

The active intellect is not the passive intellect in act, but that whereby the objects are made to be in act in the passive intellect.²⁹

The thing understood is immaterially in the one who

²⁴ *S.T. I*, 84.

²⁵ Cf., *Ch. XXI*, p. 370.

²⁶ *S.T. I*, 78.

²⁷ *S.T. I*, 79.

²⁸ It is interesting to note that according to the latest scientific experiments on the ear, that the senses act on the brain by means of the passage of electric waves of different lengths and speed through the different strands which go to make up the nerves.

²⁹ *S.T. I*, 85.

understands according to the mode of the intellect, and not materially according to the mode of the material thing.

Human intellect must of necessity understand by composition and division, it apprehends first quiddity then properties, accidents and relations of essence.

The object of the Intellect is the Truth or Being, that of the Will is the Good.

As has been stated above, Being is prior to the Good, for though Good may be regarded as an aspect of Being, yet Being cannot be regarded as an aspect of Good. Being is prior to Good, hence Intellect is prior to Will.

Moreover, to will a thing, it must first be known so that the object to be willed must first be in the Intellect, which judges whether it be a Good or not to offer to the Will, for the Will only has the choice of the various things offered to it by the Intellect under the aspect of Good. Yet subsequently the Will commands the Intellect in respect of the object when chosen.

It was this priority of Being and Intellect over Good and Will, upon which St. Thomas insisted, that became one of the chief points of divergence between the Dominicans and the Franciscans.

The following are some further proofs of the priority of Intellect.

As the intellect has material and sensible things for its proper object, it understands itself according as it is made actual by the species abstracted from sensible things, through the light of the active intellect which not only actuates the intelligible things, but also by their instrumentality actuates the passive intellect, therefore the intellect knows itself not by its essence but by its acts.³⁰

The habit of a being determines the manner in which he realizes his own definition, that is how far he realizes his own essence.

If the habit approximates the man to his ideal type it is good, otherwise it is bad.

Everything that is passive and moved is disposed by the action of the agent, wherefore if acts be multiplied a certain quality is formed in the power, which is a habit. As a general rule habits arise more from acts than from natural dispositions.

God gives certain things to some and not to others, but He works in all according to their mode. Acts produced by such infused habits do not cause a habit, but strengthen an existing habit.³¹

It is the person then destitute in its essence, which ceaselessly enriches itself with new knowledge and new moral habits, that is to say virtue and practical habits.

³⁰ S.T. I, 87.

³¹ S.T. II, 53.

P. Rousselot has endeavoured to stress this in the following way :

“Idea is that which the intellect conceives in itself of the object known. The intelligent in act and the intelligible in act are two controvertible terms, hence the function of the intellect is to gain being rather than to form concepts. In becoming something else the intellect tends to lose its subjectivity, but at the same time by bringing more and more of the potentiality of the soul into act, it thereby increases its being.

Paradoxically, therefore, by loss of subjectivity of the intellect the soul gains in being, not by extension but by condensation.” When such habits are good then the soul is brought more and more approximately to its true end—God (cf., Whosoever shall save his life shall lose it and whosoever shall lose his life for My sake shall find it (Matt. XVI, 25)).

Intellection in this life is never perfect owing to the shadow of time and space, and according to St. Thomas, we cannot in this life understand separate immaterial substances in themselves either in the passive or active intellect.³²

The human soul understands itself through its own active understanding, which is proper to it, showing perfectly its own power and nature. But there is no proportion between such act and power and the nature of immaterial substances.

We know God through His creatures, the first object of our knowledge is the quiddity of material things. Other things, than God, are known because of God, not as if He were the first known object, but because He is the first cause of our faculty of knowledge (cf., p. 281).³³

It is heretical to say that the essence of the creature is identified in Heaven with that of the Creator, or that each particular humanity is like that of Christ united hypostatically to the Divinity. But whether this possession of God be concluded formally by Will or by Intellect, it is open to differ.

St. Thomas held by the Intellect.

The Intellect holds the Will only tends.

Will is employed in the conquest of the Good and it is the seat of pleasure and its characteristic act is Love.

Beatitude is the attainment of the final end, which does not consist in an act of the Will.

The Will tends either to the absent end through desire, or to the present end by the repose of pleasure ; desire of the end is not attainment of the end, but a movement towards it. As for pleasure, it outlives the Will since the end is present, and it is not the pleasure that is taken in a thing that can render it present to one. It follows then that that by which the end is rendered

³² S.T. I, 88.

³³ S.T. I, 88.

present to the Will must be something other than the act of the Will.

But first we wish to obtain it, then we obtain it by the fact of its presence in us by means of the Intellect, and then the will takes pleasure and is rested in the end obtained.

Thus the essence of the Beatitude consists in an act of intelligence.

The last end is to see God and not to take pleasure ; as for desire and love existing before the end, they cannot be the last end. The pleasure is the formal compliment to the end. The two are inseparable but Intellect is the more essential, for movement itself is incomplete.

“Nec illa duo sunt consideranda quasi duo bona sed quasi unum bonum.”

The act of a power “taking” is perfected by the presence of the “taken” in the taking ; the act of the appetitive power is perfected by the inclination of the subject of the appetite towards the appetising object. Consequently the perfected act of the power “taking” is like rest, the perfected act of the appetite is rather that of movement.³⁴

Contemplation is not a becoming but a completed action.³⁵

Hence the voluntary operation is an act essentially relative to another and imperfect ; but the intellectual operation is a perfected act and therefore final.

LOVE

Considering things in the abstract, knowledge is superior to love, but it is necessary to distinguish in the concrete, for if the object of the act is in itself superior to the human soul, love is superior to intellection.³⁶

St. Thomas regards love as the destructor of individualities. “In covetous love I subordinate the object loved to myself totally. I abolish its individuality, it is no longer for itself, but is as part of my being subordinated altogether to me, *e.g.* as one loves a rose which one picks, or water that one drinks.

In the love of goodwill, on the contrary, it is I who subordinate myself as instrument or part to the object loved, not placing my end in my benefit, but in its. Love in such case is a principle of activity for an end outside of myself in a whole which includes me, subdues me, and goes beyond me, like the instinctive movement of the hand to save the body. In both cases the tendency is to obliterate the individuality of one or the other.

With regard to social sentiments, it is the collection or whole to which we belong, such as one's nation or humanity,

³⁴ S.T. I, 81.

³⁵ C.G. II, 55.

³⁶ S.T. I, 82, 83.

which naturally we prefer as realizing more fully our proper nature.

If you consider the collection of things which participate this attribute in common "being," everything prefers separated being, unparticipated and subsistant, to the limited and deficient being which it participates. Both angels and men and even irrational beings, according to their manner, *naturally* love God better than their own essence."³⁷

This important doctrine resolves the apparent contradiction which vitiates the Aristotelian view of pure love, and explains by the same means the real common relationship of the strictly intellectual perfection, adopted by St. Thomas, with the supremacy of love insisted on by the Fathers. One must distinguish man, in so far as he is confined to his own individuality, or in as much as he may be looked at as part of the universe, or rather as an analogical participation of God.

In the first case, all the reasoning of Aristotle prevails in the human microcosm, reason is best, all the rest is subordinated and the end is contemplation.

In the second case, contemplation is not excluded, it is the good of the part, it may be that the whole will demand a contribution from the part for the good of the whole. But the most certain and immediate end of the part is to be good as a part, to be subordinated as far as it can to the end of the whole, and in as much as that end is unknown to be maintained in a "mobile expectation."

It was in connection with this that the Fathers in their "impossible suppositions" used to ask. If God were to place my perfection of part (of loving Him) apart from my blessedness (perfection of the individual) which should I choose happiness or love? And they decided for love. But perfection which God wishes for men is identical with blessedness. The logical disjunction of the "impossible supposition" is due to our default of intuition of the Divine plan for us.³⁸

In reality and precisely because we are only beings and individuals so far as we are a participation of God, the duality disappears for those who look at things in the first truth. In Heaven logical artifice will cease, and we shall see that which God wishes of us and that which unites us to God no longer distinguished, but rather formally identified.³⁹

ANALOGY

"Omne agens agit sibi simile."

The cause is found in the effect under a new mode of being :

³⁷ S.T. I, 60.

³⁸ C.G. III, 112, 13.

³⁹ Ver., XXIX, 3, 5.

all causes act as they are in act, so every cause produces an effect which resembles it.

Between a being and a being there is analogy, it is a relation between proportions, a proportionality.

By proportion, the analogy of an intrinsic attribution, as a common term is applied to many objects owing to a relation; this relation is of such a kind that the term belongs primarily to one and secondarily to others in an order of subordination, e.g. a common name where the meaning is relatively diverse and simply one.

Relation is said to be real on one side only, and on the other relative, e.g. in knowledge the object is said to be relative, not because it is itself related, but something else is related to it. The effect is the analogue of the cause.

When comparison is made between being *per se* and being caused in its very existence, two orders of being are dealt with which are incommensurable and hence compossible.

Thus it is in its being that the creature is an analogue of its Creator. The perfection of its actuality, conceived as good, invites it to communicate that actuality freely to the being of its possible effects. "Ens est diffusum sui et communicativum" (cf., Ch. XXI, p. 322).⁴⁰

The created universe is filled with efficacious causes, as St. Thomas says "it is born under the sign of fecundity which cannot generate sterility." Second causes, that is contingent beings generate not beings but substantiality, they cause but do not create: so likewise the active intellect is capable of generating truth analogically through participation through Divine Intellect."⁴¹

TRUTH

Truth is found in thought alone, for truth lies in the adequation of the thing and the intellect.

The intellect becomes adequate to the thing, and the adequation is set up in the intellect, and therefore the truth resides there.

Truth is in the intellect affirming that things "are" or "are not," and judging them to be "this" and not "that."

There are three kinds of truth: *the relative to being*, the truth is what is "verum est id quod est"; *the absolute*, conformity of fact between object and intellect, "veritas est rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis," e.g. eye and the colour perceived by it; and *logical truth* of the judgment, here knowledge is the manifestation and declaration of the already realized accord between

⁴⁰ S.T. I, 45.

⁴¹ Ver., XI.

intellect and being. "Tertium modo definitur verum secundum effectum consequentem."

God is truth and truth is the object of the intellect. "Truths above reason need not be and are not contradictory to it, but it is competent to reason to expose the false arguments offered against those truths, which are beyond its full comprehension."

NUMBER

Transcendental units are only formal differences, one is not a unit, *e.g.* God and man are not two.

Multitude is the term used for transcendental differences, it does not belong to any genus and is applied to immaterial things only.

Abstract numbers by analogy are applied to multitude.

St. Thomas upheld the doctrine that was much contested, *viz.* "as the form is the unifying factor, whenever there is substantial unity, there can only be one form." (cf., Ch. XXII, p. 383).

Such are some of the leading features, which are more fully developed in the next two chapters, of the system of St. Thomas Aquinas, which have remained throughout the centuries not lacking in supporters. Though fiercely attacked by the Franciscans on many points, it received the decisive and official approval of Leo XIII in 1879. The Acts of the Sacred Congregation of Studies under Pius X in 1914 and 1916 show that though controversial questions are still raised, yet no decisive opinion of the Roman Church has been reached, for the points dealt with are colourless.

Amidst all this welter of conflicting ideas, and the strain of the production of innumerable decisions, the saintliness of the character of St. Thomas Aquinas may justly and aptly be gathered from the prayer composed and regularly offered by him before his Communion. "Precor ut haec sancta Communio non sit mihi reatus ad poenam sed intercessio salutaris ad veniam. Sit mihi armatura fidei et scutum bonae voluntatis. Sit vitiorum meorum evacuatio, concupiscentiae et libidinis exterminatio, caritatis et patientiae, humilitatis et obedientiae, omnium virtutum augmentatio: contra insidias inimicorum omnium tam visibilium quam invisibilium firma defensio; motuum meorum tam carnalium quam spiritualium perfecta quietatio: in te uno ac vero Deo firma adhesio atque finis mei felix consumatio."

implanted in us by God, or that they must be that very truth and very being, shared in a finite mode by our human understanding.

Such proofs, however, provide no transition from idea to being.

All our knowledge originates in sensory intuition.

The being, which we apprehend directly, is the idea realized in matter; it is therefore a sophism to try and prove that this very being we apprehend, is God. Emptied of its realistic content the argument of St. Anselm is an analysis not of an essence, but of an abstract notion.

The true problem is to discover whether our conception of God or truth is such as to prove the link, in God Himself, which combines essence and existence in one; where God is both His Own Essence and His Own Existence.

St. Thomas therefore limited his arguments from reason to such proof as can be adduced from sense-objects from whence according to Aristotle all knowledge is derived.

But according to M. Gilson, St. Thomas by sense-objects does not limit himself to material objects but includes those intelligibles involved in them, and which our human intellect can abstract from them. From the fact that their Divine Exemplars are beyond our comprehension it does not follow that their finite participations escape us also. Though effects resemble their causes according to their own mode, both the senses of men and the essence of angels are effects unequal to the power of their causes, so that sensible things themselves retain traces of their likeness to God, which are too imperfect and inadequate to manifest the Essence of God.

Hence in place of the above arguments which he had rejected, he sought to substitute proof of the existence of God from a consideration of His Effects. In this way he arrives at his celebrated Five Proofs of God's Existence.

I. FROM MOTION

Our senses give witness that there is motion in the world. A thing in motion must have Potentiality for that towards which it is being moved.²

A thing moves in as much as it is in Act.

Motion is a reduction from Potentiality to Actuality.

(It must carefully be borne in mind that it is upon this transcendental conception of movement in its widest sense that this argument is based.)

The Agent must be in Actuality.

² Cf., pp. 74-79.

From the same point of view a thing cannot be in Potentiality and Actuality at the same time.

From the same point of view and in the same way it is impossible that anything should be both Mover and Moved.

Whatever is put in Motion must be put in motion by another.³

It is impossible to regress in this way *ad infinitum* for the second mover only imparts motion because the first set it in motion, as the stick only moves because the hand imparts movement to it.

Hence there must be a First Mover which is God.⁴

In the *Contra Gentiles* in addition to the foregoing proof of God as First Mover he sets out two other arguments of Aristotle taken from the "Physics" both of which like the above depend upon the two propositions that "whatever is in motion is moved by another," and that "it is not possible to proceed to infinity in movers and things moved."⁵

Now the first of these two arguments involves three hypotheses :
 (a) If a thing moves itself, it must needs have the principal of movement in itself else it would be clearly moved by another.
 (b) It must be moved "primarily" that is by reason of itself and not of its part ; this excludes an animal in which one part moves another. (c) It must be divisible and have parts since whatever is moved is divisible.

(In a previous passage Aristotle had sought to establish this by saying that anything moved from sphere A B to sphere C D must at some time be partly in A B and partly in C D. Hence it must have parts.)

Granted these hypotheses Aristotle argues :

Since what is stated to be moved is moved primarily.

If one part is at rest the whole is at rest.

Nothing that is at rest while another is at rest is moved by itself, for if so its motion must be the result of the other's motion and hence not of itself.

Hence that which was stated to be moved by itself is not moved by itself.

The force of this argument, St. Thomas thought lay in this, that if a thing moves itself primarily and of itself not by reason of its parts, it follows that its being moved does not depend on something, whereas a divisible thing like "Being" depends on its parts so that it cannot move itself primarily and of itself.⁶

Avicenna is accused of quibbling in alleging that to be at rest or in motion does not belong to a part except accidentally.

The second proof given in the *Contra Gentiles* is by induction.

A thing is not moved by itself, if it is moved accidentally.

³ Cf., p. 80.

⁴ Cf., pp. 80-81.

⁵ Cf., p. 80.

⁶ C.G. I, 13.

Nor again if it is moved by force, which is manifest.

Nor if it is moved by its nature, like animals, which are clearly moved by their souls (*sic*) which are moved accidentally being subject to generation and corruption.

No power in a body causes movement except it be moved accidentally; since when the body is moved the power of that body is moved accidentally.

Nor if it is moved by nature as heavy and light things, since these are moved by their generating cause and by that which removes the obstacle to their movement.

Now whatsoever things are in motion are moved either *per se* or accidentally. If *per se*, either by force or by nature, if the latter, either by something in them, as in animals, or not by something in them, as in heavy and light bodies. Therefore whatever is in motion is moved by another.

St. Thomas was probably on safer ground in only setting out Aristotle's third proof of First Mover from Potentiality in the *Summa Theologica*.

However, in the *Contra Gentiles* he definitely draws attention to the wider use by Plato of the term Movement as including any operation such as understanding and thinking.⁷ This is important as Aristotle by his Immovable First Mover did not mean to include such operations.

In the *Contra Gentiles* the following Indirect Proof is also adduced.

"Whatever is in motion is set in motion by another" is not a necessary proposition. (In a necessary proposition the proposition is true absolutely and universally, but an accidental proposition is only true in certain cases.)

If it is true only by accident it is not necessary.

It is therefore possible that none of the things that impart motion are in motion.

But a thing that is not in motion does not set another in motion, according to the proposition.

If therefore it is possible that nothing is in motion, it is also possible that nothing imparts movement and hence there is no longer movement.

But Aristotle holds it is impossible that movement should cease at any moment.

Hence it is wrong to say that it cannot happen that none of the things in motion should not be set in motion *or* that the above proposition is true by accident.

If it is not true *per se* motion may be the same or different from that imparted.

⁷ Cf., C.G. I, 13.

Since kinds and forms of movement are finite in number a regress *ad infinitum* is impossible hence there must be a First Mover.

If the circle were completed and changes of volume substituted for changes of space the same would apply only indirectly instead of directly.

If the First Mover moves itself then you have the difficulty of being in potency and act at the same time.

But if only a part of the mover is the mover and another is put in motion again the mover is entirely immobile.

2. FROM THE FORMALITY OF EFFICIENT CAUSE

Nothing is the efficient cause of itself, for in such case it would be prior to itself, which is impossible.

First Cause is the cause of intermediate causes, which are the cause of the Ultimate Cause.

Without cause there is no effect.

First Efficient Cause is God.

3. FROM POSSIBILITY AND NECESSITY

Things can exist or not exist.

Since they can generate and corrupt they consequently exist and then not exist.⁸

It is impossible for things to have always existed, for that which can cease to exist must have begun.

Therefore if everything could cease to exist, at one time there must have been nothing.

(Because in infinity a possible cannot fail to occur.)

But if there was nothing in existence, there would be nothing in existence now; because that which does not exist, only begins to exist by something already in existence.

Therefore not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something which is necessary.⁹

Every necessary thing has its existence caused by another or not.

Necessary things, having their necessity caused by another, lead to Efficient First Cause.

Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being, having of itself its own necessity and not receiving it from another, but causing necessity in others.

This is First Necessity which all men speak of as God.

The Jewish thinker Maimonides, called by St. Thomas Moses, had argued on the same lines.

Given, that there are beings, then either (1) no being is born or

⁸ Cf., p. 74.

⁹ Cf., p. 92.

perishes, or (2) all beings are born and perish, or (3) some beings are born and perish. Neglecting the first two propositions as obviously impossible St. Thomas follows the argument of the third proposition to arrive at the same conclusion.

This argument, however, involves the distinction between essence and existence in created things. (Later on St. Thomas describes essence as the potentiality of existence.)

Such distinction is to be found in St. Augustine, Boethius and the Arabian philosophers.¹⁰

It must, however, be pointed out that in this St. Thomas is not strictly following Aristotle.

Though Parmenides seems to have identified *τό ὄν* with actual existence rather than with Being, in his effort to distinguish *εἶναι* from the descriptive copula *εἶναι*,¹¹ yet Aristotle, in insisting on the identity of *τό ἔν* with *τό ὄν*,¹² would have appeared, in making *τό ὄν* to be both substance and existence, to have been too out and out an opponent of Plato's ideas to have allowed of any such distinction.¹³

On the other hand, Plato denied that Being and held that Essence alone, was infinite and immortal.¹⁴

4. FROM GRADATION

More or less, is predicated of different things according as they resemble in their different ways that which is in the degree of Most. So that there is something the truest, best, noblest, and consequently something which is the uttermost being: for the truer things are, the more truly do they exist; as Aristotle says "As each thing is disposed in existence so also is it in regard to truth." That which is most complete in any genus is the cause of all that genus.

This is the "maxima ens" in the absolute sense and the proof given in the *Contra Gentiles* stops here. But in the *Summa Theologica* the following is added.

Therefore there must be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection: this is God. Here we have the "maxima ens" in a relative sense.

5. FROM THE GOVERNANCE OF THE WORLD

(This is taken from the argument of John of Damascus.)

Things that lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for some purpose.

It is evident from their acting in the same way to produce the best result, that they act not fortuitously but designedly.

¹⁰ Cf., pp. 106-107.

¹¹ Cf., p. 27.

¹² Cf., p. 61.

¹³ Cf., pp. 63-64.

¹⁴ Cf., pp. 30-34.

Therefore some Intelligence exists, by whom all natural things are ordained towards a definite purpose. Such Intelligence is God. At the same time, it is noted that it is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He should allow evil to exist and out of it to produce good. It has to be conceded that these proofs are Platonic in their conception of a participation of things in God by resemblance.

DIVINE ATTRIBUTES

In order to define an object, we begin by ascertaining its genus, then the added differences, which give its species, and finally those differences which separate it from all else.

But to do this with God is impossible, since He is beyond all genus and species; nor can there be any definition of Him, nor, save through His effects, any demonstration of Him.

We cannot therefore ascertain any added differences, but must proceed to acquire what knowledge we can of the attributes of God in a negative way by discovering what He is not.

This may be summarized in the following way: from the fact that God is the First Mover and immobile as shown by the first Proof, it follows that God has neither beginning nor ending and hence is *Eternal*; since eternal, He has not potency and hence is *Pure Act*; since pure act, He has no matter and hence is *Immaterial*; since He has neither potency nor matter, He is hence *Simple*; therefore without *Composition* and without *Body* (God is a Spirit, John IV, 24).¹⁵ In the *Contra Gentiles* great note is taken of Aristotle's proof of no Body of First Mover, from eternity of movement and infinity of power not residing in magnitude. And in reply to the objection to Aristotle's argument, based on the eternity of the world, St. Thomas states that such supposition, which was not accepted amongst Catholics, only seems to make it less manifest that God exists and that therefore such proof is the more conclusive.

We use concrete names to signify His substance and abstract names to signify His simplicity.¹⁶

Now nature or essence of things composed of matter and form connotes only what is included in the definition of the species; whilst connotating principles are regarded as the constituent formality in regard to the individualizing matter.

But where there is no matter, forms themselves are individualized of themselves. Hence forms must be self dependent individuals.

Hence God is His own Divinity, Life, and Whatever is predicated of Him.

¹⁵ Cf., p. 81.

¹⁶ S.T. I, 13.

From this *via negativa* it is seen that a concept of fullness arises and it is therefore not to be confused with the Oriental mode of thought that results in the concept of Nirvana, as has been maintained by some writers.

Likewise, since it is shown that God is (not has) Being and all His Attributes the charge of scepticism sometimes brought against this *via negativa* thus set forth by St. Thomas falls to the ground.

At the same time, the doctrine of God's Will prevents him from being charged with Pantheism.

Moreover, everything composed of matter and form owes its perfection and goodness to its form. But God Who is First Good, as First Mover and First Cause has not participated good, but is Good of its own Essence, since such Good is prior to that which has participated good.

Further, God is not only His own Essence, but His own Existence. For whatever a thing has besides its essence must be called by the constituent principles of the essence, as a property that follows from the species, and is caused by the essential principles of the species, *or* by some exterior agent. Now nothing can be sufficient cause of its own existence, so long as its existence is caused at all. Hence, since God is the first efficient cause it is impossible that His Existence should differ from His Essence.

Moreover Existence is that which makes every form or nature actual ; therefore if they differ, existence must be compared with essence as actuality to potentiality. But there is no potentiality in God, therefore His Essence is His Existence. Similarly that which has existence, but is not its own existence, exists by participation.

Now God we have seen is His own Essence, therefore if He is not His own Existence, He would not be the First Being. Therefore God is His own Existence as well as His own Essence.

As we have seen (p. 304) God is in no genus.

That from which the difference of the species is derived, is related to that from which the genus is derived, as actuality to potentiality and there is no potentiality in God. Moreover all in one genus agree in quiddity or essence of the genus, which is predicated of their nature, but differ in their existence ; thus in every member of a genus existence and essence must differ, which is impossible in God where they are the same.

God is called the measure of all things, not that He is in the same genus, but in the sense that everything has the more existence or Being, according as it is more like Him or has more truth.

God has no Accident because He has no potentiality, He is

His own Existence and He is the First Cause and the essential is prior to the accidental.

God Who is the Efficient Cause cannot be the form of any individual Being. As Perfect Being, He cannot be the form of all the conditions which make created Being incomplete or imperfect Being.

God is spoken of as the Being of all things, as their efficient and exemplar cause but not as their essence. The Word is an exemplar form, not a form which is part of a compound or composite, for simple things do not differ by added differences.¹⁷

Hence, God is not the World Soul, as alleged by the Almaricians, who thought Him to be the formal constituent principle of all things, nor is He Primary Matter as taught by David of Dinant.¹⁸ He is neither the Soul of the First Heaven, nor is He involved in any kind of pantheism.

Now God, Who is not distinct from His own Existence, is universally perfect being, that is "He lacks not the excellence of any genus."

The excellence of any being whatsoever is ascribed to a thing in respect of its being, since for example no excellence would accrue to a man for his wisdom unless he "were" wise; so according as a thing has being, so is its mode of excellence.

Aristotle defines Perfect as that beyond which it is not possible to assume anything or any one single portion. St. Thomas describes created things as perfect, when they are brought from potentiality to actuality, hence perfect is that which is not wanting in Actuality.

God, the first principle in order of efficient causation, is Pure Act and most Perfect, so that all created perfections are in God as their First Cause and Existence.

God, Who is His Own Being, the essence of Whom has being of itself and not from outside, is necessarily the whole of Being, or in other words possesses the power of being in its highest degree.

It therefore becomes clear that there are two modes of existence, that of God Who *is* Being "He Who Is" and that of the creature who *has* Being.¹⁹

Dionysius expresses this by saying "God exists not in any single mode, but embraces all being within Himself absolutely without limitation uniformly, He is the very existence to subsisting things." But it was from such a statement of his and also a similar one "The being of all is the super-essential Godhead"²⁰ that some derive the pantheistic conclusion that God is the formal

¹⁷ Cf., p. 70.

²⁰ *Coet. Hier.*, IV.

¹⁸ Cf., pp. 107, 217-218.

¹⁹ *De. Div. Nom.*, V.

being of all things, not perceiving that in that case it would not be above all, but in the midst of all and something of all whereas, by above all, he declares, It to be by Its nature distinct from all and placed above all, and by saying that, the Godhead is the being of all, he declares that all things derived from God a likeness to the Divine Being.

If it has been established that God is Simple, and that His Being and Essence are One, and that His mode of existence is not that of His creatures, how can we deduce from our knowledge of sensibles anything further about God beyond the negative facts already ascertained. Hitherto, it is clear, that they are all in one way or another negative. That He is without termination, Eternal; without potentiality, Pure Act; without matter, Immaterial; without composition, Simple; without Body; without genus; without *having* being like any other being and so on. Though as was stated on page 300 our senses are unequal to the power of their cause, so that sensible things retain traces of the likeness to God, which are too imperfect and inadequate to manifest the essence of God, yet it cannot be maintained that all the names and terms which we apply to God, based on His effects, are so altogether remote from Him as to be wholly equivocal. Since He is in another mode of Being such terms cannot possibly be univocal, but on the other hand, if they were purely equivocal, all such human concepts would be without value. It is true that an equivocal cause is one superior to its effect and that God cannot be said to resemble His creatures, but the form of the effects may be traced, though not in the mode in which it occurs, in the effect, but analogically, that is according to an order or relation to some one thing.

This may happen as when many things have relation to some one thing, *e.g.* Health, an animal is healthy as subject of health; medicine as effective thereof; food as preserving it; and vigour as a sign of it. Or according as order or relation of two things may be observed, not to some other thing, but to one of them: thus, Being is said of substance and accident, in so far as accident bears a relation to substance, and not as though substance and accident were referred to a third thing. In this second way are names said of God. This relationship of the name is consequent on the relationship of knowledge, since the name is the sign of the intellectual conception.

Accordingly, since we arrive at the knowledge of God from other things the reality of the names predicated of God and other things is first in God according to His mode, but the meaning of the name is in Him afterwards.

Wherefore He is said to be named from His effects. At the

same time the several names predicated about God are not synonymous. For as various things by their various forms are like one simple thing, which is God, so our intellect by various conceptions devises names, which it applies to God, and although they signify absolutely one, the names have not the same meaning, since they denote the concepts of the intellect previously to the thing understood.

At the same time our intellect understands that, what corresponds to such conceptions is all absolutely one, because our intellect does not ascribe its mode of understanding to the things which it understands. Consequently it enunciates the unity of the thing, by a verbal composition as "God is good or goodness" so that, if there is any diversity of composition it is referred to the understanding and unity of the thing understood. Similarly a preposition is sometimes inserted to imply diversity as "Goodness is in God" because here, we imply both a certain diversity that is befitting the understanding and a certain unity which must be referred to the thing.²¹

In view of the above use of terms in an analogical sense, those terms which describe the perfections of creatures may be applied to God. The Goodness of God may be concluded from His Perfection has already been proved (p. 307).

Aristotle defines good as that which all things aim at. A thing is good by its virtues, which is a perfection, hence every thing desires its own perfection, as its proper good.²²

Now it has been proved that God is perfect, therefore He is Good. That which is perfect is actual, which is Being, but God is Pure Act and is Being, therefore He is Goodness itself.

Any good that is not its own goodness is good by participation. In final causes there is no procession to infinity, therefore we come to a first good that is good, not by participation, but by its essence and that is God.

End is called the cause of causes, hence goodness though logically subsequent is causally prior to Being as end to form.

Here it is objected that the Platonists, not distinguishing primary matter from privation, extended the term good even to non-being (*S.T.* I, 5). Yet St. Thomas in the *Contra Gentiles*²³ quotes with approval a passage from Dionysius (*De Div., Nom.* IV) that "good includes both existing and non-existing things": in proving that matter is good, since in non-existing things matter as subject to privation seeks a good.

Every being, as being is good and actual and in some way perfect, for every act implies some perfection, which includes the formality of goodness.

²¹ C.G. I, 30-36.

²² Cf., p. 88.

²³ C.G. III, 1, 20.

Now, evil is opposed to good and consists in imperfection. A thing is perfect as it is in act, therefore it will be imperfect according as it is deficient in act; hence, evil is either a privation or includes a privation.²⁴ Now the subject of privation is potentiality and this cannot be in God, hence, there can be no evil in God.

No being, as being, is spoken of as evil, but only so far as it lacks being: man is evil through lack of virtue, an eye is evil because it lacks the power to see.

As we have seen on page 307, all created perfections are in God as their First Cause and Existence, therefore His goodness contains all goodness and consequently He is the Good of every good.

In the *Summa Theologica*, St. Thomas goes into the question of participation by creatures of the Divine perfections at some length.²⁵ He shows how Plato had treated ideas of all things as separate individuals denominated by participation of the idea of Being or One: regarding that which is Being and Oneness (*per se*) as *Summum Bonum*. And because God is convertible with Being, as also is One, he called God the *per se* good, from which all else is called good only by participation.

On the other hand, Aristotle denied that separate ideas of natural things subsist by themselves, but granted that there is one First Being essentially being and essentially good which is God. From such First Being, essentially being and essentially good, every thing can be called being and good, in as much as it participates in it, by way of a certain assimilation though afar off and as in effect. Hence everything is called Good from Divine Goodness as from the first exemplary efficient and final principle of all Goodness.

Further, everything is called Good, by reason of the similitude of Divine Goodness belonging to it, which is its formal goodness, giving it its denomination. Thus there is one Goodness belonging to all and also many kinds of Goodness.

The relation, by reason of which anything is asserted of God relatively to His creatures, causes no complexity in the infinitely simple essence of God, for it has no reality in God, but only in created things, it is a unilateral relationship. As M. Gilson puts it, "to posit God as the Supreme Good does not mean that He is the sum total of particular goods, or that He would not be defined in His supreme degree even without the existence of created goods; but on the contrary it means that the finite and limited goods are defined by reference to Him, as participated and falling short of His perfect goodness. Here again, the

²⁴ Cf., p. 68.

²⁵ Cf., pp. 35-36.

relation is unilateral : it is valid only as from the creature to the Creator."

Mgr. D'Arcy expresses it thus : " as the base of each of our concepts, there is to be found, besides the indefinite multiple relation to common quantity, a higher relation to a transcendent absolute. In this, there remains united and opposed as irreducible pairs, the absolute being and the defective participations ; the *esse imparticipatum* and the *esse participatum*. So that the doctrine of Analogy is nothing more than the re-statement of act and potentiality in the light of concept and predicament. The unity lies in the Order of Act and Potentiality, this is a metaphysical *via media* which common sense recognises."

At the same time it must be noted that it is to combat such doctrine that Modernists like Siebeck seek to evolve such a thesis as, God being the mere process of form of evolution of the human Will. Or others like Croce, or Bergson, or Lloyd Morgan, who seek to establish the evolution of sense-objects as the natural outcome of a necessary self realization of the Deity, Who being Pure Act must ever be progressive.

In the *Contra Gentiles*, St. Thomas adduces some seventeen arguments to prove monotheism, nearly all of which are variations of the thesis, that if God is Simple and Perfect and Sovereign of all that which is possessed by creation, by way of participation, as has been proved, it is impossible for there to exist any difference either essential or accidental, whereby a plurality of gods could be distinguished the one from the other. The other proof rests on the Unity of the World that which is first and reduces all into Order is God.

Now, One does not add anything to Being, but is only a negation of division, One means undivided Being.²⁶ Plato following Pythagoras held that : One being convertible with Being and One being the principle of number, that Numbers were the substance of all things.²⁷ Whilst Avicenna held that One added something to the substance of Being, but that each is one by its substance or procession to infinity and that One, the principle of numbers, is different and belongs to the genus of quantity.²⁸

St. Thomas follows Aristotle, One is opposed to Many ; One, as principle of number, is opposed to Multitude, whilst One, as convertible with Being, is opposed to Multitude by way of privation, as the undivided to the divided. But no privation takes away altogether the existence of a thing, for privation means negation in a subject.

Hence, it follows that Multitude is some one thing ; evil is some good and non-being is some kind of being. But since the

²⁶ Cf., pp. 61-63.

²⁷ Cf., p. 39.

²⁸ Cf., p. 200.

opposite is not predicated of the opposite, what is relatively being (potentiality) is non-being : what is relatively good is absolutely bad ; and what is absolutely one is relatively many.

Though unity is prior to division, in reality division is prior to unity in our apprehension. Supreme Unity shuns division as tending to non-being. Whence it becomes clear, that God is supremely One, supremely Being and Undivided.²⁹

In addition to being good and unique, it may be argued from the Perfection of God, that God is also Infinite.

Now all dimensive or numeral quantity is naturally finite, it was therefore considered that infinity, as expressing a lack of natural determination, was a privation and therefore an imperfection.

Thus matter, before being perfected by form, was held to be both imperfect and infinite : this in part arose from a confusion of the infinite with the unspecified, but that need not detain us here. For with God, infinity is not a privation, but the negation of such limits as would determine His absolute perfection.

Form is contracted by Matter, and Being is the most formal of things : then since, as has been shown, God is His own Being it follows that such Being, being in no way contracted by matter nor inherent by any subject, either form or matter, must be without limit and infinite.

At the same time, since God is His own Being, and does not have being like everything else, He is clearly distinguished from all other beings. All finite things are in a genus, but God is not in a genus but infinite (cf., pp. 304 and 305).

As God, then, is not infinite in respect of multitude, since He is Unique and without composition or parts, nor in respect of continuous part, since He is incorporeal, it remains that He is Infinite in Spiritual Magnitude. Spiritual Magnitude, is referable to power and to goodness, as perfection of a thing's nature or essence.

Magnitude of power is gauged by the magnitude of deeds or of things made : since, that a thing is in act makes it to be active, so according to the degree in which it is perfected in its act is the degree of magnitude of its power. For power is not only a principle of operation but also of effect.

Wherefore, Spiritual things are said to be great according to their degree of perfection. Since God is Pure Act and Perfection it follows that He is perfect without limit, and that His Greatness is therefore Infinite, and His power is Omnipotent, and thus He is Almighty.

From this it does not follow, that if power be in God as the

²⁹ S. T. I, 11.

principle of His effect, that it is the principle of God's essence, which is His operation.

It is but a logical relation which is indicated, when it is said that God works by His essence. This arises because when operation, considered as requiring a principle, is attributed to God, the logical relationship of that which derives its existence from a principle, is also attributed to Him mediately. But though operation involves a principle, essence does not. Hence, although the Divine Essence has no principle, neither real nor logical, yet the Divine operation has a principle in our way of thinking. In like manner, from the mere fact that essence is the principle of action, it follows that it has the formality of power.³⁰

We next come to our concept of God in relation to space and time.

As we have seen on page 310 everything is called good from Divine Goodness as the first exemplary efficient and final principle of all goodness.

St. Thomas maintains, that God is in all things, not as part of essence or accident, but as an agent, which is present to anything upon which it works, according to the Mode of its existence. Though an agent at a distance must act through a medium, it belongs to the great power of God to act immediately.

In this way, God is in every place, but not like a body which does not suffer the co-presence of another body. Corporeal things indeed are said to be in anything which contains them; but spiritual things are said to contain those things in which they exist, as soul contains the body.

In this connection, it must be remembered that there is a two-fold form of the indivisible.

(a) With regard to corporeal things, indivisible is a term of the continuous, a point, or a movement.

(b) With regard to incorporeal substances the indivisible is outside the genus of the continuous and is found in God, angels, or souls.

Totality of quantity, then, demands totality of place, but totality of essence is not commensurate with totality of place. In incorporeal substances totality can have reference to essence alone.³¹

God is everywhere by *Essence*, *Presence* and *Power*. God is in a thing as *Active Cause*. God is in a thing as operation in Operator, thing known in Knower, He is in rational creatures by the prerogative of His Grace.

God is in all things by *His Essence* as He is cause of all things.

³⁰ *De Potentia Dei*, I, 1, and R.10.

³¹ *S.T.* I, 8.

God is in all things by *His Power* as all things are subject thereto.

God alone is everywhere, primarily (in His Whole Self) and absolutely (not accidentally nor dependent on a supposition). At the same time, it is concluded that God is Immutable, for the following reasons :

(1) God as First Being is Pure Act, without any potentiality which is posterior to Act. Hence He cannot be changeable (cf., p. 300).

(2) Everything moved remains as it was as regards some term (continuousness of object of continuity), but in God there is no composition, for He is altogether Simple. Hence He cannot be moved (cf., p. 301).

(3) As God is infinite, He comprehends all plenitude of perfection of all Being, so that He cannot acquire anything new or extend Himself to anything. Hence He has no motion (cf., p. 313). In God, what is possible is not different from what is.³²

St. Thomas, however, draws special attention to those operations of acts of understanding, willing, and loving, which are included by Plato and St. Augustine as movements. Such movements, are not included by Aristotle (cf., p. 302), and are not such motion or change, which can only belong to a thing as a potentiality.³³

As to *Time*, it is thereby that we must reach Eternity, like as we attain the knowledge of "Simple" things by way of "Compound" things.

Time is but numbered motion "Before" and "After," so that in a thing bereft of motion, which is always the same there is no Before or After hence there is no Time.

Thus, Eternity is the apprehension of Uniformity outside of Motion. For as Time is the measure of things having a beginning and an ending, so the wholly Immutable has no succession, no beginning, no ending. Eternity is known from two sources, it has no beginning or ending, that is no term either way and moreover, it has no succession, that is the whole exists all at once. This is described by Boethius as "The whole simultaneous and perfect possession of interminable life."

God is not only His own Being and His own Essence, but He is also His own Eternity.

The apprehension of Time is based on the flow or motion of the "Now," whereas the apprehension of Eternity is based on the standing still or motionlessness of the "Now." God's knowledge is not discursive.³⁴

³² C.G. IV, 24.

³³ S.T. I, 9.

³⁴ S.T. I, 15.

Thus as Time is the proper measure of motion or repose of the movable, so Eternity is the proper measure of permanent Being, God alone.

"Age (aevum) is the measure of Incorporeal things, it has no before or after but is one and simple, based on the first creation of infinite things, which as they are not ended by any other creature may be called infinite without incongruity" to which is applied the term "Eternal."³⁵

As has been shown above (cf., p. 312) the Infinity of God lies in spiritual magnitude in perfections. The two highest perfections of rational animals are intelligence and will.

Of the various proofs put forward in the *Contra Gentiles* that God is Intelligent, the following indicate the line adopted.

The self mover moves itself by appetite and apprehension ; but sensitive apprehension is of particulars only and the apprehension of the simple is prior to that of the particular. Hence, the First Mover has apprehension of universals and is therefore intelligent. Again, the First Mover is the universal principle of movement and every mover moves by some form, which it "intends" in moving. Hence, that form must be universal, which only occurs in intellect ; hence, the First Mover is intelligent. Or again a thing is intelligent from being without matter, so forms become understood by being abstracted from matter. Hence, understanding is of universals and not of singulars, because matter is the principle of individualization. Forms understood become one with the intellect actually understanding. Hence, a thing is actually intelligent from the fact that it is without matter. Now it has been shown that God is immaterial, hence He is intelligent.

In consequence of what has been shown in the foregoing, it follows that in God we find that intellect, the object understood, the species abstracted by the understanding, and the understanding are all one and simple. The force of the divine intellect in knowing things is likened to an active power, since it knows not by receiving from things, but rather by pouring itself into them.³⁶

God knows Himself as the first and *per se* object of His knowledge and other things as seen in His Essence.

To the objection, that the simple Essence of God is thereby confounded with a multitude of objects of vision, it is replied that we do not understand eternal objects according to their own nature, but according to their species contained in our intellect, whereby it becomes intellect in act, that is according to the mode of the knower.

Now, in God, His understanding is founded on His own

³⁵ S.T. I, 10 and *De Potentia Dei*, III, 14.

³⁶ C.G., 70.

Essence in the place of such species. Moreover, His Essence, though simple, includes all perfections of everything. Thus His intellect can consider multitude, as knowing Being in general. Now, multitude is inconceivable without distinction, hence He understands things as distinct from one another, even all singulars and particulars, likewise all imperfections, as falling short of perfection. Since God knows all differences, He knows what is contained under them, even our thoughts and wills.³⁷

This was a point of great importance in St. Thomas's system, for it directly combated the teaching of the Averroists of his time and also a thinker like Siger of Brabant, who regarded God only as the Final Cause of the Universe and that it was immaterial to him to rule them providentially or even to know them.

St. Thomas went further, and in this departed from Aristotle, in asserting that, God knows future contingents, for God knows all future contingents both in their causes and in themselves, as actually realized. This results from the fact that, although future contingents are realized successively, God does not know either them or anything else successively, His knowledge is not discursive.³⁸

It has been seen on page 315, that God is in Eternity and not in Time, and that He is His own Eternity so that the mode of His knowledge as also of His Being is Eternity. As Eternity exists all together simultaneously, it comprises the whole of time in a changeless presence. So God knows future contingents as actually present and realized, but such knowledge of His does not affect the character of their contingencies.

This is so even though the knowledge of God is the cause of things, but it is so only in so far as His Will is joined to them. Such creative knowledge is termed "the Knowledge of Approbation."

Origen put it rather differently by saying: a thing will not happen because God knows it as something future, but, because it is a future known by God, before it exists. The importance of this view of the knowledge of God of future contingents arises, when the redemptive effect of Christ's Passion is taken into consideration. This predestination therefore neither militates against man's Free Will, nor is it a fatalistic cause of evil, as it has sometimes been represented to be.

Having thus ascertained that Intellect is attributed to God, it follows that it must now be considered in what way Will may be attributed to Him.

It has been shown that God is Good and Intelligent. Now, a thing is good according to its desirableness, and as it is known,

³⁷ C.G., 68.

³⁸ S.T. I, 15.

it is therefore the proper object of the Will. Now, God understands good and since He is perfectly intelligent, He understands 'being' simultaneously with the motion of good. The object of the Intellect therefore is the very idea of desirable good and the object of the Will is the desirable good of which the idea is in the Intellect.³⁹ Hence, as an end, the Intellect moves the Will, but as agent, the Will moves the Intellect. Again natural things have actual existence by their form and the Intellect is actually intelligent by intellectual form. Everything has this aptitude towards its natural form, when it does not possess it, it tends towards it, and when it possesses it, it is at rest therein; likewise everything also inclines to expand and diffuse its own good in other beings. So that natural perfection is natural good. Such indeed is the Fourth and Final Cause laid down by Aristotle.⁴¹

Intellectual nature, such as wisdom, has aptitude to good, as apprehended through its intellectual form, to rest in, or to seek which, pertains to the Will. Hence Will is in intellectual being, in the same way as appetite is in a sentient being. From all of which it is clear that there is Will in God, inasmuch as there is Intellect in Him.

Attention must here be called to the fact that in this St. Thomas differed directly from St. Augustine in placing intellect before the will, and it was on this point that the Franciscans differed so strongly from the Dominicans.

Now God only wills Himself as the end and any other things as ordered to that end so that His will is immutable.

As God is His own Goodness, His Will which desires perfect goodness is directed to Himself, and since His Goodness is perfect, nothing that He wills as a means to His Goodness, is said to be necessary, for though He wills this to be the means of His Goodness, yet He does not Will such on account of it. As a thing cannot be the cause of itself and since the act of Willing is but one and the same, the means cannot be said to be the cause of the end, except by reference to their end in the measure in which it is proper for them to participate in the divine Goodness. Hence He Wills Himself and other things.

For, as by one act, God understands all things, so by one act, He Wills all things in His Goodness. Thus it is said that God necessarily Wills His own Goodness, but that He has Free Will with respect to what He does not necessarily Will. But it must be borne in mind that according to the Divine Mode, He being perfectly simple is His own Will, or put in another way, His Will is His Existence and Essence. Hence it follows that the Will of God is the cause of all things and that it must needs

³⁹ S.T. I, 82.

⁴¹ Cf., p. 59.

always be fulfilled. This must be rendered clear by regard to the exact mode of His Will, for that which He Wills simply takes place, though that which He Wills antecedently may not take place. Things effected by the Divine Will have that kind of necessity, which He Wills in their proper nature, be it absolute or conditional.

Out of this arises the doctrine of Predestination, which is a certain Divine preordination from eternity of those things which are done in time by the Grace of God. God does not Will malice or compel virtue, but like the description of direction of movement, which does not get its species from the term whence, but from the term whither, the rational creature is directed to Eternal Life as an arrow to its mark.⁴²

At the same time it must be understood that God does not create future contingents, in willing them in their proper nature, for willing is an action performed within the person who wills ; God therefore in willing temporal creatures does not confer *ipso facto* existence upon them. Such existence is theirs only by reason of Divine action aiming at an effect external to God Himself, *viz.* by acts of producing, creating, and governing.

St. Thomas quotes with approval the saying of Dionysius that the fullest knowledge vouchsafed to us in this life of the divine nature is the certitude that God remains beyond all that we may think concerning Him.

The foregoing account of the attributes of God may appear to be somewhat unduly detailed, but it is through the transcendental mode of simplicity that it is sought to enunciate the apparently mutually contradictory attributes of immutability and omnipotence, in such a manner, that even within the realm of human reason, such expression of their correlation may be employed as to show that they coalesce rather than conflict the one with the other.

In modern times, in lieu of the static immovable, First Mover of Aristotle, a more dynamic view of the eternal sameness of God has been expressed as an eternal continuity of identity.

Having dealt with certain negative attributes of God, we have since investigated those attributes of Goodness, Oneness, Infinity, Ubiquity, Immutability, Intellectuality, and Volition, it remains to be shown that God is Truth and Love.

That God is Truth is not difficult to prove, when it has been agreed upon, as to what is meant by the term truth. St. Thomas describes it as the equation of thought and thing, in so far as intellect asserts that to be, which is, and that not to be, which is not ; truth in the intellect belongs to that which the intellect

⁴² *S.T. I.*, 23.

asserts, and not to the operation whereby it asserts it. Because the truth of the intellect does not require that the act itself of understanding be equated to the thing ; since sometimes the thing is material, whereas the act of understanding is immaterial. But that which the intellect in understanding asserts and knows, needs to be equated to the thing, namely to be in reality as the intellect asserts it to be. Hence, God by His simple act of intelligence, wherein is neither composition nor division, but knowledge of the essence of things, asserts in understanding that which is composition and division. Hence, truth is not excluded from the Divine Intellect by reason of the latter's simplicity.⁴³

Now things understood are said to be true, in so far as they are conformed in relation to the intellect. They are related to the intellect, either by their own nature, as a house to the design in the intellect of the architect, or by accident, as a house in the mind of an observer.

As good denotes that towards which the appetite tends, so truth denotes that towards which the intellect tends : as good is convertible with Being so is Truth (cf., p. 304), but as good adds to being a relation to appetite, so truth adds a relation to intellect. Truth is logically prior to good, in that truth regards Being simply and immediately, whereas good follows Being as it is some perfection of Being, also a thing must be known in some way before it can be desired (this was one of the innovations of St. Thomas on the doctrines of St. Augustine).

Now, God as has been shown is His own existence and intellect and is therefore truth, for truth is in intellect as it apprehends a thing as it is, and truth is in things, as they have 'being' conformable to the intellect.

At the same time St. Thomas follows Aristotle in denying that truth implies relation to intellect in such a way as to base truth upon human understanding. The real truth of things consists in their relation to the Divine Mind. Thus, it is the being of a thing, not its truth, which is the cause of truth in the intellect. Thoughts and words are true, because the thing thought or spoken exists and not because they are true.

Further, if anything be predicated of many things analogically, it is found in only one according to its proper nature. So that though there are as many truths as things known, and as many as created intellects, yet there is only one primary truth ; for though forms and essences are many, yet there is only one Divine Intellect in conformity to which all things are said to be true " and because the Divine Intellect is Eternal in it alone Truth hath Eternity."⁴⁴

⁴³ C.G. I, 59.

⁴⁴ S.T. I, 16.

As to Falsity, it is the contrary of Truth. "In as much as something is said, or seems to be, something that it is not; or not to be, what it really is; as Truth implies an adequate taking in of a thing, so Falsity implies the contrary."⁴⁵

A thing is absolutely false, when false as compared with the intellect on which it depends, and partially false, as compared with another intellect accidentally. Natural things depend on the Divine Intellect, but Artificial things depend on the human intellect.

Those artificial things are false absolutely, which fall short of the form of art, or proper operation of art, *e.g.* a boat that will not float.

Natural things are false absolutely, only when the voluntary agent withdraws from what is ordained, and this constitutes Sin. But, natural things are partially false, either by being signified by a false thought or word; *e.g.* "to describe a diameter as a false commensurable thing" or according to appearance, as to mistake gall for honey, or tin for gold.

The degree of falseness varies with that which is found in a thing, which should not be there.

The senses have no false knowledge, except accidentally, they truly represent things as they appear to them; or to put it in another way, sense in its own proper object is never false, nor is the intellect when directly informed by the likeness to the essence of the thing apprehended. When falsity occurs, it is accidentally in the composition, which takes place as Aristotle put it "He who is deceived understands not that wherein he is deceived."⁴⁶⁻⁷⁻⁸

St. Thomas, regarding the Intellect as prior to the Will, did not place Love in the foremost division ascribed to it by the Franciscans.

For him, as the Intellect is directed first to universal truth and then to particular and special truth, so the Will regards good with joy as regards a separate good and with delight as regards a conjoined good present and possessed, and with desire and hope for good not yet possessed.

It is the proper nature of love, that the lover wills the good of the loved one, love is indeed the first movement of the Will and regards good universally, whether possessed or not. Since it has been shown that there is Will in God, it follows that love, the first act of will, must be in God and in consequence of His simplicity, according to His divine mode, He is Love, in the same way as He is any of the other attributes ascribed to Him, as previously explained.

⁴⁵ Cf., p. 70.

⁴⁶ Cf., p. 76.

⁴⁷ Cf., p. 82.

⁴⁸ S.T. I, 17.

However, as God rejoices in an operation that is one and simple, it follows that He loves without passion. For passion is a bodily or spiritual movement, which is said to arise from receiving anything either good or ill, or being deprived of anything good or ill. Passion is regarded as in the appetitive, rather than the apprehensive part of the soul. And whereas, the passion of the soul, that is of the intellectual appetite, induces a spiritual change in feeling and understanding, so the passion of the body, that is of the sensitive appetite, produces a natural change in the body.⁴⁹ Passion therefore, being a kind of movement of that which is subject to potentiality, is foreign to the Immutability of God. But the good which God wills to His creatures is not the Divine Essence (cf., p. 310), hence it can vary in degree.⁵⁰

The Gifts of Grace are not to be lightly subjected to comparison, for those equal in themselves are greater as they are less deserved. St. Thomas comments that it may seem presumptuous to pass judgment on these matters, since it is the Lord and not another "Who is the weigher of spirits" (Proverbs, XVI, 2).

As virtue is a kind of goodness of the virtuous person "in respect of which he is said to be good and his work good,"⁵¹ it follows that Divine Goodness contains in its own way all virtues. But such are not in God as a habit, which is an imperfect act, a mean between potentiality and act, for God is Pure Act, but they are His Essence. Moreover virtue relating to human active life and passions, in connection with bodily goods and pleasures, cannot of course from their nature be fittingly ascribed to God.⁵² The divine virtues are called exemplar virtues, the others have their exemplar in the Divine Wisdom which contains the proper types of all beings.

St. Thomas refers to the Platonic theory of ideas with approval, if such ideas are placed in the Divine Intellect (cf., pp. 123, 315).

Virtues about passions are applied metaphorically in Scripture to God on account of a likeness of effect⁵³ (1 Sam., II, 1; Micah VI).

The Divine Act of Intelligence being Pure Act is devoid of succession and therefore exists eternally simultaneously as a whole. Thus God is likewise His own Life and His own Happiness.

CREATION

Without here considering the relationship *inter se* of the Blessed Trinity or the hierarchy of the Angelic Host, we will proceed to

⁴⁹ S.T. II, 1, 22.

⁵⁰ S.T., I, 6 and 20.

⁵¹ Ethics, VI, 2.

⁵² C.G. I, 92.

⁵³ S.T. I, 54, 93.

examine the aspect of St. Thomas with regard to creation and the production of man.

As we have seen on page 310 the relation, by which anything is asserted of God relatively to His creatures, causes no complexity in the infinite simple essence of God. God is essentially self-subsisting Being, which is One ; all Beings, apart from God, are Beings by participation, the mode of Being is different, in that whilst God of His Essence is Being, creatures of their Subsistence have Being, and their substance and Being are never identical.

Whilst Plato enunciated that Unity comes before Multitude, and Aristotle that whatever is greatest in Being and truth is the cause of every Being and truth ; whatever is the cause of things considered as Beings must be the cause of things not merely as they are "*such*" by accidental forms, nor according as they are "*these*" by substantial form, but according to everything that belongs to their being at all in any way.

God is indeed the first exemplar cause of all things : creatures represent the Divine Idea existing in the Divine Mind.

It is the Divine Goodness that is the end of all things, thus God is the efficient, exemplar, and final cause and the first principle of all things and is one in reality.⁵⁴

God is the universal cause of being, and it is not becoming that He should act only by movement and change, but by Intellect and Will. God is actual Being and it is not a form inherent to Him, but His whole substance that is in act, therefore the proper mode of His action is to produce a whole subsistent thing, not merely an inherent thing, namely a form in matter.

Further, as potentiality precedes act in point of time, act precedes potentiality in point of nature, for potentiality is not reduced to act, save by a Being in Act ; thus God, Who is Pure Act is simply prior to matter. So that if there be any matter proportionate to God's action, He is still the cause of such matter.

Ancient philosophers including the Arabians only considered particular emanations from particular causes, hence they established the dictum that "Nothing is made from Nothing." Creation for them only signified a mode of change, because the mode of signification followed the mode of understanding. But God by creation produces things without motion, and creation is not in truth a change but only so in imagination and metaphorically.⁵⁵

Between being and non-being there is an infinite distance, in a certain sense, when it is infinite on both sides, as when non-being is compared with the Divine Being which is infinite.

But sometimes it is finite on one side only, as in the comparison

⁵⁴ S.T. I, 45.

⁵⁵ C.G. II, 16.

of non-being to the finite, in which case it is possible to pass from non-being to that which is finite, inasmuch as the distance is determinate on the one side, although there is no passage properly speaking; for thus it is a continuous movement through which one part passes after another.

Further, when a thing is made from nothing, nothing does not hold the position of patient, except accidentally, but rather the opposite to the thing made by the action. Nor is the opposite in the position of patient in the action of nature except accidentally, but the subject is 'this.'⁵⁶

St. Thomas here gives a quotation from *St. Anselm, Monolog.* V, VIII, which is so comprehensive and perspicuous that it is worthy of special attention.

"When a thing is said to be made from nothing, the negative implied in the word nothing may bear directly on the preposition 'from,' or it may be included in the preposition. Further if it bears directly on the preposition it may bear on the whole, so that the negative extends not only to the preposition but also to the verb, in this sense it might be said that, a thing is made from nothing because it is not made; thus it could be said of a silent man that he speaks of nothing. In another sense, the verb remains affirmed and the negative bears on the preposition only, then we say a thing is made, but there is no pre-existing thing from which it is made, thus we say so and so grieves for nothing, because he has no cause to grieve; it is in this sense that a thing is said to be made from nothing by creation.

If however the preposition includes the negation, again the sense is twofold, one true and the other false. It is false, if the preposition connotes causality (since in no way can non-being be the cause of being); it is true, if it implies mere order, so that to make a thing from nothing, is to make a thing whereas before there was nothing and this is true of creation."

The statement of Boethius that, there is no order between non-being and being, refers to the order of definite proportion or of real relation, such order, says Avicenna, cannot be between being and non-being (comparison may be made to the *μη δέν* of Parmenides) (cf., p. 27).⁵⁷

When a thing is made from nothing, its being begins in an instant and its non-being is not in that instant; nor is it any real, but only an imaginary instant.

As outside the universe there is no real, but only an imaginary time, in respect of which we may say that God is able to make a thing outside the universe, at this or that distance from the universe; even so before the beginning of the world, there was

⁵⁶ *De Potentia Dei*, III, 1. ⁵⁷ *De Potentia Dei*, III, 1, r, 3, 4 and 7, 10.

no real, but an imaginary time, wherein it is possible to conceive an instant, which was the last instant of non-being. Hence it does not follow that there must have been a time between those two instants, since real time is not a continuation of imaginary time (cf., pp. 314, 327, 438, 453).

Things proceed from God by means of Knowledge and Intelligence and in this mode a multitude of things can proceed directly from a Single and Simple God, whose Wisdom contains within Itself the universality of Being.

Since accidents can only exist in substances, in which they inhere, they are said to be concreated.

There are various arguments set forth that God does not act of natural necessity but by judgment of His Will and also to combat the theory of creative creatures, who were held to create of necessity in order to produce a multiplicity from unity.⁵⁸

Every agent that acts of natural necessity is confined to one effect ; all natural things always happen in the same way, unless there be an obstacle. Now the Divine power is not directed to only one effect, for God can do all those things, except those which include the notion of non-being or imply a contradiction and are thus intrinsically impossible ; since every act of an active power terminates in being, such can neither be the principal nor secondary term of action of an active power, and God is Pure Act. Hence God acts according to His Will and not of necessity.⁵⁹

Again the universe is ordered to an end and is not the result of chance, but directed to a good.

Now the first agent for an end must be an agent by intellect and will, because things devoid of intellect work for an end as directed by another, like the flight of an arrow is directed towards a mark by the aim of the archer. In order that a thing be rightly directed to a due end, it is necessary to know the end, the means, and the due proportion between both ; and this belongs only to an intelligent being. Since God is the first agent, He works not by a necessity of His nature, but by His Intellect and Will.

Further, every agent acts, as the likeness of its effect is in it, and whatever is in another, must be in it, according to the mode of thing in which it is. God is intelligent by His Essence, hence His effect is in Him in an intelligible way. Hence He acts by His Intellect. Now intellect does not produce an effect except by means of Will, the object of which is a good, which moves the agent to this end. Therefore God works by His Will and not by a necessity of His nature.⁶⁰

The error of Peter Almarar (Almaric Bène) was that God cannot act beside the order of Divine Justice and Wisdom

⁵⁸ Cf., pp. 307, 322.

⁵⁹ *De Potentia Dei*, I, 111.

⁶⁰ *C.G.* II, 23.

according to which He works, and that thus God cannot do otherwise than He does. Though the natural end of the Divine Will is the Divine Goodness, which it is unable not to Will, yet creatures are not proportionate to this end, as though without them the Divine Goodness could not be made manifest, which was God's intention in creating.

Hence God's Will, without prejudice to His Goodness, Justice, Wisdom, can extend to other things than those He has made absolutely.

But since He cannot make contradictions to be true, at the same time it can be said, *ex hypothesi*, that God cannot do otherwise than He has done, for we suppose that He does not wish to, and that He foresaw, that He would not do otherwise. God cannot will what is contrary to His goodness, since He wills naturally and sin is a lapse from divine goodness, wherefore God cannot will to sin.⁶¹

Since in voluntary actions, power and knowledge are brought into action by the will, God's power and knowledge are described in universal terms as being without limit as Omniscient, Omnipotent, and Almighty; whereas the Will being the determining force cannot cover all things, but only those to which it determines power and knowledge, hence God cannot be called 'All Willing.'⁶²

Since God by creation produces things by His Will and Intellect without motion, it follows that creation in the creature is only a certain relation to the Creator as its principle of being.

Creation therefore is the Divine Action, which is His Essence with relation to creature, but such is not a real relation, but only that of reason. Again, viewed from the point of view of creature, since the relation of the act of creation to its effect, depends, as has been shown, on the Divine Will, though God's action cannot cease in its substance, its relation to its effects might cease, if He so Willed. This however, does not involve potentiality of non-existence inherent in the being of the creature, because the being itself would cease to exist, if God withdrew His preservation of the being. Creatures, in this way, are therefore dependent not only for their creation, but also for their preservation upon God.⁶³

The form of a thing generated depends naturally on the generator, in so far as it is educed from the potentiality of matter, but not as to its absolute existence. Hence, when the act of the generator ceases, the eduction of the form from potentiality into actual being, that is the "becoming" of the thing generated ceases; whereas the form itself whereby the thing generated has its existence does not cease. Nevertheless, the creature generated

⁶¹ *De Potentia Dei*, II, 5 and 6.

⁶² *ib.*, I, 7.

⁶³ *ib.*, V, 3.

depends for the preservation of its being upon God as above stated.⁶⁴

This unilateral relationship of creatures to creator arises out of difference of mode of Being, since the former have only a participation that Being which the latter is. "As a pure analogue of Divine Being, the created being can form neither an integral part of God, nor be added to nor subtracted from Him. There is no common measure between two quantities not of the same order."

Names which impart relation to creatures are applied to God from Time and not Eternity. In such manner is the term "on the right" not applied to a column, unless it is on the right side of an animal. Thus creatures are ordered to God and not He to them, and hence are really related to Him, though as mentioned before (p. 310) in God there are no real relations, but relations, in idea alone, to creatures.^{65 & 66}

To create is proper to the whole Trinity, but the processions of the Divine Persons are the cause of Creation, of the Father, through the Son and by the Holy Ghost.

Everything has a trace of the Trinity "in measure, number and weight" (*Wisdom*, XI, 21 Vulgate) where measure represents substance, number represents species, and weight represents order.

As to forms and accidents "of a being," such as works of art, the forms are said to be concreated, and the compositum is made of matter.

We have already seen (p. 325) that God by creation produces things by His Will and Intellect without motion, the distinction of things is not therefore from chance, which Democritus and Leucippus suggested by postulating an infinite number of material principles.

The distinction is not from Matter, Anaxagoras held that a confused mass of material principles were subsequently separated by an Intellect.

Nor is the distinction on account of a contrariety of agents, as Empedocles thought, of attraction and repulsion; nor of good and evil, like the Pythagoreans, Marcions, and Manichees. But it was on grounds such as these that Origen, following Plato, held the body to be the prison of the soul.

Nor is the distinction through the order of Secondary Agents, as held by Plato or by Avicenna, who held that God through understanding Himself, produced the First Intelligence in act and potentiality, which by understanding God, produced the Second Intelligence, which, through understanding itself, as

⁶⁴ *De Potentia Dei*, V, 1. ⁶⁵ *S.T.* I, 13. ⁶⁶ *De Potentia Dei*, III, 15.

being in act, produces the soul of the sphere and, as being in potentiality, the substance of the first sphere. Nor was the world made by Angels which heresy was held by Simon Magus.⁶⁷

The Will of God alone is the cause of all things; from the eternal action of God an eternal effect did not follow, but such effect as God Willed, that is, an effect which has being after not-being.

By faith alone, did St. Thomas state that, we held, and by no demonstration can it be proved, that the world did not always exist.

"In the beginning" is expounded in a threefold sense to exclude three errors. "In the beginning" is expounded as of "Time," because some said the world always was, and that time had no beginning. "In the beginning" is also expounded as "In the Son," the exemplar principle, because some said that there are two principles of creation, good and evil.

"In the beginning" is likewise expounded as "before all things," since some said corporeal things were created by God, through the medium of spiritual creation. Whereas four things should be held to be placed and created together, the empyrean heaven, corporeal matter, time, and the angelic nature (cf., p. 334).

Time is made from some "now," not because such first "now" is in time, but because from it time begins.⁶⁸

Since time is included in the universality of things made by God, the fact that He made it then and not sooner does not really enter into the question. For that would be to consider time, as though it preceded its making, instead of being conditional on its making. Hence, if we consider the making of the universality of creatures, amongst which time itself is included, we must consider why such and such a measure was affixed to time, and not why the making was at such and such a time. The fixing of the measure to time depends on the mere Will of God, Who Willed that the world should not have always been, but should have a beginning, even as He Willed the heavens to be neither greater nor smaller than they are (cf., pp. 314, 324, 438, 453).⁶⁹

In opposition to Peter Lombard, The Master of Sentences, St. Thomas held that it was not possible for the creature to create, not of its own power or authority nor even instrumentally, for five reasons.

First, the power of the maker is proportionate to the distance between the thing made and the opposite from which it is made. Hence, because non-being is further from being than any other particular being may be, none but an infinite power can produce being from non-being.

⁶⁷ C.G. II, 39-42.

⁶⁸ S.T. I, 46.

⁶⁹ *De Potentia Dei*, III, 17.

Second, in the making of a thing, the manner of the making depends on the action of the maker. Now the agent acts, for as much as he is in act, wherefore that alone acts, by its whole self, which is wholly in act, and this belongs to none but the infinite act, who is the first act and consequently none but an infinite power can make a thing as to its whole substance.

Third, since an accident must needs be in a subject, and the subject of an action is the recipient of that action, that agent alone, whose action is not an accident, but its very substance, requires no recipient matter, when it makes a thing, and such is none but God.

Fourth, as all second causes derive their action from the first cause, it follows that all second agents receive their mode and order from the first agent, who receives neither mode nor order from any other. Now since the mode of an action depends on the matter that is the recipient of the agent's action, the first agent alone would be competent to act, without presupposing matter from another agent, to provide matter for all second agents.

Fifth, to reduce potentiality to act, powers are proportionate to one another according to the distance of the potentiality from the act. Hence for a finite power to produce something without potentiality, it would have to be proportionate to a power, which educes potentiality to act, so that there would then be proportion between potentiality and non-potentiality which is impossible.⁷⁰

St. Thomas then, agrees with St. Augustine in maintaining the possibility of proof of creation *ex nihilo* as against Albertus Magnus and Maimonides, who held it to be a matter of faith; and against Averroes who denied the possibility altogether; but he agrees with Maimonides that it is impossible to prove the beginning of the world in time, and that it is possible to deny the eternal existence of the world, whereas Albertus Magnus held that the beginning of the world in time can be proved once the postulate of creation *ex nihilo* is admitted.

As mentioned on pages 317 and 325 God produced things into being in order that His Goodness might be communicated to creatures and represented by them; and of His Wisdom produced many and diverse things for that purpose, so that the Wisdom of God is the cause of distinction and inequality of things. Now formal distinction is that of things differing specifically, and material distinction regards things differing numerically.

In incorruptible things there is only one of each species, as the species is sufficiently preserved in the one, and individuals of the same species are only multiplied in respect of matter,

⁷⁰ *De Potentia Dei*, III, 4.

Forms of things are like numbers, in which the species vary by the addition or subtraction of unity. Hence species are ranged in degrees. The universe would not indeed be perfect, if there were but only one grade of goodness.

As to the first creation of corporeal things, to the words of Genesis "the earth was without form and void" or the "earth was void and empty" various meanings have been attached. Some thought these words to mean that matter was formless, in the sense that it actually had no form, but that all forms were in potentiality. But matter of this kind cannot exist in nature, unless it receives formation from some form, since whatever exists in nature exists actually, and actual existence comes to a thing from its form, which is its act, so that nature does not contain a thing without a form.

Further, since nothing can be included in a genus, that is not contained specifically in some division of a genus, matter cannot be a being, unless it be determined to some specific mode of being, and this cannot be without a form. Hence, such matter could only precede its formation in point of nature, and not in point of duration, and such was the view of St. Augustine.

St. Augustine also held that all creation took place at once, and that the days mentioned in Genesis refer to the succession, in which the knowledge of the creation became known to the Angels. The evening implying their knowledge from the light of their own nature, and the morning the knowledge obtained through the Light of the uncreated Word.

On the other hand Basil the Great and Gregory held that the formless matter does not denote absence of all form in matter, but the absence of natural finish and comeliness, and that it seemed in keeping with the wise ordering of its Maker, Who in producing things out of nothing, did not at once bring them from nothingness to the ultimate perfection of their nature, but at first gave them a kind of imperfect being and afterwards perfected them: so that creation took place by degrees. Thus showing that they receive their being from God, so as to refute those who should assert that matter is uncreated, and also that they derive their perfection from Him, so as to refute those who should ascribe the formation of this lower world to other causes.⁷¹ And this is in consonance with modern science, but the further arguments as to the work of the respective days, being based on crude ideas on the subject of Physics may be neglected.

MIRACLES

Since all corporeal creatures are in some way directed to an

⁷¹ *De Potentia Dei*, IV, 1, 2.

intellectual nature, as their end, while the end of the intellectual creature is the knowledge of God, it is not strange, if some change be wrought in a corporeal substance, in order to bring intellectual nature unto the knowledge of God.⁷²

Such works done by God outside the usual order assigned to things are called Miracles, because we are astonished (*Admiramur*) at a thing when we see an effect without knowing the cause. A thing is wonderful simply, when its cause is hidden, simply, that is, when it is wonderful in itself and not only to this person or that one. Now God is the cause which is hidden to every man simply, for no man can comprehend Him by his intellect. Hence miracles are properly speaking works done by God outside the order usually observed in things.^{73, 74, 75}

St. Thomas advances three arguments against objections which have been raised against God acting contrary to the customary order of nature. First, that God is the Author of all things, and nothing derives its existence except from Him, so that He is not merely the cause of some movement of things, in such a way that natural forms, which are the principles of natural action, cannot be influenced nor their actions hindered by any supernatural cause (cf., p. 322).

Second, God knows Himself perfectly and in Him is the likeness of every one of His effects, inasmuch as there can be nothing that does not imitate Him, and thus it follows that He has proper knowledge of all things (cf., p. 315).

Third, God does not act by actual necessity but by His Will (cf., p. 324), from which it follows that He can act independently of the course of nature in the production of particular effects, or by producing a form in a particular matter, or as regards operation.⁷⁶

In reply to the further objection, that since God has implanted an order in things, that He cannot produce in them effects apart from their proper causes, without a change in Himself, attention is drawn to the fact that such order is only in keeping with that which is wont to occur for the most part, but it is not everywhere in keeping with what always occurs, that it is not always, may be on account of a defect in the agent, indisposition of the matter, or by reason of a stronger agency, as when nature produces a sixth finger in a man.

Wherefore, if the natural order can be changed by a created power, much more can the Divine Power at times work apart from the order, without prejudice to His Providence. In fact He sometimes does this to manifest His power, to show that all

⁷² *C.G.* III, 2, 99.

⁷³ *S.T.* I, 105.

⁷⁴ *S.T.* II, 2, 178.

⁷⁵ *S.T.* III, 44 and *C.G.* III, 2, 107.

⁷⁶ *De Potentia Dei*, VI, 1.

nature is subject to the Divine Will ; for by this, it is proved that the order of things proceeded from Him, not of natural necessity, but of His Own Free Will.

When angels or demons apply natural things in order to produce a definite effect, they employ them as instruments, which produce effects not only in proportion to the instrument, but in excess, as it acts by the power of the agent. Such effects are not true miracles, but are wonderful to us, because these causes are applied for the production of their proper effects in a way that is strange to us, like the works of a skilled craftsman ; also the natural causes are invested with a certain power through serving as instruments of spiritual substances.⁷⁷

Demons are unable to perform true miracles, but act contrary to some particular, or they employ "Seeds"; they also act on the imagination, in the same way on more than one person at the same time. They can put thoughts in our minds.⁷⁸

Demons, by their natural knowledge, know certain things remote from man's knowledge and reveal what they know to man, not by enlightening the intellect, but by imaginary vision or even by audible speech. But it is impossible for such instruction to be wholly false, for it contains some truth whereby it is rendered acceptable, so that the intellect is led astray by a semblance of truth, in the same way as the will is seduced to evil by a semblance of good.⁷⁹

True miracles are wrought by the power of God for man's benefit either in confirmation of truth, or in proof of a person's holiness.⁸⁰

EVIL

St. Thomas enters into a long argument to prove that demons are not naturally evil, since they have existence, thereby refuting the error of the Manicheans, who held the dual existence of good and evil in such a way as to exclude God from being the sole Creator.

Now good is everything appetitable, and since every nature desires its own being, the perfection of any nature is good. Hence it follows that evil cannot signify "being," form, or nature, for evil signifies the absence of good.

Moral evil is the absence of due end, so evil neither belongs to the perfection of the universe, nor does it come under the order of the same, except accidentally, that is by reason of the good joined to it.

⁷⁷ C.G. III, 2, 103.

⁷⁸ S.T. I, 111-114.

⁷⁹ S.T. II, 2, 172.

⁸⁰ S.T. II, 2, 178.

Being can only be used of the term evil in the sense of a "copula," e.g. to describe something evil as being evil.

Since what is best, is best in relation to the order of the whole, many good things would be taken away if God permitted no evil to exist.

Evil itself is a privation and has for its subject good, but evil is not in the good opposed to it, as its subject, but in some other good.

Through lack of being evil cannot be a *per se* effect and likewise has not the essential condition of a cause, it is incidental thereto alone.

There may be stated to be three kinds of good :

(1) That which is destroyed by evil, the good opposed to the evil, e.g. light by darkness or sight by blindness.

(2) That which is not effected by evil, the good the subject of evil, e.g. air not effected by darkness.

(3) That which is diminished by evil, the aptitude of a subject to some actuality, as contrary to its intensity.

First Act is the being of the thing, of that which is called being in virtue of the very act of existing being exerted "ens dicitur ab actu essendi."

Second Act is the causal operation of 'this being,' the intrinsic or extrinsic manifestation of its first actuality by the effects it produces within or without of itself.⁸¹

Now the first act is the form and integrity of a thing, and the second act is its operation.

Evil, which comes from the withdrawal of the form and integrity, in voluntary things, has the nature of a pain or penalty. Whilst evil, which consists in the subtraction of the due operation in voluntary things has the nature of a fault.

In this way fault is a greater evil than pain.

God, then is the cause of evil as a material cause, since good is the subject of evil. Evil in no way has any but an accidental cause, evil is caused in the action otherwise than in the effect.

Evil, which consists in defect of Action, is not reduced to God: corruption is, however, the accidental outcome of the order of the Universe.

Hence God is the Author of evil as a penalty but not as a fault (cf., Isaiah, XLV, 7; Ecclus., XXXIII, 13).⁸²⁻³

There is then, one first principle of good and no first principle of evil. Nothing can be essentially evil, because evil always lessens good, but never wholly consumes it. Aristotle says, "If the wholly evil could be, it would destroy itself, because all good

⁸¹ S.T. I, 48, 5.

⁸² S.T. I, 49.

⁸³ S.T. II, 79.

being destroyed, evil itself would be taken away, since its subject is good." Every evil is caused from some good and since evil is only an accidental cause it cannot be a first cause, for the accidental cause is subsequent to the direct cause. Those who upheld two first principles of good and evil, failed to consider the universal cause and only considered particular cause of particular effects. Goodness of a thing does not depend on its order to any particular effect, but on its order to the whole universe, *e.g.* fire, good and bad effects.

They knew not how to reduce contrary particular causes to universal common cause.

Evil as a privation, is opposed to some good, which has some potentiality and not to the Supreme good, which is Pure Act."⁸⁵ As to origin of sin (*cf.*, p. 372).

INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES

Since the Intellect and Will of God is the cause of all things, it was proper that creatures should be both incorporeal or intellectual substances capable of willing, and also corporeal or material substances.

There is in all things a desire for good ;⁸⁶ in things devoid of knowledge, it is called a natural appetite ; in those with a sensitive knowledge, it is called animal appetite ; in those which understand, it is called the intellectual appetite which is the will.

Hence all intellectual substances have a will.

Further, the principle of every operation is the form, whereby a thing is actual, since every agent acts for as much as it is actual. Wherefore the mode of the operation consequent upon a form must be in accordance with that form. Now the form understood, whereby the intellectual substance acts, proceeds from the intellect itself, being conceived and after a fashion thought out by it, as a craftsman thinks out the form whereby he works. Therefore intellectual substances move themselves to act as having dominion over their action. Hence they have a will.

Now no body is found to contain anything except by quantitative measurement, but an intellect does not contain a thing understood by quantitative commensuration, because by the whole of itself it understands and comprehends both the whole and part of things, both great and small in quantity.

Therefore no intelligent substance is a body. It is immaterial, since everything composed of matter and form is a body and it is not a body.

Moreover intellectual substances are subsistent forms and do not exist in matter, as though they depended upon matter,

⁸⁵ *S.T.* I, 49.

⁸⁶ *Ethics*, I, 1.

because material forms depend on matter as regards their 'being' and properly speaking have not 'being' themselves, but the composites have being through them. If intellectual substances were forms of this kind, they would have material being, as if they were composed of matter and form, but their substance is not their 'being,' only God as we have seen at page 306 is such, all other things participate being. Hence every created substance is compared to its being as potentiality to act. Consequently, in intellectual substances, there is but one composition of act and potentiality namely of substance and 'being,' of "what is" and "whereby it is"; whilst in things composed of matter and form, there is a twofold composition of act and potentiality: the the first, of substance itself, which is composed of matter and form, the second, of the already composite substance and "being," which composition can also be said to be of "what is" and "being," or of "what is" and "whereby it is."

Wherefore matter and form divide a natural substance, while potentiality and act divide 'being' in general. So that whatever is consequent upon potentiality and act, as such, is common to created substances both material and immaterial, for instance to receive and to be received, to perfect and to be perfected. Whereas whatsoever things are proper to matter and form as such, for instance to be generated, to be corrupted and so forth, are proper to material substances, but are in no wise applicable to immaterial substances.

From this it clearly follows, that every intellectual substance is incorruptible since all corruption is separation of form and matter; simple corruption from separation of substantial form, relative corruption from separation of an accidental form. Because, as long as the form remains, the thing must exist, since by the form the substance is made the proper recipient of being. Now no intellectual substance is composed of form and matter, hence no intellectual substance is corruptible.

Here it may be noted that actuality and potentiality are not different accidental modes of being, such as go to make alteration, they are indeed substantial modes of being.⁸⁷

THE SOUL

Of intellectual substances, man is the lowest form, whilst at the same time man is the highest form of corporeal substance. St. Thomas inclines to the view that Angels were created at the same time as corporeal creatures, though he admits that all the Greek Fathers taught that it was previously (cf., p. 327).

Man is a composite substance, of a self-subsisting intellectual

⁸⁷ *De Potentia Dei*, III, 8, r. 12.

substance, the soul, and of a corporeal body of form and matter. An intellectual substance, the soul, is therefore joined to a body composite of form and matter. This cannot be by mixture or contact properly so called, but only by virtual contact (cf., p. 337) whereby the soul becomes the form of the body. Such is the philosophy of Aristotle which is adopted by St. Thomas, as distinguished from that of Plato, who held that man is the soul making use of the body.

To follow Plato in his proof of the substantiality of the soul, the unity of man becomes jeopardized, whilst to follow Aristotle in his proof of the unity of man is to risk the substantiality of the soul and its immortality along with it.

St. Thomas therefore in adopting the view of Aristotle that the soul is the form of the body, is careful to distinguish, and to insist that though such form possesses and confers substantiality yet there is no individual difference in such a form until it is individualized in the composite which it forms with this body to produce this man ; yet at the same time he maintains that each soul is a separate creation.

That is to say that the human soul is identical in each human individual, but once brought into act in the composite the soul remains an individual incorporeal substance and as such is immortal.⁸⁸

Human souls, however, are individualized in respect of their bodies and not as though their individuality were caused by their bodies.⁸⁹

Now in all intellectual substances there are three things, essence, power, and operation. All these may be observed with reference to the soul.

In the first place, soul is the first principle of life, which is shown by knowledge and movement ; for though a body, such as a heart may be a principle of life, nothing corporeal can be the first principle of life. It does not belong to a body as such to be a living thing, or every corporeal thing would be a living thing or a principle of life. Therefore, a body is a living thing as "such" a body. But a body is "such" a body because of its principle, called its act. The soul then, which is not a body, is the act of a body which is moved essentially.

The soul is also the principle of intellectual operation. Man understands through the soul. The mind or intellect which is a power of the soul, has an operation of its own apart from the body, which is necessary for the action of the intellect, not as its organ of action, but on the part of the object (cf., p. 394). St. Thomas adopts the view of Aristotle, that of the operations of the

⁸⁸ *S.T.* I 47, 118.

⁸⁹ *C.G.* II, 75.

soul, that of understanding is alone performed without the use of a corporeal organ, and since every distinct operation supposes a distinct substance the soul must be a distinct substance. And as to feeling and operations of the sensitive soul, they are operations not of the soul, but of the composite being. From this he deduces, that the souls of brute animals are not subsistent and do not exercise the operations of the animals themselves.⁹⁰

Further if the dumb animal's soul remains after its body has perished, it will be a form separate from matter, hence actually understood. Now in things separate from matter, that which understands is the same as that which is understood. Therefore the soul of a dumb animal if it survived the body will be intellectual, which is impossible.⁹¹

It may be well at this juncture to recall in outline the psychology of the human mind as set forth by Aristotle and adopted by St. Thomas.

The senses produce in the passive intellect phantasms of the objects sensed, which phantasms always truly represent not the objects themselves, but the effect that such objects have on the senses.

These phantasms therefore, are always in the knower according to the mode of the knower, and not of the thing known; as in transient actions the form from which the external act proceeds is the likeness or form in the mind of the agent, so in immanent acts, such as seeing, the form produced by the external object is the form or likeness whereby the agent sees, etc., so that the intellect is said to know the object itself and not merely the phantasm whereby he knows it. From which it follows that thinking, being an immanent action must terminate in a concept.⁹²

The active intellect which is a habit, as light is a habit⁹³ and is not the passive intellect in act, but whereby objects are made to be in act in the passive intellect, then proceeds to extract from these phantasms, which are individual, the universal species to which they belong and present such to the possible or passive intellect.

Such phantasms are not intelligible themselves, according to Aristotle, who herein differed from Plato, who regarded his "ideas" as actually intelligible from the fact that they were immaterial.

But the passive intellect itself being a true intellectual substance is only concerned with intelligibles, that is to say universals. The species received into the possible intellect is as the thing by which one understands and not as that which is understood. Before being actualized the possible or passive intellect is only

⁹⁰ *S.T.* I, 75.⁹¹ *C.G.* II, 82.⁹² *S.T.* I, 85.⁹³ *C.G.* II, 78.

in potentiality ; it is not in act until invited by the senses or imagination to form general ideas which must have been preceded in the mind by a certain number of particular ideas ; (there are no innate or *a priori* notions). These the possible or passive intellect after consideration presents to the will under some aspect of good, which in turn directs the intellect to some act.

Thus the intellect understands that the Will wills and the Will wills the intellect to understand.

The acts which belong to the intellectual power may be summarized as follows :

Intelligence is the act of apprehension.

Intention is the ordering of what is apprehended to the knowledge of something else or to some operation.

Note.—Intention is also used of the movement of the will, which sets other powers of the soul and itself in motion.

Invention is the search of what is intended.

Wisdom is the examination of what is found with reference to something known.

Interior Speech is thinking about the means of making wisdom known.

External Speech is that proceeding from internal speech.

Synderesis is the first practical principles bestowed on us by nature : common sense.

Habit is a principle of act.

Conscience is the first natural habit of *synderesis*.⁸⁴

Memory, as a power of retaining species, is in the intellect, but as something past, is only in the sensitive part which apprehends individual things (cf., p. 342).

Now the intellect is the form of the body and does not move the body, except through appetite, the movement of which presupposes the operation of the intellect. Thus, Socrates does not understand because he is moved by his intellect, but he is moved by his intellect because he understands. The action of the "motor" is never attributed to the thing moved. (This was before the common use of steam and internal combustion engines.) If Socrates consisted of a motor united to the rest, as a motor, Socrates would not be one absolutely, nor a 'being,' for a thing is a "being" according as it is one. Therefore Intellect is united to body as its form.

Further, man has only one soul, the intellectual soul contains virtually whatever belongs to the sensitive souls of animals and the nutritive soul of plants.

And here it must be noted that St. Thomas, in *S.T.*, II, I, 71, defines "virtually" as meaning in a certain respect ; but Roger

⁸⁴ *S.T.* I, 79.

Bacon gives it a clearer meaning when he says, virtually in the spiritual world is equivalent to that which is quantitative in the corporeal world.⁹⁵

Plato's theory of several souls in liver, heart, and brain, is definitely rejected, as this would involve the soul being united to the body as a motor and not as form. Nevertheless, constant reference is made to the higher and lower parts of the soul or reason, and to those parts which act through a corporeal organ.

Further, Averroes and others held that the possible intellect, by which the soul understands, has a separate being from the body and is not the form of the body. But the one who understands, is the one who has the intellect, and the thing understood, is the thing, whose intelligible species is united to the intellect. Consequently, though the intelligible species is united to the intellect, it would not follow that the man is the one who understands, but only that he is understood by the separate intellect. Moreover, every knower, by its cognitive power is united to its object; therefore man is not united to the intellect by the intelligible form, but by the intellect he is united to the intelligible. Again, Averroes suggested that man derives his species from the passive and not the possible intellect, but the passive is the same as the cogitative power proper to man or the natural estimative power in animals.

It would follow that, as this belongs to the sensitive faculty, to which belong also memory and imagination, an animal cannot be placed in a higher kind of life than the sensitive. Now man is in a higher kind of life, as is shown by Aristotle, who places the intellective, which he ascribes to man, above the sensitive which he ascribes to all animals. Aristotle himself makes it clear that the intellect is not outside the human soul, but is one of its powers.

Alexander (cf., p. 347) tried to make out that the possible intellect is a power in man, not rooted in an intellectual substance, but that it is consequent on the mixture of the elements in the human body, and is a mere preparedness in human nature to receive the inflow of the active intellect. But it is proved against this, that the possible intellect is not confined to any particular sensible nature and consequently not mixed with the body, because it is receptive of all the forms of sensibles and cognisant of them, so that it does not refer to preparedness but to a prepared recipient.

Other opinions have been held, such as that of Galen, who thought the soul to be a temperament, but the operation of the intellect surpasses the power of the active and passive qualities,

⁹⁵ Cf., Ch. XXV. p. 503.

so that temperament cannot be the principle of the soul's operation, and consequently it cannot be the soul. Nor is the soul a harmony, as Empedocles held, according to Gregory of Nyssa, by such harmony is meant not that of sound, but of contraries. Now harmony is either of composition itself, or for the manner of the composition. But the soul is not a composition, or each part would have to be the composition of some part of the body. Nor is it the manner of composition, since in the various parts of the body there are various manners or proportions of composition. Each part of the body would have a distinct soul, which is clearly false. Therefore the soul is not a harmony.⁹⁶

Since the soul is united to the body as its form, the soul is the act of an organic body, not of one organ only. The whole soul then, is in each part of the body by totality of perfection and essence, but not by totality of power. Its relation to the whole is compared primarily and essentially, as to its proper and proportionate perfectible, but as to the parts secondarily, as they are ordained to the whole. On the other hand some of the powers of the soul are in it according as it exceeds the entire capacity of the body, *viz.* Intellect and Will.

Averroes further erred, when he held that there was but one intellect for all men ; since it has been proved that the soul is the form of the body, this one substantial form cannot possibly be in more than this one matter, because the proper act is produced in its proper potentiality and since they are mutually proportionate.

The human souls are individualized in relation to the bodies and not as though their individuality were caused by their bodies.

It thus follows that, unlike angels, who never have bodies, there are many souls of one species and they retain their multiplied existence.

The intellectual soul is also manifold in power although it be one in its essence, for as comprehending universals it has power extending to the infinite. But it does not follow that universals are outside the souls as Plato maintained. For knowledge and thing have not necessarily the same mode of being.

Thus it is not incompatible that though universals do not exist outside the soul, yet that the intellect in understanding universals understands things outside the soul.⁹⁷

Having considered the soul as a subsisting intellectual substance, that it should be united to the body as its form requires some elucidation.

The metaphysical principle is that the less perfect is ordered towards the more perfect as to its end ; every nature desiring its own being and perfection. Each soul is created for the individual

⁹⁶ C.G., II, 57-64.

⁹⁷ C.G., II, 75 and 76.

body with which it is united and the cause of the union must be attributed to God direct, since no other than God can create. The Platonic theory of metempsychosis and of recollection is rejected absolutely, likewise the error of Apollinaris that souls are generated by souls, as bodies are by bodies.⁹⁸

It is the lowest of the intellectual substances, and as M. Gilson puts it "the tendency of the soul to union with the body is so far constitutive of its essence that without it, it is not in complete conformity to nature though not violating nature."

St. Thomas argues at great length that sensitive or vegetal souls are not transmitted by the semen, but only arise from the power or soul force contained in it. Also, that the former succeeds and includes the latter, in the course of the development of the embryo, and that subsequently the rational soul, being a subsistent substantial form is created by God in the composite body, in such a way as to include both the vegetal and sensitive souls.

Whatever may be thought of his conclusions, since they are for the most part based on those arguments prevalent at the time which were drawn from crude and inaccurate information with regard to biology of Aristotle and Galen; coupled with the idea that the sun itself generated the life produced in putrefying matter, it seems best to avoid attaching any weight whatever one way or the other to his arguments and views on this subject.

As to the precise process of production and junction of the soul to the body the modern Thomistic view does not quite coincide with that directly expressed by St. Thomas, as the soul is the act of the body (cf., p. 335) the question turns on the exact date at which, in the course of generation, there can be said to be a body which is capable of being in act; the whole difference then depends on a matter of biology, in the knowledge of which St. Thomas with those of his age was by no means proficient. The matter is very clearly set forth in *Foundations of Thomistic Philosophy*, by A. D. Sertillanges, O.P. (p. 220, English Translation).

Because the soul is incorruptible, it does not follow that all souls were created at the same time as the angels (cf., pp. 327 and 334). Eternity is the term used to express the measure of the existence of incorruptible creatures, which nevertheless being created in time have had a beginning. It does not however follow that, all such as have the attribute of eternal have had a beginning at the same time.^{98a}

Since it has been shown (p. 334) that no intellectual substance is corruptible, it follows that the human soul is incorruptible and therefore that it does not suffer corruption with the body.

⁹⁸ C.G. II, 83-86.

^{98a} *De Potentia Dei*, III, 14, s. 9.

Further, nothing is corrupted on account of that wherein its perfection consists, and that of the soul is in a certain abstraction from the body, for the soul through the intellect is perfected by knowledge and virtue.

Moreover, no form is corrupted except by the action of its contrary, corruption of its subject, or the failure of its cause. The human soul, as form of the body, is not destroyed by its contrary, since by the possible intellect it is cognisant and receptive of all contraries; nor through the corruption of its subject, for the soul is a form independent of the body, as to 'being'; nor by failure of cause, since its end is directed to the First Principle which is God.

Incorporeal substances being subsistent forms, which stand with respect to their own 'being' as potentiality to act, it follows that the soul is in potentiality and as such is subject to accident.

The soul has one essence and several powers, which are distinguished by their acts and objects, but not by the accidents of such. All powers of the soul flow from its essence as from their principle. The essence of the soul is not its power, the soul has essence, power, and operation. Power and act are in the same genus, but operation is not in the genus of substance. As M. Gilson points out, in avoiding making powers either substance or accident St. Thomas really makes them intermediaries between the two (Gilson, *St. Bonaventura*, pp. 329 and 332).

Only those powers of the soul Intellect and Will, which are performed without a corporeal organ, are in the soul itself, the other powers are in the composite body and consequently cease to exist after death, though they remain virtually in the soul as their principle and root.⁹⁹

In the soul five genera of Powers are placed, *vis.* Vegetative, Sensitive, Appetitive, Locomotive, and Intellectual: Appetite being that natural inclination whereby each power desires something suitable for itself. The operation of these powers involves two kinds of change; one is Natural Change, whereby the form of the changer, according to its natural existence, is received into the thing changed; and the other is termed Spiritual Change, whereby the form of the changer is received according to a spiritual mode of existence into the thing changed.

Moreover, the operation of the sense requires a spiritual change, whereby what is termed an "Intention" of the sensible form is effected in the sensible organ: thus the view or sight of an object effects the vision of it in the mind of the seer.

As each sense is only capable of considering such matters as effect it, there are in the sensitive power common sensibles, all

⁹⁹ S.T. I, 77.

reducible to quantity, whereby matters are judged and distinguished as between the respective senses and their actions.

In addition to merely receiving sensible species, the bodily organ of the sensitive power also has to retain them and this is called "Phantasy" or "Imagination."

About these, man by the assistance of his reason is able to exercise his cogitative power, but in animals, their limited power of thinking is called estimative, both of which render possible the use by the sensitive power of memory and all of which in fact belong to the sensitive power (cf., pp. 337 and 361).

Such is the distribution of the powers of the soul by Aristotle, which is fully adopted by St. Thomas; the mode of operation of the intellective power has already been dealt with at page 337.

There is likely to arise some confusion as to how St. Thomas deals with Memory, for while memory, as the power of retaining species is placed in the intellect, memory of something passed, which apprehends individual things, is placed in the sensitive power; this is so because the past, as past, since it signifies 'being' under a condition of fixed time, is something individual; whilst memory which regards its object under the common nature of being belongs to the intellect.¹⁰⁰

Reason and intellect are not considered distinct powers. To understand, is to understand intelligible truth, whilst reason is but to advance from one thing understood to another thing understood, so as to apprehend or know an intelligible truth.

Thus wisdom and science, higher and lower reason, are all but one power distinguished according to functions and habits.

As has been stated, the appetite is the natural inclination by which each power desires something suitable for itself. Now in things without knowledge, their form determines the thing to its own being only, that is to its nature, natural inclination, and natural appetite. But things with knowledge are determined to their natural being, in such a way that it is receptive of the species of other things and the appetitive power inclines to what it knows. Such superior inclination belongs to the appetitive power of the soul and is called "Desire."

Now what is apprehended by the intellect and by sense are generically different, hence the intellectual appetite or Will is a distinct power from the sensitive appetite or Sensuality.

Sensuality is sub-divided into two species of powers, Concupiscible, which desires to acquire what is suitable and avoid what is harmful; and Irascible, which resists attacks, that hinder what is suitable, or inflict harm. These are both subject to reason and Will as well as to imagination and sense.¹⁰¹

¹⁰⁰ S.T. I, 79.

¹⁰¹ S.T. I, 81.

PASSIONS

Whatever receives something is passive, Passion of the soul arises either, when some good is received and some ill taken away, or when some ill is received and some good taken away.

Passion is a kind of movement of the Concupiscible, or the Irascible appetite ; good causing attraction, and evil repulsion. This gives rise to the different kinds of Passion, since they differ according to their active causes, which are the objects of the soul's Passions.

So there are two contrarieties in the Passions of the soul, according to the objects good and evil, and also according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same term : in Concupiscible only the former but in the Irascible both.

From this it follows that with regard to Concupiscible Passions :

(1) Good causes an attraction in the appetitive power, which amounts to an inclination, aptitude, or connaturalness, which is called the Passion of Love.

Evil the contrary, which is the Passion of Hatred.

(2) Good causes a movement of approach or to attainment, which is Desire or Concupiscence.

Evil causes a movement of withdrawal, which is Avoidance or Dislike.

(3) Good, when obtained causes the appetite to rest in Delight, or Joy from the withdrawal of evil.

Evil, when acquired causes the appetite to rest in Pain, or Sorrow from withdrawal of good.

With regard to Irascible Passions :

Future good, which is arduous to obtain, gives rise to Hope.

Future withdrawal of good, which it is difficult to avoid, gives rise to Despair.

Future evil, which it is difficult to avoid, gives rise to Fear.

Future withdrawal of evil, which it is difficult to obtain, gives rise to Daring.

Anger, which is caused by evil, already present, of which it is difficult to get rid, has no direct contrary. It cannot arise from movement of withdrawal, for evil is already present or past, and the opposite of present evil is present good, which can present no difficulty so as to involve Irascibility.

Those Passions are voluntary which are commanded by the Will, or not checked by the Will. Passions are morally good, when checked by reason. Antecedent Passions diminish both good and sin, but consequent Passions increase the good and

aggravate the sin ; this is with reference to Passions occurring both before and after the act of choice.¹⁰²

In man, the sensitive appetite is determined by the cogitative power in so far as the particular sensible reason is moved by the universal reason. Our syllogistic argument starts from the universal premiss, to conclude in a particular proposition, when the sensible object is perceived as good or bad, useful or harmful. The perception of usefulness or harmfulness, in this particular instance, is conditioned by our intellectual knowledge of usefulness and harmfulness in general. So that the object is made to appear pleasing, or otherwise, by our reason acting on the imagination, through the appropriate syllogism.

By reasoning we are able to soothe our anger or allay our fear.¹⁰³

“The soul dominates the body in a despotic way, but the intellect dominates the appetite by a politic or royal power.”¹⁰⁴

At the same time it should be noted that when an animal, under the stress of its irascible appetite, forgets its pleasure in order to desire a victory, unattainable except by pain, it is subject to a power extremely close to that of the order of the Will. In the same way the estimative power of an animal often attains the results analagous to those of the intellect.

WILL

It has already been shown (p. 316) that the object of Will or Rational Appetite is the desirable good. Happiness is man's supreme good. That which is desired as the last end, constitutes happiness, but its attainment is also called happiness. Now natural necessity, according to the inclination of nature, and the necessity of the end or utility, are not repugnant to the Will ; for the necessary, is that which cannot not be and when necessity is imposed on a 'being' by one of its essential principles, whether material or formal, it may be said that the necessity is natural and absolute.

Thus some propositions have a necessary connection with first principles (*e.g.* demonstrable conclusions), the denial of which would involve a denial of first principles. To these the intellect assents of necessity, when it learns the connection of the conclusions with the principles. In some cases, however, such connection is not established and then they are termed contingent propositions. So likewise is it with the Will, for some goods have no necessary connection with happiness and to such the Will does not adhere of necessity ; in other cases, the Will does not adhere until the certainty of the connection is

¹⁰² *S.T.* II, 23 and 24. ¹⁰³ *De Verit.*, XXV, 4. ¹⁰⁴ Aristotle, *Politics*, I.

shown. From this it follows that the Will does not of necessity desire everything that it desires, since good is of many kinds, so that the Will is not determined to one.

Now every appetitive power is determined to its proper object, and that of the Will is for general good, yet the Will is indeterminate as to Choice of Means, which does not belong to the act of the intention of the means. Choice therefore does not regard the end but the means.

But since the imperfections of the Will are such that the Will never finds any but particular good, it is never obliged to will, what it wills, so that it has no compelling end.

It is on account of this, that man does not adhere of necessity to God, the Supreme Good, and to whatever is of God, since man has not a clear view of the Divine Essence. Whereas in the case of the Blessed dead, who are confirmed in Grace, their Will naturally adheres to God.

Further, it is obvious that the Will can never be constrained violently, for violence, by definition, is that which runs counter to the natural inclination of a thing, whilst the act of the Will is nothing but the inclination of the Will to its object. So that constraint or violence would immediately destroy the Will, if they entered into it.

The Will, then, is free from necessity, in fact the contrary would destroy all morality.

Moreover, God in moving voluntary causes, does not deprive their actions of being voluntary, for He operates in each thing according to its own nature.

Will is an active principle, not determinate to one thing, but having an indifferent relation to many things; God so moves it, that He does not determine it of necessity to one thing, but its movement remains contingent, and not necessary, except in those things, to which it is moved naturally.¹⁰⁵

Free Will, then, is a power named from its act and it is not a habit. The act of Free Will is Choice, involving both the cognitive and appetitive powers. Materially, free will is voluntary, formally it is rational; without reason, Will would not be Will but mere desire. Aristotle describes it as either appetitive intellect or intellectual appetite.¹⁰⁶ Choice indeed is a desire proceeding from Counsel; the proper object of such Choice being means to the end.¹⁰⁷

As it is the same power of the soul both to understand and to reason, so it is the same power of the soul to Will and Choose. Therefore Free Will is not a separate power from Will, though willing and choosing are separate acts.

¹⁰⁵ S.T. II, 10.

¹⁰⁶ Cf., p. 95.

¹⁰⁷ S.T. I, 83.

Origen, on the contrary, held that God only caused in us the power to will and not to Will itself.¹⁰⁸

Having considered how the soul is joined to the body, and of what its powers of Intellect and Will consist, attention must now be given to the acts of such powers and the mode of their operation.

To begin with, we must enquire as to what the soul knows of the immaterial.

The expression of St. Augustine that "the mind knows itself by itself," St. Thomas explains as not meaning that the knowledge is of "what it is" but merely "that it is." He quotes Aristotle that "the possible intellect understands itself even as it understands other things."

Now the soul does not know what it is, as a self evident principle, nor by recognizing its own existence to be able to distinguish itself.

But it understands itself by means of an intelligible species of itself, by which it is brought to actual intelligibility. For considered in itself, it is only potentially an intelligible being, and nothing is known according as it is in potentiality, but only according as it is in act. Separate substances indeed, understand by their being, but our intellect only understands, what it is, through the intelligent species, by which it is made actually understanding.¹⁰⁹

So that our mind knows itself by itself, inasmuch as by the very fact that it perceives itself to act, it perceives itself to exist, and since it acts by itself, it knows by itself, that it exists. In short it perceives "that it is" and not "what it is."

In this way, the soul, by knowing itself, knows of separate substances "that they are," but not "what they are," which is to understand their substance. Consequently the science about the soul's intelligence can be used as a principle on which to establish all our knowledge about separate substances.

So that, as through the soul we perceive its acts and seek, by a study of its acts and their objects, to know "what it is" through the principles of speculative science; so too concerning those things which are in our soul, namely its powers and habits, we know indeed that they are, since we perceive their acts, but what they are, we gather from the nature of such acts.¹¹⁰

St. Thomas strenuously denies that in this life our intellect can attain to the knowledge of any separated intellectual substance. Avempace had maintained the contrary, and held that the intellect could extract the quiddity of a thing, which has quiddity without being its quiddity, therefore our intellect can arrive at knowing

¹⁰⁸ C.G. III, 2, 89.

¹⁰⁹ Cf., p. 341.

¹¹⁰ C.G. III, 1, 46.

a quiddity that has no quiddity and such is the quiddity of a separate substance (*sic*). So that through its knowledge of sensibles, that is acquired from phantasms, our intellect can arrive at understanding separate substances.

But to all this, St. Thomas objects that, since the idea as such is a universal, the quiddity of an idea must be the quiddity of a universal, namely genus or species, which includes matter and form, and consequently quite unlike the quiddity of a separate substance, which is simple and immaterial.¹¹¹

Further, Alexander of Aphrodisia (300–200 B.C.), through holding that our intellect was subject to generation and corruption, thought we were able to understand separate substances; apparently on the basis that, since when generation is completed, the operation of a thing is perfected, like an animal, which when quite perfect can walk by itself, so we, by understanding all sensible things and thus acquiring their intelligible species and then by understanding ourselves, can understand separate substances by our habitual intellect. But, though when the generation of a genus is perfected, its operation must be perfected, yet it is in keeping with the mode of that genus, and not of a higher, genus.¹¹²

St. Augustine proves the immortality of the soul from the eternity of truth which is in the soul.

Truth is not only in the soul, in the same way as God is said to be in all things by His essence, a thing being true in so far as it is like God; but the soul is said to be true, in its nature according as it is likened to supreme nature, which is truth itself. Since it is its own being understood by itself, so too that which is known by the soul is true, so far as it bears a likeness to that divine truth which God knows. So that, although different things are known and different things believed to be true by different people, yet some truths there are, in which all men agree, such as first principles of the speculative and of the practical intellect, in as much as a kind of image of the divine truth is reflected in the minds of all men. (The accuracy of the reflection being increased by the amount of divine light received into the soul, *e.g.* Light of the World.)

Yet the knowledge of "what God is" that can be gathered from the human mind does not surpass the knowledge gathered from sensible things, since even the soul knows what itself is, through understanding the nature of sensible things. Consequently, even in this way, God is not known in a higher fashion than the cause is known from its effect.

As we have seen on pages 333, 341 and 344 there is in all things

¹¹¹ C.G. III, 1, 41.

¹¹² C.G. III, 1, 42.

a desire for good. Happiness means the acquisition of the last end, and St. Thomas rejects the arguments that happiness lies either in wealth, honour, fame, power, in the goods of the body, or in pleasure, which is properly an accident resulting from happiness.¹¹³

It follows that good is the end of each thing, for everything is directed by its action to its end : since either the action itself is an end, or the end of the action is also the end of the agent and this is its good. Also the end of a thing is the term of its appetite, and the appetite of a thing terminates in a good, therefore the end of everything is a good. Consequently that which is the supreme good, is the supreme end of all, which is God.

But God is the First Agent and since the end effected by the agent's acts cannot be the First Agent, but rather its effect, God cannot be the end as something effective, but only as something already existing and to be acquired. Now since the agent is said to be the end of the effect, for as much as the effect tends to be like the agent, it follows that all things tend to a likeness to God as their last end. Properly speaking the aspect of the end is the good, and things tend to become like to God in as much as He is good.

Creatures, however, do not attain to goodness in the way in which it is in God, but each imitates it according to its mode.

God's Being is His Essence and He is His Goodness and He alone is His Own Being, hence each thing is good by having a share of good, as each is 'being' by having a share of 'being.' Whilst 'being' is predicated of a thing absolutely, good is founded on Order, for a thing is said to be good not merely because it is an end or possesses an end, but even though it has not attained an end, so long as it is directed to an end, for this reason it is said to be good.

Hence matter, which cannot be called a 'being' absolutely, because it is potential being, whereby it has been shown to have an Order towards 'being', is called good absolutely, on account of this very Order.

Thus good in a sense extends further than 'being,' for which reason Dionysius says, that good includes both existing and non-existing things.¹¹⁴ For even non-existing things, namely matter, considered as subject to privation, seeks a good namely to exist.

Further, God is His very being and has supreme perfection of goodness, whereas the creature has its perfection not in one thing, but in many, because what is united in the highest is manifold in the lowest.

¹¹³ S.T. II, 1.

¹¹⁴ Cf., p. 27, 309.

Wherefore, although each is good, in as much as it exists, it cannot be called good absolutely if it lacks other things that are required for its goodness; thus a man, who being despoiled of virtue is addicted to vice, is said to be good in a restricted sense, in so far as he is a 'being' and is a man, but not absolutely, in fact, he should be called evil.

It follows, therefore, that things are directed to God as their end, not only in respect of substantial 'being,' but also in respect of such things as are accidental thereto and belong to their perfection, and, moreover, in respect of their proper operation, which also belongs to a thing's perfection.¹¹⁵

The essence of happiness consists in an act of the intellect, but the delight that results from happiness pertains to the Will, for the intellect apprehends the end before the Will, yet the motion towards the end begins in the Will.

Therefore, that which last of all follows attainment of the end namely delight in enjoyment, belongs to the Will.

Happiness consists in an operation of the speculative rather than the practical intellect (the latter is ordained to good outside itself, but the former has the good within itself) by a contemplation of truth, and if this good be perfect the whole man is perfected and made good thereby.¹¹⁶

Therefore, the last perfect happiness, which we await in the life to come, consists entirely in Contemplation on the Vision of the Divine Essence.¹¹⁷

HABIT

As has been shown, the Will has free choice of the means, and it must therefore be further determined in what way such choice is reached. Choice proceeds from counsel (p. 345). In arriving at such choice, in addition to the knowledge and understanding in the passive intellect, it is further influenced by the very nature of the active intellect, which is dependent on the nature of the man himself. This consists not only of his human nature, but also such disposition called Habit, added to or modifying the very substance of the man. "The Habit of a being determines the manner in which he realizes his own definition; that is how far he realizes his own essence and how far he is from his proper goal."¹¹⁸

If his habit approximates him to the ideal type to which he tends, it is a good habit; if it removes him from it, it is a bad habit. They are defined by Aristotle as "dispositions according to which a subject is well or ill disposed." Habit is the first

¹¹⁵ C. G. III, 18-20.

¹¹⁶ Cf., Ch. XX, p. 294.

¹¹⁷ S. T. II, 3.

¹¹⁸ Cf., p. 68.

species of quality in respect of the very nature of the subject. In practice it is distinguished from disposition as being difficult rather than easy to change. In the soul it is a quality, which resides in its powers. Some habits are in some way natural or innate; in the intellect, such as the understanding of first principles; or in the will, these principles of habit which are the principles of rectitude and are named the seeds of virtue, though these are only principles of habit, because inclination, the beginning of habit, does not belong to the habit but to the "appetitive power" itself. Or again, in the body according to individual temperaments, *e.g.* naturally prone to gentleness.

As a general rule, habits arise more from our acts than natural dispositions. The subject does not all at once acquire a firm disposition, changed only with difficulty: the habit begins by being imperfectly in the subject and is gradually little by little perfected by increase in extent.¹¹⁹

Everything that is passive and moved is disposed by the action of the agent, wherefore, if acts be multiplied, a certain quality is formed in the power which is passive and moved which is entirely overcome by such active principle, such quality is called a habit. Because in such acts there is a passive as well as active principle, numerous such acts can produce a habit in a power.

God, in respect of His Nature, is the same to all; in respect of the Order of His Wisdom, for some fixed motive, God gives certain things to some which He does not give to others. Though God's power is always united to act, for operation is Divine Essence, yet the effects follow as His Will commands and His Wisdom orders. God works in all according to their mode, but that does not hinder God from doing what Nature cannot do: but it follows from this that He does nothing contrary to that which is suitable to Nature. Acts produced by such infused habits, do not cause a habit, but strengthen an existing habit.¹²⁰ But since habit must be in its subject, it is distinct from that to which it is disposed, as potentiality to act. In God Himself, Who is Pure Act, there is no habit.

Considerable diversity of opinion has been held at various times as to the increase of habits. St. Thomas advances the proposition "That from which a thing receives its species must remain indivisibly fixed and constant in something indivisible."

A form cannot be participation more or less. First, because the participation has its species in respect of that form, so that no substantial form is participated more or less, for it would alter the species except in respect of material disposition. Secondly, where the form is essentially indivisible, so that if anything

¹¹⁹ S.T. II, 53.

¹²⁰ S.T. III, 51.

participate in that form, it must participate in respect of its indivisibility. *E.g.* Numbers, continuous relations of and figures of quantity respectively: as two cubits long, double, or circle. A thing, that is two, or a circle, cannot be more or less; as two more or less, or more or less a circle, or more or less a triangle. Hence there are two ways of intensity or remission in habits; first of the habit itself, greater or less health, or second, in respect of participation by the subject, as good health is participated more in one person than in another.

Habit itself gives neither species nor indivisibility to the subject; it is in fact a perfection and not a term. "Like acts cause habits," according to Aristotle. If the act of will is equal to or greater than the habit, the act increases the habit, but if less it lessens it. Habits diminish in the same way as they increase; either the habit itself or the participation of the subject.¹²¹

As to the destruction of habits a form is corrupted, by its contrary, or indirectly through its subject being corrupted. When a habit has a corruptible subject, and a cause that has a contrary, it can be corrupted in both ways, *e.g.* health and sickness; but habits that have an incorruptible subject cannot be corrupted indirectly. There are, however, some habits which reside chiefly in an incorruptible subject, but reside secondarily in a corruptible subject. The habit of science, for instance, resides chiefly in the passive intellect, but secondarily in that power of apprehension, which is the sensitive power commanded by reason. It is, therefore, only corruptible on the part of the lower sensitive power.

Again, both intelligible species residing in the passive intellect as also the active intellect, the cause of species, have no contrary; so that First Principles both speculative and practical cannot be corrupted by forgetting or being deceived. On the other hand, the habit of Conclusion, is caused by reason, to the cause of which there may be contraries, either on the part of the proposition, which is the starting point of reason, or on the part of the reasoning, as a sophistical syllogism is contrary to a dialectical syllogism. Whence science or the habit of conclusion is destroyed through being deceived.

As to virtues which are habits, the intellectual reside in reason itself. Moral virtues reside in the appetitive part of the soul and are caused therein because it is natural to be moved by reason. These, therefore, may be corrupted by judgment of reason, when its motion is contrary, whether influenced by ignorance, passion, or deliberate choice.

Habits, as has been said, are dispositions of a thing that is in.

¹²¹ S.T. II, 1, 52.

potentiality to something, either to nature or to operations which is the end of nature, the media between pure power and completed act.¹²²

Of those powers which are dispositions as to nature, several can be in the same subject at the same time, as in one subject parts may be taken in various ways, parts of the body as to health or beauty.

Of those habits which are disposition to operation and belong properly to powers, several can be in one power at the same time.

Several objects can move one passive power, so that it can be the subject of several acts specifically diverse. Now habits are qualities or forms adhering to a power and inclining it to acts of a determinate species. Hence several habits, even as several specifically different acts can belong to one power. And though the intellect can only understand one thing at a time actually, yet it can know more than one thing habitually at the same time. "Since the end in practical matters is the principle in speculative matters."¹²³ The diversity of ends demands diversity of virtues, even as does diversity of active principles. Such ends are the objects of internal acts with which virtues are concerned.

It follows, then, that habits, distinguished specifically by the difference good or bad, are so distinguished according to reason and nature; good habits are those which are consonant with such, whilst bad habits, on the other hand, are distinct in their diverse repugnance to that which is in keeping with reason and nature.

So that there are many vices about one and the same matter, all of which are contrary to but one virtue.¹²⁴

HUMAN ACTS

Having dealt with Intellect and Will as powers of the soul and habit as a quality which resides in such, it follows that the operations or acts which result therefrom must be brought into review.

And here it may be noted that as 'Person is an individual substance of a rational nature,' according to Boethius (cf., Chap. XXII, p. 377) the actuality of the reasonable soul in communicating itself to the body determines the existence of the individual, who is a person, so that the individual soul possesses personality as by definition.

It is the person, which, destitute in its essence, ceaselessly enriches itself with new knowledge, new moral habits, that is to say virtue, and with practical habits, that is to say arts, and thus

¹²² S.T. III, 11.

¹²³ *Ethics*, VII.

¹²⁴ S.T. II, 54.

gradually building itself up issues in human operations, the most perfect of which are termed the masterpieces of sage, hero, artist or saint.

Now the circumstances of an act are whatever conditions there are outside the substance of an act, and yet in some ways touch the human act and are therefore termed the accident of the human act.

As man is directed to happiness by human act and such should be proportionate to that end, the due circumstances, which give rise to the commensurateness by which acts are said to proportionate have to be considered.

Human acts, likewise depend on circumstances as to being good or evil, better or worse; and further depend on whether they are voluntary or involuntary from the knowledge or ignorance of the agent as to circumstances.

Circumstances touch the act itself, as Cicero says: *quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando*. And first with regard to fortuitous circumstances, it is observed that according to the definition of nature its effect is that of 'generally and for the most part'; so likewise acts which seldom or rarely occur are denominated as being caused by Chance or Luck. St. Thomas accepts this definition and instances corruption and defectible use of power in nature as being examples of chance. He likewise reduces the concerted actions of an indefinite number of causes to chance, which seems strange in dealing with the Omniscient Power. One cannot help bearing in mind Professor Eddington's reflections on chance as a true cause, and his illustration of a cartload of monkeys let loose for an indefinite period in a paper warehouse provided with typewriters ever producing the works contained in the Library of the British Museum.¹²⁵

Heavenly bodies are not the cause of things concerning our intellect, as the latter is higher than any body, and in the sense employed by Aristotle it is outside of movement properly speaking.¹²⁶ Further heavenly bodies being singular sensibles, they are not actually intelligible and are likewise subject to time. But the intellect is intelligible and "abstracts" from time and place, for it considers the universal, which abstracts from the here and now. Intellect is not sense as held by Democritus and Empedocles and others.

The intellect does not merely receive images of bodies as the Stoics held, so as to be bound by their impressions, but as Boethius shows it transcends bodies, being capable of synthesis and analysis and cognitive of universals and simple forms.

But since the intellect in us cannot be exercised without the operation of the bodily forces of imagination, memory and

¹²⁵ *Nature of the Physical World*.

¹²⁶ 7, *Phys.*, III.

thought,¹²⁷ if these be hampered, so likewise is the activity of the intellect.¹²⁸ As Damascene says, "the various planets produce in us various temperaments, habits, and dispositions."¹²⁹

Since the will is in the intellectual part of the soul, the heavenly bodies cannot directly affect the cause of our willing or choosing.

Ptolemy is quoted in the saying "the astrologer should not express himself in detail, but only in general terms; because the majority resist not their bodily dispositions, but not always for this or that individual, may be, uses his reason to resist that inclination."¹³⁰

Further, since the impressions of universal causes are received by their effects, according to the mode of the recipient, and since the things of this world are fluctuating and changing, by reason of matter being in potentiality to various forms, and on account of the contrariety of forms and powers, it follows that the impressions of heavenly bodies are not received of necessity by these lower bodies.

A remote cause does not lead to a necessary result, unless the middle cause be also necessary.

Many contingencies do not make one necessary thing. Aristotle denies that contingent things, being accidental, have any *per se* cause, but only those things which exist *per se*. To be musical as well as white, is not due to any cause, since accidental things are not mutually dependent.

With regard to the Platonic and Arabian opinions, that the heavenly bodies are moved by their own souls; against Avicenna, it is argued, that one human intellect only affects another through the means of the body's voice and hearing; hence the heavenly bodies' souls could only affect the human soul through the human body; as to the lack of necessary result proof has already been given above. On the other hand, if it acts directly on the human soul, then the movements of the heavenly body have nothing to do with it.¹³¹

Again, since the good understood is the proximate moving cause of the Will, no created substance can move the Will except by persuading the Will that a particular thing is the good understood. But since the Will's desire is satisfied by the Divine good alone, as its last end, God alone can move the Will as an agent.¹³²

"Human affairs are to be referred to higher causes and do not happen by chance, for acts of choice and will are under the immediate governance of God."¹³³

¹²⁷ Sed., cf., 341-342.

¹³⁰ C.G. III, 2, 85.

¹³³ S.T. I, 115.

¹²⁸ S.T. I, 115.

¹³¹ C.G. III, 2, 87.

¹²⁹ C.G. III, 2, 84.

¹³² C.G. I, 37.

Human knowledge pertaining to the intellect is directed by God, through angelic intermediaries. While things pertaining to the body, whether internal or external and adapted to man's use, are governed by God by means of the angels and heavenly bodies (*e.g.*, tides and seasons).

There is one general reason for this: everything that is multiform, changeable, and defectible must be referred to a principle, that is uniform, unchangeable, and indefectible. And everything connected with us is multiform, changeable and defectible. In this way God alone is the cause of our willing and choosing" (cf., Isa. XXVI, 12: "Oh Lord Thou has wrought all our works in us").¹³⁴

God's action alone has a direct bearing on a man's choice, nevertheless the angel's action has a bearing by way of persuasion and a heavenly body by way of disposition. As to the latter, since it is by way of nature, which tends to one thing, but when two things are united together accidentally they are not really one, but only accidentally. Hence no natural cause can be the *per se* cause of such conjunction. Whereas one that acts through the intellect, can cause an inclination to this whole, because it belongs to an intelligent being to direct many things to one.

In this way, fortuitous events when referred to divine causality cease to be fortuitous, but not, when they are referred to a heavenly cause. It is in this way that a man is said to be fortunate or the reverse.¹³⁵

What happens here by accident, both in natural things and in human affairs is reduced to the preordaining cause of Divine Providence, for, as has been said, intellect can consider what happens by accident as one. Thus fate is Providence and essentially, fate is the series or order of "second" causes.

Fate, then, in regard to second causes is changeable, but as regards Providence it is unchangeable, since it is of conditional necessity. Fate, in short, is the ordering of "second causes" to effects foreseen of God.¹³⁶

To Providence belong both plan and government, which include secondary causes as executors of His Order.

Divine Providence is the *per se* cause of a future effect and although it is present and past, yet it is more truly eternal; but it does not follow that a particular effect will be of necessity, for the Divine Providence may be the *per se* cause, that this particular effect will happen contingently.

Consequently, it belongs to His Providence sometimes to allow defectible causes to fail and sometimes to preserve them from failure.

¹³⁴ C.G. III, 2, 89.

¹³⁵ C.G. III, 2, 92.

¹³⁶ S.T. I, 116.

Second causes are not inconsistent with Providence, in fact they accomplish the effect of Providence.

Accordingly, prayers are efficacious before God, not that they upset the unchangeable order of Divine Providence, since even the granting of each supplicant's prayer is included in the order of Divine Providence.

All error on this matter is attributed to overlooking the difference between universal and particular orders.

For since all effects are ordained to one another, for as much as they have one common cause, this order must needs be the more general, as the cause is more universal. Hence the order appointed by the universal cause, which is God, must of necessity include all things.

There is nothing, therefore, to prevent a particular order being changed through prayer or in some other manner, because there is outside that order something that can change it.

Those, who like the Stoics, held prayers to be altogether useless, failed to consider the universal order, in that they imply that man's volitions and desires, which led him to pray are not included in the universal order. If they are contained in that order, effects will follow through the Divine Ordinance from these as from other causes.

If the unchangeableness of the Divine Order does not deprive the causes of their efficiency, neither does it destroy the efficacy of prayer.¹³⁷

We pray, that we may impetrate that which God has disposed to be fulfilled by our prayers.

Reasons why petitions are not granted, are instanced on account of the petition of some apparent good being in fact otherwise; or since God moves us to desire, if the movement be not continued by repeated prayer; or, if unaccompanied by contemplation, devout affection, and humble but firm resolution.¹³⁸

God by His Providence directs all things to His Goodness, as to their end, not indeed as though His Goodness gained anything from the things that are made, but in order that the likeness of His Goodness may be impressed on things as far as possible. Since every created substance must needs fall short of the perfection of the Divine Goodness, in order that it might be more perfectly bestowed, there was created diversity among them, so that it might be more perfectly represented in various ways by things of various kinds, which include second causes.

In addition to circumstances, human acts depend on whether

¹³⁷ *S.T.* II, 2, 83.

¹³⁸ *C.G.* III, 2, 96.

they are voluntary or involuntary according to the knowledge or ignorance of the agent, as stated on page 353.

As to ignorance, St. Thomas clearly distinguishes ignorance that is concomitant, which causes non-voluntariness, when it makes no difference to the act, from ignorance that is consequent to the act of the Will, either through not wishing to know something, that is affected ignorance, or ignorance of evil choice when it regards what can and ought to be known and which arises from passion, habit, or negligence; in the latter cases not to act and not to will are said to be voluntary.

Ignorance that is antecedent, is that which is in no way voluntary and yet is the cause of willing that which would not otherwise be willed.

Acts take their species from their object and in morals the end is what the principle is.

The object of an act is not the matter "of which," but the matter "about which," and stands in relation to action as its form, through giving to it its species.

Human action has goodness in a fourfold manner :

(1) Goodness derived from its genus, in as much as it has fullness of action and 'being.'

(2) Goodness according to its species, which is derived from the essential suitability of its object.

(3) Goodness from its circumstances, in respect, as it were, from its accidents.

(4) Goodness from its end, to which it is compared as to the cause of its goodness.

Human actions are predicated good or evil in reference to reason.

Human action is called moral in as much as it proceeds from reason, hence good and evil diversify species in human actions; if in accordance with reason, it is good; if repugnant to reason, it is bad.¹³⁹

The end is last in execution, but first in intention of reason, in regard to which moral actions receive their species.

Goodness of Will depends on reason, in the same way as it depends on the object.

But goodness of Will depends more on Eternal Law than on human reason. Although the Eternal Law, as it is in the Divine Mind, is unknown to us, yet it is known in part by natural reason, which is derived therefrom, as its proper image or by some sort of additional revelation. And though, absolutely speaking every Will at variance with reason, whether right or erring is always evil, yet though Eternal Law cannot err, human reason can. So

¹³⁹ S.T. II, 18.

that the Will that abides by human reason is not always right, nor always in accordance with Eternal Law.¹⁴⁰

This has to be maintained to obviate the consequences of the refusal to accept more than one power of intellect, a term which is variously employed to cover "soul," "intellect," "higher reason," "lower reason," and even intellect and Will combined.¹⁴¹

The amount of the goodness of the Will can be measured, as to quantity, by the object of the act and the intensity of the act.

With regard to the object, if external, the measure is as to its due proportion to the end, or on account of obstacles; or if internal, as to the proportion alone, thus the Will may not be so good as the intention, but the intention redounds to the goodness of the Will.

With regard to intensity, the intensity of intention redounds upon interior and exterior acts of the Will, yet the merit is measured by the intensity of the act rather than that of the intention.

The goodness of the Will depends on the intention of the end, and the last end of the human Will is the sovereign good, which is God. The good, then, is primarily compared to the Divine Will, which is its proper object. Since that which is first in a genus is the measure and rule of all that belongs to that genus, everything attains to rectitude and goodness as far as it is in accord with its proper measure.

Therefore, in order that man's Will be good, it needs to be conformed to the Divine Will, not that this can be by way of equality, but by way of imitation only.

If a man's Will wills a thing to be according as it appears to be good, it is good, since Will follows the apprehension of reason and intellect. But the more universal the aspect of the apprehended good, the more universal will be the good to which the Will tends. Now what God wills is under the aspect of His Own Goodness, which is the good of the whole Universe. But the apprehension of the creature, according to its nature, is of some particular good proportionate to that nature. Hence various Wills of various men can be good in respect of opposite things. But the particular good must be referred to the common good or end.

The end supplies the formal reason of what is willed, so that man must will a particular good, materially, and Divine Good, formally.

It is conformed to the Divine Will, as the last end, and as to the thing materially as efficient cause; since the proper inclination according to nature or to a particular apprehension of some particular thing comes to a thing from God as its efficient cause.

¹⁴⁰ *S.T.* II, 19.

¹⁴¹ *S.T.* I, 79.

Hence, a man's Will is conformed to the Divine Will, because it wills what God wishes him to will. Likewise in what is willed from Charity, this conformity is reduced to formal conformity of the last end, which is the proper object of Charity.

To be good a thing must be good in every respect, but it is evil if evil in only one. If the Will be good, as to its object and end, then the external act is good, but if the Will be evil, as to intention of end or act willed (the object), the external act is evil.¹⁴²

VIRTUE

Mention has been made on page 351 of intellectual and moral virtues as being habits, so that having considered the powers of the soul, the end of man, and the human acts directed thereto depending on good and evil, circumstance, and volition, we now have to consider the virtues whereby those powers are perfected.

Virtue is primarily an accident, denoting a perfection of a power. Rational powers are not determinate to one particular action, but are determinate to acts by habits: hence human virtues are operative habits.

St. Augustine defines virtue as "a good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God forms in us without us."

St. Thomas analyses this definition by explaining that as to the Formal Cause of Virtue, the genus is that of quality, and the difference is that of good defined by reason, and not merely that good, which is used as a term convertible with 'being.'

The Material Cause of virtue is accident, which has no matter "out of which" it is formed, but it has matter "in which" it exists, as its subject, *viz.* the mind, and it has matter "about which" it is concerned, as its object. The latter is not here specified, since the object fixes the species of the virtue, and this is a definition of virtue in general.

The Final Cause, since virtue is an operative habit, is operation.

Now since operative habits may be good, such as virtue, or evil, such as a vicious habit, or both, such as opinion; the definition clearly sets the distinction of virtue amongst operative habits, as being a good one and not a bad one, by specifying "by which we live righteously," and again as distinguishing from those which are both good and bad, by saying "of which no one makes bad use."

The Efficient Cause of virtue is God, and this is expressed by "which God forms in us without us," our consent is implied only in our power to refuse or neglect it.¹⁴³

¹⁴² S.T. II, 19, 20.

¹⁴³ S.T. II, 55.

Since diversity of powers follows the generic conditions of objects, and diversity of habit follows the specific conditions of objects, it follows that one virtue cannot be equally in two powers ; yet it may be in two or more powers in a certain order, as chiefly in one and extended to another by "diffusion" or by way of disposition, as when one power is moved by another or receives from another.

Whilst science and art produce aptness, virtue makes the work actually good, and hence must be in the Will, or in some power moved by the Will ; but in a relative sense, virtue may be in the practical and in the speculative intellect, without reference to the Will.

The irascible and concupiscible powers can be subject to human virtue, in so far as they participate in reason, for such virtue is nothing but habitual conformity to reason. For as Aristotle says "the soul rules the body by a despotic command, but reason rules the irascible and concupiscible powers by a political command."¹⁴⁴

Whilst the object of the Will is the good of reason proportionate to the Will, the Will does not need virtue to perfect it. But as to good, which exceeds its capacity, as regards the whole human species, like Divine Good, which transcends the limits of human nature, or as regards the individual, like the good of a neighbour, will does need virtue, *e.g.* charity, justice, and moral virtues.

There are then Intellectual, Moral, and Theological Virtues.

And first of *Intellectual Virtues* these are : Wisdom, Science, Understanding, and Prudence.

Now Truth considered in itself, is as a principle and is immediately understood by the intellect. Understanding is that habit of the intellect that perfects it for the consideration of truth. Truth, considered as known through another, is not understood at once by the intellect, but by reason's enquiry and is as a term, either as it is last in some genus, or the ultimate term of human knowledge.

This gives rise to the saying of Aristotle, "things that are knowable last, from our standpoint, are knowable first and chiefly in their nature."¹⁴⁵ Here Lewes points out that the Schoolmen translated τῆ φύσει γνωριμώτερον, as *notius naturae*, instead of *notius natura*, as though Nature's knowledge were contrasted with our own. The simple point being, that in induction, a conclusion is arrived at from particulars already known ; and in demonstration, it is the conclusion which is already known that is the starting point.¹⁴⁶

Wisdom considers the highest causes, hence it judges all things

¹⁴⁴ *Polit.*, I. ¹⁴⁵ *Cf.*, p. 55. ¹⁴⁶ *History of Philosophy*, Lewes, I, 295.

and sets them in order, for there is no perfect and universal judgment, that is not based on first causes.

Science perfects the intellect, as to that which is last in this or that genus of knowable matter. Thus science depends on Understanding and they both depend on wisdom.

As Art is the right reason of things to be *made* (where the action passes to outward matter) so Prudence is the right reason of things to be *done* (where the action abides in the agent).

Prudence, then, is an intellectual virtue in the reason, to perfect it in giving good counsel, or making a good choice, and hence is necessary for a good life, which consists of good deeds done a right, from a right cause.

Memory, Understanding, and Foresight are secondary virtues, being parts of Prudence (cf., pp. 337 and 342).

Now Truth of the speculative intellect depends on conformity of intellect and thing; and since the intellect is only infallible, in conformity with necessary matter, and not with contingent matter, the speculative habit is only about necessary things.

On the other hand, Truth of the practical intellect depends on conformity of the intellect with a right appetite. Now the Human Will is only concerned with contingent matters, whether of interior action or of external work, so that intellectual virtue in the practical intellect is in connection with contingent matters alone.¹⁴⁷

Moral Virtues are in the Appetitive Powers and are habits in conformity with reason.

Moral virtue can be without wisdom, science, or art, but not without prudence and understanding; at the same time prudence can be without moral virtue. "Such as a man is, such does the end seem to him."¹⁴⁸ Moral virtue as compared with passion may be summarized as follows: Passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite, whereas, moral virtue is not a movement, but a habit the principle of movement of the appetite.

The movement of passion begins in the appetite and ends in the reason, since appetite tends to conformity with reason; whereas, the movement of virtue begins in reason and ends in appetite, as the latter is moved by reason. Since virtue is referrable to good alone, virtue is freedom from passions that are out of order or out of time.

The Stoics did not discriminate between the intellective appetite, that is the Will, and the sensitive appetite, hence all passions of the soul were held to be incompatible with virtue.

Moral virtues take their species from their proximate ends, and are all about passions, except Justice, which is about operation.

¹⁴⁷ S.T. II, 57.

¹⁴⁸ *Ethics*, III.

There is not a different virtue for each passion, for some are contraries as joy and sorrow, and there is but one virtue which is a mean, Temperance.

Different concupiscible passions conflict with reason, in the same manner and require but one virtue, but they follow order, e.g. love, desire, pleasure, on the one hand, and hatred, avoidance, and sorrow on the other.

Irascible passions are not all of one order, daring and fear are about danger, hope and despair about difficult good, and anger about what has caused harm. Hence there is Temperance about concupiscible passions; Fortitude about fear and daring; Magnanimity about hope and despair; and Meekness about anger.

The objects of passions as related to sensitive appetite cause the species of the passion: and the objects of passion as related to reason cause the species of the virtues.

Hence, one single object of passion, according as it is apprehended by sense, imagination, or reason, or as it belongs to soul, body, or external things, has various relations to reason, and consequently causes specific differences or virtues.

Hence there are ten moral virtues about passions: fortitude, temperance, liberality, magnificence (good taste in spending money), magnanimity, honour, gentleness, friendship, truthfulness and *εὐτραπέλια φιλοτιμὰ* (graceful wit, or pleasure in games).

In addition there is one moral virtue about operations—Justice.¹⁴⁹

Of these the four Cardinal Virtues are: Prudence, Justice, Temperance, and Fortitude.

The formal principle of virtue is "good as defined by reason," from whence are derived four formal principles, which give rise to these four virtues. Where the good is regarded, as existing in the very act of reason, the virtue is Prudence: as reason puts its order into operation, Justice: as reason puts its order into passions that thwart reason, Temperance: and as reason puts its order into passions which withdrew us from following the dictates of reason, Fortitude.

So likewise these have four subjects:

Prudence is in the power which is rational in its essence;

Justice, in the power that is rational by participation in the Will;

Temperance, in the power that is rational by participation in the Concupiscible power;

Fortitude, in the power that is rational by participation in the Irascible power.

¹⁴⁹ S.T. II, 60.

Further, these virtues are exemplars :

Prudence of the Divine Mind ;

Temperance of God's gaze, which conforms the appetite to reason ;

Fortitude or unchangeableness ;

Justice of the Eternal Law.

Moreover these virtues have four social effects in perfecting human affairs :

Prudence directs thoughts to God ;

Temperance neglects the body ;

Fortitude prevents fear from neglecting thoughts of God ;

Justice whole-hearted consent to thoughts of God.

Finally these virtues, when perfect, produce four effects :

Prudence sees only God ;

Temperance has no earthly desire ;

Fortitude has no passion ;

Justice imitates the Divine Mind, which is what is attributed to the Blessed.¹⁵⁰

The Theological Virtues are Faith, Hope and Charity.

Happiness surpassing man's nature ("partakers of Divine Nature," 2 Peter, I, 4) requires virtues beyond those of which the human soul is capable and these are the theological virtues, which are bestowed directly by God.

These virtues are called theological, because they direct us to God ; they are infused by God alone ; and they are made known to us by Divine Revelation alone.

They are not "exemplar" but "exemplate" virtues.

They are distinct as having God for the last end : as regards Intellect, in Faith held by Divine Light ; as regards Will, as to movement of intention in Hope ; and as to spiritual union, whereby the Will is so to speak transformed into that end, by Charity.

Two things pertain to appetite, movement to and conformity with the end, and in both these cases the means is the Love of Charity.¹⁵¹

As to the cause of virtues, since each thing derives its species from its form and its individuation from matter, and man's form is his soul and matter is his body, man's specific nature belongs to his soul and his particular temperament to his body.

Virtue is natural to man inchoatively : as to his specific nature, with regard to naturally known principles of knowledge and action, which are the seeds of intellectual and moral virtues, and in so far as there is in the Will a natural appetite to good,

¹⁵⁰ S.T. II, 61.

¹⁵¹ S.T. II, 62.

in accordance with reason : and as to his individual nature, with regard to a natural aptitude for science, fortitude and temperance, by the disposition of his body, because certain sensitive powers are helped or hindered thereby, and in consequence the rational powers, which those sensitive powers assist.

So that in both ways intellectual and moral virtues are in man inchoatively by a natural aptitude, but, not perfectly, since nature is determined to one ; while the perfection of virtues depend on various modes, matters, and circumstances.

On the other hand, theological virtues are, as has been stated, entirely infused by God.

Now the notion of good consists in Mode, Species, and Order, according to St. Augustine, or as expressed in the Book of Wisdom, Number, Weight, and Measure (Wisdom XI, 21 Vulgate).

Hence there are two rules, human reason and Divine Law, from which it follows, that human virtue is directed to human good, and that infused virtue alone is directed to Divine Good. So that acquired and infused virtues differ in species.

Good is in accordance with rule and measure, and evil is discordant with such, either by exceeding or falling short of it. Moral virtue consists in conformity with reason, between excess and deficiency, the mean is equality or conformity. But if compared with reason itself, it is an extreme, conformity as opposed to deformity ; whilst if compared, in respect of its matter, with passions and operations, it holds the mean position of conformity to reason.

Again, the measure of theological virtue is twofold, first from the nature of the virtue itself, the measure is God Himself. The measure of Faith is according to Divine Truth ; the measure of Charity is according to His Goodness ; and the measure of Hope according to the Immensity of His Omnipotence and Loving Kindness, which surpasses all human power and therefore in respect of which there can be no need.

Second, by comparison with ourselves, according to the measure of our condition, so that, there can be extreme and a mean in theological virtues accidentally in reference to ourselves, as Hope is a mean between presumption and despair.

As all moral virtues are dependent on Prudence, one cannot have one virtue without having all ; as to magnificence and magnanimity, if prevented by circumstance, one is regarded as possessing them in proximate potentiality (which seems to be summed up in the expression, " he would if he could " ; this though logical does not seem to be very material). Moral virtues can be acquired without Charity, but not proportionate to the supernatural last end. Such requires Charity, so that only infused

virtues are perfect. Faith and Hope cannot be perfected without Charity, and Charity is impossible without Faith and Hope.

"Fellowship of man with God consists in a certain familiar colloquy with Him, which is begun in this life by Grace, but which will be perfected in the future life by Glory, each of which things we hold by Faith and Hope, so that Charity is impossible without Faith and Hope."¹⁵²

Simply, intellectual virtues which perfect the reason are more excellent than moral virtue which perfects the appetite, but in relation to act, it is the contrary, since it is the function of the appetite to move the powers to act.

Since virtue is a principle of action, the nature of virtue agrees more with the moral than the intellectual kind.

The chief moral virtue is Justice, because the subject is the rational appetite; the chief intellectual virtue is Wisdom, which considers the supreme cause, God, and the object self and another. And the chief theological virtue is Charity, which approaches its object, God, nearest.

Formally, the Cardinal Virtues remain in the future life but not materially, according to St. Augustine, Prudence will neither prefer nor equal any good to God; Fortitude will adhere to God most steadfastly; Temperance will delight in Him Who knows no imperfection; and Justice will be subject to God.

In the Resurrection the irrational powers will be in the bodily organs, but they will be perfectly disposed to obey reason.

"So far as phantasms are concerned, which are the quasi-material element in the intellectual virtues, these latter cease when the body is destroyed; but as regards the intelligible species, which are in the passive intellect, the intellectual virtues will remain." They remain formally, but not materially, like moral virtues.¹⁵³

GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

In addition to the theological virtues infused by God, there are the sevenfold gifts of the Holy Ghost: Wisdom, Knowledge, Understanding and Counsel in the Reason; and Fortitude (or ghostly strength), Piety (or true godliness) and Fear in the Will (cf., Isaiah, X, 1, 2).

The gifts of these higher perfections are so called, not only because they are infused by God, but also because by them man becomes amenable to Divine Inspiration.

Man possesses the theological virtues imperfectly, since he knows and loves God imperfectly.

In matters directed to the supernatural end, to which man's

¹⁵² S.T. II, 65.

¹⁵³ S.T. II, 67.

reason moves him, as it is in a manner and imperfectly actuated by the theological virtues, the motion of reason does not suffice, unless it receives in addition the prompting or motion of the Holy Ghost (cf., Rom. VIII, 14, 17). Therefore to accomplish this end it is necessary for man to have the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

The Gifts are habits, and extend to all those things to which the virtues both intellectual and moral extend; they are said to be remedies against folly, ignorance, dullness of mind, and hardness of heart and the rest. As the moral virtues are united by Prudence, so the Gifts are united by Charity.

The Gifts in essence remain after death, when God is all in all, but in regard to matter they will not remain in Glory.

The theological virtues are more excellent than the Gifts and regulate them; otherwise the Gifts are more excellent than the virtues.¹⁵⁴

THE BEATITUDES

The Beatitudes differ from the virtues and Gifts of the Holy Ghost as act from habit.

The hope of future happiness arises from preparation or disposition to such, by way of redemption and merit, also from a kind of imperfect inchoation of such, which is to be found in Holy men even in this life.¹⁵⁵

FRUITS OF THE HOLY GHOST

The fruits of the Holy Ghost are: Love, Joy, Peace, Long Suffering, Gentleness, Goodness, Faith, Meekness, and Temperance (Gal. V, 22, 23).

Fruits are virtuous deeds in which one delights, whereas Beatitudes are perfect works.¹⁵⁶

They cause release from double servitude; from compulsion of passion or evil habit, and also from only doing right actions in obedience to the Law against the will of the doer.¹⁵⁷

SIN

Having considered the goodness of human act and the virtues, it remains to consider the origin of sin.

Only human souls have bodies, therefore intellectual substances cannot have any cognitive power beside the intellect, therefore whatever they know, they understand so that they can make no error about the apprehended good; nor can their judgment be shackled by passion, since passion belongs to the sensitive faculty, which exercises no operation without a corporeal organ. Its

¹⁵⁴ S.T. II, 68. ¹⁵⁵ S.T. II, 69. ¹⁵⁶ S.T. II, 70. ¹⁵⁷ C.G. IV, 22.

knowledge is of the quiddity of a thing and is not discursive, so no error can arise from these causes.

Now sin is an action done for a certain end, and lacking due order to that end, so that there can be no sin in the Will without error.¹⁵⁸

Moreover, there is no composition and diversity of goods in separate substances, their very good is in relation to the intellect. Likewise in intellectual goods there is no excess or deficiency, for by their very nature they are a mean even as truth; so that neither is sin in the Will, in either of these ways open to them.

However, as there is order amongst active causes, so too is there order in final causes, so that the secondary end depends on the final end, even as the secondary agent depends on the principal agent.

A fault occurs in active causes, when the secondary agent strays from the order of the principal agent.

In the same way, in final causes also, when the secondary end is not subordinate to the principal end, there is sin in the Will, the object of which is the good and the end.

Every Will naturally desires that which is the proper good of the Willer, namely perfect being, nor can it will anything contrary to this. Accordingly, no sin of the Will can occur in a Willer, whose proper good is the ultimate end, which is not subordinate to any other end, but to which all other ends are subordinate.

Such a Willer is God, Whose Being is the sovereign good, which is the ultimate end. Therefore in God there can be no sin in the Will.

But in every other Willer, whose proper good must needs be subordinate to another good, sin of the Will can occur, if we consider him in his nature, it is not implanted in him to direct his perfection to another end unfailingly: since the higher end is not his proper end but that of a superior nature, so that it is left to his discretion to direct his own perfection to a higher end.

Hence there could be sin in the Will of a separate substance, through not directing his own good and perfection to his last end, but adhering to his own good as his end.

Now since rules of action must needs be taken from the end, the consequence was that through making himself his own end, Satan pretended to submit other things to his rule, and that his Will was not subject to another higher than himself. But this belongs to God alone. In this sense, we are to understand that he desired to be equal to God, not that his good might be equal to Divine Good, such could not come into his mind, it not being his proper good. Now the Will, to rule others, and the refusal to

¹⁵⁸ S.T. II, 21.

submit one's Will to the ruling of a superior, is the Will to be supreme and so to say not be a subject, which is the sin of pride. Hence it is reasonably said that the demon's first sin was pride.

But as from one error about a principle, errors various and manifold result, so from the first disorder, in the demon's Will, there arose all manner of sins in his Will, both of hate towards God as resisting his pride, and most justly punishing his fault, and of envy towards man and many such sins.

It is also clear that he strayed from the mean of virtue, inasmuch as he did not submit to the order of his superior, and thus gave himself more than was his due, and to God less than what was due to Him, as the Sovereign Ruler to Whose order all things should be subject.

Consequently, in this sin, the mean was missed, not through excess of passion, but through inequality of justice, which is about operations. For in separate substances there can be operations but no passions at all.¹⁵⁹

Since virtue implies directly that the subject is well disposed according to the mode of nature, it also consequently denotes a kind of goodness, because directed to good action.

Sin is the contrary of this latter kind of virtue, in that it denotes an inordinate act contrary to the mode of nature; whilst malice is contrary to the consequent goodness of virtue, and vice is contrary to the disposition implied directly by virtue.

Human act commanded by Will is subject to two rules: the first rule is the Eternal Law, God's reason; and the "proximate rule" is the human reason.

Sin then is a voluntary word, deed, or desire contrary to human reason and God's reason.

Sin is to vice, as act is to habit, but there is also the sin of omission which is without act. This can be so, because good results from a whole or entire cause, but evil from a single defect.

Sins are distinguished in their species by their objects, which are the ends and objects of the Will. Hence sin is properly divided against God, self, and neighbour.

The material difference of sin is in the natural species of sin, but the formal difference is in relation to the end or object.

Thus some acts have a specific material difference but no formal difference, for example unlawful strangling, stoning, or stabbing are all equally murder.

Thought, word and deed are not complete species; for the consummation is the deed, and they are but degrees, beginning, progression and completion; yet thought or cogitation, pleasure

¹⁵⁹ C.G. III, 2, 109, 110.

or consent, may be separate sins, where they do not form with deed one continuous movement.

Sins of excess and deficiency differ specifically, as they may arise from different motives inclining intention to sin.

Difference, derived from debt of punishment, is consequent to specific diversity of sin and therefore it can never constitute such specific diversity.

When the soul is so disordered by sin, as to turn away from its last end, God, to Whom it is united by Charity, there is Mortal sin; but when disordered without turning away from God, it is Venial.

But the inordinateness of sin does not destroy reason, nor does evil, if total, destroy itself (cf., pp. 331, 332).

Hence sins are not equal, but the higher the end, which attaches to sin in human act, the graver the sin and the difference of the gravity is derived from the object.

Spiritual sins are greater than carnal sins. In spiritual sin, there is turning from God, which is greater sin than turning to anything else; the sin is against God or neighbour, which is greater than against self and the impulse is less than in carnal sin, where the impulse is more.

Sin is also aggravated by circumstance, harm done, and person sinned against.

Sin is an act, but whilst such acts pass into external matters and are called transitive acts, others including all moral acts remain in the agent.

The proper subject of sin is the power, which is the principle of the act, and since sin is a voluntary act, this is the Will.

But it is not only the Will, which is subject to sin, but those other powers which are subject to the Will.

As the internal appetitive powers are free agents, and both act and are acted upon, sin can be in sensuality.

But mortal sin cannot be in sensuality, but only in reason.

Sin can be in reason in two ways, for reason has a twofold act, first to know the truth and then to direct the other powers; so that there can be sin in reason, either through ignorance or error about what reason is able and ought to know, or when reason fails to check the lower powers, as in morose delectation. This latter occurs, when reason commands unlawful passion provoking them to anger or lust, or when having deliberately considered a passion and concluded it to be inordinate, reason fails to check it.

Consent which St. Thomas had previously limited to an act of the Will, whilst assent was ascribed to an act of the intellect,¹⁶⁰

¹⁶⁰ S.T. I, 13.

in so far as it is moved by the Will is here ascribed to Higher Reason, which according to St. Augustine included the Will. Delectation on the other hand is ascribed to Lower Reason.

Though Higher and Lower Reason together with intellect are stated to be but one power of the soul¹⁶¹ (cf., Ch. XX, p. 291) the standard of Higher Reason is that of the Divine Law, whilst the standard of the Lower Reason is but Temporal Principles.¹⁶²

From this it is argued that consent to delectation in a mortal sin is a mortal sin, if the delectation is due to a desire to commit the act.

But though consent is part of the Higher Reason, in consenting to a venial sin the Higher Reason does not turn away from Eternal Law, therefore it is a venial sin and not a mortal sin.

The Higher Reason can sin venially about its own proper object, which, but for suddenness would be mortal sin; such as sudden unbelief of a dogma; but where it is concerned with a mortal sin of the Lower Reason, the sin of the Higher Reason must also be a mortal sin.

It is to be noted that here Eternal Law is used as synonymous with Divine Law, but Eternal Law is elsewhere (*S.T.*, II, 91) defined as that whereby the whole community of the Universe is governed by Divine Reason, whereas Divine Law is at the same time described as that given by God to man, that he should be directed to his end since he is ordained to eternal happiness, which is inproportionate to man's natural faculty.

There are two causes of a negation; one, the absence of cause of affirmation, simple negation; the other, the cause of an affirmation of which negation is a sequel, hence an accidental cause of negation.

Sin, which is a privation, needs an accidental efficient cause; sin, on the part of inordinateness, has a clear accidental efficient cause, whilst sin, on the part of the act, has a direct efficient cause, for it follows that the inordinateness of sin is a result of the cause of the act.

Will then, causes act directly and inordinateness indirectly, for lack of order in the act results from lack of direction by the Will. The proximate cause of sin is thus the Will and Reason, whilst the remote cause is that of the sensitive appetite. A man may sin in ignorance, but not through ignorance, as has been shown (p. 357).

The direct cause of sin is adherence to mutable good, and every sin proceeds from an inordinate desire of temporal good. This is due to the fact that man loves himself inordinately, for to wish anyone good is to love him.

¹⁶¹ *S.T.* I, 79.

¹⁶² *S.T.* II, 74.

Hence inordinate self love is the cause of every sin.¹⁶³

The Will is out of order, when it loves the lesser good the more: all evil is the privation of some good. Hence when a man wishes a spiritual evil, in order to obtain a temporal good, he is said to sin through 'certain malice' or on purpose, because he chooses evil knowingly. Whoever sins through habit, sins through 'certain malice,' for the object of the habit has become connatural.¹⁶⁴ It has been shown (p. 332) that God is author of evil as a penalty only and not as a fault.

An effect, which proceeds from a middle cause, according as it is subordinate to the first cause, is reduced to that first cause; but if it proceeds from the middle cause, according as it goes outside the order of the first cause, it cannot be reduced to that first cause. So that sin which the free will of man commits against the commandment of God is not attributed to God as its cause.

The act of sin is both a "being" and "act" and thus in both respects from God. But sin denotes a 'being' and action with a defect, and this defect is from a creative cause, free will.

Hence, though God is the cause of the act of sin, He is not the cause of sin, because He does not cause the act to have that defect which is sin.¹⁶⁵

Spiritual blindness and hardness of heart imply both a cleaving to evil and turning from Divine Light and also withdrawal from Grace; God is only the cause of the latter.

Blindness of heart is a preamble of sin, and only directed to the healing of the predestinated, to whom all things work together unto good (Rom. VIII, 25). As to others, it is directed to their damnation.

Good is sometimes for the benefit of others, or the whole universe; evil of fault must not be done that good may ensue, but evil of punishment must be inflicted for the sake of the good (Rom. III, 8).

The devil is the cause of sin in man, neither directly nor sufficiently, but only by persuasion or by proposing an object of appetite.

But the devil by his own power, unless he is restrained by God, can compel anyone to do an act, which is in the genus of mortal sin, but he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning. In so far as the will is free, man can resist sinning.

The devil is the occasional and indirect cause of all our sins, as through the Fall, all are prone to sin; but he is not the direct cause, for desires of food and lust might be inordinate, unless subordinated to reason, a matter that is the subject of free will.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶³ S.T. II, 77. ¹⁶⁴ S.T. II, 78. ¹⁶⁵ S.T. II, 79. ¹⁶⁶ S.T. II, 80.

With regard to the nature of the first man's sin, the character of sin attaches to that in which inordinateness is found, which is in the inward movement of the soul, before being in the outward act of the body. Likewise, the appetite is moved towards the end, before it is moved towards the means.

In the state of innocence, there was no rebellion of the flesh against the spirit, as long as man's mind was subject to God.

Hence it is not possible that the first inordinateness in human appetite resulted from coveting a sensible good to which the cupiscence of the flesh tends, against the order of reason. Hence man's first sin consisted in coveting some spiritual good above his measure, and this is Pride. Since through sin man's mind withdrew from subjection to God, the result was that his lower powers became not wholly subject to his reason, and so great was the rebellion of the carnal appetite against reason, that the body became not wholly subject to the soul. Hence death and bodily defects arose, for both life and soundness of body depend on the body being subject to the soul, as the perfectible is subject to its perfection.

The matter of man is a body such as is composed of contraries, of which corruptibility is a necessary consequence. Hence death is natural on account of matter and penal on account of loss of Divine favour preserving man from death.¹⁶⁷

The sin of the first man is transmitted by way of origin. The multitude of men, born of Adam, are as members of one body. As the action of the hand is voluntary, not by the will of the hand, but that of the soul, the disorder of original sin in 'this' man is voluntary, not by his will, but by that of the first parent, who by generation moves all to originate from him. Hence, this sin is called original, so that it is not the sin of 'this' man, except so far as he receives his nature from the sin of the first parent, hence it is called the sin of nature (Eph. II, 3).

Only original sin descends thus, and by it alone is nature corrupted through the natural disposition, for such disposition alone is inherited and not purely personal disposition.¹⁶⁸

Original sin is an inordinate disposition, arising from the destruction of harmony, which is essential to original justice.

In the order of original justice, man's will is subject to God, and as the Will is turned from God and the Will moves the other parts to the end, so all the other parts of the soul become inordinate.

Hence the formal cause of original sin is the privation of original justice. Original sin is in the semen as its instrumental cause and in the soul as its subject. We next come to a difficult

¹⁶⁷ S.T. II, 2, 163-164.

¹⁶⁸ S.T. II, 81.

passage; Infusion implies relation to God infusing and to the flesh, in which the soul is infused; but it cannot be said that the soul is stained, through being infused, but only with regard to the body, into which it is infused.

On the face of it this appears to be a contradiction, but it is suggested that the difficulty lies in using the term relation in two ways in the one sentence; simply, there is no relation between God and the soul infused, since the soul is a creature of the Infinite God (cf., p. 326).¹⁶⁹

God is sometimes called "Nature Who makes Nature." This force intends the good and preservation of the universe, for which alternate generation and corruption in things are requisites. But matter is proportionate to its end, and everything to its form; the end of man is happiness (p. 349) and the form of the human body is the rational incorruptible soul (p. 340), therefore the human body is naturally incorruptible.

God by the gift of original justice gave the human body this incorruptibility, which is lost through original sin and in this sense God made not death, for death is a punishment for sin.¹⁷⁰

The soul's comeliness is the refulgence of the natural light of reason and the refulgence of Divine Light through Wisdom and Grace.

When the soul cleaves to a thing by love, there is a kind of contact in the soul, so that when man sins, he cleaves to a certain thing against the light of reason and of the Divine Law. Hence there arises a metaphorical stain on his soul.

It must be made clear, that the soul is not defiled by inferior things, by their own power, but that the soul defiles itself, by its own action in cleaving to them inordinately.

The act of the Will is a movement towards the thing itself so that love attaches the soul to the thing loved.

The stain, which the soul suffers, is a privation of light, which remains even when the act of sin is past, but is removed when by Grace the sinner returns to Divine Light and the light of reason.¹⁷¹

All things contained in an Order are in a manner one in relation to that Order, and whatever rises up against an Order is put down by that Order or by its principle. Sin is an inordinate act and the sinner is in consequence put down by the same Order, to which it is inordinate, which repression is called punishment.

A man's nature is subject to the Order of his own reason; to the Order of another, who governs him in spiritual or temporal affairs, and to the universal order of Divine Government.

Hence there is for sin a threefold punishment, first, that

¹⁶⁹ S.T. II, 83.

¹⁷⁰ S.T. II, 85.

¹⁷¹ S.T. II, 86.

inflicted by man himself through his own reason, the remorse of conscience ; second, that inflicted by man ; and third, that inflicted directly by God.

Since, however, sin arises from the Will, and punishment is contrary to the Will ; sin itself cannot be punished essentially, but only accidentally : either by removing some impediment to sin, *e.g.*, the withdrawal of grace, or by reason of the substance of the act being such as to cause or involve pain, or on the part of its effect.

Sin incurs the debt of punishment through disturbing Order, and the effect remains so long as the cause remains. The disturbance is reparable or irreparable as a destroying principle ; consequently if the sin destroys the principle of Charity, whereby man's Will is subject to God and whereby man adheres to the last end, the disorder is irreparable except by God. God delights not in the punishment, but in the Order of His Justice which requires it.

In actual sins, even when the act has ceased, the guilt remains and deserves punishment, so far as the Order of Justice is transgressed. Man cannot return to that Order, except he pay some sort of penal compensation to restore him to the equality of Justice.

According to the order of Divine Justice, he, who has been too indulgent of his own Will, must suffer either willingly, or unwillingly, something contrary to what he would wish.

The stain of sin cannot be removed unless man be united to God, that is, unless his Will accepts the order of Divine Justice, and unless he take upon himself the punishment of his past sin or bears patiently the punishment which God inflicts upon him, in both ways the punishment avails for satisfaction.

Those who differ as to a debt of punishment may be one in Will, by the union of love ; so that one, who has not sinned, can bear willingly the punishment for another. It is in this way that Christ bore a satisfactory punishment for our sins. The doctrine of Atonement is dealt with in the next chapter.

As has been stated, the principle of spiritual life, which is life in accordance with virtue, is the Order of the last end, and if this Order be corrupted, it cannot be repaired by any intrinsic principle, but by the power of God alone. Because disorders, referred to the end, are repaired by the end ; even as errors about conclusions are repaired through the truth of principles. Hence defects of order to the last end cannot be repaired through something else, as a higher principle ; as neither can errors about principles. Such are mortal sins, whilst those sins which imply a disorder in things referred to the last end, the order to the end

itself being preserved, are reparable and are called venial sins.¹⁷²

The division of sins into venial and mortal is not a division of genus into species, but a division of an analogous term into its parts. Venial sin is called sin, in reference to the imperfect motion of sin, as accident is called a 'being,' in relation to substance, in reference to the imperfect notion of 'being.'

Venial sin is not against, but beside the law, through not observing the mode of reasoning which the law intended. Mortal sin is to venial sin, as the perfect is to the imperfect in the genus of sin, and as such cannot become venial, unless the act be imperfect, or by the subtraction of deliberate reason.

In the *Contra Gentiles* St. Thomas expresses this difference as follows: "As the body lives naturally, through being united to the soul, which is the principle of life, and is moved of itself, so the human Will is not only alive, when by its right intention, it is united to its last end, which union is its object and as it were its form; but it is also moved by an intrinsic principle, to do what is right, when, by love, man adheres to God and his neighbour. But without the intention of the last end and without love the soul is dead, as it were, since it is not moved of itself to do what is right. Therefore all sins, that are opposed to the intention of the last end and to love, are mortal. On the other hand, if a man without detriment to these, fails in a particular right order of reason, it will not be a mortal but a venial sin."¹⁷³

In the second part of Part II of the *Summa Theologica*, St. Thomas dealt in detail with the Theological and Cardinal Virtues, their integral and potential parts and the sins which arise in opposition thereto, in all of which he follows out the Orthodox views to their logical issues.

¹⁷² S.T. II, 88.

¹⁷³ C.G. III, 2, 139.

CHAPTER XXII

THE WORKS OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS DOGMATIC THEOLOGY

Trinity—Incarnation—Angelology—Divine Law—Worship—
Punishment—Merit—Grace—Sacraments—Baptism—Confirma-
tion—Eucharist.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE BLESSED TRINITY

THE Trinity is employed as a collective name indicating Three Persons in one God.

St. Augustine stated that "By faith we arrive at knowledge ; and reason is employed to provide sufficient proof of some principle, *e.g.*, Unity of God (cf., p. 311, 312), or as confirming an already established principle by showing the congruity of the result, *e.g.*, assuming the doctrine of the Trinity to be true, it can be shown that reason tends to confirm it."

But Wisdom is of God : a wisdom which is hidden (1 Cor. II, 6, 7).

What is of faith can be proved by authority alone to those who receive authority, while with regard to others, it suffices to prove that what Faith teaches is not impossible, *i.e.* self contradictory.

A thing may be of Faith in two ways, either directly, as principally divinely taught, or indirectly, where a denial would involve a consequence contrary to Faith, and such becomes manifest when the Church has decided that such a consequence does follow. Contrary opinion, however, as to that which is of Faith indirectly, does not amount to heresy until the matter has been established and then only if obstinately held.¹

The two great heresies with regard to the doctrine of the Trinity are, on the one hand, *Arianism*, which placed a trinity of substance with the Trinity of Persons, and on the other, *Sabellianism*, which placed unity of person with unity of Essence.

Now a notion is a proper idea, whereby we know a Divine Person ; and as there are three Persons of the Trinity, The Father, The Son and The Holy Ghost, so there are five notions in God, Innascibility, Paternity, Filiation, Common Spiration and Procession.

The relations between the three Persons are real relations of

¹ S.T. I, 32.

origin and it is on this alone that the principle of distinction of the Divine Persons is based.

It is, therefore, necessary to examine closely the exact meaning of the terms commonly utilized in a consideration of this doctrine.

As stated above, the relation of the Persons is one of origin, so the notion of Procession must be considered first.

Procession is here used as corresponding to the act remaining in the Agent, First Act, e.g., Intellect, the action of which remains in the Intelligent Agent. Or again, as when we understand from our understanding; in which case there proceeds within us a concept issuing from our intellectual power and proceeding from our knowledge of the object. This concept is the word of the heart, the *Verbum cordis*, and if imparted to another is signified by the word of the voice, *Verbum vocis*, or by operations.

But similitudes drawn from our highest knowledge of intellectual substances fall far short of Divine objects.

Procession is not as in bodies of local movement, nor is it of cause proceeding to exterior effect, as taught by Sabellius, nor as effect proceeding from cause, as taught by Arius, but by way of *intelligible emanation*, e.g., the intelligible word which proceeds from the speaker, yet remains in him, unspoken by him.

"The more perfectly it proceeds, the more closely is it joined to its source, for the more clearly a thing is understood, the more closely is the concept joined to the intelligent agent, for the intellect by understanding is made one with the object understood." Procession by an intelligible act is included in the idea of a first principle.²

The next term to consider is that of *Person*. Whilst substance is that which is individualized by itself "per se ipsam," accidents are individualized by their subjects; individuals of the genus substance are called hypostases or first substance and individuals of rational substance are called *Persons*.

Or as Boethius defines it *Person* is an individual substance of a rational nature.

Nature has already been defined as the same as *Essence* or quiddity, the *τό τι ἦν εἶναι* of Aristotle, viz., that which is included in the definition of species, or the principle of species, not individual principle, matter and common form.

The term *Substance* may mean, either Essence, or Subject, the Suppositum which subsists in the genus of substance, in a general sense it is used as expressive of an *Intention* (This) the Haecceitas of Duns Scotus. Substance is also used as signifying (a) a *natural thing* (*res naturae*) as it underlies some common nature, e.g., Socrates' substance is a human thing; (b) *Subsistence* as it exists

² S.T. I, 27.

in itself and not in another; (c) *Hypostasis* as it underlies its accidents. What these signify to the whole genus of substance *Person* signifies to the genus of Rational Substance.

Though Hypostasis strictly means an individual of the genus substance, the same as suppositum, yet in common use it signifies an individual of the genus Rational Nature. To avoid confusion *Subsistence* is used as an alternative to *Person* in speaking plurally of God.

According to Richard of St. Victor, "Person" in God is the incommunicable existence of the Divine Nature.

"The distinction of 'Persons' in God is by relation of origin only: relation in God is not an accident in a subject, but is the Divine Essence Itself and therefore subsists.

So that 'Person' signifies directly relation by way of substance and indirectly Divine Essence, although the Hypostasis subsisting in the Divine Nature is the Divine Nature itself. Similarly it may be regarded as signifying Essence directly and relation indirectly, the whole arising out of the Divine Simplicity. But by use and custom Person is used to signify Relation."³

Person is not a name of exclusion or of "Intention," but of reality. Person is common in idea to the Three Divine Persons, but not either as genus or species (*e.g.*, some man common idea to man); for Divine Persons form one existence but genus, species and every other universal are predicated of many, which differ in existence.⁴

God in understanding Himself has Himself within Himself as intelligible species or *Verbum cordis*, so that it is said "the Word was God" (John I, 1).

Since God is Pure Act without potentiality He is always understanding Himself, hence He Himself as the Word is always within Himself, and as the Word is co-eternal with Himself. So it is said "in the beginning was the Word" (John I, 1). That God is Pure Act follows from the fact that the Divine Intellect is its own understanding and act of intellect, as has been shown on page 305.

The generation of the Son was not by Will but by Nature. If it were by Will, He would be a creature as the Arians taught. Everything is such as God wills it, while the Son is such as God is. Will, indifferent to some things, has a natural inclination to last end, likewise the intellect in respect of its knowledge of first principles. Moreover a principle of Divine knowledge is God Himself, Who is the end of His Will; wherefore that which proceeds in God by His act of self knowledge proceeds naturally, and likewise that which proceeds of His act is self love.

³ S.T. I, 29.

⁴ S.T. I, 30.

And for this reason since the Son proceeds as the Word by an act of the Divine Intellect, in as much as the Father knows Himself; and the Holy Ghost by an act of the Will, in as much as the Father loves the Son; it follows that both Son and Holy Ghost proceed naturally, and further that they are consubstantial, co-equal and co-eternal with the Father and with each other.⁵

Now the being of the Word conceived within the mind consists in its 'being' understood, hence since God is His own act of intelligence, the 'being' of the Divine Word and the 'being' of the Divine Intellect and the 'being' of God Himself are the same.

Moreover, since the 'being' of God is His essence or nature, which is God Himself, the Word of God is the Divine Being and Essence and God in very truth.

But in the human mind, the 'being' of the intellect is not the same as the act of understanding, because the substance of the intellect was in potentiality before it understood actually (cf., p. 360).

Again, the intelligible species is an exemplar if it is the principle of something else, as a house in the mind of a builder; or it is an image, if compared to something else as its principle of which it is the likeness, because our act of intelligence takes its principle from the senses which are impressed by natural things.

Since God understands both Himself and other things, His act of understanding is the principle of the things understood by Him, because they are caused by Him through His intellect and will; whereas to that intelligible being which is Himself, He is compared as a thing to its principle, since this intelligible 'being' is identical with the intellect understanding it, and the Word conceived is an emanation thereof.

Consequently, the Word is compared to other things understood by God as their exemplar, and to God Himself, Whose Word He is, as His image. Hence the Word is said to be the image of the invisible God (Col. I, 15).

Now that which proceeds from a living 'being' in likeness of nature is said to be its son, and since the Word is the image of the speaker in His very essence and of the same nature, the Word is said to be the Son of the Father, thus the Word is the Son of God.

Moreover, the Word, spoken by God, understanding Himself, proceeds from Him naturally, hence the procession of the Word is truly begotten of God's utterance, and as His Being is His act of intelligence, the Word must needs be essential to God; the Son of God is therefore essential to the Father and not begotten of the Father by His Will according to the Arian heresy.⁶

The matter may be regarded from another point of view.

⁵ *De Potentia Dei*, II, 3.

⁶ *C.G.* IV, 11.

God is Pure Act, and it is the nature of every act to communicate itself as far as possible, hence the Divine Nature communicates itself as far as possible. It communicates itself to creatures by likeness only, but there is another quasi-natural mode of communication. So that as to one to whom human nature is communicated is a man, He, to whom the Godhead is communicated, is not merely like God, but is truly God, for the Godhead is the same thing as God.

Therein is to be observed the twofold difference between the Divine Nature and Material forms. Material forms are not subsistent, so that the human nature in a man is not the same thing as the man who subsists ; whereas the Divine Nature being subsistent the Godhead and God are the same. Again, created form or nature is not its own 'being,' whereas God's very 'being' is His Nature and quiddity.

Consequently, since forms here below are not subsistent, there must be in their subject something whereby the form or nature receives its subsistence, which is matter. And seeing that a material form or nature is not its own 'being,' it receives 'being' through its reception into something else ; wherefore according as it is received into diverse subjects, it has diversity of 'being.' Thus human nature in respect of 'being' is not one in Socrates and Plato, although the essential motion of humanity is the same in both.

On the other hand, the Divine Nature being self subsistent, in the communication thereof there is no need of material for subsistence. So that He Who is begotten is not composed of form and matter.

And since the Divine Nature is its own 'being,' it does not receive 'being' from the supposit in which it is : so that by virtue of one and the same 'being,' it is both Communicator and the One to whom it is communicated, thus remaining identically the same in both.

God begotten is not distinct from the begetting God by any added essence, but by the relation implied in receiving one's nature from another, which is that of Paternity in the one and Sonship in the other (whilst the Generative Power is said to denote both the Essence and the Paternity of the Father).

Such Sonship is, so to speak, the personal property of the Son and it is thereby that He is individualized ; and since the principles of individuality of each individual thing belong to that thing alone, it follows that since the Begetter is infinite, that there cannot be but one Son, for otherwise there would be nothing to individualize one from the other.⁷

⁷ *De Potentia Dei*, II, 1.

The intellect is actuated by intelligible species or form, in as much as it is in act, that is, as it actually understands. And as has been shown (p. 317) a natural thing, by the form which perfects its species, has an inclination to its proper operation and end, so likewise from the intelligible form there results in an intelligent 'being,' an inclination to its proper operations and end and this is the Will.

The Will then is the principle of those operations in its power and whereby the intellect operates for its end, because the end and the good are the object of the Will. Moreover, the principle of the Will, being the inclination referred to, is Love.

Since God's is an intelligent 'being' and His operation is His very Essence and His Will is His Essence, it follows that in God Will is not power, or habit, but act. Now every act of the Will arises from Love, hence God is Love.

Further, from the theory, which was not accepted by St. Augustine, that Intellect is prior to Will, is based the argument of St. Thomas that the Holy Ghost must proceed both from the Father and the Son, the Word.

Of the Divine Persons Who are God, God the Word is the intelligible species of that which actuates the Will of God, hence love whereby God is His own Will, as the Beloved in the Lover, must proceed from the word of God and from God the Father Who utters the Word.

Now the beloved is in the lover as its specific likeness in his intellect, but in his Will as the term of a movement is in its proportionate motive principle, by reason of the proportion and aptitude of the principle to that term.

Whatever proceeds from another as begotten, proceeds from its begetter as to its specific likeness, so that the procession of a thing to its being in a Will, as the beloved object in a lover, is not by way of generation.

Therefore, God proceeding by way of Love from His Will, does not proceed as begotten nor receive the name of Son, but is called Spirit, as being the breath of a living being's impulse from within itself.

"And as every intellectual movement is denominated from its term, and as the love is that by which God Himself is Love, it is becoming that God proceeding by way of love be called the Holy Spirit, because things consecrated to God are wont to be called Holy.⁸

God understands and Wills all things by one simple act, wherefore there can be but one proceeding of the Intellect, the

⁸ C.G. IV, 19.

Word, and one proceeding of the Will that is the Holy Ghost (cf., p. 379).⁹

But the proper notion of a relation consists in a habitude to something else, so that its proper being, which it adds to the substance, depends not only on the being of the substance, but also on the being of something extraneous.

Now this cannot occur in God, since all that is, is God's substance, the 'being' of the relation is the 'being' of His substance. Hence relations in God do not argue the presence of a dependent 'being' in Him, but only a certain habitude wherein the essence of the relationship consists.¹⁰

The relationship of Person in the Trinity is one of origin only and as such is not a thing (*Aliquid*), but is purely relative (*Ad Aliquid*).¹¹

Likewise, as the Three Persons have one and the same essence, it is not in each in the same relation, or with the same mode of existence as to relation, and the same applies to omnipotence.¹²

The Divine relations are real relations, as the processions are in the identity of the same nature ; for when something proceeds from a principle of the same nature, then both the one proceeding and the source of the procession agree in the same order and have the same real relations.

Boethius likens Divine relations to that of identity, not in every respect but only so far as the substance is not diversified by these relations.

In God, relation and essence do not differ, but relation is not predicated under the mode substance.

Nothing exists in God, which can have any relation to that wherein it exists, or of which it is spoken, except the relation of identity ; this is because of the simplicity of God. The real distinction of Persons in God is not according to that which is essence, but according to that which is relative.

The relations in God are based on internal not external acts.

From the two Divine processions of the Intellect and Will there are two opposite relations in respect of each : Paternity and Filiation in respect of the Word and Spiration, and Procession in respect of Love.¹³

As there are three several Persons in God, so are there four several real relations, but Spiration of the Holy Ghost from the Person of the Father and the Person of the Son are not separated, but belongs to both. Therefore Paternity is the Person of the Father ; Filiation is the Person of the Son : and Procession is the Person of the Holy Ghost.

⁹ S.T. I, 41.

¹⁰ C.G. IV, 14, 24.

¹¹ De Potentia Dei, II, 5.

¹² *ib.*, II, 5, and III, 15.

¹³ S.T. I, 28.

In speaking of numbers of things as applied to the Persons in God, the notion of measure has no place, because the magnitude of the Three Persons is the same and "the same is not measured by the same." So that numeral terms do not denote anything positive in God, but have only a contrary meaning, according to Peter Lombard.

But they indicate a species of quantity, for the formal division effected by opposite or diverse forms results in a multitude, which here does not belong to a genus, but is transcendental, in the same sense in which being is divided by one and many, which is only found in immaterial things, *e.g.*, one essence signifies the essence undivided (*cf.*, pp. 311, 312).¹⁴

THE PERSON OF THE FATHER

The Father is the Principle, called also by the Greeks Cause, but He is a principle such as is used of things which have no difference, *e.g.*, a point is the principle of a line.

Since the Divine Word is subsistent in the Divine Nature, they are properly termed Father and Son, as has been shown (*supra*, p. 379). Paternity is thus applied to God in respect of one Person to another, before importing any reference to Creatures.

The Father is unbegotten, such innascibility is a privation, without imperfection: a principle not from a principle.

Unbegotten thus signifies uncreated and thus applies to substance, also it is used relatively in God, and thus it is distinguished by relation. To admit more than one Innascible would involve a plurality of Natures and Gods. The generative power likewise denotes at the same time both the Essence and the property of the Father.¹⁵

OF THE PERSON OF THE SON

The Name of the Word in God is a personal and not an essential Name. As has been shown (*supra*, p. 379), the term Word is used first of thought, the interior concept of the mind; secondly of speech, the vocal sounds signifying the concept; thirdly of hearing, the imagination of a vocal sound.

Hence "Word" is not in this case to be taken as said essentially but personally, further Word is not thought, which implies a search after truth. The Word is an emanation of the intellect and a procession by generation and thus called the Son, for to be and to understand are the same in God.

Moreover, since God is simple, God by knowing Himself knows every creature and the Word conceived in the mind is representative of everything understood. So that God by one act

¹⁴ S.T. I, 30.

¹⁵ S.T. I, 33.

understands Himself and all things and His only Word is expressive not only of the Father but of all Creatures.¹⁶

The Word is also the Image of the Father (cf., *supra*, p. 379), strictly speaking an image proceeds from another like unto it in species, hence Image is a personal name, because whatever imports procession or origin in God belongs to the Persons. The Greek Doctors called the Holy Ghost the Image of the Father and the Son, but the Latin Doctors attributed Image to the Son alone (cf., Col. I, 15 ; Heb. I, 3 ; 2 Cor. IV, 4).¹⁷

THE PERSON OF THE HOLY GHOST

It has been shown above (p. 382), that the Holy Ghost indicates a relation to both the Father and the Son, as Spirit, or impulse, or motion of Love, also as breathed.

The Holy Ghost is from the Father and the Son, otherwise He could not be personally distinguished from the Son.

Moreover, He is from them by Procession and not by generation (cf., *supra*, p. 382). The Divine Persons are only distinguished by relation of origin not in an absolute sense, otherwise there would not be Unity of Essence.

No one suggests that the Son is from the Holy Ghost, therefore there must be a relationship between the Son and the Holy Ghost of origin. Further, the procession of Love, as has been shown, is from the Will and must therefore be from the Word. Moreover, there must be Order, and since two Persons proceed from the Father, there must be order between them.

The Greeks, on the other hand, hold that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son. But if the Holy Ghost originates in any way from the Son, it can be concluded that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son. The Greeks insist on "through," because they hold that the Son receives from the Father, and that the Holy Ghost receives from Him ; so that it must be said that the Father spirates the Holy Ghost through the Son ; so that the Holy Ghost proceeds immediately from the Father by mediately (that is through) the Son.

The Father and Son are but one Principle of the Holy Ghost : "Two spirating by reason of plurality of subjects, but not two spirators by reason of but one spiration."

"For adjectival words derive their number from their subjects, but substantives from themselves according to the form signified." Thus is preserved the enunciation of the Unity of the Trinity.

Owing to the paucity of human vocabulary, there are no words to signify the difference implied in connection with Love as

¹⁶ S.T. I, 34.

¹⁷ S.T. I, 35.

regards the Will, that there are in connection with thought as regards Intellect.

"On the part of the Will, with the exception of the verb love, which expresses the relation of the lover to the object loved, there is no term to express the relation of the impression or affection of the object loved, which is produced in the lover by the fact that he loves, to the principle of that impression or *vice versa*."

Hence "Love" meaning the relation of lover to loved, is said of Essence, but "Love," meaning the relation to its principle of what proceeds by love or *vice versa*, is the name of a Person, *i.e.* Love proceeding and spiration of love proceeding. "To love" is a notional term as to speak or beget, for in God there is nothing accidental.

From the fact that the Father and the Son mutually love one another, the Holy Ghost, which is this mutual love proceeds from both. As regards origin, the Holy Ghost is not the medium, but the Third Person in the Trinity; whereas as regards the aforesaid relation, He is the link between the two Persons, proceeding from both.

The Holy Ghost loves essentially, as love proceeding and not as one whence love proceeds.

On the other hand, essentially, the Father and the Son love each other, not by the Holy Ghost, but by their Essence.

Notionally, as spirating love, used in the sense of to speak, to produce words, the Father and the Son love each other and us by the Holy Ghost or by love proceeding (that is importing the formal relation of effect).¹⁸

A Divine Person can be possessed in such a way as to be enjoyed by a rational creature united to God, when it is made a partaker of the Divine Word and the Divine Love proceeding, so as freely to know truly and rightly to love God. In this way Divine Person can be a Gift, thus in one way the Gift is the same as the Giver. Love has the nature of a first gift, so that since the Holy Ghost proceeds as Love, He proceeds as the First Gift: the Gift of God giving.¹⁹

THE PERSONS IN RELATION TO THE ESSENCE

Divine Things are named in our intellect, not as they really are in themselves, but in the way that belongs to things created. But account must not only be taken of the thing signified by a word, but also the mode of signification. Thus God signifies the Divine Essence in Him that possesses it.

God, also, of its own nature from its mode of signification

¹⁸ S.T. I, 37.

¹⁹ S.T. I, 38.

stands for a Divine Person, so that things predicated of a Divine Person can be predicated of God. But Essence cannot stand for Person because Essence is an abstract form.²⁰

The human intellect stands in two ways towards God. First, to know God as He is, is impossible; for the intellect cannot circumscribe something in God and leave the rest. For all that is in God is one except the distinction of Person, and as regards these if one is removed the other is taken away, since they are distinguished by relation only, which implies that they must be together at the same time.

Second, Intellect stands towards God not indeed knowing God as He is, but in its own way, *i.e.* manifoldly and separately understanding what in God is one; *e.g.*, understanding Divine Goodness, and Wisdom and the like, called essential attributes; without, however, so understanding Paternity or Filiation or Procession, which are called personalities.

Further, the manifestation of the Divine Persons by the use of essential attributes is called "*Appropriation.*"

We can derive certain knowledge of the essential attributes from creatures, which are sources of knowledge to us, such as we cannot obtain regarding the personal properties.

In considering any creature, we view it under different aspects and we can apply our views to God in a similar manner, thus:

First, in considering any creature we can consider:

The thing taken by itself absolutely, which is considered as being such and such.

Thus the *Father* as being: Eternity, or Principle without Principle.

The *Son* as being: Species, Beauty, Integrity or Perfection, Proportion or Harmony, Brightness, Perfect Nature, Express Image, or Light of Intellect.

The *Holy Ghost* as being: Use, in the sense of use and enjoyment, or Beatitude.

Second, *as It is considered as one.*

Thus the *Father* is considered as: Unity or Principle without Principle.

The *Son* is considered as: Equality or Principle from Principle.

The *Holy Ghost* is considered as: Concord or Connection.

Third, *as Its intrinsic power of operation and causality is considered.*

Thus the *Father* is considered as: Power, Power has the nature of a Principle.

The *Son* is considered as: Wisdom, the Word is the Concept of Wisdom.

²⁰ S.T. I, 39.

The *Holy Ghost* is considered as : Goodness, Nature and Object of Love.

Fourth, as *Its relations to its effect is considered.*

Thus the *Father* is considered as : the *One from Whom*, or Efficient Cause.

The *Son* is considered as : the *One by Whom*, or Intermediate Cause as instrument.

The *Holy Ghost* is considered as : the *One in Whom contained.* In His Goodness, He preserves and governs guiding to a fitting end.²¹

Since what is concrete and what is abstract is the same in the Divine Simplicity, the properties are said to be in the Essence in the mode of identity, and in the Persons not only in the mode of identity but in the mode of signification.

Hence they determine the Persons and not the Essence.

If non-personal properties be mentally abstracted the hypostasis remains, but not in the case of personal properties ; thus the Father may be considered as to whether He is unbegotten, but the Father cannot be considered as to whether He has not Paternity.²²

As has been stated, the Divine Persons are distinguished by relation of origin, now to signify the order of origin, notional acts must be attributed to the Person. Notional acts differ from relation in their mode of signification only, but in reality are the same.

“ Since in God no motion exists, the personal action of the One producing a Person is only the habitude of the Principle to the Person who is from the Principle, which habitudes are the relations or notions.”

Thus the Father willingly begot the Son by nature, that is not of necessity, yet by His Nature and not by His Will, so that the perfect likeness to the Father of the Son is from the *Substance* of the Father (cf., pp. 379-380).²³

As notional acts exist in God, so there must be a power in God, which is the principle of the act which signifies the Divine Essence and not the relation only (cf., *S.T.*, I, 79).

St. Thomas gives four reasons for showing that there is but One Father, One Son, and One Holy Ghost.

First, the relation, by which alone the Persons are distinct, are themselves subsistent, hence there would not be more than One Father and One Son unless there were several Paternities and several Filiations. Such would not be possible, since the forms of one species are not multiplied except in respect of matter, which is not in God.

²¹ *S.T.* I, 39.

²² *S.T.* I, 40.

²³ *S.T.* I, 41.

Secondly, God understands and wills all things by one simple act, wherefore there can be but one proceeding of the intellect, the Word, and one proceeding of the Will, that is the Holy Ghost.

Thirdly, the measure in which the Persons proceed is naturally, and nature is determined to one.

Fourthly, on account of the perfection of the Persons, for since the Son is perfect, the entire Divine Filiation is contained in Him, hence there is but one Son (cf., p. 380), and likewise as to the other Persons of the Trinity.²⁴

There is equality and likeness among the Divine Persons, for in God quantity is nothing else than Essence, so that if the Persons were unequal the Three Persons would not be one God. The equality is not a real relation distinct from the personal relation, for the concept includes both the relations, which distinguish the Persons, and also the unity of the Essence. "It is only the terms that are relative," said Peter Lombard.

The Son is co-eternal with the Father for the act of generation is not successive, if it were, it would be material and accompanied by movement.

"Every corruption is a change, and so all that corrupts begins not to exist and ceases to be. Divine Generation is not changed, so that the Son is ever being begotten, and the Father is always begetting" (*sic*).

"Ever born" is a better expression than "ever being born," for the "now" of Eternity is not the same as the "now" of Time.

The order of nature signifies the notion of origin in a general and not a special kind. Since in God, the relations themselves are the Persons subsisting in one Nature, so neither on the part of Nature nor on the part of Relation can one Person be prior to another.²⁵

Divine Mission takes place without separation, having only distinction of origin. Mission involves both habitude to the sender and habitude to the end.

If the sender is designated as the principle of the Person sent, then only such Sender sends, but if the principle of effect is implied, then the whole Trinity is the Sender.

The Divine Person is sent, in the sense that He exists newly in any one. He is given as possessed by anyone; both are by Sanctifying Grace.

God is said to exist and dwell in a creature, as the known in the knower or the beloved in the lover.

²⁴ S.T. I, 41.

²⁵ S.T. I, 42.

The idea of mission means procession, so that it does not include the Father.

The mission of the Son is the illumination of the intellect and the kindling of affection, but not one without the other, because neither takes place without Sanctifying Grace, nor is one Person separated from another. Mission, implies to the one to whom it is sent, an indwelling of Grace and a certain kind of new dwelling made by Grace.

It is not sent to the Sacraments but to those who receive Grace through the Sacraments.

The apparitions mentioned in the Old Testament were not missions, because they did not signify the indwelling of the Divine Person by Grace, but were a manifestation of something else.²⁶

THE DOCTRINE OF THE INCARNATION

Everywhere in Scripture, the sin of the first man is assigned as the reason of the Incarnation ; and that a creature should be united to God in person exceeds the limits of the perfection of nature.

Perfect condign satisfaction alone is adequate to make good a fault. As the sin of man was against the Infinity of the Divine Majesty of God, mere man could not offer such condign satisfaction, as the whole human nature was corrupted by sin. It is clear that Christ came not only to take away original sin, but also the sins of man added to it : the actual sin being greater in intensity, whilst original sin is greater in extent.

Various arguments are put forward to show that it is not incompatible with reason, and therefore, so to speak, that it was fitting, that the " Word should be made flesh."

It belongs to Goodness to communicate itself to others, hence it belongs to the highest good to communicate itself in the highest manner, which is brought about chiefly by " His so joining created nature to Himself, that one Person is made up of these three, the Word, soul, and flesh. As the creature (at the Creation) began to be, not having been before, so likewise, not having been previously united to God in Person, it was afterwards united to Him at the Incarnation."

When an end is better or more conveniently attained by a certain means, such means is sometimes said to be necessary, and it is in this limited sense that the Incarnation is said to be necessary.

That it was fitting for the Person of the Word to assume humanity is made clear from the following considerations.

²⁶ S. T. I, 43.

Since the ultimate salvation of man is in order that man should be perfected in his intellectual faculty by the contemplation of the First Truth, it was fitting that human nature should be assumed by the Word, Who proceeds from the Father by an intellectual emanation.

Moreover, as the sin of the first parent was through seeking knowledge, hence it was fitting that man should be brought back to God through the Word of true knowledge.

Further, because of a certain affinity between the Word and human nature, since man derives his species from being rational.

Likewise, because of a certain affinity between the Word and creatures in general, since the Word contains the types of all things created by God ; as a craftsman has in his mind the types of all his handiwork.

Accordingly, all creatures are just the real expression and reproduction of the types contained in the concept of the Divine Word : for which reason, all things are said to have been made by Him (John I, 3).²⁷

The Incarnation is not to be viewed as merely the terminus of a movement from imperfection to perfection, but also as a principle of perfection of human nature.

It was the error of Paul of Samosata (c. 260) and Photinus (c. 891) to allege that Christ was born a man and then accorded the Godhead, this being contrary to " In the beginning was the Word " (John I, 1).²⁸

As to man's furtherance in good, there is the increase of Faith, Hope, Charity and Example. And as to man's withdrawal from evil, man is taught : Not to honour the devil ; to respect the dignity of man ; to avoid presumption ; to avoid pride ; and given freedom from the thralldom of sin.

The considerations advanced why the Incarnation did not immediately follow sin are : (1) For pride to be humbled. (2) To proceed from imperfection to perfection. (3) On account of the dignity of the Word, involving the greater numbers of heralds. (4) Lest the fervour of faith should cool (Luke XVIII, 8).

On the other hand, the Incarnation was not relegated to the end of the world on account of : (1) The imperfection from which human nature is raised to Perfection of Glory. (2) Lest all reverence and knowledge of God and uprightness of morals had been lost. (3) The manifestation of the Divine Power, which has saved man in several ways, not only by faith in some future thing, but also by faith in something present or past.

" Perfection is prior to imperfection in time and nature in things, as are different ; but in one and the same, imperfection

²⁷ C.G. IV, 42.

²⁸ C.G. IV, 28.

is prior in time though posterior in nature." Upon this dictum it is claimed that the modern theory of evolution would have had the support of St. Thomas Aquinas.²⁹

MANNER OF UNION OF THE WORD INCARNATE

By the *Council of Chalcedon*, 451 A.D., the Union is definitely to be decided to be that of *Two Natures in One Person*. Here *Nature* means the specific essence, which is signified by the definition, e.g., manhood (cf., p. 377).

Now one thing is made of two or more in three ways.

First, by Composition, Order, or Figure of things that remain in their perfection, either in confusion without order as a heap of stones, or in commensuration with order as a house.

This could not be the way, for such composition is accidental and not substantial; such unity would be only relative and not absolute, and such form is not a nature but an art.

Second, by change of several things, to one perfect one, e.g., chemical compounds.

This could not be the way, for the Divine Nature is immutable and cannot be changed into something else; the compound is not of the same species as its elements; and the impossibility of the mingling of things widely apart, for the Divine Nature is infinite.

Third, from things imperfect, e.g., man made of soul and body and diverse members.

But this could not be the way, for each Nature Divine and human has specific perfection. Human and Divine Natures could not constitute anything as quantitative parts, for the Divine Nature is incorporeal; nor as form and matter, for the Divine Nature cannot be the form of anything corporeal, since it would follow that the species resulting therefrom would be communicable to several and thus there would be several Christs; also because Christ would neither exist in human nature nor in Divine Nature, for difference varies species as unity varies number.

As has been shown, Person is an individual substance of a rational nature (cf., p. 377). So that whatever adheres to a person is united to it in person, whether it belongs to its nature or not. It is a wider term than Nature, e.g., it would be incorrect to say, This man is his manhood.

Therefore inasmuch as the Word has a human nature united to Him, which does not belong to His Divine Nature, the union took place in the Person of the Word and not in the Nature.

By the *Council of Ephesus*, 430 A.D., and by the *Fifth Council*

²⁹ S.T. III, 1.

of *Constantinople*, 553 A.D., the ascription of two persons or substances to Christ was condemned.

There is one subsisting being in Him, yet there are different aspects of subsistence, hence He is said to be a composite being. But composition of a person from natures is not so called on account of parts but by reason of number.

“It is essential to human species that the soul be united to body, for form does not constitute species, except in as much as it becomes the act of matter, and this is the terminus of generation through which nature intends the species. Hence in Christ, soul was united to body and it is heretical to allege the contrary, as it would destroy His humanity.”

“Human nature in Christ is likened to a habit or garment, not indeed in regard to accidental union, but in as much as the Word is seen by the human nature, as a man by his garment; and as a garment is changed to suit the wearer, yet his form is not changed on account of the garment. So likewise, the human nature assumed by the Word of God is ennobled, but the Word of God is not changed.”

Nestorius and *Theodore of Mopsuestia* did not concede that the man Christ was really the Son of God, but His instrument: so that there were two Persons. They held that God by His Grace dwelt in a human body and soul (cf., p. 393), which is heresy. But the *Damascene* held correctly that the human nature in Christ is an instrument belonging to the unity of the hypostasis.

Every relation between God and the creature is really in the creature, by whose change the relation is brought into being; whereas it is not really in God, but only in our way of thinking, since it does not arise from any change in God. But it is really in the creature and so is created (cf., pp. 310, 389).

Human Nature in Christ is said to be united to or assumed by the Divine Nature.

Assumption determines the term whence and the term whither; Union determines neither term.

Assumption implies action and becoming; Union implies relation and having become.

The Union of the Incarnation took place by Grace as the Will and free gift of God but not by operation, as when human nature is uplifted in the saints, but by the Personal Being of Christ alone.

This is noteworthy, for the perfection of operation requires power to be perfected by habit; whereas a nature has its being in its own suppositum without the means of habit. So Grace, which is an accident, is a certain likeness of the Divinity participated by man, but by the Incarnation human nature is not said

to have participated in a likeness of the Divine Nature but to be united to it.

Habitual Grace is only in the soul, but the Grace of being united to the Divine Person belongs to the whole human nature, which is composed of body and soul. Hence it is said that the fulness of the Godhead dwelt corporeally in Christ, because the Divine Nature is united, not merely to the soul but to the body in three ways, by essence, presence and power ; by Sanctifying Grace ; and by personal union proper to Christ. Yet not by the conversion of a Godhead into flesh (for this would be a change, cf., p. 391), but by taking of the manhood into God.³⁰

The action of assumption is common to the Three Persons, but what pertains to the nature of a term belongs to one Person. The Three Persons caused human nature to be united to the one Person of the Son.

The Father or the Holy Ghost could have become Incarnate, but the Son is said to be sent, inasmuch as He is from another, without which the Incarnation would not suffice for the nature of Mission.³¹

The Son of God in no wise assumed a human person, for there would be then two persons which is false.

The Son of God assumed human nature in a person the uncreated suppositum the Person of the Son of God.³²

Absorption does not here imply destruction of anything pre-existing, but the hindering of what might otherwise have been.

The Son of God did not assume a man unless by " man " a human nature is implied.

The Son of God is the man whose nature He assumed.

It was not human nature as a common form without sensible matter that the Son of God assumed.

It is contrary to the nature of a common form to be individualized in a person : to a common form could only be attributed common operations, according to which man neither merits nor demerits ; whereas the assumption took place that the Son of God might merit for us : such nature would not be sensible, it would be intelligible only, but the Son of God assumed human nature in order to show Himself in men's sight.

Nor could it have been human nature, as it is in the Divine Intellect, since then it would be Divine Nature and in the Son of God from Eternity.

Nor could it have been human nature, as in a human intellect, for this would be nothing but to be understood to have assumed human nature, which would have been a fictitious Incarnation, as the Damascene had said.

³⁰ S.T. III, 2.

³¹ S.T. III, 3.

³² Cf. p. 400.

Nor was it human nature in all its *supposita*, for all men would have been of equal dignity to the Son of God.

Per St. Augustine : " God judged it better to assume human nature from the vanquished race and thus to vanquish the enemy of the human race. Because it seems to belong to justice that he who sinned should make amends."

From corrupted nature that was assumed, satisfaction is made for the whole of nature. Further, it pertains to the dignity of man that the conqueror of the devil should spring from the stock conquered by the devil. Moreover, God's power was thereby made more manifest, from a corrupt and weakened nature He assumed that which was raised to such might and glory.³³

As Christ's human nature was real, so was His body, which pertains to the essence of human nature and which could not be fictitious or imaginary for similar reasons to those given above. For similar reasons also, His soul was real, flesh and bone also received their species through the soul, and if He had had no human mind He could not have wondered (cf., Matt. VIII, 10 ; Luke VII, 9).³⁴

The Son of God is united to the flesh through the medium of the soul. In nature there is a twofold order, that of dignity and that of means, cause or medium.

The order of the assumption was in accordance with both of these orders of nature ; as to dignity, because the soul is mid-way between God and flesh ; also as to cause, for flesh is not human except through the medium of the soul.

And here St. Thomas gives an important definition. The intellect is called spirit and the mind is called spirit and the spirit or mind is the essence of the soul. The intellect is the highest and noblest part of the soul, not distinct in essence, but distinct from all other parts as a power, and in this way it is a medium of the soul (cf., p. 335).

In the Incarnation the assumption of the whole and the parts was simultaneous. The Word of God assumed the parts of human nature, through the medium of the whole body through the order it had to the rational soul, and assumed the body and soul on account of the order which they have for human nature. The assumption is terminated in a personal union, not a union of nature from conjunction of the parts.

Herein it must be noted that the Grace of Union is the Personal Being of the Word, on account of the simplicity of the Word, so that the Grace of Union is the term of the assumption and not the means of the assumption. But at the same time the Union took place by Grace as its efficient cause.

³³ S.T. III, 4.

³⁴ S.T. III, 5.

THE GRACE OF CHRIST AS AN INDIVIDUAL MAN

Christ had *Habitual Grace* because of the union of His soul with the Word of God ; because of the dignity of His soul, whose operations were to attain so closely to God by knowledge and love ; and on account of the relation of Christ to the human race it behoved Him to have Grace which should overflow to others. " And of His fulness we have all received grace for grace " (John I, 16).

As Grace regards the essence of a soul, virtue regards the powers of the soul derived from its essence, so that the virtues are offshoots of grace. Hence since the Grace of Christ was most perfect, there flowed from it in consequence the virtues which perfect the several powers of the soul for all the soul's acts, thus Christ had all the virtues (cf., pp. 437, 440).

But from the nature of the case, Christ was without faith, in that from conception Christ saw God's essence fully. He was what is termed a Comprehensor. Nor had He Hope as a theological virtue, for Hope has God Himself for its object, but Christ had the Divine fruition fully, hence not Hope. However, He had hope as regards things that He did not yet possess, e.g., immortality and glory of the body. The Gifts of the Holy Ghost are given to help the virtues' perfections of the soul's powers. Christ had these in a pre-eminent degree, " Being full of the Holy Ghost " (Luke IV, 1). The Gift of Fear is indeed attributed to Christ, as the soul regards the Divine pre-eminence in an act of reverence, but this is not servile fear which perfect charity casteth out (John I, 18). Christ also had *Gratuitous Grace*, ordained for the manifestation of faith and spiritual doctrine (cf., p. 437).

Christ was a prophet, because before His Passion He was not only a " Comprehensor " but also a " Wayfarer " (cf., Jer. XIV, 8 ; Phil. III, 12) : angels are comprehensors but Christ both. Wayfarer is so called from tending to beatitude, Comprehensor as having already attained beatitude. Christ had Grace bestowed upon Him, as a universal principle in the genus of such as have grace, hence it extends to all the effects of Grace which are the virtues, the Gifts and the like. The soul of Christ is justified by *Operating Grace*, the fact that such makes the ungodly to be just is accidental to it on the part of the subject. Fulness of Grace is the limit attained as to essence and power and thus proper to Christ's power, for all that belongs to man's office or state is not proper to Christ but communicated by Him.

Though Habitual Grace in its specific nature is infinite since it is not limited, yet in Christ as " being " it is finite, as it is in the

soul as subject, which is finite. "Ordered all things in measure, weight and number" (Wisdom XI, 21 Vulgate).

The Grace of Christ reached the highest measure of grace, so that it cannot be increased on the part of grace, nor on the part of the subject, since Christ as man was a true full "Comprehensor."³⁵

THE GRACE OF CHRIST AS HEAD OF THE CHURCH

Christ is Head of the Church in Order, Perfection, and Power representing respectively Nearness to God, Fulness of Grace, and Power to bestow Grace.

Christ is indeed Head of all men: (1) Those united in glory with Him. (2) Those united by charity. (3) Those united by faith. (4) Those united in potentiality not yet reduced to act. (5) Those united in potentiality but never reduced to act.

The Potentiality is rooted in the power of Christ and in free Will.

The mystical body of the Church consists not only of men but also of angels, hence Christ is not only Head of men but also of angels.

The devil is the head of the wicked; the end of the devil is the aversion of the rational creature from God, it is disguised under the appearance of liberty.

Anti-Christ will not be as if His humanity were assumed by the devil into unity of person; but the devil by suggestion will infuse his wickedness more copiously into him than into all the others.

As stated above the Grace of Union in Christ is ordained to a Person and not to an act; the Grace of Person is ordained to hallow; and Capital Grace which overflows is ordained to the justification of others.³⁶

CHRIST'S KNOWLEDGE

Since the Son of God assumed a rational soul (cf., p. 394), Christ had created knowledge. Also through a light participated from the Divine Nature the rational soul was perfected with the beatific knowledge whereby it saw God in Essence.

St. Thomas Aquinas, after re-consideration, changed his opinion, and held that "there must have been intelligible species received in His passive intellect by the action of His active intellect, and that therefore He had acquired or empiric knowledge."³⁷

Though perfected with beatific knowledge, whereby it sees God in Essence, the soul of Christ in nowise comprehends the

³⁵ S.T. III, 7.

³⁶ S.T. III, 8.

³⁷ S.T. III, 9.

Divine Essence, the whole power of the Godhead was not circumscribed by human nature.

The soul of Christ sees it, but does not comprehend it as perfectly as it is knowable. The Son of Man is indeed Comprehensor of the Divine Essence, but not by His soul, but in His Divine Nature.

The *Sixth Council of Constantinople*, 680 A.D., condemned the opinion of those, who denied that in Christ there are two knowledges or wisdoms.

St. Thomas Aquinas explains the verse "Neither the angels in Heaven nor the Son but the Father (Mark III, 32), as against the opinions of Arius and Eunomius that the knowledge of the Son here referred to is the knowledge possessed of the human soul of Christ, whose existence they denied.

The soul of Christ, since it is united to the Word in Person is more closely joined to the Word of God than any other creature, and therefore more perfectly sees the First Truth which is the Essence of God. "And we saw His glory, the glory as it were of the Only Begotten of the Father full of grace and TRUTH" (John I, 14).³⁸

Since Christ was not merely a Wayfarer but a Comprehensor, His soul as such is in nowise subject to its body or dependent on it, but wholly dominates it and could, moreover, know separate substances. Since Christ had the fulness of prudence by the gift of Counsel, He knew all singular things present, past and future.

It is not clear how St. Thomas arrived at such an opinion, in respect of Christ's human soul, though true enough in respect of His Divine Nature. Having regard to his explanation of Mark XIII, 32, it would appear that this could not have represented his real opinion. But had not St. Thomas to conform with the doubtful decision of the above mentioned Council.³⁹

St. Thomas held that Christ had no collative or discursive mode of acquiring knowledge from causes to effects or *vice versa*, it did not befit the dignity of Christ to be taught by any man or angel and He only asked questions in order to teach.

On the other hand, Christ had a collative or discursive mode for using the knowledge already possessed, in that He could conclude one thing from another. His soul had recourse to phantasms for comparison and discussion.⁴⁰

As the soul of Christ knew by infused knowledge all things to which the passive intellect is in potentiality, so by acquired knowledge it knew whatever can be known by the active intellect. Whether this was limited to all that came within range of His senses or extended to separate substances is not clear.

³⁸ S.T. III, 10.

³⁹ Cf. p. 399.

⁴⁰ S.T. III, 11.

St. Thomas held that Christ could increase in knowledge not merely by comparing the infused intelligible species with phantasms, but also by a habit of knowledge He could increase in knowledge by abstraction of species from phantasms and from first intelligible species.

As to the transmutation of creatures, St. Thomas held that the omnipotence of Christ with regard to His own body, must be attributed to the Word of God rather than the soul and that it flows from the Divine Nature ; if this is so, there is all the more reason why St. Thomas should have held that Christ's omniscience arose in the same way and that the knowledge in His human soul was naturally limited as to sensible things (cf., p. 399).⁴¹

DEFECTS OF BODY AND SOUL ASSUMED BY CHRIST

The Son of God, having taken flesh, came into the World to satisfy for the sins of the human race, that is by taking on Himself the punishment due to sin.

The bodily defects due to the punishment of sin are hunger, thirst, and death. He did not contract these, but by the Divine Will assumed them, so that the flesh was allowed to suffer and do what belonged to it. So that He assumed these penalties in our flesh and in our stead.

But Christ did not assume the defects of sin itself, for sin nowise works satisfaction ; the truth of human nature is not proved by it, nor is it an example of virtue but opposed to it.

Christ was made sin. 2 Cor. V, 21, referred to Christ not only acting on men's behalf, but also as standing in their place.

Since virtues in the highest degree were in Christ, "Fomes" of sin, which are an inclination of the sensual appetite contrary to reason, were not in Him.

As Christ's body was passable so also was His soul to bodily passion. A soul suffers with an animal passion in its operations and thus suffers through sensation and intelligence : the affections of the sensitive appetite are called the passions of the soul. But the passions that were in Christ did not tend to what was unlawful, and as regards principle never forestalled the judgment of reason ; but all movement of the sensitive appetite sprang from the disposition of reason. According to St. Jerome passion is generally understood as dominating the soul, and "propassion" when it is begun in the sensitive appetite but goes no further.

In Christ there was true bodily pain and likewise sorrow "as a propassion." Likewise there was Fear in Christ as sorrow for bodily hurt, but not as to any uncertainty of the future event.

In Christ there was no wonder as regards His Divine knowledge,

⁴¹ S.T. III, 12.

nor as regards His human knowledge arising from infused species, yet with regard to His empiric knowledge He assumed this affection for our instruction (cf., p. 398). Anger is an effect of sorrow and a desire for revenge, righteous revenge is in accordance with justice, hence there was Anger in Christ.⁴²

CONSEQUENCES OF THE UNION : CHRIST'S BEING AND BECOMING

According to the decision of the *Council of Chalcedon*, 451 A.D., the Catholic Doctrine is that the Divine Nature is united with true human nature not only in person but in suppositum or hypostasis. Hypostasis is only the Greek word for the Latin suppositum; but whilst in the Greek there is no distinction between the generic and indefinite form of a noun, in Latin there is no distinction between the generic, indefinite or definite form of a noun. Hence of rational being hypostasis may mean, man, or a man: suppositum may mean, man, a man, or the man. Attempt was made amongst the Schoolmen to confine the use of hypostasis to a generic or indefinite meaning, e.g., man or a man, and the use of suppositum to a definite meaning, e.g., the man; and thus differentiate between the two, but in practice this was not adhered to.

Now it has been shown (p. 377) that nature is the same as essence or quiddity; that Person signifies an individual of the genus rational substance; and that suppositum signifies an individual which subsists in the genus of substance.

Suppositum or hypostasis is, then, what a man is, that is, man; and human nature is that whereby a man is, that is, his manhood. Suppositum is taken as the whole, which has the nature as its formal part to perfect it, so that nature is not predicated of suppositum; we do not say a man is his manhood. But in God the suppositum and nature are only mentally distinct (cf., pp. 391, 392). God is therefore man not only in truth of terms, but by truth of the predication. "Man is God" is likewise true, for man may stand for any hypostasis of human nature and thus may stand for the Person of the Son of God, Who is said to be a hypostasis of human nature; thus "the man Christ Jesus" signifies the eternal suppositum, the Person of the Son of God.

Things are not distinguished which are predicated of Christ, but the reasons by which they are predicated. Hence, "to be assumed," pertains to human nature in itself and not in its suppositum; so that it does not belong to God to be assumed. Thus it is said in the Athanasian Creed "not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh."

To be man, belongs to God, by reason of union, which is

⁴² S.T. III, 14, 15.

relation. Hence to be made man is newly predicated of God, not by any change of God, but by a change in the human nature which is assumed to a Divine Person.

There is change in whatever is predicated absolutely, but whatever is predicated relatively can be predicated of anything without change. "This man was not made God," because this suppositum the Person of the Son of God was eternally God, yet man, speaking commonly, was not always God.

Thus it might be true to say that this man was made white to-day, but it would be untrue to say this white thing was made man to-day.

Christ was a creature in His human nature, it was the Arian heresy to say "in His Divine Person"; hence things said of Christ as man must always, whether expressed or not, have the qualification "in His Humanity" understood.

"A term taken in the subject is taken materially"; placed in the predicate it is taken formally.

St. Thomas then considers the following expression: "Christ as man is a creature," this is granted. Because the term covered by the re-duplication signifies nature rather than suppositum.

"Christ as this man is a creature," this is denied. Because the "this" signifies the suppositum which is eternal.

"Christ as man is God," this is denied on the same grounds.

"Christ as man is a hypostasis or Person," this is not allowed unless the re-duplication refer to the suppositum and not to the nature, which as above is denied to the phrase.⁴³

Form or nature not pertaining to the personal 'being' of the subsisting hypostasis, "this being," belongs to the "person" not simply but relatively. For example, the 'being' whereby Socrates is white or a musician is not as he is Socrates, but the being as he is white or musical. Yet there is only one 'being' for one thing.

Thus the human nature is united to the Son of God hypostatically or personally, and not accidentally; so by the human nature there accrued to Him no new personal 'being,' but only a new relation of the pre-existing personal 'being' to the human nature, in such a way that the Person is said to subsist not merely in the Divine, but also in the human nature.

"Being belongs to the subsisting person, in as much as it has relation to such a nature, and of this relation the soul is the cause, in as much as it perfects human nature by informing the body."⁴⁴⁻⁴⁵

⁴³ S.T. III, 16.

⁴⁴ Cf. p. 392.

⁴⁵ S.T. III, 17.

CHRIST'S UNITY OF WILL

By the *Sixth General Council of Constantinople*, 680 A.D., it was decided that in Christ there are "two Wills and two natural operations."

The Son of God assumed perfect human nature; and the Will like the Intellect is one of its natural powers, hence there are two Wills, one human and one Divine.

But to will in a certain way, belongs to the nature, as it is in the hypostasis; hence the human Will in Christ had a determinate mode from the fact of being in a Divine Hypostasis; *i.e.*, it was always moved in accordance with the bidding of the Divine Will.⁴⁶

In Christ there was sensual appetite; inasmuch as it obeys reason naturally it is rational by participation, and because the Will is said to be in the reason (*De Anima*) it may be said equally to be a Will by participation.

This use of the term Will to denote sensitive appetite gave rise to a considerable amount of confusion; so that it was held that "Two natural Wills following His Human Will were subject to His Divine Will."

There are two species of acts of the Will on the part of reason, that towards the end simply and absolutely as towards good itself, called by the "Masters" *Will as Nature*; and that towards the means towards which it is borne under a certain relation, since the goodness of the means depends on something else, such act was called by the Masters the "*Will as Reason*."⁴⁷

Of the power of the Will, there is but one human will essentially so called and not by participation. If a man wish one thing with his rational appetite and another with his sensitive appetite there is no contrariety.

Choice is the same as the "*Will as Reason*" and is the proper act of Free Will: doubt is not necessary to choice.

In His Will of sensuality and in His rational Will considered as "*Will as nature*," Christ could will what God did not, but in His "*Will as Reason*," He always wished the same as God (*Matt. XXVI, 39*).

Christ was at once Comprehensor and Wayfarer, in as much as He was enjoying God in His Mind and at the same time had a passable body. Hence things repugnant to His Will and to His sensitive appetite could happen to Him in His passable flesh.

Although the natural and sensitive Will in Christ wished what the Divine Will did not wish, yet there was no contrariety of Wills in Him. Because neither the natural Will nor the sensitive

⁴⁶ S.T. III, 18.

⁴⁷ *Sed contra* pp., Ch. XX, p. 291.

Will rejected the reason of the Divine Will, and the Will of human reason in Christ wished for the passions.

“ For the absolute Will of Christ wished the salvation of the human race, although it did not pertain to it to wish this for the sake of something further ; but the movement of sensuality could in no wise extend as far.”

There was no contrariety of Wills in Christ, moreover neither the Divine Will, nor the “ Will of Reason ” in Christ was impeded or retarded by the natural Will or the appetite of sensuality.

On the other hand, it pleased Christ in His Divine Will and in His “ Will of Reason ” that “ His natural Will ” and “ Will of sensuality ” should be moved according to the order of nature.

The *Sixth Council of Constantinople III*, 18, states that : “ We confess two natural Wills and two operations, not in opposition, as evil minded heretics assert, but following His human Will and neither withstanding nor striving against, but rather being subject to, His Divine and Omnipotent Will.” In Christ there were two operations of the Will.

What is moved by another has a twofold action, one from its own form and the other as it is moved. Where mover and moved have different forms or operative faculties there must be distinct operations of mover and moved, though each share in the operation of the other.

Hence, in Christ human nature has its proper form and power, whereby it is, and so has the Divine Nature, so that each have operation distinct from the other.

Pope Leo said, “ Both forms do what is proper to each in union with the other, the Word operates what belongs to the Word and the flesh carries out what belongs to the flesh.”

But it must be borne in mind that it can only be put in this manner because the Divine Nature chose thus to act, for nothing else limited the Divine Nature from carrying out all the operations of human nature.

That there were two operations is stressed because of the necessity of otherwise saying that human nature had not its proper form and power, so that in Christ there was only the Divine Operation and that thus the human nature in Christ would be imperfect, which is impossible. Or, that from the Divine Power and the human power there was made up but one power, in which case there would be a confusion of natures, which is impossible.

Operations in the main that spring from the vegetative soul, or the sensitive soul, so far as it is not subject to reason, are not human operation ; but “ only as regards part of human nature ” ;

they are distinct from the operation of the Will, which alone is called Human Operation.

In Christ there was no motion of the sensitive part not ordered by reason, so that His natural and bodily operations pertained in some respects to His Will, "that His flesh should do and bear what belonged to it."⁴⁸

MERIT OF CHRIST

A thing is said to have of itself that of which it is to some extent the cause.

Though of whatever good we possess, the first cause is God, nevertheless anyone may be a cause to himself of certain good things, inasmuch as he co-operates with God in the matter. Thus whoever has anything by his own merit has it in a measure of himself, which is better than without merit.

All perfections and greatness must be attributed to Christ, hence all merit, unless of such a nature that it would detract from His dignity and perfection.

For He merited neither grace, nor knowledge, nor the beatitude of His soul, nor the Godhead.

But the glory of the body and the like are less than the dignity of meriting, which pertains to the virtue of Charity.

Hence we must say, that Christ had by merit the glory of the body, and whatever pertained to His outward excellence, as His Ascension, Veneration, and the rest, He could indeed merit for Himself, "by the very devotion with which out of Charity He humbly endured the Passion becoming obedient unto death, for which cause God also hath exalted Him" (Phil. II, 8 and 9).

Grace was in Christ not merely as He was an individual, but as Head of the Whole Church to whom all are united, as members to a head, who constitute one mystical person.

Hence it is that Christ's merit extends to others inasmuch as they are His members: even as in a man, the action of the head reaches in a manner to all His members, since it perceives not merely for itself alone but for all its members.

As the sin of Adam reaches others by carnal generation, so too the merit of Christ reaches others only by spiritual regeneration, which takes place at baptism, wherein we are incorporated with Christ.

"As many of you as have been baptised in Christ have put on Christ" (Gal. II, 27).

And it is by Grace, that it is granted to man to be incorporated with Christ and thus man's salvation is from Grace.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ S.T. III, 19.

⁴⁹ S.T. III, 19.

CHRIST'S SUBJECTION TO THE FATHER

As mentioned on page 400, all things said of Christ, as man, must be understood to be qualified as of Him "in His Humanity."

Human nature is subject to God as to Goodness, Power, and Obedience; through its proper act, as by its own Will, it obeys His commands (cf., "I do always the things that please Him," John VIII, 29). In the same manner Christ is said to be a "servant."

It was thus, that Christ prayed in order to teach that He had taken a true human nature; to show that man may wish with his natural desire, what God does not wish; and that man should subject his own Will to the Divine Will. He gave us an example that we should give thanks for benefits received, and ask for those that we have not yet obtained.⁵⁰

THE ADORATION OF CHRIST

"Adoration in two natures" was condemned by the *Third Council of Ephesus*, 430 A.D., and the *Fifth Council of Constantinople*, 553 A.D.

Honour is paid to the person.

Honour is paid to some part or something external to the person, by reason of the whole being honoured in them, e.g., vesture, image, messenger.

In the Trinity there are Three who are honoured, but only one cause of honour; in the Incarnation there is only one who is honoured.

Christ is adored with "latria" on account of His Divinity and with "dulia" on account of His perfected humanity.

As to the flesh of Christ, if by a subtle distinction that which is seen be divided from that which is understood, then it cannot be adored with "latria," because it is a creature, but must be adored with "hyperdulia."

As to an image, there is a twofold movement of the mind towards it, one as being a certain thing, another in so far as it is the representation of something else.

Now reverence is only given to it in so far as it is an image of something else.

Hence the reverence to Christ's image should be as to Himself, therefore it should be adored with 'latria.' The honour given reflects on its exemplar, but to the thing itself not at all.

But St. Thomas denied that 'latria' should be given to a messenger.

The worship of 'dulia' only, is due to the Blessed Virgin as a rational creature.

⁵⁰ S.T. III, 20, 21.

"Honour should be shown to the Saints of God as being members of Christ, the children and friends of God and our intercessors. Hence God honours their relics by working miracles at their presence. As insensible body, they are not to be worshipped, but for the sake of the soul which now enjoys God, and for God's sake whose ministers they were."⁵¹

THE PRIESTHOOD OF CHRIST AS OUR MEDIATOR

The office proper to a priest is to be a mediator between God and the people. He bestows Divine things on the people, for as much as he offers up the people's prayers to God and in a manner makes satisfaction for their sins. His priesthood differed from that under the Old Law as truth from figure.

As St. Augustine says, "The same one true Mediator reconciling us to God by the sacrifice of peace, was one with Him to Whom it was offered, united in Himself those for whom He offered it, at the same time offered it Himself and was Himself that which He offered."

Every visible sacrifice is a sacrament, that is a sacred sign of the invisible sacrifice, by which a man offers his spirit to God. "A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit" (Ps. LI, 17).

Such sacrifice is for the remission of sin, for preservation in Grace, and for the spirit to be perfectly united to God, which will be more perfectly realized in glory.

By the sacrifice of the humanity of Christ, the perfect victim :

Our sins are blotted out (Rom. IV, 25).

We receive Grace and salvation (Heb. V, 9).

We acquire the perfection of glory (Heb. X, 19).

The priesthood of Christ produces the perfect cleansing of sins by removal of the guilt of sin and the debt of punishment.

By Grace our hearts are turned to God blotting out guilt (Rom. III, 24, 25), and He satisfied for us fully whereby debt is removed (Isa. LIII, 4, 5).

The consummation of the Sacrifice consists in this, that those for whom the sacrifice is offered obtain the end of the sacrifice, which is Eternal Good. Therefore the priesthood of Christ endures for ever (Ps. CX, 4).

Christ had beatitude, in common with God, and mortality, with man. Hence for this purpose He intervened, that having fulfilled the span of His mortality, He might from dead men make immortal men, which he showed in Himself, by rising again ; and that He might confer beatitude on those, who were deprived of it, for which reason He never forsakes us, wherefore He is the good Mediator Who reconciles enemies" (cf., 1 Tim. II, 5).

⁵¹ S.T. III, 25.

Although it belongs to Christ, as God, to take away sins authoritatively, yet it belongs to Him as man to satisfy for the sin of the human race, and in this sense He is called the Mediator of God and men.⁵²

NATIVITY OF CHRIST

St. Thomas, whilst maintaining that the Blessed Virgin Mary was sinless, and sanctified in the womb from original sin as to the personal stain, denied that she was free from the guilt to which the whole nature is subject, so as to enter Paradise, otherwise than through the Sacrifice of Christ. It was not until the Council of the Vatican, 1870 A.D., that the Roman Church adopted the contrary view of the Immaculate Conception.

In the view of St. Thomas the human body is animated in succession by growth, by the vegetative, sensitive, and rational soul, each succeeding one maintaining within itself the former. And he also held it to be contrary to faith to assert that Christ's flesh was first of all conceived, and afterwards assumed by the Word of God. So he was led to the logical view that in the first instance in which the various parts of matter were united together in the place of generation, Christ's body was 'perfectly formed' and assumed, and must needs have been animated by the rational soul. He did not deny the nine months of gestation, but held that the *fœtus* was animated and 'of such a size as would have been sufficient for a small man.'⁵³

But the whole question, like those depending on the then current knowledge of biology and physics was based on a false concept of the whole matter. That the birth was miraculous there can be no doubt, but the added details insisted on by St. Thomas need carry no weight.

Whilst assuming that the actual birth of Christ was miraculous, in that it did not destroy the virginity of the Blessed Virgin, St. Thomas denied that Christ in His birth assumed the gifts of "subtlety" and "agility" which are the gifts of a glorified body resulting from an overflow of the soul's glory on to the body.

Every word that signifies a nature in the concrete, can stand for any hypostasis of that nature. Since human nature was taken by the Divine Person at the beginning of the conception, God was conceived and born of the Virgin Mother, who conceived and gave birth.

Hence the Blessed Virgin is called the Mother of God.

There are two filiations, one temporal and one eternal, but the subject of filiation is not nature, but person.

⁵² *S.T.* III, 22, 26.

⁵³ *S.T.* III, 33.

There was no filiation in Christ, but that of the Eternal hypostasis.

Every relation which is predicated of God in time, does not put something real in the Eternal God, but something according to our way of thinking.

Therefore, the filiation of Christ to His Mother is not a real filiation, but only a relation of reason.

Considered as to its cause, there are two filiations in respect of the twofold nativity, but considered as to its subject, the suppositum, no other filiation is a real relation, but the Eternal filiation of Christ.

Nevertheless, He has the relation of Son in regard to His Mother, because it is implied in her motherhood of Him. Thus God is called Lord, by the real relation of the creature to Him, though lordship is not a real relation in God, yet He is really Lord through the real subjection of the creature to Him.⁵⁴

As to the virginity of the Mother of God, "behold a virgin shall conceive" (Isa. VII, 14).

St. Thomas gives four reasons :

(1) To maintain the dignity of the Father Who sent Him.
 (2) As a property of the Son, Who is the Word of God, it was fitting that He should be conceived without corruption of the mother.

(3) For the dignity of Christ's humanity, in which there could be no sin. For it is not possible in a nature already corrupt to be born from sexual intercourse without incurring the infection of sin.

(4) On account of the end of the Incarnation, that men might be born again as sons of God, not of the Will of the flesh nor of the Will of man but of God (John I, 13).⁵⁵

As to the visit of the Magi, it is of interest to note that St. Thomas refers to a sermon of St. Chrysostom (Hom. VI in Matt.) with reference to the prophesy of Balaam, "a star shall rise out of Jacob" (Num. XXIV, 17) that Seth or Sheth wrote a book referring to this star, and that a tribe in the Far East had possession of such document and always had had twelve watchers for it.⁵⁶

Christ was circumcised to prove the reality of His nature, His approval of the Old Law, His descent from Abraham, to avoid rejection by the Jews, to inculcate obedience and by taking the burden of the law to set others free (Gal. IV, 4, 5).

Christ voluntarily took upon Himself our death, which is the effect of sin, when without sin ; to deliver us from death and to make us die spiritually to sin. So He took circumcision, which was a remedy against original sin, although He had contracted

⁵⁴ S.T. III, 35.

⁵⁵ S.T. III, 28.

⁵⁶ S.T. III, 36.

no original sin, to deliver us from the yoke of the law and to accomplish a spiritual circumcision in us, in order that by taking upon Himself the shadow He might accomplish the reality.⁵⁷

LIFE OF CHRIST

Christ's manner of life was : To publish the truth (John XVIII, 37) ; To free men from sin (1 Tim. I, 15) ; That we might have access to God (Rom. V, 2).

Christ employed parables in teaching mysteries to the crowd, who were unable or unworthy to grasp the meaning of truth ; it was better for them to be instructed in spiritual things under the garb of parables, than to be deprived of it altogether. It was not in writing, ' Not in tables of stone but the fleshy tables of the heart ' (2 Cor. III, 3).

Christ's miracles were to confirm His doctrine and to show God's presence by the Grace of the Holy Ghost. Signs were not worked for those whom He knew to be hardened, but to amend others (Matt. XVI, 4).

God alone can change the order of nature, which is what is meant by a miracle. St. Thomas here quotes Pope Leo the Great, " the Divine Nature shines forth in miracles : the human nature submits to insults, yet each communicates its actions to the other ; the human nature is the instrument of the Divine Action, and the human action receives the power from the Divine Nature " (cf. p. 329).

PASSION OF CHRIST

Necessary, means anything of which its nature cannot be otherwise ; or necessary, from some efficient or moving cause apart from itself, if compulsion results. If the external factor be an end, then necessary only from presupposing such end.

Christ did not suffer from the necessity of compulsion, neither on God's part, Who ruled that Christ should suffer, nor on Christ's, Who suffered voluntarily.

But it was necessary from the necessity of the end pre-supposed. On our part who have been delivered ; on Christ's part Who merited the glory of being exalted through the lowliness of His Passion ; on God's part, Whose determination regarding the Passion of Christ, foretold in the Scriptures and pre-figured in the observances of the Old Testament had to be fulfilled.

Since no word is impossible with God (Luke I, 37), it may be said that it would have been possible for God to deliver mankind otherwise than by the Passion of Christ. But supposing God's

⁵⁷ S.T. III, 37.

foreknowledge and ordinance concerning Christ's Passion, it is otherwise; in the consideration of which the transcendent simplicity of God, whereby His Knowledge, Wisdom, Justice, and Goodness, etc., are all one in His Essence, must ever be borne in mind.

As here, among means to an end, that one is more suitable, whereby various concurring means, employed by themselves, are helpful to the end. For by Christ's Passion, in addition to the deliverance of man, man learns that God loves him and is stirred to love Him in return; man obtains an example of obedience, humility, constancy, and justice; Christ merited Justifying Grace for man and the glory of Bliss; man is the more bound to refrain from sin; and it redounds to man's greater dignity that, having been overcome and deceived by the devil, it should be a man that should overthrow the devil.

There was true and sensible pain in the sufferings of Christ, beyond the internal pain of all the sins of the human race, for which He made satisfaction by suffering. His soul from its interior powers apprehended most vehemently *all the causes of sadness*.

All the powers of Christ's soul suffered as regards their subject, and He suffered indeed as to all His lower powers, for though intellect is not an act of body but a power of the soul, yet the soul's essence is an act of the body. The higher part of His soul enjoyed fruition, whilst Christ was suffering; and the grief of passion was not opposed to it, for it was not in the same object. The grief of passion belongs to the essence of the soul, by reason of the body whose form the soul is; but the joy of fruition belongs to the soul, by reason of the faculty in which it is subjected.⁵⁸

An effect is caused directly and indirectly. Christ's persecutors directly caused His death. But Christ could have prevented His enemies from seeking to kill Him, or from succeeding in doing so. His Divine Spirit had this power and also Christ's soul, because it was united to Him in Unity of Person with the Divine Word.

"Of His Own Will, His bodily nature kept its vigour to the end, so likewise when He willed, He suddenly succumbed to the injury inflicted."

Christ suffered out of obedience (John X, 18).

In keeping with human justification (Rom. V, 9).

Suitable for reconciling man with God (Rom. V, 10).

In keeping with His victory over death and its author.

"An obedient man shall speak of victory" (not A.V.) (cf., Prov. XXI, 28; Isa. XXV, 8; 1 Cor. XV, 54).

By His Passion He fulfilled the precepts of the Old Law; those

⁵⁸ S.T. III, 46.

of the moral order founded on charity ; the ceremonial precepts ; and the judicial precepts.⁵⁹

Grace was bestowed on Christ, not only as an individual, but as Head of the Church ; Christ by His Passion merited salvation, not only for Himself, but likewise for all His members (cf., p. 403).

Whoever suffers for justice (A.V., righteousness) sake, provided he is in a state of grace, merits salvation (cf., Matt. V, 10).

He, who atones, offers something which the offended loves equally or more than he detested the offence. By suffering out of love and obedience Christ gave more to God than was required to compensate for the offence of the whole human race, on account of the exceeding Charity, the dignity of His life as God and man, and the extent of the passion of grief rendered.

Sacrifice is properly something done for that honour, which is properly due to God, in order to appease Him. This is the most perfect sacrifice. Since being flesh of human nature it is fittingly offered for man, and is partaken of by them in the Sacrament ; because being passible and mortal, it was fit for immolation ; being sinless, it had virtue to cleanse sin ; and being the offeror's own flesh it was acceptable to God on account of His charity in offering up His own flesh.

Through guilt man had offended God and put himself under the devil.

As to penalty, man was chiefly bound to God as his sovereign judge and to the devil as his torturer.

After deceiving man, the devil held him unjustly in bondage both as to sin and the penalty ; still it was just that man should suffer it, God so permitting it as to the sin, and ordaining it as to the penalty. Justice required man's redemption with regard to God, but not with regard to the devil.

Christ's humanity is the instrument of the Godhead, Christ's Passion, as compared with His Godhead, acts in an efficient manner ; as compared with the Will of Christ's soul, in a meritorious manner ; as compared with His flesh, as satisfaction for debt, redemption from guilt, and sacrifice for reconciliation of man to God.⁶⁰

Christ's Passion is the cause of forgiveness of sins by exciting our charity ; by redemption, since He is our Head ; by efficiency, in as much as Christ's flesh, wherein He endured His Passion, is the instrument of the Godhead. Christ's Passion is corporeal, but it derives a kind of spiritual energy from the Godhead of which the flesh is an instrument.

Christ's Passion delivered us from our sins causally ; causally,

⁵⁹ S.T. III, 47.

⁶⁰ S.T. III, 48.

for example, would describe the action of a doctor in preparing medicine for future occasions.

Christ's Passion as to man, who by sin deserved to be delivered over to the devil's power, was the cause of Forgiveness of sin.

Christ's Passion, as to God, Whom man had offended, reconciled us with God.

Christ's Passion, as to the devil, who hindered man from securing salvation, vanquished him ; since he exceeded the power assigned to him by God, by conspiring to bring about Christ's death, Who, being sinless did not deserve to die.

By Christ's Passion the satisfaction abolished the debt of penalty, and the forgiveness of sins abolished the guilt, the cause upon which the debt of punishment rests.

Christ's Passion works its effect through Faith and Charity and the Sacraments of Faith.

St. Thomas goes on to explain that we are likened unto Him in baptism sacramentally and then fully delivered by Christ's satisfaction ; but as Christ died but once, a man cannot be likened a second time unto Christ's death by the Sacrament of baptism. Hence, he adds that it is necessary that those, who sin after baptism, be likened unto Christ's suffering by some form of punishment, which they endure in their own person ; yet by the co-operation of Christ's satisfaction a much lighter penalty suffices than one proportionate to the sin.⁶¹

THE DEATH OF CHRIST

Christ died to satisfy for the whole human race, to show the reality of the flesh assumed, and to deliver us from the fear of death. By dying in body to the likeness of sin, that is to its penalty, He gave an example to die to sin spiritually. And by rising from the dead and manifesting His power, whereby He overthrew death, He instills the hope of rising from the dead.

He died as man not as God.

The attributes of human nature are only predicated of the Son of God by reason of the Union ; what belongs to the body of Christ after death is predicated of the Son of God, that it was buried. Therefore Christ's Godhead was not separated from the flesh when He died.

So that the hypostasis of the Word of God was not different from that of Christ's flesh after death.

The Word of God was united to the flesh by the soul which makes it human, but flesh is still human after the separation from the soul, hence the Union was not severed.

⁶¹ S. T. III, 49.

Nor was the soul of Christ separated from the Godhead after death.

Through being united to human nature, the Word of God is not on that account called human nature. Hence, it does not follow that the Word is a soul or a body, through being united with body, but He is One possessing a soul and a body; each continued to have one hypostasis.

It is true that by death a man or animal ceases to be a man or animal; consequently, St. Thomas held, that it is erroneous to say that Christ was a man during the three days of His death, but true to say that He was a dead man. Herein St. Thomas, insisting on man being the composite of body and soul, differed from Hugo St. Victor, who like Plato, held the soul to be man; and also differed from Peter Lombard, who held that the union of soul and body was not essential to man.

Christ's body was simply the same before and after death, but not in totality because life is the essence and not the accident of the body. Hence in this sense a dead body is always different from that body when alive. (As to different views, see John Pecham, Chap. XXV, p. 516, and Richard Middleton, Chap. XXV, p. 525.)⁶²

CHRIST'S BURIAL

Whatever befell Christ's flesh, even when the soul of Christ was departed, was conducive to our Salvation, in virtue of the Godhead to which it was united. "And was buried."

The Burial was to establish the truth of His death; by rising from the grave to give hope of the resurrection; to which is added "as an example to those dying spiritually for their sins that they are hidden away from the disturbance of men" (cf., Col. III, 3).

As to the descent of Christ into Hell, a thing is said to be in a place, through its effect and also through its essence. Hell stands for an evil of penalty and not of guilt; Christ's soul descended into hell by the same motion whereby angels are moved (cf., p. 418).

Christ descended into each of the hells in a different manner. In the hell of the lost, He put them to shame for their wickedness and unbelief; to those detained in Purgatory, He gave hope of Glory; to the Holy Fathers detained on account of original sin, He shed the light of glory everlasting.

As to essence, Christ's soul descended to where the just were detained; so that He visited them, in place according to His soul, whom He visited interiorly by grace according to His

⁶² S.T. III, 50.

Godhead. While remaining in one part of Hell, He wrought His effect in every part of Hell, like as whilst suffering in one part of the earth, He delivered the whole world by His Passion.⁶³

CHRIST'S RESURRECTION

As He endured evil things in dying that He might deliver us from evil, so He was glorified in rising again to advance us to good things.

The Resurrection was ordained for the commendation of Divine Justice to those who humble themselves before Him ; to confirm our belief in the Godhead ; to raise our hopes, through seeing Christ as our Head, to rise again ; to order the lives of the faithful ; and to complete the work of our Salvation.

Since Grace is a disposition to glory, all things appertaining to glory were first in Christ, the Author of Glory (John I, 16, cf., p. 437).

According to the virtue of the Godhead united to it, the body took back the soul, which it had laid aside, and the soul took back the body, which it had abandoned, thus Christ rose through His own power (John X, 18).

But in respect of created nature, the body and soul could not thus be re-united, but it was necessary for Christ to be raised up by God (Acts II, 24).⁶⁴

Christ merited the glory of resurrection by the lowliness of His Passion (cf., p. 403), but Christ's soul though glorified from conception did not overflow into His body till after His Passion.

After the Resurrection Christ was risen in the same flesh but not in the same state of mortality as the disciples, therefore He did not live with them.

Those whose minds are well disposed, perceive Divine things rightly, whereas those not so disposed perceive them with a certain confusion of doubt or error ; "for the sensual man perceiveth not those things that are of the Spirit of God" (1 Cor. II, 14).

The proof given by Christ of His Resurrection was not as reason in confirmation as what is a matter of doubt. Reason must be grounded on principle, for nothing is known from the unknown.⁶⁵ If the principles were known, they would not go beyond human reason and consequently would not be efficacious for establishing faith of the resurrection, which is beyond human reason, since those principles must be assumed, which are of the same Order. The proof was from the authority of Scripture.

On the other hand, the proof given was a sensible sign to manifest the truth. Most evident signs that He had risen were

⁶³ S.T. III, 52.

⁶⁴ S.T. III, 53.

⁶⁵ Cf., p. 55.

given, because of the hardness of their hearts, and also that their testimony might be the more efficacious.

Whatever is first in any order is the cause of all that comes after it. Christ's Resurrection is the cause of ours.⁶⁶

The principle of life-giving is the Word of God, Who first bestows immortal life upon the body naturally united to Himself, and through it as the Instrumental Cause and Exemplar works the resurrection of all other bodies but the primary cause is Divine Justice. Christ's Resurrection works in virtue of the Godhead and this virtue extends to souls as well as bodies.

It comes of God that the soul lives by Grace and the body by the soul. Souls become good by participation of Divine Substance, sharing in Divine Goodness, but our bodies are made glorious by sharing in the glory of Christ's body.⁶⁷

THE ASCENSION OF CHRIST

By His Resurrection, Christ entered upon an immortal and incorruptible life; and whereas our dwelling place is one of generation and corruption, the heavenly place is one of incorruption. Christ ascended according to His humanity as expressing the condition of one ascending, He ascended as man not as God; but as denoting the cause, Christ ascended in virtue of His Godhead. He ascended into Heaven in His own power, first of all through His Divine power, and secondly through the power of His glorified soul, moving His body at will.

Through glory the body derives a greater share of the Divine Goodness, than any natural body does through its natural form; whilst among other glorious bodies, it is manifest that Christ's body shines with greater glory, hence set above all bodies. "Place implies the notion of 'containing,' though glorified bodies do not stand in need of 'containing'; for they draw nothing from heavenly bodies, but through the soul from God."

His Ascension like His Resurrection is the cause of our Salvation, not by way of merit but of efficiency. It is the cause of our Salvation, on our part, in that it fosters Faith, Hope, Charity and our reverence is thereby increased, since we no longer deem Him an earthly man, but God in Heaven; on His part, for He prepared the "Way" for our ascension into Heaven, as our Head, as our High Priest to make intercession for us and that He might send down His Gifts. "Fill all things" (Eph. IV, 10).⁶⁸

CHRIST'S SITTING AT THE RIGHT HAND OF THE FATHER

"*Sitting*" indicates abiding Judiciary Power. "*Right Hand*"

⁶⁶ Cf., p. 69.

⁶⁷ S.T. III, 55, 56.

⁶⁸ S.T. III, 57.

indicates the Glory of the Godhead ; the Beatitude of the Father ; and also Judiciary Power.

“ *At* ” implies personal distinction and order of origin, not degree of nature or dignity ; “ *at* ” also signifies approach to “ *the right*,” denoting something in common and yet with a distinction.

“ *At the right hand of the Father.*” Christ, as the Son of God, sits at the right hand of the Father, because He has the same nature as the Father ; hence things belong to the Son *essentially* just as to the Father and this is to be in equality with the Father. Also according to the Grace of Union, which on the contrary implies distinction of nature and unity of person. Christ as man is the Son of God and consequently sits on the Father’s right hand ; yet so that the expression “ *as* ” does not denote condition of nature, but unity of suppositum.

Further, the approach can be understood according to Habitual Grace, which is more fully in Christ than in all other creatures, so much so that human nature in Christ is more blessed than is all other creatures and possesses over all other creatures royal and judiciary power.

The term “ *as* ” requires some elucidation.

Christ “ *as* ” God sits at the right hand of the Father in equality with the Father ; but “ *as* ” man in the Father’s mightier gift, beyond all other creatures, in greater beatitude and exercising judiciary powers.

But if “ *as* ” denotes unity of person “ *as* ” man He sits in equality of power, since we venerate the Son of God with the same honour as His assumed nature.⁶⁹

CHRIST’S JUDICIARY POWER

The Judiciary Power is attributed to the Son as Wisdom begotten, Truth proceeding from the Father, and His Perfect Image. Also because He is the Son of man (John V, 27) because this belongs to the Grace of the Head, which Christ received in His human nature, on account of His likeness and kinship with men.

There is nothing to hinder one and the same thing from being due to some one from various causes.

“ As the glory of the body in rising was due to Christ, not only as befitting His Godhead and His soul’s glory, but likewise from the merit of the lowliness of His Passion, so the Judiciary Power belongs to the Man Christ, on account of His Divine Personality, and the dignity of His Headship and the fulness of His Habitual Grace ; and yet He obtained it from merit so that in accordance

⁶⁹ S.T. III, 58.

with Divine Justice He should be Judge, Who fought for God's Justice and conquered and was unjustly condemned."

All human affairs are subject to the judgment of Christ, according to His Divine Nature, since every judgment of the Father belongs to the Son, for He does and judges all things through His Word. Likewise, in His human nature, on account of the relationship of Christ's soul to the word of God, and the merit of His death; and since all human affairs are ordered for the end of beatitude, to which men are admitted or excluded by the judgment of Christ, all human affairs are included in His Judiciary Power.

Judgment cannot be passed perfectly upon any changeable subject before its consummation.

Although a man's temporal life in itself ends in death, still it continues dependent in a measure on what comes after it in the future, but souls separated from bodies are in Eternal Life. As St. Thomas quotes (2 Cor. V, 8) these must be understood as the souls of the blessed. He then goes on to state that "the soul is only changeable accidentally on account of the body"; once it is separated from the body it enters into an unchangeable condition and receives its judgment, but the body remains subject to change down to the close of time.⁷⁰

As St. Thomas defined Grace (cf., p. 437) as a quality which is an accidental form of the soul through the soul participating in Divine Goodness, the above would appear to be too wide an expression as it would crystallize its participation at death, which would be contrary to all prayers for the dead.

ANGELOLOGY

God produced things into being in order that His Goodness might be communicated to creatures and be represented by them. Because His Goodness could not be adequately represented by one creature alone, He produced many and diverse creatures, that, what was wanting to one in the representation of the Divine Goodness, might be supplied by another. Hence the Divine Wisdom is the cause of distinction in creatures.⁷¹

Things proceed from God by means of knowledge and intelligence, and in this mode a multitude of things can be produced directly from a Single and Simple God, Whose Wisdom contains within Itself the universality of Being (cf., p. 324).⁷²

Species is constituted of genus and difference. St. Thomas held that genus was derived from Sense or Matter and that Species was derived from Intelligence. So that whilst things differed specifically on account of form, things differed numerically on account of matter. From which it follows that in incorruptible

⁷⁰ S.T. III, 59.

⁷¹ S.T. I, 47.

⁷² *De Potentia Dei*, I, 3, 4, 6.

things there is only one individual of each species, as they are not distinguished materially, and diversity of power causes diversity of genus. But since forms are like numbers, in which the species vary by addition or subtraction of unity, species are ranged in degrees.^{73, 74}

“Angels are incorporeal creatures ever actually intelligent, but circumscribed by their substance,” and therefore each of a different species (cf., p. 339).

This proposition was condemned, after the death of St. Thomas, by the Council at Paris under Archbishop Tempier in 1277, in spite of the support it received from St. Albertus Magnus.

But this divergence of opinion must depend for the most part on the application of mundane terms to super mundane objects, which are not in reality susceptible of either of the terms “species” or “number” as we understand them.

For as St. Thomas states, in immaterial things there is no separate determinator and thing determined; each thing by its own self holds a determinate grade in “being,” and in them genus and species are not derived from different things but one and the same.

St. Thomas inclined to the view that angels were created together with time, matter, and the empyrean heaven, though he admits that all the Greek Fathers taught that they were created previously to corporeal creatures (cf., pp. 327 and 334).⁷⁵

Angels have not bodies naturally united to them, as it is not the nature of intellectual substances, though it is accidental to some. By the Divine Power, sensible bodies are sometimes so fashioned by Angels as fittingly to represent the intelligible properties of an Angel.

The Angels are not, however, the forms of such bodies, but are in them as the mover is in the moved, and they are moved accidentally according to the motion of the bodies assumed.

An Angel is in a place by application of his angelic power in any manner whatever to any place. An Angel’s powers and nature are infinite, so that an Angel’s power extends to one determined thing.

“Whatever is compared with one power must be compared therewith as one determined thing; since all ‘being’ is compared, as one thing, to God’s universal power, so is one particular being compared, as one, with angelic power.

Hence an Angel is only in one place.

But an Angel is indivisible and beyond the genus of quantity and situation, and the entire subject to which an angelic power

⁷³ Cf., p. 85.

⁷⁴ S.T. I, 47.

⁷⁵ S.T. I, 61.

is immediately applied is reputed as one place, even though it be 'continuous.'

"There are not two angels in the same place, since an angel is said to be in a place by the fact that his power touches the place by way of a perfect 'container' (cf., p. 414).

It is impossible for there to be two *complete* causes immediately of one and the same thing."⁷⁶

This is not because of their distinction one from the other, but because this would confuse their operations.⁷⁷

A beatified angel can be moved locally.

An angel's motion can be of two kinds: it can be "continuous" by successively quitting the divisible place in which it was before; or, it can all at once quit the whole place and in the same instant apply itself to the whole of another place, in which case the motion is not continuous.

If the motion be continuous, then intermediate space is traversed, but otherwise if not continuous, *e.g.*, thinking first of one place and then another, the intermediate space is not covered.

If the motion be continuous, then it is in continuous time, but if the motion be not continuous then in non-continuous time (one "now" does not immediately succeed another *seriatim*) (cf., p. 313).⁷⁸

There is potentiality in angels, for essence is to existence as potentiality to act. The "whereby he is" is not the "what he is," for God alone is Pure Act.

An angel's essence is not his power of intelligence, nor is his act his existence. So that his act of understanding cannot be his substance. In God alone, is substance, essence and act, one. In an angel his knowledge is intellectual coupled with memory and imagination, but not sensation.⁷⁹

An angel's intellect must be perfected by some species in order to understand things.

His intellect has no potentiality except as to things Divinely revealed, but he is not always considering everything.

His intelligible perfection comes from an intelligible outpouring, whereby he receives from God a species of things known together with his intellectual nature.

So that his intellect is not moved for the purpose of acquiring knowledge, but for operation only.

An angel understands himself by his form which is his substance, and the forms of other spiritual and corporeal natures according to their intelligible natures. Nevertheless, the higher the angel by so much fewer species is he able to apprehend the whole mass

⁷⁶ S.T. I, 52.

⁷⁷ *De Potentia Dei*, III, 19.

⁷⁸ S.T. I, 53.

⁷⁹ S.T. I, 54.

of intelligible objects. Even as material things which are below our intellect exist in a simpler mode than they exist in themselves.⁸⁰

Thus an angel has knowledge of material things by actually intelligible species, which are connatural to him (or created with him); as ours by abstraction, have by the species which make them intelligible (cf., p. 336). "Through the innate species imparted to him an angel knows things in their individual conditions in so far as they are the manifold representations of that one simple essence."

Such knowledge is what St. Augustine held to be their *Evening Knowledge* (cf., p. 329).

But beatified angels, through the Word, know, under one intelligible species, which is the Divine Essence, all knowledge at the same time under one glance, as St. Augustine said, by which they learn deeper mysteries (*De Trin.*, IV).

Such knowledge of primordial existence of things, as they exist in the Word, is what St. Augustine held to be their *Morning Knowledge*.

Reason and intellect are not distinct powers, they are distinguished according to functions and habits, not according to their objects. To understand is to apprehend intelligible truth, whilst to reason is to advance from one thing understood to another so as to know intelligible truth.⁸¹⁻²

The knowledge of angels is not discursive from one thing to another, but it understands clearly without reasoning, composing, or dividing;⁸³ though angels can syllogise and see effects in causes and causes in effects, yet in itself the future is known to God alone; for what is dependent on the Will is known to God alone.⁸⁴

Angels by their intellect know the universal formality of goodness and hence have Wills (cf., p. 344).

Intellect learns by intuition, whilst reason learns by discussion, but as reason comes to know the universal, the object presented to the appetitive faculty by reason is the same as that presented by the intellect. Therefore angels who are only intellectual have no appetite other than the Will. The object of the intellect is the true, whilst the object of the Will is the good. Though these are convertible terms, the faculties are differentiated not according to material but according to formal distinctions (cf., pp. 317 and 318).

It belongs to the faculty of the intellect to have within itself something which is outside it. And it belongs to the faculty of the Will to tend what is outside it.

⁸⁰ *S.T.* I, 55, 56.

⁸³ Cf., pp. 314, 316.

⁸¹ Cf., pp. 41, 96.

⁸⁴ *S.T.* I, 57, 58.

⁸² *S.T.* I, 79.

Free Will in angels is in higher perfection than in Man, though the liberty in so far as the removal of compulsion is concerned is not susceptible of greater or less degree. Privations and negations are not lessened or increased directly of themselves, but only by their cause or through the addition of some qualification.

Angels though of different degree have equal Free Will. But the mode of knowledge not being discursive, the choice in angels was by sudden acceptance of truth.⁸⁵ The Free Will of angels was flexible to either opposite before choice and not after.⁸⁶

Angels have "*Natural Love.*"

Nature which is the essence of the subject comes before intellect; natural love is that inclination implanted in nature by its Creator, which can exist without perfection of sense or intellect. Intellect, however, apprehends existence absolutely and for all time, so naturally desires to exist.⁸⁷

Angels have also "*Love of Choice,*" which is something loved for the end's sake. Each loves himself naturally and with the love of choice.

He loves more what is numerically one with himself and benefits himself than what is one only generically or specifically, *e.g.*, possession of knowledge.

Natural Love is the good one wills to one's self and in consequence for another as united to one's self.

The part naturally loves the whole more than itself. All creation in its entire being belongs to God, hence angels naturally love God before and more than themselves. In so far as He is the Good which beatifies all, He is loved with the love of Charity.⁸⁸

Man's free will is flexible to the opposite both before and after choice, and as stated above an angel's free will is flexible to either opposite before choice but not after choice.

The Appetitive Power is proportioned to the Apprehensive Power, so that whilst the sensitive appetite apprehends a particular good, Intellectual appetite seeks universal good. Angels apprehend immovably as we apprehend first principles, which are the objects of the virtue of intelligence.

Man by his reason apprehends movably, passing from one consideration to another. Therefore good angels who adhere to justice are confirmed therein, whilst wicked ones sinning are obstinate in sin.⁸⁹

All angels were created in Grace and all inherited beatitude in the first instance, but some at once placed an impediment to their

⁸⁵ S.T. I, 59.

⁸⁸ S.T. I, 60.

⁸⁶ S.T. I, 64.

⁸⁹ S.T. I, 64.

⁸⁷ S.T. I, 75.

beatitude, thereby destroying merit and consequently destroying merited beatitude.

The Devil himself was not wicked in the first instance of his creation, because God would then be the cause of sin.

But the devil probably sinned at once after the first instant of creation.

Probably the highest, other than "Seraphim" and "Thrones," together with the lowest angels fell.

The sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others sinning, inducing them by a kind of exhortation. More angels stood firm than those that sinned, because sin is contrary to natural inclination; that which is against the natural order happens with less frequency, for nature procures its effect either always or more often than not.

An angel or any other rational creature considered in his own nature can sin.

The Divine Will is the sole rule of God's Acts: every created will has rectitude of act, so far only as it is regulated according to Divine Will.

Hence in the Divine Will there can be no sin, but there can be in every other creature, considering the condition of its nature. It is natural for an angel to turn to God, as principle of his being, but as an object of supernatural beatitude it only comes from infused Love.

In angels there is no sin through ignorance, nor from passion, but through not being in accordance with proper measure.

The defect comes only on the part of the choice not properly regulated, not on the part of the thing chosen, that is by seeking its own good insubordinately to the rule of the Divine Will.

As has been shown on page 368 the Devil himself fell through Pride.⁹⁰

Beatitude is the ultimate perfection of rational or of intellectual nature.

It is of a twofold nature, that which can be procured by natural power, and that whereby we shall see God as He is, which is beyond nature.

The natural inclination of the Will is directed towards that which is in keeping with its nature. The angels had the first form of beatitude naturally, but since the second was beyond the angelic nature there was need of God's Grace. The angels were created in Grace, but the motion of Grace does not impose necessity; he who has it may fail to use it.

Beatitude conveys the notion of an end and is a reward of virtue.

⁹⁰ S.T. I, 63.

Men and angels merit beatitude by a motion of Charity, which comes of Grace, since the end is beyond their natural capacity. Because the angelic nature according to its mode does not pass from one stage to another, the angels were beatified straightway after one act of Charity.

Gifts of grace and perfection are according to natural gifts : on the part of God, in accordance with the degree of angelic nature, and on the part of the angel, by a motion which is not hindered or thwarted in any way. Natural love and knowledge remain in angels since beatitude adds to nature.

Beatified angels cannot sin as they see God through His Essence: this is the Morning Light to which St. Augustine refers.

They have fuller liberty than ours as the end is always in view. Perfect Charity does not merit but enjoys reward. The degree of Vision lies in the determinate mode of vision.⁹¹

All angels see the Essence of God immediately, but one enlightens another by strengthening the intellect and expanding the manifestation of truth concerning likeness. One angel does not move the Will of another "sufficiently," either as to the object or as showing the object ; but he inclines the Will as towards something lovable and as manifesting some creative good ordered by God's Goodness.

The power to will of one cannot be moved by another except by God.

"Concept arises when the mind turns to the actual consideration of any habitual knowledge."

The concept of an angelic mind is ordered to be made known to another by the Will of the angel himself. As senses roused by a sensible object, so the mind of an angel is aroused to attention by some intelligible power and thus they can converse with one another.

Angels, as regards natural knowledge, know by diverse ideas ; but what they see in God they know all at once.⁹²

Inferior angels can speak to superior, manifestation of what belongs to the Will is conveyed to others by the one who Wills.

It is enlightenment to know what God Wills, but it cannot be described as enlightenment to know what another Wills.

The Will of God is the rule of Truth.

Angels do not speak to God of what concerns Truth or created Will, but by consulting the Divine Will or admiring the Divine Excellence, which they can never fully comprehend.

As the intellectual operation of an angel abstracts from the "here" and "now," difference of time and space have no influence upon them.

⁹¹ *S.T. I, 62.*

⁹² *S.T. I, 12.*

The concept of one angel perceived by another is referred to such other by the Will of the one having the conception, hence one angel can speak to another alone. What is overheard is not due to distance but to Will.⁹³

“A Hierarchy is a sacred principality subject to one way of Government.”

There are three grades among angels of universal knowledge.

- (1) Types proceeding from God as First Universal Principle.
- (2) Types depending on Universal Created Causes.
- (3) Types applied to particular things depending on their causes.

This is a scale of decreasing simplicity of knowledge, involving an increase in number of species required to apprehend the universality of intelligibles.

Each Hierarchy requires according to Office and Action diversity of Order: summit, middle, and base; by Order is meant the inclusion of grades or a grade.

Angels are given gifts of Grace, according to the capacity of their natural gifts; thus, to “Seraphim” is given the ardour of charity; to “Cherubim” knowledge.

Superior perfection belongs to the superior degrees as its property and to the inferior by participation.

Inferior perfection belongs to the inferior degrees as its property, and also to the superior by way of excess, according to Dionysius.

There are nine grades of angels divided into three hierarchies; the names of whom, that which they signify, together with the reference in the Bible are stated below.

I

Seraphim	..	Love	Isa. VI, 2.
Cherubim	..	Wisdom	Ezek. X, 15, 20.
Thrones	..	Justice	Col. I, 16.

Seraphim contemplates the ideas of things of God in Himself, as Love.

Cherubim contemplates the ideas of things in Universal Causes, as Wisdom.

Thrones contemplate the ideas of things in their application to particular effects, as Justice.

The first consider the end; the second consider what is to be done; the third the carrying out of the work.

⁹³ S.T. I, 107.

II

Dominations	..	Orders	Eph. I, 21.
Virtues	..	Necessary energy			
		for success	Eph. I, 21.
Powers	..	Protection	Eph. I, 21.

Note.—St. Gregory instead of Virtues places in this hierarchy:
 Principalities .. Nations and Rulers .. Eph. I, 21.

III

Principalities	..	Nations and Rulers	..	Eph. I, 21.
Archangels	..	Faith and Worship	..	Jude IX.
Angels	..	Guardians	..	Numerous.

Note.—St. Gregory places Virtues instead of Principalities in this hierarchy; the variation is said to be based on the difference in order in Eph. I, 21 and Col. I, 16, but it is not obvious, as a variation appears to be with regard to dominions not principalities.

After Judgment these offices will cease as leading others to their end, but they will remain as to the attainment of the end already reached.

As regards the condition of nature, men cannot be assumed into the Angelic Orders, for natural distinction will remain according to Gifts of Grace.⁹⁴

“As the inferior angels, who have the less universal form are ruled by the superior so are all corporeal things ruled by the angels.”

Dionysius in *Divine Names*, III, says, “Divine Wisdom has joined the ends of the first to the principles of the second.” Hence inferior nature at its highest point is in conjunction with superior nature.

Local motion is the most perfect corporeal movement, for what is moved is in potentiality to nothing intrinsic, but only to something extrinsic, *viz.*, Place.

Therefore corporeal nature has a natural aptitude to be moved immediately by the spiritual nature as to place. Whence we see that the soul moves the body first and chiefly by local motion.”

An angel’s power is not limited to any body, hence he can move locally bodies not joined to it.

A miracle, as has been stated (p. 330), is something done outside the whole created order of nature and not that of any particular order alone.

Man can be enlightened by angels, in the manner mentioned above by which one angel enlightens another, also intelligible

⁹⁴ S. T. I, 108.

truth is proposed under the similitude of sensible things and the intellect is also strengthened.

The intellect assents to the Truth of Faith, not as convinced by reason, but as commanded by the Will tending to Divine Truth. At the same time Faith requires that what is to be believed be proposed by the intellect to the believer.

Angels can move the human imagination, though angels and men can move the Will only by persuasion. "An angel can offer the senses a sensible object from without and move the spirit and humours from within."

As regards things to be done, human knowledge and affection can vary and fail from good in many ways, so angels are deputed for the guardianship of men in order to regulate and move them to good.

Each man has a Guardian Angel appointed to him, sometimes several to guard one.

The Guardianship of the human race belongs to Principalities, when the interest of kingdoms and men conflict angels consult the ordering of the Divine Wisdom and in that sense are said to resist one another (cf., Dan. X, 13).

Angels do not grieve for the sins and pains inflicted on men, "*simply*" speaking nothing occurs in the world against the Will of the Blessed.⁹⁵

Demons never were in the light of the perfection of glory, but were so in relation to "imperfect Grace."

The very natural disposition of demons requires that there should be authority among them, as they are not equal in nature.

One demon does not enlighten another in the sense of manifesting of the truth in reference to God, but can make known his mental concept to another by way of speech.

Good angels have precedence over and rule bad angels, but in accordance with the Divine Wisdom they do not entirely restrain them from inflicting harm.⁹⁶

Assault of demons is due to their malice in endeavouring to hinder man's progress; and to their pride, in endeavouring to usurp a semblance of the Divine Power. But the ordering of the assault is from God, Who makes orderly use of evil by ordering it for good.

The devil attempts to hurt man by urging to sin, the flesh and the world are his instruments; but the inward disposition of man is known to God alone. Man has the power of free will to curb his animal desires, yet he can of his own accord fall into sin.

Demons are unable to perform true miracles (cf., p. 331).⁹⁷

⁹⁵ S.T. I, 113.

⁹⁶ S.T. I, 109.

⁹⁷ S.T. I, 114.

Demons have only knowledge of the truth of nature and of such part of the truth of (imperfect) Grace which arises when Divine secrets are imparted to an individual. They know some things at present which they previously did not know would come to pass, hence they have experience though not derived from senses. Grief, as a passion is not in the demons as they have not a sensitive appetite, which is a power in a corporeal organ, but only as a simple act of Will not in accordance with wishes. Of demons, some are now in hell to torment those whom they have led astray, and some in this dark atmosphere of our trial.

After Judgment all the wicked both men and angels will be in hell and the good in Heaven.⁹⁸

Angels are subject to Christ's Judiciary Powers not only on account of His Divine Nature, but also as regards His human nature; both from the closeness of His assumed nature to God, in the very Unity of Person, and also from the lowliness of His Passion. Likewise for what they do for men, of whom Christ is the Head in a special manner.

The mystical body of the Church consists not only of men but of angels.⁹⁹

DIVINE LAW

Intellectual and rational creatures surpass other creatures in the perfections of their nature and the excellence of their end. Because they have dominion over their action, since they move themselves freely to act; whereas other creatures are moved to their proper actions.

Also by their operations they attain to the last end of the universe, namely by knowing and loving God; whereas the other creatures cannot attain to that last end, except by a certain participation of His Likeness.

Therefore the intellectual nature alone is requisite for its own sake in the universe, and all others for its sake.

If a man seeks something for its own sake, he seeks it always, because "what is *per se* is always," whereas if he seek a thing on account of something else, he does not, of necessity seek it always, but only in reference to that for the sake of which he seeks it.

Things derive their 'being' from the Divine Will.

Therefore whatever is always, is willed by God for its own sake; and what is not always, is willed by God not for its own sake, but for that of another. Intellectual substances approach nearest to being always, since they are incorruptible and unchangeable, except in their choice. Hence they are governed for their own sake, and others for their sake.

⁹⁸ S.T. I, 64.

⁹⁹ S.T. III, 59.

From this it follows that, it is not wrong for man to kill dumb animals, or to use them in any other way whatever. But cruelty to animals is prohibited, lest one become cruel to human beings, or their injury lead to the temporal hurt of man.¹⁰⁰

But since rational creatures are governed and cared for on their own account, they alone are directed by God to their actions, for the sake not only of the species but of the individual. Hence it follows that God watches over man's actions not only as belonging to the species, but also as personal acts (cf., p. 325 and 330).

It was therefore reasonable that a law, which is a reason and rule of action, should be given to man by God, since man knows the reason of his action, and since man is ordained to eternal happiness, which is inproportionate to man's natural faculty (cf., p. 363).

It is necessary, therefore, that man should be directed to his end by a law given by God.¹⁰¹⁻²

Since the chief intention of God's law is that man adhere to God, and since man adheres most firmly to God by Love, so the principle of the law is directed to love.

The Will adheres to a thing most, by love which is for its own sake; or by fear which is less, being, on account of something else.

The Will is good, through willing the good and above all the greatest good which is the end; therefore above all, the Sovereign Good, namely God, makes men good and is intended by the Divine Law above all else.

It follows that the Divine Law aimed at the love of our neighbour. Men have one common last end, happiness, to which they are directed by God and should therefore be united by mutual Love. The aspect under which a neighbour is to be loved, is God, hence the habit of Charity extends not only to the love of God, but to the love of a neighbour also (cf., John XV, 12).¹⁰³

Just as the beginning of material love is sight exercised through the material eye, so the beginning of spiritual love is the intellectual vision of a spiritual lovable object. The vision of that spiritual lovable object, which is God, is impossible to us in the present life except by Faith, because it surpasses natural reason and especially inasmuch as our happiness consists in the enjoyment thereof. Therefore we need to be brought to the true Faith by the Divine Law (cf., p. 347).

From this St. Thomas goes on to argue, that since he, who errs about something essential to a thing, knows not that thing

¹⁰⁰ C.G. III, 2, 112.

¹⁰¹ S.T. III, 102.

¹⁰² C.G. III, 2, 114, 115.

¹⁰³ S.T. II, 24.

(cf., p. 320), yet in composite things, though he know not the things simply, he knows it in some respect as in its genus. This cannot apply to simple things and any error whatever removes all knowledge of the thing, so that to err about God, Who is supremely Simple, is not to know God at all.

Further, since a thing is loved and desired according as it is known, he who errs about God can neither love God nor desire Him as his end.¹⁰⁴

Though this argument is advanced against those who maintained that it matters not for man's salvation, with what faith he serves God, yet the apparent narrowness of the above bare logical argument based on the Simplicity of God must be subjected to the doctrine that God is Incomprehensible (as shown on p. 318), besides even with regard to error, excommunication is forbidden in the absence of obstinacy.¹⁰⁵

Further, heresy, which is described as essentially opposed to Faith, and schism, as essentially opposed to ecclesiastical charity, must both be obstinate also.¹⁰⁶

WORSHIP

Since it is connatural to man to acquire knowledge through the senses, Divine Providence has appointed sensible things as a reminder to man of things divine. For this reason, sensible sacrifices were instituted, since man offers these to God, not because God needs them, but that man might be reminded that he must refer both himself and all that is his to God, as his end and as the Creator, Governor, and Lord of All.

Likewise, man performs certain sensible actions, such as prostrations, genuflections, raising of the voice, and singing, not to arouse God, but to arouse himself to things divine. Such things are not done as though God needed them, for He knows all things and His Will is unchangeable and He looks at the affection of the heart and not the mere movement of the body. But we do them for our own sake, that by them our intention may be fixed on God and our hearts inflamed.

At the same time, we thereby confess that God is the Author of our soul and body, since we employ both soul and body in the worship we give Him.

The offering of these bodily things to God is called the worship or cultus of God; for we speak of cultivating those things to which we give thought in the shape of deeds.

Divine Worship is also called religion, because by their acts man tethers (*ligat*) himself, as it were, lest he should stray from God. Also, because by a kind of natural instinct, he feels himself

¹⁰⁴ C.G. III, 2, 118.

¹⁰⁵ S.T. III, 21.

¹⁰⁶ S.T. II, 2, 39.

obliged in his own way to show reverence to God, from Whom flow his being and every good.

Religion is also called Piety, by which we give due honour, to those who begat us. Hence it reasonably belongs to Piety to honour God the Father of all.

Since God is not only the cause and source of our being, but our whole being is in His Power, and all we have we owe to Him and He is truly our Master, that which we do to honour Him is called service; such service, due to God, is called by the special name of 'Latria' by the Greeks. On the other hand 'Dulia' is the reverence paid to the most excellent Creatures of God. Of all things pertaining to 'Latria,' sacrifice would seem to hold a special place, for genuflections, prostrations, and other signs of honour may be given even to men, albeit with another intention than when given to God.

External sacrifice is a representation of the interior true sacrifice, in which the human mind offers itself to God.

Our mind offers itself to God as the principle of its Creator, as the Author of its operation and the end wherein lies its happiness.

Consequently to God alone is 'Latria' due.¹⁰⁷

Ceremonial precepts are institutions of Divine Wisdom and as such are ordained for a certain end, wherefrom their reasonable causes can be gathered. But where no reason lies in the nature of the thing, the reason is to be found in its relation, since something is *signified* or *excluded* thereby.¹⁰⁸

With regard to the Law it will be well to recall the various terms employed in connection with it thus:

Testimonies indicate the authority of God.

Justification indicate rewards and punishments.

Commandments indicate what had better be done and are also enjoined by God through others.

Precepts indicate what God enjoins.¹⁰⁹

As the human mind can be raised to God by corporeal and sensible things, provided one makes right use of them to God's honour, so it belongs to the Divine Law to direct man in his love and use of corporeal things.

As the mind of man is subordinate to God, so is the body subordinate to the soul, and the lower powers to reason. Hence man is directed by Divine Law in suchwise, that the lower powers might be subject to reason, the body to the soul, and external things be employed for man's needs. Every law, that is framed aright, is conducive to virtue, which is the reason's rule applied to both inferior affections and the use of corporeal things. It is

¹⁰⁷ C.G. III, 2, 119, 120.

¹⁰⁸ S.T. II, 101.

¹⁰⁹ S.T. II, 109.

requisite to legislate for those things which are necessary to the observance of law.

Since the law is proposed to reason, man would not obey the law unless all that is in man be subject to reason. Therefore it is for the Divine Law to command that all that is in man be subject to reason (Romans XII, 1).¹¹⁰

Even before the law some of the leading men were gifted with the spirit of prophecy; it is believed that a heavenly instinct prompted them to worship God in a certain definite way; which would be in keeping with the interior worship and a suitable token of Christ's mysteries, which were foreshadowed also by other things that they did. "All things happened to them in figure" (1 Cor. X, 11).

Under the Old Law the ceremonies had no power of justification, but it was possible for the minds of the faithful to be united by faith to Christ Incarnate and Crucified, so that they were justified by faith in Christ, of which faith the observance of those ceremonies was a sort of profession, inasmuch as they foreshadowed Christ (cf., Prayer of Priest, Lev. IV, 26 and V, 16), as though the sin were forgiven through the faith and devotion of the offerers.¹¹¹

The New Law of the Gospel is chiefly the Grace itself of the Holy Ghost for the grace of faith is a law (Rom. III, 27).

Secondarily, it contains certain things, to dispose us to receive and pertaining to the use of, the Grace of the Holy Ghost.

Consequently, the New Law is in the first place inscribed in our hearts and only secondarily is it a written law.

Three reasons are given by St. Thomas, why the New Law was not given before, these are as follows.

First the Grace of the Holy Ghost was not given until sin was cast out through the Redemption by Christ.

Second from the fact that perfection is not reached from the outset, *e.g.*, as boy grows to man.

Third that man left under the Old Law, through falling into sin, might realize his weakness and acknowledge his need of grace (Rom. V, 20).

He goes on to add that no other state will succeed that of the New Law, but that change will occur with regard to place, time, and person, according as the Grace of the Holy Ghost dwells in man more or less perfectly.¹¹²

This would appear to have special reference to the "Eternal Gospel" which purported to be based on the writings of Joachim of Flora, 1130-1202, which appeared about 1254, and which

¹¹⁰ C.G. III, 2, 121.

¹¹¹ S.T. II, 103.

¹¹² S.T. II, 106.

foretold a third state or dispensation under the Holy Ghost which was to commence about 1260.

The *Doctrina Joachitica* was condemned by the Synod of Arles in 1263.¹¹³

PUNISHMENT

A reward is something proposed to the will as an end, whereby it is urged to do well ; on the other hand a punishment, as an evil to be avoided, is set before the will to withdraw it from evil. Just as it is essential to a reward, that it be a good, in harmony with the will, so is it a necessary condition of punishment, that it be an evil in opposition to the will.

When a man voluntarily keeps the order of the law, imposed by God, a good accrues to him, not of necessity as it were, but by the appointment of his Lord, and this is to be rewarded ; conversely, his lot is evil when the order of the law is infringed, and this is to be punished. Now the Sovereign Good is man's Beatitude, which is his last end and the nearer a thing approaches to this end, the higher must it be placed as a good of man.

The nearest thing to that end is virtue and everything else that is of use to man in well doing, whereby he attains beatitude.

After this comes the right disposition of reason and of the powers subject thereto. And after this the well being of the body, which is requisite for facility of action. Lastly come those things that are without, which we employ as helps to virtue. From all of which it follows that rewards and punishments are not all equal.

Consequently, the punishment of one who sins mortally, as has been shown (cf., p. 374), is that he be altogether debarred from obtaining his end, and of one who sins venially that he experience difficulty in obtaining his end. The end and the good are the perfection of the Will, as form is of matter, consequently the Will does not obtain the last end, unless it is fittingly disposed, which arises by intending and desiring the last end.

Therefore a man will not obtain his end if his intention be diverted from the end.¹¹⁴

The argument, put forward by St. Thomas for eternal punishment, is that man has not a natural aptitude to obtain his last end in this life.

Therefore privation of this end must be punishment after this life. But after this life, man is no longer able to obtain his last end. For the soul needs the body to obtain its end, inasmuch as through the body it acquires perfection both in knowledge and in virtue. The soul once separated from the body does not

¹¹³ Cf., Ch. XXIX, p. 612.

¹¹⁴ C.G. III, 2, 143.

return to this state, wherein it attains to perfection through the body, as those maintain, who held the transmigration of souls. Therefore man who is punished by being deprived of his last end, must needs remain punished eternally.

Though he grants the arguments of those who hold that punishments are remedial, he maintains that God inflicts eternal punishment, that there may be maintained the right order, which shows forth His Wisdom. And such punishment also carries some affliction.¹¹⁵

MERIT

Since, in addition to the Divine precepts, there are Divine Counsels, whereby men are withdrawn from the occupations of this present life, that they may more freely turn to God, thereby forgoing lesser goods for the sake of greater; but so that this is not so necessary for righteousness that without them righteousness is impossible, it follows that all acts of virtue are not equal.

Acts take their species from their objects, consequently the best of human acts is that which is directed to the last end, which is God, immediately. After this the act will be so much better in species according as its object is nearer to God.

The precepts of the law are best fulfilled through love, but one man may fulfil an obligation with greater love than another, hence one virtuous act will be better than another. The same reasons show that all sins are not equal, since by one sin a man strays from his end more than by another.

Merit and reward refer to the same thing, for reward is something given in return for work or toil. Such reward is sometimes an act of justice, but such involves an element of equality between the parties, for "justice is simple between those who are simply equal." Where, however, there is no equal right, but only a relative right, there can be no character of merit simply, but only relatively.

There is no absolute equality between man and God for they are infinitely apart.

All manner and measure of human virtue in man is from God. So that man obtains from God a reward for his operation for which God had given him the power of operation. Even natural things by their proper movements and operations obtain that to which they are ordained by God, but differently, since the rational creature moves itself to act by its free will, which action has the character of merit.

God seeks from our goods, not profit but glory, the manifestation

¹¹⁵ C.G. III, 2, 144.

of His Goodness ; nothing accrues to Him, but only to ourselves by our worship of Him. Thus man is ever an unprofitable servant (Luke XVII, 10). Hence we merit from God, not that anything accrues to Him, but as we work for His Glory. Everlasting Life is a good exceeding the proportion of created nature, since it exceeds its knowledge and desire (1 Cor. II, 9). Hence no created nature is a sufficient principle of an act meritorious of Eternal Life, unless the supernatural gift of Grace be added (cf., p. 363).

Moreover, as man now exists in sin, there is impediment of sin. The wages of sin are death (Rom. VI, 23).

The meritorious works of man can therefore be regarded in two ways.

First, as they proceed from free will and in this respect as to the substance of the work, there can be no *condignity* with Eternal Life on account of inequality ; but there is *congruity* on account of equality of proportion, for it seems congruous that if a man does what he can, God should reward him according to the excellence of such man's ability or power.

Second, as it proceeds from the Holy Ghost moving to Everlasting Life, it is meritorious of life everlasting condignly, for its value depends on the power of the Holy Ghost and not on the power of the man.

Merit rests chiefly in Charity ; and Everlasting Life consists in the enjoyment of God.

The human mind's movement to the fruition of the Divine Good is the proper act of Charity, whereby the acts of the other virtues are ordained to this end, since all the other virtues are commanded by Charity. For the habit to which the end pertains always commands those habits to which the means pertain.

Hence the merit of Life Everlasting pertains first to Charity and secondly to the other virtues as their acts are commanded by Charity. Likewise what we do out of Love, we do most willingly, hence as merit depends on voluntariness, merit is chiefly attributed to Charity.

The gift of Grace cannot be merited, because the term implies that it is gratuitous, and because unless under Grace there can be no merit.

As to this, St. Augustine changed his opinion, having at one time believed the beginning of faith to be from us and its consummation to be granted to us by God (cf., p. 435).

One may merit first Grace for another congruously, as it is in harmony with friendship that God should fulfil man's desire

for the salvation of another, though sometimes there may be an impediment.

The impetration of prayer rests on God's mercy.

No one can merit for himself restoration after a future fall, either condignly or congruously, such restoration depends on mercy alone.

Every act of Charity merits Eternal Life absolutely, but by subsequent sin there arise an impediment to the preceding merit, hence no one absolutely merits Life Everlasting, except by the act of final Grace, but only conditionally, if he persevere. Perseverance depends solely on the Divine Motion, and does not fall under merit.¹¹⁶

In the same way holy men work miracles (cf., p. 331) in two ways according to St. Gregory, by impetration and authoritatively. In both ways faith makes a man deserve that a miracle be wrought in answer to his prayer, though like all other virtues it derives its merit out of Charity, which unites us to God from Whom we merit and perfects our will whereby we merit.

For this three reasons may be given :

First, miracles are arguments of faith, for something done above the faculty of nature provides a proof of that which surpasses the natural faculty of reason.

Second, because faith is based chiefly on the Divine Power, which it conceives as being the motive or medium of assent to things which appear to be above reason, wherefore the Divine Power in miraculous works comes especially to the assistance of faith.

Third, because miracles are wrought independently of natural causes, and faith takes its arguments not from reason pertaining to nature and the senses, but from things pertaining to God.

Again, Faith makes a man suitable to work miracles authoritatively.

First, because as Divine instruments they announce as it were to natural things the Divine Command, which nature obeys. And it is by Faith that God's words dwell in us, because Faith is a kind of participation in God's Truth.

Secondly, because they act by the power of God working in nature, and faith gives persistence and stability to his apprehension.

Thirdly, because miracles are wrought authoritatively by command, fitness for which involves a certain aloofness and withdrawal. Now Faith withdraws the mind from the domain of nature and sense, and sets it on the foundation of things intelligible.¹¹⁷⁻¹⁸

¹¹⁶ S.T. II, I, 114.

¹¹⁷ C.G. III, 101.

¹¹⁸ S.T. II, 178.

GRACE

As has been shown (p. 347), the knowledge of truth that is appointed as man's last end is one that surpasses his natural faculty, for it consists in his seeing the First Truth Itself in Itself, hence he stands in need of supernatural assistance from God to enable him to tend to that end.

Since Divine Providence provides for all things according to their mode and it is proper to man as a rational being to act voluntarily, compulsion is incompatible with this. Therefore God by assisting man does not compel him to do right.

It has been shown (cf., p. 433) that man is unable to merit God's assistance, since this is above him, but he is moved for this purpose by God. The effect of God's assistance surpasses the faculty of nature, it is not proportionate to the acts that man performs by his natural faculty. Therefore man cannot by such acts merit the aforesaid assistance (cf., Titus V).

The good of the part is the good of the whole, hence everything, by its natural appetite and love, loves its own proper good on account of the common good of the Universe, which is God.

In the perfect state, man referred the love of himself and of all other things to the love of God as its end, thus he loved God more than himself and above all things.

But in his corrupt state, unless it is cured by God's Grace, man's appetite follows its private good on account of its corruption.

Thus human understanding has a form, intelligible light, which is sufficient for knowing intelligible things that can be known through the senses. But higher intelligible things cannot be known by the human intellect, unless perfected by the stronger light of faith or prophecy, and such light is the Light of Grace. Hence man cannot even prepare himself to receive the Light of Grace, except by the gratuitous help of God moving him inwardly (cf., p. 433).

Man's turning to God is by Free Will and thus man is bidden to turn himself to God, but Free Will can only be turned to God, when God Himself turns it (cf., Ps. LXXX, 3, 7; Jer. XXXI, 18; Lam. V, 21; John XV, 5).

Hence by the assistance of Sanctifying Grace man is enabled to love God, for it is an effect in man of the Divine Love.

The last end to which man is conducted to Divine Grace is the Vision of God in His Essence, consequently man cannot attain to this end unless he be united by conformity of Will and this is proper effect of love. Operation to be perfect must be constant and prompt and this is also the chief effect of love.

To rise from sin is not the same as to cease sinning, but to be restored to what is lost by sinning. This is a triple loss consisting

of : First, the stain by which the Light of Grace is lost, through the deformity of sin ; Second, the corruption of natural good, wherein man's nature is disordered by man's will not being subject to God's will ; and Third, the debt of punishment in that by sinning man deserves eternal damnation (cf., p. 371).

These losses can be restored by God alone.

The lustre of grace can only be brought back by God shedding His Light of Grace anew ; hence the gift of habitual Grace is required.

Nature can only be restored when God draw's man's will, and the Debt of Guilt of Eternal punishment can only be remitted by God, against Whom the offence is committed and Who is man's Judge.

In a state of corrupt nature man needs Grace to heal his nature. In the present life such healing is in the mind, but the carnal appetite is not restored. Man needs not only Habitual Grace, whereby his nature is healed, but a further Infused Grace in order to be moved by God to act righteously, for the flesh remains corrupted and the intellect darkened so that man needs guiding and guarding in all things.

Further, perseverance, the abiding in good to the end of life, is a gift of Grace that needs to be sought that one justified by Grace may be kept from evil till the end of life.

Since the principle and object of Grace is God, Who by reason of His very excellence is unknown to us, His Presence or absence in us cannot be known with certainty ; but since things are known conjecturally, by signs, anyone may know he has Grace, when delighting in God and not conscious of mortal sin.

Grace and Charity perfect the appetite faculty, and whoever has faith or knowledge is certain that he has them. The imperfection of knowledge here referred to would appear to be not of the knowledge of the reception of the gift of Grace, but the lack of certainty that the recipient may not cast it away before death.

Grace is a quality, which is an accidental form of the soul, through the soul participating in the Divine Goodness.

Grace acts not efficiently but formally, as whiteness makes white : Grace therefore is prior to virtue, in that its subject is the essence of the soul, whilst virtues are perfections of the powers of the soul.

Whilst Peter Lombard thought that Grace and Virtue only differed logically, St. Thomas maintained the contrary ; for as the natural light of reason is something besides acquired virtue, ordained to natural light, so Grace, which is a participation of the Divine Nature, is something besides infused virtues, which are derived from and ordained to the Light.

Grace is not divided in its essence but only in its effects.

Sanctifying Grace is that whereby man is united to God.

Gratuitous Grace is that whereby one man co-operates with another in leading him to God.

Operating Grace is that effect in which the mind is moved, or is moved not to move, such operation is attributed to God.

Co-operating Grace is that effect in which the mind both moves and is moved, when the operation is attributed not only to God but also to the soul.

Prevenient and Subsequent Grace have five effects: (1) To heal the soul. (2) To create desire of good. (3) To carry into effect the good proposed. (4) To persevere in the good. (5) To reach glory.¹¹⁹

As justice implies the general rectitude of order, so Justification, which is the effect of Grace, implies a transmutation from a state of injustice or disorder to that of justice or order.

Grace is the effect of the Divine Love in us, but it is taken away by sin, hence there is no remission of sin without an infusion of Grace.

The Justification effected by Grace is brought about by God moving man to justice. Now God moves everything in its own manner (cf., p. 350), and it is proper to the nature of man to have free will (cf., p. 345), so that a movement of free will takes place together with such movement to justice. Hence God so infuses the gift of Justifying Grace, that at the same time He moves the free will to accept the gift of Grace in such as are capable of being moved thus.

Infants are moved to Justice by infusion of their souls, which is brought about by the Sacrament of Baptism. As Original Sin, from which they are justified comes to them by generation, so is Grace given them through Christ by spiritual regeneration.

For Justification, a movement of the mind is required, by which it is turned to God, which turning is by Faith. So that four things are accounted necessary for Justification: First, infusion of Grace; Second, movement of the free will towards God by Faith; Third, movement of the free will away from sin; Fourth, Remission of Sins.

Every movement has its species from its term. Justification takes place in an instant and not in succession. The succession of opposites must be looked at differently in things that are subject to time and in those that are above time. "Discrete" time is non-continuous and involves no necessity for time, between the last instant in which the preceding is, and the first instant of the subsequent.

¹¹⁹ S.T. II, 109-113.

Hence there is no last instant in which sin inheres, but a last time, whereas there is a first instant in which Grace inheres (cf., pp. 324, 327 and 453).¹²⁰

SACRAMENTS

The Sacrament of the Church is an outward sign which is a kind of seal, and an inward effect which is a spiritual power.¹²¹

The definition given in the Catechism is "An outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual Grace."

Sacrament signifies a hidden sanctity, a sacred secret, and by relationship it signifies the cause of a sign, or other relation, likewise it implies habitude of sign, or a kind of sign. Sacrament properly so called is that which is the sign of some sacred thing pertaining to men.

Here it is used in the sense of "The sign of a holy thing as far as it makes men holy."¹²²

It is proper to human nature to acquire knowledge of the intelligible from the sensible; and a sign is that by means of which one attains knowledge of something else. Hence the name sign is given primarily to things offered to the senses; it, however, conveys something to the mind besides the species that it impresses on the senses.

In Scripture scriptural things are set before us under the guise of sensible things.

Since the sacred things, which are signified by the Sacraments are the spiritual and intelligible "goods" by means of which man is sanctified, it follows that Sacramental signs are sensible things.

Sanctification of man is in the power of God, Who sanctifies; it is not for man to decide what things shall be used for his sanctification, therefore we must use those things which are determined by Divine Institution.

Now the cause of our sanctification, Christ's Passion, is past; the form of our sanctification, Grace and Virtue, is present; and the end of our sanctification, Eternal Life, is future. All these are signified by the Sacraments, but the sign is not ambiguous or uncertain through signifying more than one thing, since such things are mutually ordained and form one thing.

To the sensible signs words have to be added to indicate the cause of the sanctification, the Word Incarnate; the person sanctified, who is composed of body and soul; and on the part of the Sacramental signification to signify the mental concept, e.g., baptized.

In sacraments words are as form and the sensible things as

¹²⁰ S.T. II, I, 113.

¹²¹ S.T., Supp., 34.

¹²² S.T. III, 60.

matter. The determining principle is the form, which is as it were the end and terminus of matter. For the "being" of a thing the need of a determinate form is prior to that of matter, for the matter is needed to be adapted to the form.

Hence since in the Sacraments determinate sensible things are required, much more is there need of a determinate form of words.

As to variations of the words themselves, the intention of the person who says them is essential, and the meaning must be essentially the same, which cannot be so, if a substantial part be suppressed, for in that case the meaning would be destroyed.¹²³

As stated above, human nature is led by corporeal and sensible things to those which are spiritual and intelligible. Divine Wisdom provides man with means of Salvation in the shape of corporeal and sensible signs called Sacraments.

Man sinned through affection for corporeal things and God has provided man with a spiritual medicine by means of certain corporeal signs.

If man were offered spiritual things without a veil, his mind being taken up with the material world, it would not be able to apply itself to them.

It follows that man through the Sacraments, consistently with his nature, is instructed through sensible things. "Man is humbled through confessing that he is subject to corporeal things seeing that he receives assistance through them and he is even preserved from bodily hurt by the healthy exercise of them."

Before Christ, sacraments were necessary for man to testify to his faith in the future coming of a Saviour. Christ's Passion is the Final Cause of the old sacraments. But since the Final Cause precedes not in time, but in intention of the Agent, this is no reason against the existence of sacraments before Christ's Passion, of which it was the Final Cause. Sacraments are signs in protestation of faith, whereby man is justified; and they vary according as they signify the past, present, or future.¹²⁴

The Sacraments not only contain, but cause Grace.

The efficient cause is both principle and instrumental.

A principal cause works through the power of its form, and in this way none but God can cause Grace.

An instrumental cause works not by the power of its form, but by motion, whereby it is moved by the principal agent, *e.g.*, Couch not like axe but like art in the craftsman's mind.

Thus Sacraments cause Grace, for they are instituted by God to be employed for the purpose of conferring Grace. That is, properly speaking, as an instrument by which someone works,

¹²³ S.T. III, 6c.

¹²⁴ S.T. III, 61.

e.g., He saved us by the laver (A.V., washing) of regeneration (Titus III, 5).

Though the Principal Cause cannot be called a sign of the effect, yet the instrumental cause can be so called, as it is in part an effect as being moved by the principal agent.

Now Grace perfects the essence of the soul, in so far as it is a certain participated likeness of the Divine Nature, and from Grace flow perfections into the powers of the soul, which flow from the essence of the soul (cf., p. 395).¹²⁵

The Sacraments are ordained to special effects in the Christian Life, *e.g.*, Baptism. Thus Sacramental Grace confers a certain Divine Assistance in obtaining the aid of the Sacraments.

In a Sacrament Grace has a passing and incomplete mode of being, and consequently it is not unfitting to say that the Sacraments contain Grace.

Instrumental power has a "being" that passes from one thing to another and is incomplete, just as a motion is an imperfect act passing from agent to patient. So that an instrumental spiritual power can be in a body, *e.g.*, the voice which proceeds from a mental concept to arouse the mind of the hearer. Thus the Sacraments are said to contain Grace both as being signs and as instrumental causes thereof.

The Sacraments are ordained principally to take away defects consequent on past sins, in so far as they are transitory in act, but endure in guilt. And also to further perfect the soul in things pertaining to Divine Worship.

Christ delivered us principally through His Passion, not only by way of efficiency and merit, but also by way of satisfaction; likewise by His Passion He inaugurated the rites of the Christian religion by offering Himself as oblation and sacrifice to God (Eph. V, 2).

Thus God is the principal and efficient cause of Grace, in comparison with Whom Christ in His humanity is as a united instrument and the Sacraments separate instruments, *e.g.*, hand and sticks.

Though the subsequent existence of the end, as a Final Cause, may cause a movement, yet the Efficient Cause cannot in point of time come into existence after causing the movement. Hence an instrumental cause cannot be subsequent to the movement. Hence the Sacraments under the Old Law were only signs and did not confer Grace.

As to circumcision various opinions were held and St. Thomas, who admitted that he had changed his own opinion, finally held that it was "a sign of justifying faith."¹²⁶

¹²⁵ S.T. I 77.

¹²⁶ S.T. III, 62.

Anything that assimilates or discriminates one thing from another may be called a character or seal.

Since men by the Sacraments are deputed to a spiritual service pertaining to their worship of God, it follows that by the means of the Sacraments the faithful receive a spiritual character.

Worship of God comprises, offering our souls to God, receiving Divine Gifts or bestowing them on others, for which purposes some power is needed either active or passive (cf., pp. 428-429).

Character received from the Sacraments signifies a spiritual power ordained unto things pertaining to Divine Worship.

Such power is instrumental and as the virtue, which is in the Sacrament is not in a genus, but is reducible to a genus on account of its incomplete nature, so Character is not properly in a genus or species, but is reducible to the second species of quality. St. Thomas rejected Aristotle's division of quality when dealing with habit.^{126a}

Divine Worship consists in certain actions, and the powers of the soul are ordained to action as essence is ordained to existence, therefore Character is subjected not in the essence of the soul but in its power.

As the essence of the soul from which man has his natural life is perfected by Grace (cf., p. 436) from which the soul derives Spiritual Life, so the natural powers of soul are perfected by a spiritual power, which is Character.

The subject of Character is the intellectual part of the soul, where faith resides, and the intellect being perpetual and incorruptible, Character cannot be blotted out from the soul.

"The whole rite of the Christian religion is derived from the Priesthood of Christ.

Hence Sacramental Character is specially the Character of Christ, to Whose Character the faithful are likened, by reason of the Sacramental Characters, 'which are nothing else than certain participations of Christ's Priesthood flowing from Christ Himself.' His Priesthood is compared with Character as that which is complete and perfect is compared with some participation thereof. Christ's Priesthood is Eternal, consequently, every sanctification wrought by His Priesthood is perpetual, enduring as long as the thing sanctified endures."

A complete form is in its subject according to the condition of its subject. Now the soul of a Wayfarer is changeable as to freewill, so that Grace is in the soul in a changeable manner.

But Character is in the soul as an instrumental power and such power follows rather the condition of the principal agent.

Consequently Character exists in the soul in an indelible manner, not from any perfection of its own, but from the perfection of Christ's Priesthood, from which the Character flows like an instrumental power.

As the Eucharist does not ordain man to any further Sacramental action or benefit, it does not imprint Character ; whereas Orders, Baptism, and Confirmation do imprint Character.¹²⁷

As has been stated, God alone, as Principal Agent, works the interior Sacramental effect ; a minister is in the nature of an instrument, as his action and the material are both applied extrinsically, and the interior effect is produced through the power of God.

Now an instrument acts not by reason of its own form, but by the power of the agent, hence whatever form or power an instrument has in addition to that which it has as an instrument, is accidental to it.

Therefore ministers of the Church can confer the Sacraments though they be wicked ; the recipients receive an effect whereby they are enlivened not to the minister but to Christ.

He who approaches a Sacrament receives it from a minister of the Church because he is such. Consequently as long as the minister is tolerated in the ministry, he that receives a Sacrament from him does not communicate in his sin, but communicates with the Church from whom the minister has his ministry. For the minister acts in the person of the whole Church whose minister he is ; which in the words uttered by him, the intention of the Church is expressed, and that suffices for the validity of the Sacrament, except the contrary be expressed on the part of either of the minister or of the recipient of the Sacrament.

If permission to use this power is withheld, he sins in administering and the recipient also sins in receiving, and thus does not receive the reality of the Sacrament, unless ignorance excuse him.

Nevertheless, previous perversion avoids the truth of the Sacrament, *e.g.*, Mockery : though subsequent or ulterior motive does not avoid it.

It belongs to men and not to angels to dispense the Sacraments and to take part in their administration, but God did not bind His power to the Sacrament, so as not to be able to bestow Sacramental effects without conferring the Sacrament.

Certain churches are said to have been consecrated by the ministry of angels (*cf.*, *Acta, S.S.*, September 29th).

However, if demons, who are lying spirits, were to perform a sacramental rite, it should be pronounced invalid. This is

¹²⁷ *S.T.* III, 63.

expressly stated in view of certain blasphemous and necromantic practices.¹²⁸

The Sacraments, as set forth, are seven in number.

Man attains perfection in corporeal life both in regard to his own person and also as regards the community in which he lives, as man is by nature a social animal; in the former, by acquiring some vital perfection directly *per se*, in the latter by the removal of hindrances to life, *e.g.*, ailments.

There are three Sacraments corresponding to spiritual life in regard to the former.

- (1) By Generation, Baptism.
- (2) By Growth, Confirmation.
- (3) By Nourishment, Eucharist.

There are two Sacraments as regards man's spiritual passible life in the second sense. One is for Healing, Penance; and the other for Diet and Exercise, Extreme Unction, which prepares man for final glory.

Finally, there are two Sacraments as to the exercise of man's powers. As to power to rule and exercise public acts, Order; and as to propagation of species, Matrimony.

These Sacraments are remedies against defects caused by sin.

Baptism is the remedy for absence of spiritual life; Confirmation, for infirmity of soul from recent birth; Eucharist, for the soul's proneness to sin; Penance, for actual sin after Baptism; Extreme Unction, for the remainders of sins, not sufficiently removed by penance owing to negligence or ignorance; Orders, for divisions in the community; Matrimony, for concupiscence in the individual and decrease of numbers through death.

Further, the Sacraments correspond with the Theological and Cardinal Virtues as remedies for the defects and penal effects of sin as follows:

Baptism	Faith	Original sin
Extreme Unction	Hope	Venial sin
Eucharist	Charity	Malice
Order	Prudence	Ignorance
Penance	Justice	Mortal sin
Matrimony	Temperance	Concupiscence
Confirmation	Fortitude	Infirmity.

Of these the Eucharist is the greatest, because it contains Christ substantially, the others contain an instrumental power which is a share of Christ's power, but that which is essential is prior to that which is by participation.¹²⁹

¹²⁸ S.T. III, 64.

¹²⁹ S.T. III, 65.

BAPTISM

The Sacrament is that which is done outwardly, the reality is the inward justification, which induces Character and is indelible (cf., p. 441); St. Thomas, differing from Hugo St. Victor, held that the justification remains but can be lost.

Baptism received its power, when Christ was baptized, but was proclaimed to mankind by His Passion.

As to the water to be used the species must not be destroyed. St. Thomas held that "the water which flowed from the side of Christ on the Cross was not phlegmatic humour, but that it was pure water gushing miraculously like blood from a dead body" (*sic*).

Since washing by immersion is better than by sprinkling, so is it with baptism. So a trine or single immersion is efficacious, though trine became the rule of the Church.

Although Christ's Passion is the principal cause as to the minister, yet it is an instrumental cause as to the Blessed Trinity. Hence the Trinity is mentioned, not Christ's Passion.

"It was by a special revelation from Christ that in the primitive Church the Apostles baptized in the name of Christ, in order that the name of Christ, which was hateful to Jews and Gentiles, might become an object of veneration, in that the Holy Ghost was given in Baptism after the invocation of that Name."

St. Thomas following Pelagius II (579 A.D.) but in opposition St. Ambrose (397 A.D.) and Nicholas I (858 A.D.) insisted on the necessity of the full and exact use of the words contained in Matt. XXVIII, 19, "In the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost."

Baptism cannot be reiterated, for we are baptized in Christ's death and Christ died but once (cf., Heb. VI, 6) as a man is born once, but eats many times; so Baptism is given once, but the Eucharist is given frequently.

A man may without Baptism of water receive the Sacramental effect of Christ's Passion in so far as he is conformed to Christ by suffering for Him; this is the Baptism of Blood as received by the Martyrs. Likewise, by the power of the Holy Ghost, as a man is moved by the Holy Ghost to believe in and love God and to repent of his sins, this is the Baptism of repentance such as that of the "dying thief." Likewise there is the intention, but lack of practicability.¹³⁰ The Deluge, Crossing of the Red Sea, Washings under the Law, and the baptism of John were figurative baptisms.

Priests are consecrated for the purpose of celebrating the Sacraments of Christ's Body, and that is the Sacrament of

¹³⁰ S.T. III, 66.

Ecclesiastical unity (1 Cor. X, 17) and by Baptism, a man becomes participator in that unity, whereby he receives the right to approach the Lord's Table. Hence it is proper to a priest to baptize; for it belongs to the same to produce the whole and to dispose the part in the whole.

A Deacon's duty is to assist and serve priests, but it does not belong to the office to baptize, except in cases of urgency. A layman and even a woman may baptize in a case of emergency. An unbaptized person can validly baptize, but cannot be a god-parent; but two are not to baptize one person, nor one use the words and another dip.¹³¹

No one can obtain Salvation except through Christ. Baptism is conferred on man that being regenerated thereby he may be incorporated in Christ, by becoming His member "as many of you as have been baptized in Christ have put on Christ" (Gal. III, 27).

Consequently, all are bound to be baptized, and without baptism there is no salvation for men.

"Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost he cannot enter into the Kingdom of God" (John III, 5). Christ may dwell in your hearts (Eph. III, 17).

But as mentioned above, desire for Baptism may be sufficient, which desire is the outcome of Faith that worketh by Charity, whereby God sanctifies inwardly and which with God counts for the deed.

Baptism of children should not be deferred, because in them we do not look for better instruction or fuller conversion, also because of the danger of death, for no other remedy is available for them besides the Sacrament of Baptism (*sic*).

In the Appendix St. Thomas states that "defect, transmitted through origin, having the character of sin does not result from withdrawal or corruption of a good consequent upon human nature by virtue of its principles, but withdrawal or corruption of something super-added to nature. Hence there is no further punishment than privation of the end to which the gift withdrawn destined him, but which gift (the Divine Vision) human nature is unable to obtain of itself. Sensible punishment will be inflicted for that which is proper to the person, but in this case the guilt does not arise from any action of his own person and hence is absent.

The unbaptized children were never adapted to obtain Eternal Life, since it was not due to them by virtue of their natural principles, for it surpasses the entire faculty of nature, nor could they perform acts of their own whereby to obtain so great a good.

¹³¹ S.T. III, 67.

Hence they will nowise grieve for being deprived of the Divine Vision, but will rejoice that they have a large share of God's goodness and their own natural perfection. They will not grieve any more than the lack of many graces accorded to others of the same condition makes a wise man to grieve."¹³²

No one having the Will to sin should be baptized. No kind of satisfaction should be enjoined on one who is being baptized, for this would bring dishonour to the Passion and Death of Christ; but to make satisfaction to one's neighbour is to cease to sin.

Confession is not required before Baptism but repentance as a part of Sacramental penance; but the inward virtue of penance is required.

It is necessary to have the intention and Will of receiving the Sacrament and right faith is also necessary, without which Grace cannot be had. Nevertheless, the Baptismal Character is impressed even where right Faith is absent.

It is necessary to baptize children, that as in birth they incur damnation through Adam, so in a second birth they may obtain Salvation through Christ (Rom. V, 12 and John III, 5).

"Children before birth receive nourishment through the mother, so in spiritual regeneration children before the use of reason, being as it were in the womb of their mother the Church, receive Salvation not by their own act, but by the act of the Church.

Hence such children are said to believe and to repent by their sponsors, not so much from those that carry them, as from the whole company of the Saints and the Faithful, and are said to intend by the act of those bringing them to be baptized."

A child cannot be baptized until after parturition, and it is wrong to kill the mother that the child may be baptized; but if the mother die while the child yet lives in her womb, she should be opened that the child may be baptized.

The insane may be baptized, if in accordance with their wishes, if any, when sane; either before they became insane, or during a lucid interval; but if insane from birth they may be treated as little children.¹³³

By Baptism we are incorporated in Christ as His members and Christ's Passion, which is communicated by Baptism, is sufficient satisfaction for all sins of all men.

Consequently, he who is baptized is free from the debt of all punishment due to him for his sin.

Every sin, including original sin, is taken away by Baptism, but the baptized are subject to death and the penalties of this

¹³² S.T., App. I,

¹³³ S.T. III, 58,

life, not by reason of a personal debt of punishment, but by reason of the state of their nature.

This is no bar to their entrance to the Heavenly Kingdom, when death severs the soul from the body ; since they have paid as it were the debt of nature.

God made man immortal as long as he did not sin, but man's bodily nature became passible and corruptible on his ceasing to be sinless.

"The Tree of Life did not cause absolute immortality but warded off corruption."¹³⁴

This also appears to be an effect of sin in addition to original sin, which is inherited by man through the destruction of harmony, which is essential to original justice and which taints the soul (cf., pp. 372 and 373).

Thus sin, which is the cause of the passibility of the body, is also the cause of that inherited corruption of the flesh which stains the soul, and it is this latter which is referred to as the burden of original sin, for it is that which gives rise to its "obstacles." Christ in His humanity assumed the former but was not tainted with the latter (cf., p. 398).

"Baptism has the power to take away the penalties of the present life, yet it does not, but by its power they will be taken away from the just in the Resurrection" (1 Cor. XV, 64). (The sting of death is sin, v. 56.)

St. Thomas gives three reasons why this is so. First, as Christ, Who was full of Grace and Truth had a passible body (cf., p. 398), which through His Passion and Death was raised up to a Life of Glory, so a Christian receives Grace in Baptism, but retains a passible body, so that he may suffer for Christ therein (2 Cor. IV, 11), yet at length he will be raised to a life of impassibility (cf., Rom. VIII, 11).

Second, for our spiritual training, by fighting against concupiscence man may receive the Crown of Glory (Rom. VI, 6).

And third, lest men might seek to be baptized for the sake of impassibility in the present life and not for the sake of the Glory of Life Eternal.

The Baptized are enlightened by Christ as to the knowledge of truth, and made fruitful by Him with the fruitfulness of good works by the infusion of Grace.

The absence of works by children after baptism is due to act and not to habit, hence it cannot be deduced that they have not received Grace (cf., p. 437).

A wrong motive in bringing children to Baptism does not deprive the child of re-generation.

¹³⁴ S.T. I, 97.

“To open the gates of the Heavenly Kingdom is to remove obstacles that prevent one from entering. This is guilt and debt of punishment, which are taken away by Baptism, hence it opens them.

When a man is baptized he receives Character (cf., p. 441), which is like a form, and he receives in consequence its proper effect unless it is hindered. When the obstacle is removed by Penance, Baptism forthwith produces its effect.”¹³⁵

CONFIRMATION

Confirmation is held to be the Sacrament of the fulness of Grace.

Besides the movement of generation, whereby man receives life, there is the movement of growth, whereby a man is brought to a perfect age.

So in confirmation man arrives at a perfect age of the spiritual life.

St. Thomas held that it was not instituted, but promised by Christ, though he quotes Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventura and the Franciscans, as holding that it was instituted by the Councils, and also Pierre de Tarantaise that it was instituted by the Apostles.

Of the chrism, oil is said to signify the Grace of the Holy Ghost, the oil of gladness (Ps. XLV, 7) and the balm which is mixed with it, for its fragrant odour, which spreads it about, as representing “the good odour of Christ” (2 Cor. II, 15); “My odour is the purest balm” (Ecclus. XXIV, 2).

An instrument receives instrumental power when it receives its form and when moved by the principal agent, so with Holy Chrism previously blessed by the Bishop.

“I sign thee with the Sign of the Cross, I confirm thee with the Chrism of Salvation in the Name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, Amen.”

The Holy Trinity cause the conferring of the spiritual strength; the spiritual strength itself is bestowed by visible matter; and the sign given to the combatant in which sign Our King triumphed.

Character is imprinted by confirmation: ages of the body do not affect the soul.

The Holy Ghost is not given or sent except with sanctifying Grace. Hence it is bestowed in confirmation.

The rite is reserved to bishops who possess the supreme power of the Church.

We must firmly hold that the Church’s ordinations are directed by the Wisdom of Christ.¹³⁶

¹³⁵ S.T. III, 69.

¹³⁶ S.T. III, 72.

EUCCHARIST

St. Thomas commenced his argument of this doctrine with a statement, which is open to a great deal of misconstruction, and he was thereby forced to employ a considerable laxity of expression in order to render his true meaning clear, which he might have stated in the first place, without laying his whole argument open to adverse comment.

As eventually stated by St. Thomas, then: "the difference between the Eucharist and other Sacraments having sensible matter is that whereas the Eucharist contains something which is sacred absolutely, namely Christ's Own Body, the Baptismal water contains something which is sacred in relation to something else; and the same holds good of Chrism and such like.

Consequently the Sacrament of the Eucharist is completed in the very consecration of the matter, whereas the other Sacraments are completed in the application of the matter for the sanctifying of the individual.

For in the Sacrament of the Eucharist what is both reality and sacrament is in the matter itself, but what is reality only, namely the Grace bestowed is in the recipient; whereas in Baptism both are in the recipient, namely the Character, which is both reality and sacrament, and the Grace of pardon of sins, which is reality only. And the same holds good of the other sacraments."

A thing is said to be one, not only from being indivisible or continuous, but also when it is complete.

The Eucharist is said to be ordained to spiritual refreshment, which is conformed to corporeal refreshment. "My flesh is meat indeed and My blood is drink indeed" (John VI, 55). There this Sacrament is materially many, but formally and perfectly one.

The reality of the Sacrament is the unity of the mystical body, without which there can be no Salvation.

Before receiving a Sacrament, the reality of the Sacrament can be had through the very desire of receiving the Sacrament (cf., pp. 444, 445).

The difference between corporeal food and spiritual food, as St. Augustine states, is that the former is changed into the substance of the partaker, whilst the latter changes the partaker into itself.

So that one can be changed into Christ and incorporated in Him by mental desire, even without receiving the Sacrament.

Even as Baptism is the Sacrament of Faith and the foundation of spiritual life, so the Eucharist is the Sacrament of the Charity, which is the bond of perfection (Col. III, 12).

As to the past the Sacrament is called a sacrifice, in respect of Our Lord's Passion.

As to the present the Sacrament is called Communion, in respect of Ecclesiastical unity, in that men are aggregated through it in partaking of His Flesh and Godhead and are united one with another.

As to the future the Sacrament is called the Eucharist, because the Grace of God is Life Everlasting, and because it really contains Christ Who is full of Grace. "Which is a host (victim, Douay, sacrifice) of sweetness" (A.V., an offering and sacrifice to God for a sweet smelling savour) (Eph. V, 2).

In this Sacrament of the Eucharist, what is sacrament only is the bread and wine, what is reality and sacrament is Christ's body, what is reality only is the effect of the Sacrament.

It is not necessary that the bread be leavened or unleavened, but Gregory says "the Roman Church offers unleavened because Our Lord took flesh without the union of sexes, but the Greek Churches offer leavened bread, because the Word of the Father was clothed with flesh, a leaven is mixed with flour."

St. Thomas suggests that unleavened bread is more reasonable.

First, because it was instituted on the first day, "Azymes," when nothing fermented should be in the house of a Jew (Exod. XXII, 15, 19). Second, because it is the Sacrament of Christ's body which was conceived without corruption. Third, because it is more in keeping with the sincerity of the Faithful: "Christ our Pasch is sacrificed therefore let us keep the peace . . . with unleavened bread of sincerity and truth" (1 Cor. V, 8).

However, St. Thomas thought the custom of the Greeks was not unreasonable, on account of its signification and in detestation of the Nazarenes who mixed up legal observances with the Gospel.

Wine from the grape alone should be used (Matt. XXVI, 29, and Ps. CIV, 15).

Water is to be mixed with the wine, because it is the custom of the country; because of the Water and Blood which flowed from the side of Christ from the Cross; because water signifies the people and wine signifies Christ's blood; and because the effect is Life Everlasting.

St. Ambrose is quoted as saying "Water flows into the Chalice and springs forth Everlasting Life."

Only a little water is to be added, so as not to change the species of the wine, as the water is not consecrated apart from the wine, it is changed into the wine.

Next follows the oft disputed doctrine as to the change of the Bread and Wine in the Eucharist.

Here St. Thomas states his argument with as great clearness as is possible, in so far as it is based upon the Aristotelian *Metaphysic of Substance and Accident*.

He commences with the premise that the presence of Christ's true body and blood in the Sacrament cannot be detected by the senses, nor understanding, but by Faith. We have the Divine Authority alone (Luke XXII, 14).

He advances three reasons why this is so : First the sacrifices of the Old Law contained the figure only (cf., pp. 439, 440), hence the sacrifice of the New Law, instituted by Christ Himself, contains more, namely Christ Himself, not merely in figure but in very truth. Therefore it is the perfective of all the other Sacraments in which Christ's Virtue is participated.

The second reason arises from Christ's Love. His bodily presence is a reward of friendship. Hence it is the sign of Supreme Charity and the "Uplifter" of our Hope on account of such familiar union of Christ with us.

The third reason arises from the perfection of Faith, which concerns His humanity just as it does His Godhead (John XIV, 1). And since Faith is of things unseen, as Christ shows us His Godhead invisibly, so in this Sacrament He shows us His flesh in an invisible manner.

Christ's body is not in this Sacrament in the same way as a body is in a place, which by its dimensions is commensurate with place, but in a special manner which is proper to this Sacrament. Hence Christ's body is said to be on many altars, not as in different places but sacramentally, that is invisibly after the manner and by virtue of the Spirit.

The Substance of the bread and wine is changed into Christ's flesh and blood. It is neither dissolved into original matter nor annihilated.

The change is not like a natural change, but is entirely supernatural and effected by God's power alone.

The Substance of the bread and wine does not remain after consecration. For Christ's true body exists in the Sacrament, which was not there before consecration. There is no change of place by local motion. Consequently Christ's body cannot begin to be anew, except by the change of the substance itself ; and what is changed into another no longer remains after such change.

"This is my body" would not be true if the substance of the bread were to remain there ; for the substance of the bread never is the body of Christ ; were it such, rather would one say, "Here is my body."

Every created agent is limited in its act, as being of a determinate genus and species.

The action of every created agent bears on some determinate act; and the determination of everything in actual existence comes from its form.

No created agent can act except by changing the form in something, every change is a formal change.

But God is Infinite Act, hence His action extends to the whole nature of being.

Therefore, He can work not only a formal conversion, so that diverse forms succeed each other in the same subject, but He can work also the change of all being, so that the whole substance of one thing be changed into the whole substance of another.

This is done in this Sacrament.

This is not a formal but a substantial conversion; it is no kind of natural movement but is Transubstantiation.

“Form cannot be changed into form nor matter into matter by the power of any finite agent. But such change can be made by an infinite agent, which has control of all being, because the nature of being is common to both form and matter, and whatever there is of being in the one, the author of being can change into whatever there is of being in the other, withdrawing that whereby it was distinguished from the other.”

The accidents of the bread and wine remain after the consecration. The following reasons are given.

It would be repugnant to eat human flesh and to drink human blood, lest it would be a cause of derision by unbelievers, if we were to eat Our Lord under His own species; while we receive Our Lord's body and blood invisibly, it redounds to the merit of Faith, for Faith is not contrary to the senses, but concerns things to which the senses do not reach.

The substantial form does not remain, for the same reasons as the substance of the bread and wine does not remain, after consecration.

The soul is the form of the body giving it the whole order of perfect being: *i.e.*, corporeal being, animated being, and so on. Therefore the form of the bread is changed into the form of Christ's body, according as the latter gives corporeal being, but not as it bestows animated being.

It was on this question of the accidents having during the change no substance in which to inhere, that gave rise to the doctrine, enunciated by Wycliffe and followed by Luther, of Consubstantiation.

But St. Thomas deals with this by stating, that a change may be instantaneous either on the part of the form, which is the

terminus of the change, *e.g.*, a substantial form which does not receive "more or less." Or, on the part of the subject, *e.g.*, when the subject is in the ultimate disposition to receive the form, as when a transparent body is illuminated suddenly. Or, on the part of the agent, which possesses infinite power, wherefore it can instantly dispose the matter for form, "Ephpheta (Ephphatha). Immediately His ears were opened and the string of His tongue was loosed" (Mark VII, 34).

For these reasons this conversion is instantaneous, in that the substance of Christ's body, which is the term of the conversion, does not receive "more or less"; in this conversion there is no subject to be disposed successively, and it is effected by God's infinite power.

MIDTIME

This leads St. Thomas to a disquisition upon midtime, which, as it has direct bearing on some of the divergent views entertained in connection with this doctrine, it seems not amiss to set out in a shortened form.

St. Albertus Magnus and St. Bonaventura held that there was no midtime between two instants, only if referring to the same movement, but not to different things. But that there is no midtime between the instant that marks the close of rest and that which marks the beginning of movement.¹³⁷

To this St. Thomas objects that, Unity of time and of instant or even their plurality is not taken according to movements of any sort, but according to the first movement of the heavens which is the measure of all movement and rest.

Again others grant this, but allege that there are other movements such as those of angels, which are not so dependent, hence between two instants of such movements there is no midtime.

St. Thomas again objects that this is not to the point, because although the change in question has no relation to the movement of the heavens, still it follows the pronouncing of the word, which pronouncing is measured by the movement of the heavens. Therefore there must be midtime between every two signate instants of that change.

Further, some say that, the instant in which the bread was last and the instant in which the body of Christ is first are indeed two, in comparison with the things measured, but are one comparatively to the time measured, as when two lines touch, there are two points on the part of the two lines, but one point on the part of the place containing them.

To this St. Thomas objects that, here is no likeness because

¹³⁷ *Albertus Magnus*, IV. *Sent Dist.*, XI. *Bonaventura*, IV. *Sent Dist.*, XI.

instant and time is not the intrinsic measure of particular movement, as a line and a point are of a body, but only the extrinsic measure as to place in respect of the bodies.

Moreover, others say that, it is the same instant in fact, but another according to reason.

To this St. Thomas objects that according to that, it would follow that things really opposite would exist together, for diversity of reason does not change a thing objectively.

Having objected to all the foregoing explanations, St. Thomas arrives at the conclusion that "it must be said that this change, is wrought by Christ's words spoken by the priest, so that the last instant of pronouncing the words is the first instant in which Christ's body is in the Sacrament and that the substance of the bread is there during the whole preceding time. Of this time no instant is to be taken as proximately preceding the last, because time is not made up of successive instants."¹³⁸

And therefore a first instant can be assigned in which Christ's body is present; a last instant cannot be assigned in which the substance of the bread is there, but a last time can be assigned. And the same hold good in natural changes.¹³⁹

"In instantaneous changes, a thing is "in becoming" and is "in being" simultaneously; just as becoming illuminated and to be actually illuminated are simultaneous, for in such, a thing is said to be "in being" according as it now is, but to be "in becoming" according as it was before" (cf., pp. 323, 324, 327 and 438).¹⁴⁰

St. Thomas then contrasts this conversion with that of creation and natural transmutation in that it has something in common and also differs from each.

Though Creation is only signified as a mode of change, because the mode of signification follows the mode of understanding, the order of terms of it and of natural transmutation are the same of those of this conversion; after one thing there is another.

In Creation, after non-being there is being.

In natural transmutation, after air there is fire.

In this conversion, after bread there is Christ's body.

Hence, as compared with creation, in neither is there any common subject belonging to either extremes; but as compared with natural transmutation, one extreme passes into the other; though here the whole substance passes, while in natural transmutation the matter of the one receives the form of the other; also something remains the same, here the accidents; in natural transmutation, the matter or subject.

In no case are the extremes co-existent, therefore one extreme

¹³⁸ Aristotle, *Phys.*, VI.

¹³⁹ *Phys.*, VIII.

¹⁴⁰ S.T. III, 75.

cannot be predicated of the other, but because of the relationship we can use the preposition "ex," "out of," which denotes *Order*. Since the whole substance passes it is called "transubstantiation."

Again, since there is no subject of conversion here, terms which are true of natural transmutation cannot be employed, for here there is no potentiality to the opposite, hence to say "the bread can be the body" is incorrect.

Likewise, the preposition "de," "of," denotes consubstantial cause, which is here lacking, hence to say "the body is made of bread" is incorrect; so also to say "the bread will be body" and "the bread may become the body" are equally incorrect.

Nevertheless, since the accidents remain after the conversion, some expressions may be admitted by way of similitude, *viz.*, "is," "will be" or "is made of" provided that by the word bread, it is not the substance of the bread which is understood, but in general "that which is contained under the species of bread," under which species there is first contained the substance of bread and then the substance of the body of Christ.¹⁴¹

HOW CHRIST IS IN THE SACRAMENT

We next come to the "Productive Doctrine of Transubstantiation," held by St. Thomas and his followers the Jacobins, because the Body of Christ, without coming down from Heaven, is rendered present in the bread by a reproduction of the same substance, whereby the substance of the Bread is changed instantaneously into the substance of Christ's body, yet Christ's body is not subject to those dimensions as were the substance of the Bread (cf., pp. 452, 457).

It may here be noted, that subsequently the Franciscan followers of Duns Scotus, the Cordeliers held the "Adductive Doctrine of Transubstantiation" so called because according to that, Christ's Body is brought down from Heaven not by a successive but by a momentary change, and it is not the substance of the Bread that is changed into the substance of Christ's Body, but that the Flesh and Blood of Christ succeeds into the place of the substance of the Bread being conveyed thither from another place. It does not appear that the general terms employed in the decisions of the Council of Trent effectively exclude either Doctrine.¹⁴²

The doctrine held by St. Thomas, then, is as follows.

The entire Christ is in the Sacrament.

By the power of the Sacrament there is under the species of the Sacrament that into which the pre-existing substance of the Bread and Wine is changed.

In addition to the substance of Christ's Body, there is also

¹⁴¹ S.T. III, 75.

¹⁴² *Jurieu*, 205.

from *natural concomitance* that which is "really" united with that in which the conversion is terminated. Hence the Godhead and the Soul of Christ are in this Sacrament, not by the power of the Sacrament but from *real concomitance*.

As the Body is in the Sacrament by way of substance and not of quantity, no question of the parts or quantity can arise; even as the nature of water is in the whole of water.

The whole Christ is under each Sacramental species; but in the one the species of the other is there, not by the power of the Sacrament, but by *real concomitance*.

The whole nature of substance is under every part of the dimensions, under which it is contained, as the entire nature of bread is under every part of bread.

Further, the conversion which takes place in this Sacrament is terminated directly at the Substance of Christ's Body and not at its dimensions, yet the substance of Christ's Body is not "really" deprived of its dimensive quantity and its other accidents. Hence by *real concomitance* the whole dimensive quantity of Christ's Body and all its other accidents are in this Sacrament, even as in a white sweet object, where the sweetness is in the sight after the manner of whiteness.

The substance of Christ's Body succeeds the substance of the bread, which is present not locally under its dimensions but substantially, not as the dimensive quantity of a body is under the dimensive quantity of place.

Christ's *Body* is not subject to those dimensions as is the substance of the bread.

But the substance of the bread was there locally by reason of its dimensions being compared with that of place through the medium of its own dimensions. Whereas the substance of Christ's Body is compared with that place, through the medium of foreign dimensions, so that the proper dimensions of Christ's Body are compared with that place through the medium of substance, which is contrary to a located body.

Hence in no way is Christ's Body locally in the Sacrament.

In Christ "being" in Himself and "being" under the Sacraments are not the same.

What is not in a place is not moved of itself locally, but only according to the motion of the subject in which it is. Since Christ has unfailing and incorruptible being, He ceases to be under this Sacrament, not because He ceases to be, nor yet by local movement of His own, but only by the fact that the sacramental species cease to exist. Hence, strictly speaking, Christ is immovably in this Sacrament.

Christ's Body cannot be seen by the bodily eye, nor by the

intellect (whose object is what a thing is), except by Faith, so far as a Wayfarer is concerned. Being supernatural, it is only directly visible as Divine Essence, which not even Angels or devils can see, except through faith, though in case of the latter it is unwilling.

As to the various apparitions which have occurred in connection with the Sacraments from time to time, they were either a special Miracle in the eye of the beholder, or a special Miracle in relation to the accidents in order to represent truth.

But the Body of Christ remains in the Sacraments.¹⁴³

After consecration, the accidents of the bread and wine are not subjected in the substance of the bread and wine nor in their substantial form. Nor, as stated (pp. 455, 456) in the body and blood of Christ; the substance of a human body cannot in any way be affected by such accidents, nor is it possible for Christ's glorious and impassible body to be altered to receive these qualities.

Such accidents cannot be subjected in the surrounding atmosphere as suggested by some, for atmosphere is not susceptible to such accidents, nor displaced by the motion of these species. Accidents do not pass from subject to subject. Moreover, the atmosphere would then have both its own and foreign accidents. Nor can it be said that this happens miraculously, because the words of the Sacrament only effect what they signify.

But the accidents continue without a subject, or rather, it is miraculously bestowed on the dimensive quantity of the bread and wine to be a subject of subsequent forms, so that it supplies the place of matter and receives miraculously the power and property of substance.

St. Thomas proceeds to show that this must be so in the following manner.

Being is not in a genus.

Hence being cannot be the essence of substance nor the essence of accident.

From this it follows that the definition of substance is not being of itself without a subject.

But it belongs to the quiddity or essence of substance, from whence the definition is derived, to have existence not in a subject. So likewise the definition of accidents is not, being in a subject, but to have existence in a subject.

In this Sacrament, the accidents do not cease to be accidents, nor is their definition withdrawn from them, but they remain

¹⁴³ S.T. III, 76.

not in a subject, not by virtue of their essence, but by the Divine Power sustaining them.

The accidents acquired individual being in the substance of the bread and wine, and when that was changed they remained in the individuated being, which they had already acquired.

Though they had no being of their own, yet their subject had being through them (*sic*) then after the change they remain in being and are thus compounded of essence and existence like the angels.

The other accidents are subjected in the dimensive quantity that remains ; something having quantity and colour and affected by the other accidents is perceived by the senses, nor are the senses deceived in this.

Dimensive quantity is the first disposition of matter, and since the first subject is matter, all other accidents are related to their subjects, through the medium of dimensive quantity (*sic*). So that where the subject is withdrawn the accidents remain according to the being that they had before, and all the accidents remain founded upon dimensive quantity.

Moreover, since the subject is the principle of individuation of the accident, it is necessary for that which is the subject of some accidents to be the principle of individuation.

This is so because the notion of individual cannot be in several. It is not natural to be in any other, thus immaterial separated forms, subsisting in themselves, are also individuals themselves. Also because a form, be it substantial or accidental, is naturally in one not several, *e.g.*, This whiteness in this body.

This last reason is further explained in the following manner.

As to substantial forms, matter is the principle of individuation of all inherent forms ; and since they are naturally in the subject, if one of them is received into matter, which is not in another, neither can the form itself thus existing be in another.

As to accidental forms, the principle of individuation is dimensive quantity. For that something is naturally in another one solely, is due to the fact that the other is undivided in itself and distinct from all others. And it is on account of quantity that substance can be divided.

Therefore dimensive quantity itself is a particular principle of individuation, in forms of this kind, namely inasmuch as forms numerically distinct are in different parts of matter, hence also dimensive quantity has of itself a kind of individuation ; for it belongs to dimension for it to be quantity having position.

Therefore dimensive quantity can be the subject of other accidents rather than the other way about.

This long and involved argument as to dimensive quantity is

forced upon St. Thomas, by his strict adherence to what he held to be the true Aristotelian view that matter alone was the principle of individuation.

It was likewise as we have seen on page 417 that he reached the conclusion that no two angels were of the same species.

Everything acts so far as it has actual being, and everything stands in the same relation to action as to being. Hence the sacramental species, having retained being after the conversion, retain their action and thus have the same effects as the bread and wine.

Likewise, they can be corrupted by corruption to themselves, *e.g.*, by alteration of qualities by addition or division, especially by alteration of dimensive quantity in which the other accidents are subjected, and also by alteration of colour, savour, etc.

They can also be corrupted by the corruption of being, by a contrary agent, as the substance of bread and wine was subject to corruption, although it was not corrupted before the miracle. The potentiality of being to corruption remains the same after the subject of which it was being has been taken away (*cf.*, p. 457). But it is only the corruption of such being that causes the sacramental species to cease to be sacramental.

In addition, the sacramental species can be converted into a substance generated from them, hence they can nourish the human frame.

Reception is the consumption of the sacramental species under which the Body of Christ truly is.¹⁴⁴

This sacrament differs from the others in that it is accomplished by the consecration of matter, the rest are perfected in the use of consecrated matter. In the other sacraments the consecration consists only of a blessing, from which the consecrated matter derives instrumentally a spiritual power, a blessing which the priest as an animated instrument can pass on to the inanimate instrument. But in this sacrament, the consecration of the matter consists in a miraculous change of substance, which can be done by God alone. Hence the minister has no other act save the pronouncing of the words.

Thus the form differs, in that in other sacraments the form implies use, here the form implies consecration alone. In the others the form is pronounced by the minister in person, here as if Christ were speaking in person. The power of consecrating this sacrament on Christ's behalf is bestowed on the priest at his ordination.¹⁴⁵

Since the words are uttered in the person of Christ, it is from His command that they receive this instrumental power from

¹⁴⁴ *S.T.* III, 77.

¹⁴⁵ *S.T.* III, 82.

Him. Hence there is in the words a created power causing the transubstantiation.

“As the concept of the practical intellect does not presuppose the thing understood, but makes it, so the truth of this expression does not pre-suppose the thing signified but makes it; for such is the relation of God’s Word to the things made by the Word. The term ‘this’ points to a substance yet without determining its proper nature, it does not indicate the accidents.

The meaning of this expression is, in the order of nature, understood before the thing signified, as cause is prior to effect; but not in the order of time, because this cause has its effect with it at the same time” (instantaneously).

At the consecration of the bread and wine the first form does not await the second in its action, but has its effect on the instant.

EFFECTS OF THE SACRAMENT

The effect may be considered from what is contained in it; this is Christ, Who just as by coming into this world visibly bestowed the Life of Grace upon it (John I, 17), so also by coming sacramentally into man, causes the Life of Grace. Again, the effect may be considered by what is represented by it; this is Christ’s Passion, therefore this Sacrament works in man the effect which Christ’s Passion wrought in the world. “This is My Blood which shall be shed for many unto the remission of sins” (Matt. XXVI, 28).

Further, the effect may be considered from how it is given; this is by way of food and drink, therefore it does for spiritual life what material food does for bodily life, *viz.*, sustain, give increase, restore, and give delight (John VI, 56).

It is given under the species of bread and wine, and there are many grains in bread and many grapes in wine. As St. Augustine exclaims, “O, Sacrament of Piety, O, sign of Unity, O, bond of Charity.”

“Since Christ and His Passion are the cause of Grace and spiritual refreshment, and Charity cannot be without Grace, it is clear that this Sacrament bestows Grace.”

Although the body is not immediately the subject of Grace, still the effect of Grace grows into the body (cf., p. 440).

Moreover, it belongs to this Sacrament to cause the attaining of Eternal Life, for by His Passion Christ opened to us the approach to Eternal Life (Heb. IX, 15).

In addition, the refreshment of spiritual food and unity denoted by the species of bread and wine are to be had in this life though more perfectly in the state of Glory.

Christ’s Passion has not its effect on those, who are not disposed

to it, so also they do not come to Glory who receive it unworthily.

This Sacrament in itself has from Christ's Passion the power of forgiving sins, but in comparison with the recipient, whoever is conscious of mortal sin has an obstacle to its effect, because he cannot be united to Christ, which is its effect, so long as he retains attachment to mortal sin.

As a Sacrament, the power is not directly for satisfaction, but for nourishment through the Union of Christ and His members. But because the union is the effect of Charity, from the fervour of which man obtains forgiveness not only of the guilt but of the punishment, it has this consequence, by "concomitance" (cf., p. 456) with the union, that man obtains forgiveness of the punishment in accordance with his fervour.

As a sacrifice, it has a satisfactory power, yet in satisfaction the affection of the offeror is weighed rather than the quantity of the offering.

Though the offering in its quantity suffices to satisfy all punishment, yet it becomes satisfactory for them for whom it is offered according to the measure of their devotion. Likewise, it preserves from sin in strengthening the spiritual life, and as a sign of Christ's Passion it repels all the assaults of demons.

This Sacrament is both a sacrifice and a sacrament (cf., p. 449); it is a sacrifice as Christ's Passion is represented, and also a sacrament as invisible Grace is bestowed under a visible species.

So this Sacrament benefits recipients by both sacrament and sacrifice, because it is offered for all who partake of it. But to others who do not receive it, it is beneficial by way of sacrifice, inasmuch as it is offered for their salvation (Matt. XXVI, 28).

It has no effect except in those who are united with this Sacrament in Faith and Charity.¹⁴⁶

St. Thomas died before he had finished his *Summa Theologica*, after adding a series of Questions on Penance to the foregoing.

But the work was completed from his Commentary on Book IV of the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, "The Master," probably by Fra. Rainaldo (Reginald) da Piperno, but some say that it was done by Henry of Gorcum.

¹⁴⁶ S.T. III, 79.

CHAPTER XXIII

THOMISTS—DOMINICANS

Peter of Spain, d. 1277—John of Paris, d. 1306—Robert Kilwardby, d. 1279—Gilles de Lessines, d. 1305—Ulrich of Strasbourg, c. 1250—Gilles de Orleans, c. 1250—Vincent de Beauvais, d. 1264—Lambert of Auxerre, c. 1250—and other Grammarians—Bernard of Auvergne, d. 1280—Bernard de Trilia, d. 1292—William Mackelsfield, c. 1280—Robert of Hereford, c. 1300—William Hotun, d. 1298—Thomas of Sutton, c. 1310—Nicholas Trivet, d. 1328—Hervaeus Natalis, d. 1323—John of Naples, c. 1315—Durand de Pourçain, d. 1332—Armand de Beauvoir, c. 1334—Gratia dei d'Ascoli, c. 1320—Peter de la Palu, d. 1342—Robert Holcot, d. 1349—John of Capreolus, d. 1444—Dominic of Flanders, d. 1500—Peter of Brussels or of Crockaert, c. 1509—Franciscus Sylvester, d. 1528—Thomas de Vio Cajetan, d. 1534—Francis of Vittoria, d. 1546—Dominicus de Soto, d. 1560—Melchior Canus, d. 1560—and others.

Petrus Hispanus (Pietro di Guiliano), Pope John XXI, 1276–1277, of Lisbon, was a Thomist and a logician.

His *Summa Logica* was an excellent abridgment of the *Organon*, which became a manual for professors and scholars: he also wrote a work called *Pava Logicalia* or *Summulæ*.¹

He taught in Paris and subsequently became Archbishop, Cardinal, and Pope.

He appears to have been a better logician than Pope.

John of Paris, 1269–1306, also known as John Quidort or John the Deaf, and sometimes referred to as “Pungens Asinum.” A Dominican and Thomist wrote two valuable works, *De Principio Individuationis* and *De Unitate*, but they have now been lost or have not been identified amongst existing manuscripts bearing these titles.

He also wrote *De Regia Potestate et Papali* and an unfinished *Correctorium Corruptorii* of St. Thomas' works.

A *Quodlibetum* and a *Commentary on the Sentences* are now recognized as having been written by this author and have been reviewed by Grabmann, 1922.

According to John the active intellect is directly created in the soul by God, and does not spring from the essence of the soul as taught by St. Thomas. St. Augustine did not know of this theory,

¹ B.M.R.L., 2D XXX, f. 106, thirteenth century.

and he is alleged to have had recourse to innate ideas in consequence.

Robert Kilwardby, d. 1279. After studying in Paris joined the Dominicans at Oxford, 1240–1245, where he became their theological master. He became English Provincial of the Dominican Order, 1261, and was made Archbishop of Canterbury in 1273 and Cardinal in 1279.

He was a strong Augustinian and condemned thirty propositions circulating in Oxford, which were based on Aristotle's *Unity of Form*, on March 18th, 1277.

Besides theological works, he wrote no less than thirty-nine works on philosophy, none of which have been printed or edited, but a list is given of them in *Hauréau*, III, 28, n., including *Errores in Sententiae*.²

Of these 'Quomodo Deus sit homini philosopho cognitus'³ goes to prove that he agreed with the doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas as to how God is known to us, and as to the Names of God (Ch. XXI, p. 308).

Gilles de Lessines, in Hainault, 1230–1305, a Dominican and Thomist, wrote an important work *De Unitate Formae*,⁴ in which he sets out the arguments of those in favour of the doctrine of "Plurality of Forms," and then proceeds to establish "Unity of Form."

(In the same manuscript there is another work of similar import by an English Dominican, Richard Clapoel or Chappelwell, sometimes confused with Richard de Middelton.)

According to Gilles, those who upheld the Plurality of Forms maintained that the form of man is not simple, but is composed of many forms naturally associated and that if one of them is missing the man is imperfect. The last form in which form all the others unite is the intellect.

So that there exists between the various definitions a natural relation, the name of which includes the whole, likewise in a thing composed by nature there must be an aggregate of forms which constitute it.

A body, for example, is composed of various members each of which has its own form and its own matter, and is consequently distinct from the rest. But these members naturally united, by the bond of a natural dependence, make but one body, nevertheless it is not a simple body.

Likewise with regard to the soul, the soul has various parts

² B.M.R.L., 9B VI, f. 16, thirteenth century.

³ *Bib. Nat.*, 16390, f. 135.

⁴ 15962, *Bib. Nat.*

essentially different, the union and natural order of which constitute but one soul, yet this soul is not simple although it may be the single form of the living body. Certain Masters (some Franciscans) not content to realize this abstraction, which the Dominicans call the substantial form, insist that there are as many forms actually distinct from one another as there are names for the diverse faculties of the living and thinking subject.

To support this view, according to Gilles, his opponents are bound to adopt all the arguments of Democritus, Leucippus, Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Plato which have been refuted by Aristotle.

Gilles de Lessines himself sets out his opinion as to the substantial form. "It is necessary to know in the first place that there is a sole substantial form. We allege that from this form, which confers specific being on the subject, proceeds all the being of the subject and of its essential parts; thus the soul, reaching the physical organic body, confers upon it specific 'being' and makes it not only become animal, but that it is such animal, man or horse. We say in consequence, that such body, the subject of the soul, obtains from its form, which is its soul, that by which it is the body of *this* animal; that it obtains from it likewise, that by which it is the physical organic body of such or such animal. Thus that which the soul operates in the subject confers on it its specific being.

It is by reason of this, that it is said that this animal is man, ass, horse, or that which belongs to such other determined species. But the specific essence being the whole being of an individual and this essence coming from the soul, the soul is consequently that by which the individual is all that it is: whence it follows that it attributes being to the body and to all the parts of the body, in a word to all that which is in the individual subject.

From that we conclude that the different manners of being of the parts of the subject, which are indicated by different names, by calling the flesh flesh and not bone, and the foot foot and not hand, etc., are the same being, which these parts receive from the soul and that they do not differ essentially, but accidentally, in so far as they are considered under the relation of their forms or their functions."

Thus the substantial form of Gilles de Lessines is the principle of life and this principle is the soul itself. He therefore proves the identity of this soul with the form which gives the essence, and in addition distinguishes the simple nature of the soul from its diverse manifestations, so as to bring back into unity the five souls of Aristotle *sic* (Plato) defined by the Realists as distinct parts of a composite whole.

As to the difficulty that is met with in explaining the action of an immaterial substance upon a body or matter, he admits this is a mystery, but rejects any hypothesis of a "mediating form" or "plastic mediator," as only doubling the difficulty without solving the problem. The substance being given, he establishes that the diverse manners of being of this substance are the multiple manifestations of a single energy, a single force of the soul properly so called.

Ulrich or Udalrich of Strasbourg or Ulrich Engelbert, c. 1250, was one of the favourite pupils of St. Albertus Magnus at Cologne. He wrote *De Anima*, which has been lost, and an immense treatise *De Summo Bono*⁵ in six volumes.

The first is on the ways which lead to the knowledge of God ; the second, the Unity of the Divine Nature ; the third, the Trinity ; the fourth, God the Father considered as first principle ; the fifth, God the Son ; the sixth, the Holy Spirit, the Virtues, and the Sins. The author is both a learned theologian and a philosopher, but somewhat obscure.

With regard to Substance, he maintained that it is the foundation of all that subsists. It is defined as first and second substance ;⁶ the first is Socrates, it is never in a subject ; the second substance is the species of Socrates, it has the first substance as its subject, it is not a quality, for without such and such quality, the subject still exists, but separated from its second substance the subject is destroyed.

Moreover, the second substance is the very principle of the first substance. This is not contradictory, what is meant is that the principle of Socrates is his specific form, and that deprived of this form Socrates perishes, neither can this form exist without Socrates.

Prime substance is composed of matter and form and is, as Aristotle says, the unique subject to which all else adheres or reaches ; the principal element, the most noble element of this substance, is not matter : it is the form identical to the quiddity.

But the form is anterior to the prime substance.

The form is everywhere and eternal. It is by accident that it is joined to matter. He does not admit Platonic Ideas. Quiddities of things exist in things and nowhere else. But before things, their cause was the first cause, the first form from which all forms emanated.

If, then, there are not physical forms, which can be considered as anterior to forms individualized in the bosom of things, it is nevertheless certain, both according to religion and to philosophy,

⁵ 15900, 15901, *Bib. Nat.*

⁶ Cf., p. 473.

that the reason of being of Socrates has preceded the generation of Socrates, this reason of being, this metaphysical form of Socrates, subsisting from all eternity in the Divine Intellect. Is it not equally to be recognized that the form of Socrates is in Socrates himself, an essence of perfect simplicity, which does not depend on matter, having informed it without being incorporated itself.

Gilles D'Orleans, c. 1250, a Dominican and a Thomist, wrote on the eclipses of the sun and the moon and on Ethics, also a treatise *De Generatione et Corruptione*.⁷

With regard to the question of Potentiality, Aristotle distinguishes Being, Non-Being, and Being in Potentiality. To be in potentiality is to be possible; that which is not in being yet, is either not possible, or in potentiality or never will be.

Here the question is, that as regards matter, whether potentiality belongs to its essence, or whether it is something apart from its essence. In the latter case, matter, which is becoming, will be already subject to an accident, even before it exists. That is what the Realists alleged. They distinguish matter, which ought to be, from that which can be, which they define as a lesser being, but still a being formally.

Gilles argues against this, "If potentiality was a thing of the genus of substance, it would be the subject of such or such substance, which it is not.

Is it then a form? No, for the matter which ought to be, cannot receive any form before that to which is attributed its being, that is the substantial form. Being neither the subject nor the formal quality of a thing, which is not yet in existence, what is it? Indeed it is nothing more than an idea contrary to another idea, the future act of the matter. These terms of act and potentiality express quite simply two concepts, which signify two modes of a subject itself deprived of all reality."

Though not a great orator, he was a good logician, naturally following the Thomistic tenets of the Dominicans.

Vincent de Beauvais, d. 1264, was a Dominican Friar who had use of the library of St. Louis, King of France (1226-1270). He wrote *Speculum Majus*, which is a mine of information. There are three parts of the Original, but a fourth part, called *Speculum Morale*, was added in the next century by an unknown author.

Though his original contributions to the problem of universals are of very doubtful value, yet this great work may be said to contain a summary of all the information that had been acquired up to

⁷ 15805, *Bib. Nat.*, with Hotun. Cf., p. 469.

the thirteenth century, being a collection of all the opinions approved of by the authority of some great name. Amongst these extracts may be noted a temperate judgment of Erigena's *De Divisione Naturae*; this is the more remarkable as it had been condemned by Honorius III in 1226 because quoted in support of the heresies of David de Dinant and Almeric Bène.

He also wrote *De Eruditionae Puerorum*⁸ containing quotations from many authors. From him it is clear that the pseudo Augustine *De Spiritu et Anima* was written by a Cistercian monk Alcher (cf., p. 160); also that the author of the *Institution of Novices* was Gerard Ithier, seventh prior of Gramont; and that the author of the *Cloister of the Soul* was Hugo de Folliot Prior of St. Laurent.

Lambert of Auxerre, c. 1250, a Dominican of Auxerre and one of the founders of their House. He wrote a *Summa of Logic* which did much to clarify the terms employed by the philosophers of his time.

It may here be mentioned that with *John de Garlande*, d. 1252, the teaching of the grammar of Donatus and Priscian came to an end (cf. Chap. V, 114, 115). Speculative grammar, a combination of logic and grammar, continued to flourish under *Nicholas of Paris*, *Siger of Courtrai* (Procurator of the Sorbonne), d. 1341, and *Thomas of Erford*, c. 1350, which did much to add clarity and precision to language.

The grammar of *Donatus* and *Priscian* was formally abolished from the University of Toulouse in 1328 and from Paris in 1366.

Bernard of Auvergne or of Gannat, c. 1280, a Dominican of Paris and a strict Thomist, became Bishop of Clermont. Most of his works, which were written against the tenets of Henry of Gand, Geoffrey of Fontaines, James of Viterbo and Giles of Rome, have been lost, but a Vatican MS. *Inpugnationis Bernardi*, against Giles of Rome, has now been found likewise that against Geoffrey by Pelzer at Florence.

According to Bernard of Auvergne, Intelligence is the knowledge that we have of a thing in general without respect to its particular characteristics. Thus when I define a rose, I do not think of such and such rose in particular. Geoffrey of Fontaines thought that the intelligence of an object was simply the reception of the species. But Bernard replied that first perception is passive whilst the intellect is active. "The last perfection of man cannot consist in a first reception. In short, although the first matter be constituted substantially by the form, it is in the form which it has

⁸ 16390, fol. 15-135, *Bib. Nat.*

received. Hence the last perfection of man is the intelligence, according to the philosophers and holy doctors, who nevertheless place Beatitude in the simple contemplation of the Divine Essence.

If then the intelligence properly so called is a purely passive act, so that the intellect contributes to it in no way, since it contributes nothing to the reception of the species, the last perfection of man consists in the exercise of a purely passive faculty. Which is false. In short, in the most noble condition to which the human being can rise, he ought to attain his last perfection. But this perfection is active being rather than passive being. The Beatitude of man is not indeed in an act of pure passivity."⁹

Bernard de Trilia, 1240-1292, a Dominican Thomist who was born at Nîmes and died at Avignon. He wrote *Questiones de Cognatione*.¹⁰

According to him, the difference between Plato and Aristotle was psychological;¹¹ Plato thought that forms emanated either from ideas, or from some supernatural intelligence or substance, whilst on the other hand, Aristotle thought of matter as being naturally endowed with the power to receive all forms, and that these forms are actualized in time and in matter by the action of some external agent; both are right and natural. Bernard thought that matter was primarily uninformed, but did not insist on it. According to Plato, the human intelligence is a ray of Divine Intelligence, the generator of human intelligence, it is provided with all the ideas by which it judges and knows external things, that is they are innate: then general ideas are born with the human intellect, which appears to be a wild supposition. St. Augustine says one must reason about immaterial things in the same way as about material things. But what is known of material substances?

If the celestial bodies are naturally perfect, so that duration neither adds nor detracts anything from them, we see on the other hand, that terrestrial bodies are always imperfect and are always trying to change, striving after new forms. So it must be recognized in that which concerns material things that superior intelligences receive, in the instant that they are formed, all the species and notions which are proper to them; whilst inferior intelligences are enriched daily by new notions. Besides it is necessary to explain why, if ideas are innate, human intelligence is ignorant of anything. This, it is said, is because the intellect in

⁹ *Hist. Lit. France*, Vol. 25, p. 215.

¹⁰ 3609, *Bib. Nat.*, Mazarin.

¹¹ Cf. Bernard of Chartres, Ch. XI, p. 173.

the body is like being in a dark prison and that it is bound to make great efforts to enjoy light and liberty.

To all this Bernard asks why; is the union of the body and soul a fact contrary to nature? It is impossible that a natural state prevents or at least hinders the operation, which the intelligence ought naturally to accomplish. There are no innate ideas.

Again, Avicenna had taught, that the ray of divine light is insufficient and had to be incessantly renewed. One of the separate intelligences, the least elevated in the hierarchy of eternal substances, is constantly occupied in pouring into souls the secrets of life and the mysteries of the law which governs all phenomena; Ideas have no other origin.

Then, said Bernard, observation is of no importance to the human intellect, and notions collected from individual things do not contribute to the form of general ideas; such indeed is obviously false.

Hence it must be declared with Aristotle and St. Thomas that the understanding has two movers, the external mover which presents the objects, and the internal mover which sees them and judges them; whence it follows that all ideas take their origin from sensation and are reduced into act by reason.

In some of his *Quodlibeta*, 1279-1287, he gives fuller treatment of the real distinction between essence and existence, than St. Thomas ever put together in a single passage.

William Mackelsfield, of Coventry, c. 1280, a Dominican professor at Oxford. He was one of the first Thomist writers and wrote *Contra Henricam de Gande quibus impugnat Thomam* and *Contra Corruptorum Thomae*.

Robert of Hereford, c. 1300, Dominican professor at Oxford, likewise wrote *Contra Dicta Henrici de Gande* and *Contra Primum Egidii*.

William de Hotun or Hozun or Hodon, d. 1298, was a Dominican. He became Provincial Prior of his Order and subsequently Bishop of Dublin, much to their displeasure. He wrote some *Questiones de Quodlibet*, c. 1280.¹²

With regard to prime matter, he held that it was a logical fiction. Matter created by God, which all senses attest as being concrete, is not numerically one; so many substances so many matters. But with regard to abstract matter (*essentia*) as matter and form are said to be two essences, this matter is but one, but such unity is

¹² 15805, *Bib. Nat.*, with G. d'Orleans, cf. p. 466.

not positive but privative, since in order to arrive at it, all plurality of forms must be extracted.

As to the soul, in so far as it is a separable substance, though not a separated substance, so it is the principle of life.

Thomas of Sutton, c. 1310, was a Dominican at Oxford who supported Thomism against Duns Scotus, though on certain points he held different views.

His works, which were thought to have been lost, have in recent years been discovered in MS. at Erfurt and consist according to both Ehrle (1913) and Pelster (1922) of the following: *De Unitate formae*, *De Productione formarum*, *De Pluritate formarum*, *Quodlibeta*, *Questiones disputatae*, *Thomas Anglicus contra primum Senti. J. Scoti*, *De Concordantia Librorum Thomae* (which according to the catalogue of Stams was included in the edition of St. Thomas' own works by Pius V in 1572), likewise three books of questions against the Franciscan Robert Cowton, contained in the *Codex Rossianus IX*, published at Venice, 1523, and no longer attributed to Thomas of Jorz (old form of York) (q.v., p. 248).

Thomas of Sutton stresses the pure passivity of both sensation and thought; both being according to him phenomena of receptivity alone.

He likewise stresses the possibility of the will in the sense that God is the "motor universalis" Who has placed in us the tendency to the good, so that liberty only effects the means of choice.

As against Duns Scotus, he maintains with St. Thomas that contingent futures have a "veritas determinata" for the Divine Knowledge, inasmuch as God knows them in the eternal vision of His Own Essence; and that this truth does not rest on the decree of the will calling them into existence.

Many of his allusions are identified as being directed against Henry of Gand and his opponent Geoffrey of Fontaines, though he does not mention them by name.

Nicholas Trivet, 1258-1328, an English Dominican who taught at Paris and Oxford, was a Thomist. He commented on the *De Consolatione Philosophiae* of Boethius^{13a} and on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard and on *Seneca*^{13b} and other classical works. He also wrote *Annales Sex Regum Angliae*^{13c} (1138-1307) and a Universal History, also *Quodlibeta* and *Questiones Disputatae*.

As to the distinction between *esse* and *essentia* he proposed that *esse* should be taken as the concrete subject with all its accidents and *essentia* its abstract nature.

¹³ B.M.R.L., a. 15A XXX, b. 15C XII, c. 13B VI, all fourteenth century.

The expression 'right as a Trivet' is said to have originally had reference to his accuracy.

Hervaeus Natalis (Hervé de Nedellec or Hervé le Breton), d. 1323, a Dominican was educated at the monastery of Morlaix and took his degrees in Paris. He became General of the Order of Dominicans in 1318 and died at Norbonne in 1323.

He wrote many works and was generally considered very learned, very subtle, but very unintelligible, but perhaps not so difficult as John de Bassoles. His chief works were *A Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, *Quodlibeta*, *De intentionibus secundis*, also essays, *De beatitudine*, *De verbo*, *De aeternitate mundi*, *De materia coeli*, and *De unitate formarum*, which have been printed, also four unedited treatises against the *Quodlibeta* of Henry of Gand.¹⁴

Though, of course, a Thomist, he does not hesitate to expand some of their doctrines in a more Nominalist direction, at the same time treating some of the propositions of Duns Scotus with considerable respect and reserve.

To begin with the question of univocal being, after showing that Duns Scotus and his followers did not really differ amongst themselves, though they did not accept each others' arguments, he declined to accept the advanced Nominalist view that this word 'being,' whether taken as univocal or equivocal, is simply the sign of a concept without basis. He maintained that all 'beings' are not one single 'being,' but since all are really 'beings,' 'being' is common to them although there is no common 'being.'

Hervé did not admit uninformed matter, he even declared that God could not have created it even had He wished. As to formalities said to divide common matter such as animality, humanity, things accidental in relation to univocal being, but essential as to individual being, Hervé denied their existence saying, "It is quite clear that no creature of God is universal, they are all singular, everything produced out from its cause, everything endowed with existence, is a singular. So that the 'formalities' of the Scotists do not signify God's creatures, they signify simply intellectual concepts though not mere arbitrary concepts. The general concepts, which represent the conformities between things, are not mere illusions of our imaginative powers, they are true notions, whose basis is the nature of things. There is no such real thing as humanity or animality."

Hervé, in defining 'word,' maintained that the species which it represents is certainly not the indeterminate notion of a natural substance; it is indeed an express species, *i.e.*, a formed thought

¹⁴ 3157, *Bib. Nat.*

' cogitatio formata ' whose efficient cause is the intellect or reason. Likewise the reason is the agent that is the producer of the word, the sign of this species ' Operatio intellectus est actio productiva verba.'

This shows that the objects of the word are not any sort of impressed species. In short the word, being definitive, enunciative and syllogistic, never explains a single thing but always a complex one in which simple things are contained.¹⁵

As to individuation, " The effective cause, which determines the plurality of things, either in respect of number, or in respect of species, is certainly the efficient cause.

The cause which makes them what they are, makes them many. If we speak of the internal principle, of the essential principle, of the numeric distinction, that which is this principle in each individual is its very essence ; it is by its own essence that each individual is distinguished from another both formally and intrinsically. But if we speak of the subjectively distinctive principle, it seems that all accidents, simultaneously actual, owe their plurality and their numeral distinction to their subjects.

Thus the external reason is the act of the Creator, and the internal reason is neither some quantity of matter, as St. Thomas said, nor an undefinable form as Duns Scotus said, nor some haecceity as his followers said, but simply the essence of the substance itself.

Hervé agreed with St. Thomas that the idea is only a simple relation between subject and object ; but St. Thomas had held that the first ideas were in fact not only relations, but species which intervene as partial causes in the formation of ideas of a higher degree, species really distinct both from the thing sensed and the subject sensing ; in short, conceptual subjects having the same genus of persistence as natural subjects.

Further, according to St. Thomas, the nature of the final concept produced by the intellect is really distinguished from the impressed species and from the act from which it derives its origin, and this distinction constitutes the subjective entity of an intellectual atom.

On the other hand, Hervé first deals with the simplicity of the human soul. It was usually held in the Franciscan School that substance is a quantity of matter determined, not by a single but by several forms, equally worthy of being called substantial.

Hervé denied this, as being wrongly attributed to Aristotle, and over and over again maintained, that each composite substance has only one substantial form and that this single form is the reasonable soul in man, the immortality of which is proclaimed

¹⁵ *Hist. Litt. de France*, Vol. XXXIV, p. 328.

by the conscience of the human genus ; and that other forms are accidental. Hervé does not claim that this soul moves without having been moved. Naturally, it is in potentiality to act, but it will not act until it has received the impact of an external agent. From this external agent comes the impressed species, the foundation of the express species, or from the idea which forthwith effects the intellect already in action. Hervé continues, " It is falsely claimed that the idea indicates formally a relation ; formally the idea indicates the form which it represents. This form is not formally a relation, it is in some way the foundation of the relation which is the consequence of it. If then it is sometimes said that the idea is something relative, it is necessary to understand that it does not mean a formal relation, that the idea is not formally a relation, but that it is the foundation of the relation which follows. In short, neither the idea nor the exemplary form, nor this intelligible image existing in the intellect, which we call the intelligible species, are formally relations ; they are the foundations of relations."

As to truth, Hervé maintained, that if truth is not in a soul subjectively, it is at least there objectively. But this truth is not sensible species, nor intelligible species ; it is properly a relation, the relation of conformity, which ought to exist between the species and the things outside, whilst the foundation of this relation is the concept of the species.

Thus truth is not with regard to this foundation an ' other ' subject, it is an objective relation.

As to the distinction between the subjectivity of ideas and the objectivity of relations, Hervé said, " the ideas are in the soul of particularly determined subjects, as spiritual essences, but the relation of these ideas with the things outside is simply objective, to these ideas they are stable foundations of fugitive modalities. From this it is easy to see the vanity and non-reality of these foundations, the first and second ' intentions ' being only objective modalities of a single subject, the intellect, the thinking subject."¹⁶

Hervé held that it was impossible to form a definition of God by abstraction. Every first notion has for term its object. From this acquired notion the intellect sets up various relations, which are second notions with regard to the first. Of what order will the notion of this divine quiddity be ? It cannot be preceded by any other ; there is no object from which the elementary knowledge can gather what is the proper essence of God. Consequently it is not abstracted. Further, an abstracted notion, taken in itself, evidently proves nothing as to existence ; it affirms the possibility, not the actuality, of its object.

¹⁶ Cf., Ch. XX, p. 281, Ch. XXIV, p. 487, Ch. XXV, p. 508.

In this way reason conceives abstractively some nature, but such conceived nature may be a simple name only. What then will prove that it belongs effectively, as subject or predicate, to the order of actual things? The intuitive notion will be the sole proof of the existence of actuality. So that the true knowledge of the real God is not given to us in this light and all that we know and all that we conceive of this Supreme Essence comes to us not from knowledge, but from Faith.

John of Naples, c. 1315, was a Dominican, who was educated at Paris; he wrote *Questiones Diverses*, published at Naples in 1618.

As to truth, he declared that there are three sorts of opinion which may be had in mind.¹⁷ The first opinion is that truth, properly so called, is the quidditative entity of everything naturally determined. And the question is to know what is this entity in the human understanding. It is there objectively as a truth less than real verity. The second opinion defines truth, as the conformity of the thing to its eternal exemplar; even as the truth of the natural thing is conformed to the idea of the Divine Intellect, so the truth perceived by the human intellect is conformed, it is said, to the truth of the natural thing. Being then the entity of the thing in perfect relation with the reason of being, with the efficient cause of this thing, the truth can be considered as an act alike subjective in the Divine Intellect and in the human intellect. Thirdly, it is said that the truth taken formally is the conformity of the thing, inasmuch as it is a thing in itself, to this very thing, inasmuch as it is thought by the intellect.

The third opinion regards truth under two different modes, primarily as being in nature, secondly as being in the intellect. According to this last definition, truth is not some entity possessing existence in the bosom of the soul, but it is a sort of relation of the thing to this very thing, as it is thought, and this relation seems to be a being of reason and not a real being.

(It may be noted that of these three definitions of truth the first is Nominalist, the second Realist and the third that of Hervé.)

John of Naples rejected the first, and combined the second and third to establish this proposition: If the truth is in the Divine Intellect as a determining principle of that which is to be a created thing, and in this subsequently created thing as a principle determining abstractions, which the human intellect ought to make, the truth is everywhere, in nature really, and in the intellect formally. But to be formally is not said of a

¹⁷ Cf. Ch. XX, p. 296.

simple relation : all formal being is an actual subject, in the same way as all real being, it is thus not true that truth has in one and the other intellect only an objective manner of being ; it is necessary to say that it resides there subjectively.

This is a curious passage ! As Hauréau remarks, in seeking to establish one fiction John sets up another ; which is more unreliable the real or the formal entity of truth ?

Durand de St. Pourçain, d. 1332. *Doctor Resolutissimus*. Was born at St. Pourçain in Auvergne. He was a Dominican educated in Paris, where he became a Doctor in 1313.

After being Head of the Sacred Palace at Rome under Clement V and John XXII, he became Bishop of Limour in 1317, of Puy-en-Velay in 1318, and of Meaux in 1326.

It is possible that William of Occam may have been one of his pupils in Paris, but it is clear that he could not have been his teacher as some have suggested, as William of Occam did not begin to shine in Paris until 1320.

His chief work was a *Commentary on the Sentences*,¹⁸ printed at Antwerp in 1576. Breaking with the realism of St. Thomas Aquinas he anticipated the Terminism of William of Occam.

As to Universals, Durand held that the active intellect, considered as an external mover, was a pure fiction ; and that considered as an internal mover our intellect, as an artisan of our ideas, has not the slightest action on things outside. Universality in things does not exist, all are born singular.

Against the doctrine of St. Thomas as to individuation, he maintained that if nothing exists universally, the sole principle of being of all individual existence is the external mover, which produces and which places all actually determined substances among the number of beings.

As against the Scotists, the Thomists argue that form is naturally universal, whilst matter is not ; and that it is more easy to distinguish two individuals in relation to their matter, than in relation to their form ; but Durand said that this is not so and one could even prove that it is less so, as Angels have no matter yet doubtless they exist individually. However it is true that to attribute a primordial individuality to matter, one must suppose it to be previously determined by quantity.

Durand insisted that it was all nonsense to make any such supposition, upon which their whole argument rested. The subject of quantity is not matter, it is the whole composite of matter and form, and this subject is naturally determined by its own quiddity, before receiving the additional determination of

¹⁸ B.M.R.L., lib. iii and iv, 9E XIII, fourteenth century.

quantity. Hence quantity is not of itself the principle of determination, which is being sought for. Durand denied that the two Thomistic propositions, that quantity taken as belonging to the very definition of the individual, and definite quantity, are not intrinsic modes, but modes concomitant with substance.

He argued against them as follows: "in the first place, things, which constitute only a single thing, have the same principles (*sic*). But the universal nature and individual or single nature are, as things only, the one and the same thing, and differ only according to reason, the species signifying in an indeterminate manner that which the individual represents in a determined manner. It is evident that this determination and this indetermination mean the one an essence, the other a concept, the unity of the universal being only based on the concept, and that of the singular on the real essence of this singular: indeed, on the one hand, the intellect produces the universal, and on the other, the act of the natural agent terminates in the singular. So that the quiddity and the individuality have the same principle, from the point of view of the reality of things, and differ only according to reason.

Secondly, that which can be taken as being and which can be said of objects themselves, does not indicate a thing which happens to join itself to the object of which it is said.

But individual being is not, from the point of view of reality, anything else than being (since amongst external things all are individuals or singulars), so that individual being is not a thing, which goes and joins itself to some subject, but is the mode of being necessary to all that exists. Socrates is an individual, by that which makes him existing, and that which makes him existing is the extrinsic mover; the agent which produces the singular being is singular itself. For even as the act comes from an individual thing, so does it produce a thing individually determined. This matter, this form, these are the two intrinsic elements of substance. If it is asked, by what this form is this, the answer is, that it is this by that which has given it being, that is to say, by the extrinsic mover.

As to the matter, it is 'this,' by its necessary union with the form, no natural form being able to exist separated from matter. So that it is not necessary to go and look for principles of individuation outside nature, outside natural principles, but it is necessary to understand that the common species and the individual take being to themselves from one and the same essence, and differ only as a concept from a reality."¹⁹

"It was St. Thomas who stressed the importance of this

¹⁹ II, *Sent.*, III, 2.

investigation of individuality, because individuality itself is nothing else than the first degree of being."

Finally, Durand sums up his opinion on intellection. The intellect is a reflexive power, it knows itself and knows what is in it with certainty, and so to speak in an experimental manner. So that we know by experience what we think, and that we have in us the principle of our thought. Hence, if there were in our intellect certain species as are supposed, it seems that we shall be able to know with certainty that they are there, even as we distinguish with certainty other things that happen to be there, such as our acts and habitual dispositions. But there are not any. So that it appears that they do not exist any more in the intellect, than species, intended to represent objects, exist in the sensible organs.

Armand de Beauvoir, c. 1334, a Provençal. He was a Dominican and Thomist and took his degree at Paris in 1334 and was afterwards made Head of the School of the Sacred Palace in Rome by Benedict XII. His chief work was a dictionary entitled *Declaratio difficultum terminorum tam theologialium quam philosophiae ac logicae*, which dealt chiefly with logical definitions and was published at Cologne in 1502. He with Peter de la Palu examined the opinions of Pope John XXII made before he became Pope (see below).

Gratia dei D'Ascoli, c. 1320, a Dominican, logician and physician. He was a Thomist and wrote a Commentary on Aristotle's logic called *Commentaria Super totam artem Veterem*, published at Venice, 1493, which is often quoted. As to Universals, he was more inclined to the Platonic or Scotist views than the Thomist.

Peter de la Palu, 1280-1342, a Dominican and Thomist, afterwards became Patriarch of Jerusalem.

He commented on the *Sentences*.

As a good theologian and a strong Papist he acquired a good knowledge of the various schools of thought, which he used to enforce his arguments, without himself contributing anything special to their views. He was a member of the Commission appointed by John XXII to examine the opinions of Olivi and also of the Commission at Vincennes in 1333 which examined the views of John XXII as to the Beatific Vision.

Robert Holcot, d. 1349, a Dominican and strong Nominalist, even for a Thomist. He was an Englishman of Holcot in

Robert Holcot et al. Sententiarum

Northamptonshire, who taught at Cambridge; he was a friend of Richard of Bury, Bishop of Durham, and is thought by some to have written the latter's *Philobiblion*. He wrote a Commentary on the *Liber Sapientiae*,²⁰ and *Quæstiones de Sententiis*,²¹ published at Lyons, 1497, and some twenty other works.²² He held that there were two orders of truth, natural truth and the real truth; so that philosophy was not bound to come to the same conclusions as theology.

In comparing complex ideas with simple ideas, which terminate in the perception of a single object, he distinguished two ideas of certainty and placed simple ideas in the first place.

He also endeavoured to reduce the value of all complex notion to that of opinion purely subjective.

John of Capreolus, 1380-1444, a Dominican educated at Paris and Toulouse, who then went to Rodez where he had been born. He was a strong Thomist and wrote *Libri defensorum Theologiae Divi Thomae de Aquino*, which won for him the title "Princeps Thomistarum."²³ In this book he quotes the works of Bernard of Auvergne and Thomas Bradwardine²⁴ (*q.v.*); it is a defence against the objections of Peter Aureolus, Scotus, Durandus, John of Ripa, Henry of Gand, William of Ware, Adam Marsh and others. He attributed St. Thomas' adhesion to the doctrine of Determined Dimensions to that of his doctrine as to the Unity of Substantial Forms.

He traces the controversies of the last two centuries and compares Thomism with both Scotism and Occamism.

He was called the prince of theologians.

Dominic of Flanders, d. 1500, a Dominican who taught the *Metaphysics*, *Posterior Analytics* and *De Anima* of Aristotle at Bologna. He was a Thomist and wrote a *Summa Divinae Philosophiae*. He was called the prince of philosophers.

Peter of Brussels or Peter Crockaert, c. 1509, a Dominican of Paris who was at first a Terminist but afterwards became a Thomist. He was the teacher of Francis of Vittoria. He wrote in an elegant style and commented on the works of Aristotle and the *De Ente et Essentia* of St. Thomas.

Franciscus Sylvester, 1474-1528, of Ferrara, a Dominican who

²⁰ B.M.R.L., 2D V, f. 160, fourteenth century.

²¹ B.M.R.L., 10C VI, f. 7, fourteenth century.

²² Cf., Quétif and Echard, *Scrip. Ord. Praed.*, 1, 629-32.

²³ Printed Venice, 1484, 1514, 1588.

²⁴ *Hist. Litt. de France*, Vol. 25, p. 207.

was Regent at Bologna and became General of his Order. His chief work was *In Lib. St. Thomae de Aquino contra Gentes Comment.* He also wrote on the Posterior Analytics and likewise a treatise against Luther. According to him, "the note of the Infinite consist of the identity of the Essence and Existence."

Thomas de Vio Cajetan, 1469–1534, a Dominican educated at Padua, Pavia and Rome. He became a Cardinal, 1517, Bishop of Gaeta, 1519, where he had been born, and Legate in Hungary. His chief works were Commentaries on the *Summa Theologica* and the *De Enti et Essentia* of St. Thomas; also on the *Categories*, *Posterior Analytics* and *De Anima* of Aristotle, and two treatises *De Analogia Nominum* and *De Sensu Agente et Sensibilibus*.

He exercised great influence on Vittoria, the founder of the Thomist School at Salamanca. He was the originator of the idea of 'substantial modes' in which he was followed by Suarez (q.v.).

Francis of Vittoria, 1480–1546, a Dominican who studied at Paris under Peter of Brussels or Crockaert. He taught at Salamanca where he founded a school of Thomism. He wrote a *Summa Theologica*.

Dominicus de Soto, 1494–1560, a Dominican who taught at Salamanca, 1552–1560, after Melchior Canus (see below). At Paris he had studied Nominalism, but Thomism was the basis of his philosophy, though it was influenced by the Terminism of Buridan (q.v., p. 599).

He commented on the works of Aristotle and the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas.

Melchior Canus, 1509–1560, a Dominican, first a Professor of Alcala and afterwards successor of Francis of Vittoria at Salamanca, 1546–1552. He wrote *De Locis Theologicis* and a Commentary on the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas.

His followers were Bartholomaeus of Medina, d. 1581; Dominicus Bannez, d. 1604, and John of St. Thomas, 1589–1644, a professor of Alcala and Salamanca.

Other Dominicans of this period who commented on the works of St. Thomas were Sylvester Prierias, d. 1523, John of Ochoa, d. 1566, Bernard Bongeaud, d. 1574, Hannaeus, d. 1578, and Luke Carboni, d. 1597.

CHAPTER XXIV

THOMISTS OTHER THAN DOMINICANS

Humbert of Gendrey, d. 1298, Cistercian—Siger of Brabant, d. 1281/4, Sorbonne—Geoffrey of Fontaines, d. 1304, Sorbonne—Peter of Auvergne, d. 1305, Paris—Girard de Nogent, c. 1270, Sorbonne—James of Viterbo, d. 1308, Augustinian—Giles of Rome, d. 1316, Augustinian—Alphonso of Toledo, c. 1345, Augustinian—John Dumbelton, d. 1317, Oxford—James of Douai, c. 1320—Gerard of Bologna, c. 1295, Carmelite—Raould the Breton, c. 1320, Sorbonne—John of Pouilli, c. 1320, Sorbonne—John of Jandun, c. 1320, Col. Navarre, Paris—Augustin of Ancona, d. 1328, Augustinian—Thomas of Bailly, d. 1328, Paris—Guy of Terrien, d. 1342, Carmelite—Henry of Herford, d. 1370—Peter of Rivo, d. 1472, Louvain—Henry of Gorcum, d. 1431, and others of Cologne—Petrus Fouseca, d. 1594, Jesuit—Louis Molina d. 1600, Jesuit—Franciscus Toletus, c. 1569—Gabriel Vasquez, d. 1604.

Humbert of Gendrey, d. 1298, Abbot of Prulli (Pruth), was a Cistercian monk. He wrote glosses on the *Metaphysics*¹ and on the *De Anima* of Aristotle and on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard. Up to this time the Cistercians had taken no active part in the Nominalist and Realist discussions, not advancing beyond the unreflective line taken by St. Bernard. But Abbot Humbert was a disciple of St. Albertus Magnus and St. Thomas Aquinas, though where they differed his preference was always in favour of the former. It was through him that the whole Order of Cistercians from henceforth became imbued with a moderate and conciliatory spirit towards Nominalism.

Siger of Brabant, 1235–1281/4, was a “Regent Hospes” or “Socius” of the Sorbonne and a Canon of St. Martin of Liège.

It was generally customary to identify him with the Siger who was said to be Dante’s teacher in Paris and who is represented by Dante in his *Paradiso*, X, 136, as being a close acquaintance of St. Thomas Aquinas and his illustrious circle in Paradise; but according to Wulf this confusion has now been dispelled; nor was this Siger the Siger of Courtrai, d. 1341.

His Averroist opinions were controverted by St. Albertus Magnus in 1269 and the same were condemned at the Synod of Paris in 1277. He was assassinated by his clerk who went mad.

¹ 746. Arsenal, *Bib. Nat.*

His chief work is *De Anima Intellectiva*;² whilst adopting the teaching of Aristotle, he proceeds to add new explanations of his own.

According to Siger, the soul is the intellect and the vegetative and sensitive souls are only so called by analogy.

Since man lives, feels, and thinks, the diversity of these acts shows the plurality of form united in the human person; but these forms, usually all called souls, are not all of the same nature.

Sensibility and vegetability are attributes of the body, whilst the intelligence is that which it is, of itself by itself.

It is said to be the form of the body, but it is better to say that it is united to the body, without abdicating anything of its individuality. (This is Plato, not Aristotle.)

It is wrong, with St. Albertus Magnus, to say that the soul is life and in all the manifestations of life that it is the same soul acting according to different modes.

St. Thomas is inaccurate in having distinguished act from potentiality of the soul, for he goes on to disunite body and potentiality, but has united act and body.

The intelligence, the intellective soul, in a word the soul, is, both in act and potentiality, a substance, which is wrongly defined as separable from the body; it should be said to be always separated, as much in this life as after this life. Of course, the intellect thinks by means of the body, but that does not mean that the intellect and the body are really united. The body is not the subject of the soul, in relation to the soul the body is the object.

This opinion of Siger has been described as "spiritualism which is strictly dogmatic."

To the objection that the substantial disunion of the two elements of the composite prevents form from individualizing matter, so that matter must be essentially one, he declares that there is no universal matter. Any notion of universal indeterminate matter, genus, and species, apart from the individuals which compose them, are but pure notions, abstracted from things, yet in no way conformed to the essence of things.

The principle of individuation is not internal but external.

Such individual matter receives such individual form and such individual substance is created. If Plato and Socrates have the same form, that only proves that the act of the creator of such a substance has invested with such an identical form such and such diverse matters. Neither matter nor form exist on a common basis, other than that of the generator principle.

² 16133, *Bib. Nat.*

Geoffrey of Fontaines or *Godefroid*, d. 1304, of the Sorbonne, Chancellor of the University of Paris, became Canon of Liège, Paris, and Cologne, and then Bishop of Tournai in 1300.

In his *Quodlibeta* he reviews the various phrases employed in philosophy and declares that the multiplication of names in no way increases the number of substances.

For him *esse* and *essentia*, being and essence mean the same thing, though one has sometimes more force than the other they both mean "being" taken in itself. "Being only involves potentiality of becoming. As potentiality must have a subject, that subject is called 'being.'

Is it perchance matter, which is still indeterminate matter, which has not yet received from the form that act which gives it essence? Is this only a fiction? To take the case of fire, the being of fire, is said to correspond to the word fire, taken absolutely, without any acceptance of quality intrinsic or extrinsic; essence of fire is said to be the fire, which burns and which obtains this property of burning from the form joined to the potentiality. But if this is so, where is there a fire that does not burn, the thing deprived of its substantial form? As this cannot be done, it leads him to the conclusion that the generation of 'being' and of essence take place simultaneously in the bosom of the subject, and that in a word all the realist distinctions as to 'being' and essence are purely abstract.

Since 'being' is not before essence, the universals taken in themselves likewise become simple points of view taken by the intellect.

If the universals had been in nature, then the most universal of the universals would have 'being,' so that all things in nature would be but one 'being' in reality, which was what Parmenides declared. But this is false.

He then deals with those species called '*Entia Specialia*'; these do not determine 'being,' but are rather determinations. So that the notion of genus is never contained in that which determines the genus in the species, *e.g.*, animal being outside of the notion of reasonable. But 'being' cannot be outside the notion of something; then 'being' is not a thing in itself, even when this word is used to indicate a collection of things. Being is not, however, purely equivocal, it is analogous, since there exists between all beings an analogy, a harmonic relation, an order not less essential than conceptual; indeed both actually according to reality and also according to intelligence most beings are in a reciprocal dependence."³

However he was quite clear that this negation of 'being' in itself

³ *Quod.*, II, iii, 1.

does not affect the great principles on which science and the social order depended.

But if things subsist individually, how is the production of this universal concept explained, which comes from things without being conformed to the nature of things? Does the active intellect modify the nature of things, before transmitting the notion to the passive intellect, or is it an operation exercised on the phantom, or impressed species, that the active intellect transforms this particular species into the universal species?

Geoffrey of Fontaines refuses these explanations emphatically. Things are what they are, and the active intellect exercises no control over them. As to these concepts they come from things according to the process proper to it, the intellect conceives universally that which subsists individually. The senses provide the sensations, and the intellect forms the abstractions, and that is all that God has permitted us to know concerning the generation of ideas.

According to Geoffrey the Realists maintain that individuation was by an individuant form, which caused part of the substantial form to disappear. But Geoffrey would have nothing of what he termed accidental individuation. If individuality comes from this form then matter is universal and all individuals subsist in the bosom of the same being. St. Thomas had said that individuation could not come from an external principle, but one of the two elements of the substance carried with it that which individualized it or determined it, and that, determined by this concomitant quality, this element is, with regard to the other, the subject of all information; so that the individuality comes from the matter, but from matter naturally and necessarily circumscribed and limited by some quantity, some magnitude. This was another error. Such quantity in fact is nothing more than an accident. One can never make a substantial difference from an accident.

Geoffrey de Fontaines held that one ought to define substance, as being that which subsists by itself and that there was no room for investigation, whence comes that which corresponds to the definition of an individual. The individual is that which is, under all relations, by the act which produces it in the number of substances.

“*Res Communiter non existunt*,” there is no existence common to things, so that neither of the two elements of the Substance can be taken as a non-different.

But if neither is a non-different why enquire whence comes the difference?

That which constitutes the difference is the individuality. Were it accidental it would be necessary that it appears on the

surface of a common substance. But there is no common substance, so that the individuality is not adventitious, that is to say, posterior to the generation of a matter from a common form.

In two words, individuality proceeds neither from matter nor form, but is the natural necessary condition of all informed matter, and its principle is the very act which produces a substance out of nothing.

As to the Divine Ideas, Geoffrey first established that there are three modes of being for things : in nature *esse reale*, in the human mind *esse diminutum*, in the Divine Intellect *esse in causis*, *esse in potentia*.

Things considered in potentiality are not in any predicament, since such supposes substance and substance existence. Since ideas are before things, they are not things, so that they are not some sort of entity, for the terms thing, substance, essence, and entity are synonymous.

Both Dominicans and Franciscans did not agree to this. Before a thing exists there can be nothing more than knowledge of its future existence. He denied that the Divine Essence, with reference to certain ideal causes, is the exemplary form by which the essences of creatures are what they are, so far as they are real, that is to say, certain examples realized, as it is claimed, from all eternity, before these creatures exist ; it is simply the exemplary form, which, His Will lending its assistance, attributes simultaneously to creatures being, which corresponds to essence, and being which corresponds to existence, otherwise one could not say that God made anything. Indeed one ought not to call nothing an essence true real quidditive and predicable.

The views of Geoffrey of Fontaines were adopted by John of Pouilli, Guy of Terrien and John Baconsthorp (*q.v.*).

Peter of Auvergne, d. 1305, was a pupil of St. Thomas Aquinas and Rector of the University of Paris in 1275, and was made a Canon in 1301.

He was held to have completed and commented on various works by St. Thomas Aquinas, and on the *De Coelo et Mundo*, *Meteorologica*, *De Animalia*, etc., and other less well-known works of Aristotle. By Denfle he has been identified with *Peter de Croc* or *Peter du Cros*.

Girard de Nogent, c. 1270, of the Sorbonne, wrote various Questiones on the *Analytics*, *Categories*, and *Metaphysics* of Aristotle. For the most part he followed in the footsteps of Peter of Auvergne as a strict follower of St. Thomas Aquinas.

James of Viterbo, d. 1308, *Doctor Spectulativus*, was an Augustinian monk.

The Order of Augustinians established itself in Paris in 1259 (cf. p. 486). James was the first of their Order who was a philosopher. He afterwards became Archbishop of Benevento and then of Naples. He was a great admirer of St. Thomas Aquinas, though in some ways he preferred the teachings of Henry of Gand.

In his *Quodlibeta*⁴ he argues that :

As to 'being,' whilst not admitting the reality of being in general, he even maintained that the simple idea of an indivisible whole is not in the human intellect. "The word 'being' has a concept formed by analogy from a mode of 'being' proper to all things : it is not the concept of these multiple 'beings' under the form of a single 'being.' It is not an abstraction, it is only a word, an empty word."

Further, he denied the actuality of genus and species of themselves, *secundum se*, for they cannot be defined as parts of essence. Even essence taken in itself is not to be said of a real subject.

Consequently, genus and species are not potential parts of this essence. Essence being here represented by multiple 'beings,' genus and species follow it in the condition of transformed essence, so that in the abstract genus and species divide essence, but in the concrete 'beings' are subjects to which genus and species owe their existence.

Again, there are no innate ideas in the mind, but Aristotle's expression that the passive intellect is like a polished table requires elucidation.

"If one says that the soul resembles a polished table on which in act nothing has been written, it is necessary to add that the soul is always in act, intelligent. There is, it is true, a certain incomplete act, called natural potentiality, or an aptitude, which could in a way be called a mode of 'being,' but that is not acquired, it is a natural gift born simultaneously with the soul. 'Actus non acquisitus, sed naturaliter inditus et animae connaturalis.' Moreover, the soul is not said to be in potentiality in respect of this act ; it is not in potentiality in respect of a complete act.

As to our means of knowledge, these are our reason and external things. It cannot be denied that the original aptitude of our reason comes from God, nor admitted that God has formed us in such a way that we should always think the false and never the true. On the other hand, as regards external things, no doubt one does not suppose that the Author of things has given Himself the strange pleasure of making us see things which are not. Thus all

⁴ 15362, *Bib. Nat.*

the perishable works of God bear the impress of His eternal ideas, creatures, which affect our senses, reveal the creative thought to our reason, itself created in the expectation of this revelation."

Giles of Rome (Aegidius Colonna), d. 1316, *Doctor Fundatissimus*, an Augustinian, Prior of his Order in Rome, 1284, General of his Order, 1292, Archbishop of Bourges, 1295, Primate of Gaul, 1296.

He was the chief cause of the Augustinian Order (founded 1255, sometimes called Servites), becoming strict followers of moderate Nominalism. His teachings, adopted by a General Assembly of the Order at Florence in 1287, remained binding upon them for several centuries.

He was the author of over sixty works, including *Questiones*;⁵ his *De Regimine Principum* was ordered to be translated into French by Philip III, King of France. He was a fervent interpreter and apologist of St. Thomas Aquinas.

He maintained that matter deprived of form is only in potentiality of becoming: it does not exist. That which gives the act, the existence, to matter is form. With the arrival of form, matter becomes. The first subject is matter, but the first substance is this man, this horse, a composite. No doubt there are simple substances in the order of eternal or Divine things, but in the order of natural things subject to experience and in the order of natural-born things, there is none.

A composite is composed of matter and form. Matter can become this or that, it is form which actualizes, vivifies, animates, moves, to first and all future acts such and such quantity of matter, determined by such and such magnitude.

Quantity is an accidental form, the arrival of an accidental form cannot precede the act which produces being, consequently no subject is actual before it is actualized by the substantial form. To be this substance it is necessary to be, but as it is impossible to be without being this substance, the accidental form necessarily accompanies matter at the moment when matter becomes; and if the act of the substantial form is that by which a thing is, the matter, which becomes, has become this thing only by its quantity, its concomitant form, and since there is nothing which can be either this or that, one can, one must, maintain that the individuating principle of substance as regards substantial form, that is the specific form, is the matter singularly determined by the quantity.

This is one of the propositions of St. Thomas Aquinas censured by Bishop Tempier at the Provincial Council held in Paris in

⁵ B.M.R.L., 10C VIII, 9B III, fourteenth century.

1277, which Giles expressly states he hopes one day will be wisely amended.

But he was driven out of Paris in 1281 and only allowed by Honorius IV to return on making a retraction in 1285, according to Mahieu, not only as to individuation by matter but also as to a single substantial form.

He rejected both the Platonic and Aristotelian views as to universals, the 'species abstracta' is called a universal because it refers to a plurality of individuals, it is not predicated of them, but because it is that in which the individuals are similar. Both the *esse essentia* and the *esse universalitatis* are mere *esse rationis*, existing only in the consideration of the mind, the latter is an object of the first 'intention' and the former of the second 'intention.'⁶

As to verity, Giles declares that there are three: Logical truth, which is in the human mind; Real truth, which exists in things; and the Absolute truth, which is in God.⁷

This proposition as to truth was substituted for the proposition of essences by Richard of Middleton.⁸

Its faculties, he held, were accidents of the soul.

As to the Beatific Vision, however, he held this to lie in the satisfaction of the Will rather than in that of the Intellect.

Alfonso of Toledo, c. 1345, an Augustinian, was a follower of Giles of Rome. He wrote a Commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard.

John Dumbleton, c. 1320, died after 1349, was educated at Merton College, Oxford, of which he became a fellow. He wrote a *Summa Logicae et Naturalis Philosophiae*⁹ in ten books, and other of his works are contained in MSS. 32 and 195 at Magdalen and 306 at Merton Colleges, Oxford.

Preferring Aristotle to Anaxagoras or Plato, he appears to have been a strict Thomist, though exhibiting the love of sophistry for which Oxford became notorious after the advent of William of Occam.

James of Douai, c. 1320; of this author no particulars appear to be known. But he wrote a treatise *De Anima*¹⁰ which shows him to have been a Thomist.

He denied the existence of innate ideas. Intelligence is, said he, naturally deprived of all notion, it is a faculty which another

⁶ Cf. Ch. XXIII, p. 473.

⁸ Cf. Ch. XXV, p. 525.

¹⁰ 14698, f. 36, *Bib. Nat.*

⁷ Cf. Ch. XX, p. 296.

⁹ 16146, *Bib. Nat.*

actualizes, and that other faculty, whose operations necessarily receive those of intelligence, is sensation itself determined by the presence of an external object.

As to certainty of knowledge, he recognized that the internal sense is always certain to have felt, always certain to have collected, some notion of the sensible object, but that nevertheless the intelligence can and ought to have doubts about the conformity of this notion with the object. Indeed, we perceive things not such as they are, but such as we have a disposition to perceive them "secundum naturam recipientis."

As to universals properly so called, they do not exist as they are conceived, these abstracts do not resemble anything which actually exists. It is true, that substance is the term of generation, yet this term is not a simple substance, it is substance accompanied by dimensions and accidents. Substance is not brought into existence in the bosom of nature without any dimension, and as dimensions and accidents individualize substance, all such substance is individual and not universal.

Although a thing may be in itself what it is independently of individuating principles, yet it does not exist in nature apart from such principles.

That is why in nature nothing exists except individually.

Gerard of Bologna, d. 1317, a Doctor of the University of Paris, was a Carmelite, of which Order he became Prior General in 1297. He wrote a Gloss on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, a *Summa Theologica* and *Questiones et Quodlibeta*.¹¹

Up to his time, the Carmelites, who claim to have been instituted by the prophet Elias, had concerned themselves but little with philosophy. Gerard, who was a Thomist, however, came to be looked up to by them as he was the first of their number, who had obtained a Doctorate of Theology in the University of Paris.

He was teacher of John Baconsthorp (cf. Chap. XXVII, p. 586).

In the *Quodlibeta*, Gerard states that the unity of genus or species is not a real thing.

Unity is a word used to express four different notions; unity by analogy, unity of genus, unity of species, and unity of the individual substance, numerical unity. But only the last is real, because it alone has for its subject a certain quantity of matter. To admit the reality of species and genus would logically involve the admission of the reality of the most general of genus, 'being,' and thus to suppose that 'being' is common to the Creator and the creature, which is a manifest impiety.

¹¹ 17485, *Bib. Nat.*

Aristotle is not to be held responsible for such an opinion, according to him, it is simply by analogy that 'being' is said both of the Creator and creature, 'being' in general not being anything real at all and also being divisible. This is in accordance with the tenets of St. Thomas, but on the other hand, he does not always follow him too closely.

Thus in dealing with matter in potentiality, he maintains that to say that the numerical one can be in many, the one must be considered as not being actual, but in potentiality, for in that state it has not the differences by which it differs in each of the individuals; that is to say because the individual differences are absent and lack the forms in which the plurality is found.

The common or universal forms are 'beings' in potentiality, that is why to know a thing, in so far as it is universal, is to know it in potentiality.

So that the community that is conceived proper to common forms is only in potentiality outside the mind. But this community, which is conceived as proper to matter, is pure privation, for it is conceived only by depriving it of all individual forms; so that the matter thus conceived does not exist outside the mind; outside the mind it exists only in so far as it is common to all generable and corruptible individuals.

If there is anything by which the matter differs from non-being, it is in so far as, apart from the mind, it is some 'being' subject to sensible individuals.

Such is the true idea of matter; Aristotle has not said so anywhere, but it is the true meaning to attach to his words.

He disagreed with the opinion of St. Thomas as to mental species, rendered necessary to explain the succession of thoughts in the absence of things which are their objects; he maintained that either the presence or the memory of an object was sufficient to enable the intellect to act.

Raoul the Breton, c. 1320, a Secular. Particulars of this author seem to be unknown, though perhaps he may be identified with a Head of the Sorbonne of that name, 1315-1320, upon whom John XXII bestowed several preferments.

There are extant copies of his Commentaries on the *Analytics Topics*, *Soul*, and *Physics* of Aristotle; and on the *De Divisione* of Boethius and on the *Six Principles* of Gilbert de la Porrée.

From his writings it appears that he was a Thomist and opposed to the teachings of Duns Scotus.

He maintained that genus is a concept, without foundation, without hypostasis; that if genus were a thing, the form of this thing would be the same as that of its species; that species

deprived of their forms would be confounded with genus from which they are not materially distinct; and that individuals would disappear in the train of species by being confounded in the bosom of a uniform whole, in the bosom of a common matter, essentially determined by a common form.

But if they are not things, they are in things, though not as essential predicates; they actualize the individual subject and thus in this respect they are one of the two elements of substance, but they are not substances, substances exist of themselves, whilst universals having only a dependent existence are united to matter in the bosom of their common subject. He admits of two universals, 'causalitate' and 'prædicationi,' that is to say the universal object of the notion and the universal existing as notion in the mind.¹²

John of Pouilli, in Picardy, c. 1320, of the Sorbonne, wrote *Quodlibeta*.¹³ His works were condemned at Avignon in 1323.

Many of the questions propounded in these questions and answers appear to be very subtle and frivolous, but seemed to be merely inserted to explain what a waste of time it would be to try and find a solution for them!

Yet, he cannot be termed a sceptic nor mystic, he was perfectly convinced that all 'beings' of themselves, which are outside the intellect are particulars, for universal 'beings' exist forsooth only as concepts. He refused to accept the tenets of St. Thomas Aquinas with regard to intermediaries of intellection or any other intermediaries of sensation. On the other hand, he condemned the Scotist theory of Will. On the whole he favoured the views of Geoffrey of Fontaines.

He was a determined opponent of all Dominicans, especially Hervæus Natalis (cf., Chap. XXIII, p. 471).

John of Jandun, c. 1320, a Master of Arts of the College of Navarre, in Paris, was not a monk, nor even a secular priest. He wrote numerous commentaries on the *Physics*, *Heaven and Earth*, *Soul*, and *Metaphysics* of Aristotle, and on the *De Substantia Orbis* of Averroes.¹⁴

For some reason which it is not necessary to go into he became involved in the dispute between King Louis of Bavaria and Pope John XXII, taking the side of Louis; this resulted in the end in his being excommunicated by the Pope, so that he had to flee; and he died in exile.

¹² *Hist. Litt. de France*, Vol. 36, p. 175.

¹³ 15372, *Bib. Nat.*

¹⁴ Printed at Venice, 1488, 1575 and 1586.

According to him, Aristotle was the greatest Philosopher ; Averroes the next ; and St. Thomas Aquinas was the best interpreter of Aristotle.

John of Jandun argued, against the views put forward by Averroes as to the unity of 'being,' that this would lead to the supposition that the world is but a concept, as Parmenides had held.

He strenuously denied that matter ever existed without form.

As to the native individuality of souls, he fails to find any philosophical argument in their favour, but maintains that, by faith only, we know that they are individual. He insisted, however, with St. Thomas, in the unity of the soul, and denied that the sensitive is separated from the intellectual soul. Again, though this would seem to show logically that the soul perishes with the body, yet, by an act of faith, we believe the contrary.

John of Jandun has sometimes been described as an Averroist, for he considered Averroes the best commentator of Aristotle ; but all this but clearly shows that though he was forced to note the arguments of Averroes, on whose works he commented, yet it in no way effected his true faith in this respect.

At Padua there were a succession of Averroists who supported his construction of Aristotle rather than the Christian philosophy put forward by St. Thomas Aquinas, which was only based on Aristotle. Such were Peter of Albano, d. 1316 ; Urban of Bologna, d. 1405 ; Paul of Venice, d. 1429 ; Gaetan of Thiene, d. 1462 ; Vernier, d. 1500 ; Alexander Achillini, d. 1518 ; Zimara, d. 1532 ; and Nifo, d. 1546.

Augustin d'Ancona or (Triumpho), 1243-1328, an Augustinian monk and a Master of Paris and Naples, was a strict follower of Giles of Rome, who was of the same Order, and thus he was a Thomist.

His chief work was *De Cognitione Animae*,¹⁵ in which he showed very clearly that universals are purely concepts and that all ideas, even the most general, are acquired, being abstracted or deduced from those which are more particular.

Thomas of Bailly, d. 1328, a Canon of Paris and Master of Theology, Chancellor of the University, 1316. He wrote *Quodlibeta*, full of philosophy, recently discovered by Langlois (*Hist. Litt. de France*, XLV, 1921, 302-310).

He was a staunch Thomist and follower of Hervaeus Natalis (Chap. XXIII, p. 471).

¹⁵ Printed Bologna, 1503.

Guy of Terrien, or De Perpignan, d. 1342, a Carmelite, Master of Theology, Paris, 1313, who became General of his Order. He wrote a *Commentary* on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard and *Quodlibeta*, and *Questiones Ordinariae et Disputatae* and commented on the works of Aristotle. He was the teacher of John of Baconsthorp.

He showed preference for the views enunciated by Geoffrey of Fontaines.

For him there was no real distinction between essence and existence, and he refutes the "modi reales" of Durandus and the "formalitates" of Duns Scotus. Prime matter is not a principle of individuation of corporeal substances, nor does it enter into the composition of spirits, so that "rationes seminales" are unnecessary.

He stresses individuality and regards even specific essence as characterized by otherness.

Henry of Herford, d. 1370, was a Thomist, who wrote an encyclopædic work entitled *Catena Aurea Entium*; in it are to be found important fragments of the *Summa Theologica* of Nicholas of Strasbourg (cf., Chap. XXIX, p. 618).

Peter de Rivo, 1420-1472, a Professor of Louvain, who had a conflict which lasted for thirty years with Henry of Zoemerem or Someren, a theologian of the same place.

Since 1427 Nominalism had been forbidden and Realist interpreters of Aristotle, Averroes, St. Albertus Magnus, St. Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome only allowed.

Peter de Rivo maintained with Aristotle that contingent propositions could neither be true nor false, for if they were true before the event the propositions would be necessary not contingent. This is a fallacy, for ignorance of the future does not affect the truth of the proposition. Yet applying this Aristotelian proposition to matters concerned with Divine Foreknowledge, he deduced that prophecy has no truth; thereby displaying the complacency of the Nominalists in opposing faith and reason, though he himself professed to be a Realist.

The matter was referred to the sister Universities of Cologne and Paris, Louvain being divided.

The matter eventually came before the Roman Court, and first, in 1470, Henry of Someren was excluded from the University of Louvain, but the dispute finally ended by a retractation in due form being imposed on Peter de Rivo in 1473.

Henry of Gorcum, d. 1431, was educated at Paris, and became

Rector of the College of the Mountain (de Monte) at Cologne. He wrote *Questiones in Partes St. Thomae*.

He was a strong Thomist, whilst those of the sister College of Laurentia, at Cologne, were followers rather of St. Albertus Magnus.

The followers of Henry of Gorcum were Gerard Teutigan of Herrenberg, or de Monte, d. 1480, Lambertus de Monte, d. 1499, and John Versor.

The Albertistae were Heymeric de Campo, d. 1460, Gerard Hardewyk, d. 1503, and Arnold of Luyde, d. 1540.

Amongst many others, Petrus Nigri, d. 1481, who with Mathias Corvin, did much to promote the University of Buda Pest, opposed the Terminists on behalf of Thomism; Petrus Nigri was the author of *Clypeus Thomistaram*; Barbus Paulus Soncinus, d. 1494, summarized the works of the Thomist, John of Capreolus (cf., p. 478); and Michael Savaretius also defended Thomism against Scotism.

Petrus Fonseca, 1548–1594, a Jesuit, first occupied the Chair at Coimbra, and came to be called the "Aristotle of Coimbra." His great work on Aristotle is known as the *Collegium Conimbricense* or *Cursus Conimbricinsium*.

He held that existence was distinct from prime matter and that there was a real distinction between essence and existence. He also held that God had knowledge not only of the present and future but also of future conditionals.

Louis Molina, 1536–1600, a Jesuit, was a disciple of Fonseca, and wrote a work called *Concordia*.

Franciscus Toletus, c. 1559–1569, of Cordova, a Jesuit, who taught at the Roman College and became a Cardinal. He wrote *Enarratio in Summam Theol. Thomae*, though, a Jesuit he was a disciple of Dominic de Soto of Salamanca (cf., p. 479).

Gabriel Vasquez, 1551–1604, another Jesuit, lectured at the Roman College and taught at Alcala. He was the rival of Suarez. He wrote *Disputationes Metaphysica*, and a fine Commentary on the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas.

CHAPTER XXV

FRANCISCANS

St. Bonaventura, d. 1274—Roger Bacon, d. 1292—Robert Marston, c. 1280—Henry of Gand, d. 1293—William de la Mare, d. 1298—William de Ware, c. 1300—William Falgar, c. 1280—John Pecham, d. 1292—Richard de Middleton, d. 1308—Matthew of Aquasparta, d. 1302—Walter of Bruges, d. 1307.

St. Bonaventura, 1221–1274, John of Fidanza, *Doctor Seraphicus*, was born at Bagnarea, near Orvieto, in Italy, and studied in Paris, where he became a teacher.

He was a Franciscan and became known by the name of Bonaventura; he studied, if not under Alexander of Hales, certainly under John of Rochelle, who succeeded him. It was at this period that he formed his friendship with St. Thomas Aquinas the Dominican, which was never interrupted by their philosophic differences.

It was a turbulent time for the Friars, who objected to being subject to the discipline of the University of Paris, whilst attending lectures given by its members, which resulted in riots from time to time; one being in 1245, when they were both in Paris together.

St. Bonaventura became Head of the Franciscans in 1257, and having refused the Archbishopric of York, he died at the Council of Lyons in 1274, having just been made Cardinal and Bishop of Albano.

He was known as Doctor Seraphicus, and was mentioned by Dante. He was canonized by Sixtus IV in 1482 and made a Doctor of the Church in 1587 by Sixtus V.

His published works consist of eighty-eight volumes, but his chief books were *Itinerarium mentis ad Deum*, *Breviloquium*, and a Commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard.

He was a mystic, who though he wrote no special work on philosophy, yet reasoned and argued as a metaphysician; at the same time insisting that the certainty of faith was greater than any certainty that the human reason could attain in respect of the knowledge of God. Though, indeed, he did not deny to reason the certainty of its knowledge in its own domain like certain Sceptics.

In his Commentary on the *Sentences*, Tenneman points out,

that he held that the word matter had two meanings, that which exists in nature, and that which reason considers under that term. As conceived by reason, one can say that matter is unformed, as deprived of distinct form, or as deprived of all form. As St. Augustine taught, matter is essentially unformed, as apt to receive all form, and when considered thus, this aptitude, this potential disposition, stands in place of form for it. Matter in nature is never outside of time and place, outside of movement and rest. It is not only contradictory (apt to receive opposites), but it cannot even exist deprived of form (*Lib.*, II, 12, 5, 1).

As to universals, he says, humanity is common to Peter and Paul, but it does not belong to the category of substance. "The individuation comes from the actual union of matter and form, in which one of the two elements assimilates itself to the other. Thus when one seals, one makes several impressions on the wax, but these impressions cannot be several in the wax and the wax cannot be divided into all its parts by means of these different impressions.

But if, however, the investigation of the principle of individuation be carried further, it must be said that the individual being, this thing here, *hoc aliquid*, consists principally of the matter of being 'this' or 'that,' *hoc* (for it receives from matter its position in space and time) and that the *being* of a thing, *aliquid*, comes to it from its form. The individual possesses essence and also possesses existence. It is the matter which gives *existence* to the form, but it is the form which gives actual *essence* to the matter" (*Sent.*, II, 3, 2, 3).

Matter and form are the intrinsic principles of the substance, which corresponds with the name of Socrates.

St. Bonaventura held that the individuality of Socrates comes from the form, but St. Thomas Aquinas held that it comes from the matter.

St. Bonaventura really preferred to say that the individuality came from neither, but from the act of both; though he added that in his opinion the *essence* is given by the form, whilst the *existence* is given by the matter.

What individuals have in common is existence, which they owe to matter, whilst they owe it to form that they are of such an essence, which is distinct from any other; thus it is form which is the principle of individuation.

But it was not for arguments such as these that St. Bonaventura acquired such renown. Some philosophers had claimed that reason could attain to the supreme place and that by thinking of God one could see Him in spirit and in truth. This was an opinion that St. Bonaventura strenuously denied. Afraid of

going beyond the extreme limits of nature, other philosophers resigned themselves to knowing nothing of God. But St. Bonaventura, recognizing the incapacity of reason, hastens to take Faith as a guide. Faith is a virtue of the soul. A question then arises, is Faith in the cognitive or affective part of the soul. St. Bonaventura places Faith in the affective parts of the soul, but adds that this region of the soul is not isolated, so that the exercise of this virtue shines upon the intellect, illumines it, transforms it, and renders it capable of the holy emotions of ecstasy.

Further, in comparing the certainty of faith, with that of knowledge, it is necessary to consider two things. For knowledge can be taken of that clear and certain vision of God that we shall have in Heaven. But it is not in doubt that such surpasses Faith, even as Glory surpasses Grace, and the importance of the fatherland that of the way to it.

In this way must be understood the saying of St. Augustine, reproduced by Hugo St. Victor, that "The certitude of things absent is above opinion, but below knowledge," otherwise it might be considered to attack faith. But it is quite true, when it is understood that the knowledge here referred to, is that which the elect will enjoy in the presence of God. As to philosophic knowledge, it is human knowledge which is less certain than faith. It can rise sufficiently high to attain one of the articles of Faith, but it can never give the certainty equal to that which obtains this Divine Grace.

Philosophers have been able to prove the existence of God, but what value have all their proofs compared to the transport of love of a faithful heart (*Sent.*, II, 2, 3, 2).

As has been said, St. Bonaventura was called Doctor Seraphicus, and John Gerson, another mystic, has well said of him, "if I am asked who is the most perfect of all the Masters I reply without offence to the others it is St. Bonaventura, this Doctor, so solid, so sure, so pious, so just, so sincerely religious in all in that which he has written. Taking care not to introduce into the science of Divine things these strange theses, these doctrines of the age, logical or philosophical, which so many others put before us under the outward guise of theology, he never strove to enlighten the mind without aiming at exciting piety, religion of the heart, 'religiositatem affectus.' It is that which has made him to be neglected by the secular scholars (whose number also is too great) although for the theologians no doctrine can be more sublime, more divine, more sound, more sweet than his."

Roger Bacon, 1214-1294, known to his successors as *Doctor*

Mirabilis, was born at Ilchester, in Somerset, in 1214, and educated at Oxford, at which University he took his M.A., but the date is unknown. Whilst at Oxford he was a pupil of Adam Marsh, and may have attended the lectures of Grosseteste. Before 1236 he went to Paris, where he took his degree about 1248. It is thought that he became a Franciscan about 1247.

After lecturing at Paris and Oxford, he returned to Paris in 1257, when by the order of St. Bonaventura, the Head of his Order, he was detained in a sort of prison belonging to the Order and forbidden to read, write, or look at the stars, but he in fact appears to have been able to write and consult the various works from which he quoted.

However, the Pope Clement IV ordered his release in 1263, when he went back to Oxford. But having again incurred the censure of his Order, in 1278 he was condemned by a general Chapter of the Order to imprisonment, in which he remained until released in 1292 by order of Pope Celestine V, two years after which he died in obscurity.

Of his mathematical and scientific discoveries we are not here concerned, his chief discoveries being that of the magnifying power of convex lenses producing the telescope and the camera obscura, and also the inherent powers of gunpowder, the actual discovery of which is now no longer attributed to him.

In 1266, Pope Clement IV, having heard of Bacon's works, requested a copy, notwithstanding any Franciscan constitution to the contrary.

He was most scathing concerning nearly all his contemporaries, which, no doubt, assisted in leading to the condemnation of his works in 1277, when Bishop Tempier at Paris procured the condemnation of so many current opinions.

But at the end of the next century, the Franciscans placed Bacon among the most famous natural philosophers of their Order, and he was quoted as an authority in the Schools at Oxford.

In addition to his scientific investigations he wrote both a Hebrew and a Greek grammar. He is believed to have studied Greek under those Greeks brought to England by Grosseteste. He was not only an enthusiastic admirer of Aristotle, but also of the Arabians Avicenna, Al Hazen the mathematician, and Averroes.

His chief philosophic works are contained in *Quaestiones supra undecim primae philosophiae Aristotelis*, *Communia Naturalium*, *Metaphysica*, *Opus Magus Compendium Studii Philosophiae*, *Opus Minus Compendium Studii Philosophiae*, and especially *Opus tertium Compendium Studii Philosophiae*. His *Compendium Studii Theologiae* was unfinished.

MATTER, PRIVATION AND FORM

Roger Bacon follows Thomas of York in a holding that three things are required for the 'becoming'¹ of non celestial matter, *viz.*, matter, privation and form. But though these three are required "secundum rationem," yet in practise they are reduced to two matter and form 'secundum rem.' The absolute nature of matter is its desire for perfection and its Privation is an accident of this absolute nature, such privation or potentiality is active, in so far as it is regarded as that by which matter seeks a new form; and the potentiality is passive, as it is regarded as that by which matter is able to experience change.

The former active potentiality is the same as "ratio seminalis" which occurs in generation.

Bacon is very clear, however, that in generation the agent plays an active part; whilst holding that generation is not a violent or non-natural process, yet he held that the agent did not merely excite the "rationes seminales" to develop themselves, but it actually transmutes matter, so that the form may be educed; "for in some way the agent possesses that which the matter is to receive."

Such actuality possessed by the agent is termed *virtus agentis*, similitudo, species, or imago, because it resembles the agent's definition, operation, and composite whole and not merely its form.

EMANATION OF FORCE

Bacon regarded the species or force propagated by the agent as a portion of the medium momentarily modified by the agent. The modified medium serves the purpose of providing the necessary distance "per essentiam" between the mover and that which is moved (for no form acts on the matter of which it is the act), and the necessary contact "secundum virtutem" (for no agent can act at a distance or through a vacuum).²

Such species, he thought, were propagated in all directions³; they continue in a straight line as long as the medium through which they are passing is of one density, otherwise they are refracted either towards the perpendicular drawn towards the surface of contact or away from it.⁴

The species is, in short, only an incomplete stage of the substance, and therefore the species of the substance and accident can produce each other "primus effectus agentis similis ei in naturae." Hence accident can never generate substance.

¹ Cf., pp. 28, 36, 72, 80.

³ Cf., Grosseteste, Ch. XVIII, p. 242.

² Cf., Duns Scotus, p. 552.

⁴ Duns Scotus, Ch. XXVI, p. 563.

ALTERATION

In addition to creation and generation, there is "becoming" by alteration; here the matter which remains throughout must be corporeal substance and the form educed must be an accident.⁵

Because the matter is already an "ens in actu," here it is said to be "in potentiae propinqua," and the movement of the alteration is said to be according to what is in potentiality to the new form and not according to what is already in act.

As to matter itself, Bacon regarded it as created and ingenerable and incorruptible, being only generated "per accidens" or "per suam privationem"; it is the subject of contraries desiring a new, and the corruption of its present, form, and always seeking its own good.

He thought it only knowable by analogy and that like form, it can be called equivocally substance, since both are parts of the substantial composite; further, though never existing without form, it has its own true nature and essence and therefore contributes to the composite.

UNITY OF MATTER

Bacon rejects the theoretical numerical unity of matter in all things, and denied any distinction between essence and existence (It will be seen on p. 505 that he contradicts this with regard to angels) regarding existence as the "proprio passio" of essence, so that the essence of matter must be numbered according to its different existences, and since these are not all one, neither can essence of matter be all one.

Further, if in the many, matter is one in number, it would be infinite, for it could be in an infinite number.

Should matter be infinite, it would be equal to God and even would be God, which leads to Pantheism.

To say that the essence of matter need not be infinite, but that it is only its potentiality which is infinite, which being passive cannot be identified with God, Who is active, will not be correct. For that would involve an accident being superior to its subject, which is impossible; if the potentiality is infinite then matter must be infinite.

Hence Bacon, like Thomas of York, held that the unity of matter is only logical, since matter as it exists in nature is always divided and specified, as are also forms and composites. Matter for them then is not specified by forms and composites, but together with forms and composites. Bacon's chief reason for the above is based on the traditional Aristotelian theory, that every form requires a corresponding disposition in matter,

⁵ Cf., St. Albertus Magnus, Ch. XIX, pp. 265, 266.

supposing that if the "forma universalis" completely satisfied the appetite of "materia prima," then all subsequent forms would require corresponding matters.

MULTIPLICATION OF CLASSES

This differentiation of matter and form leads to a dual aspect of both the singular and the universal in all composites, and these are again divided as relating to either matter or form. Thus with regard to the man Socrates, as a reasonable animal, some thirty-six divisions in seventy-two classes, or grades, are given! There is one set of divisions in respect of the universal man in Socrates, another in respect of this Socrates, and a third in respect of the composite!

As to form, Bacon held it to be prior to matter, only in the sense that it is a term of generation, and the chief cause of the diversities of composites; it perfects the material principle, and is the end of the efficient cause, moreover it is that through which the composite acts. Form gives 'being,' that which is the principle of operation and the principle of knowledge. He regarded forms as being generated by being educed from potentiality into complete 'being,' by the activity of universal or particular agents. Bacon agreed with Aristotle in holding that there is no mid-time in the generation of forms. "Forma substantialis inducitur tota in instanti," further he states "exitus materiae de potentia ad actum qui est generatio . . . fit successive et sit motus non mutatis."

UNIVERSALS

With regard to universals Bacon accepts Aristotle's opinion that it is "*in rebus*," but as he deals with the other views at length, it may be well to re-state them here according to his views.

First, the universal is not in the soul, and the expression in Aristotle's *De Anima*, "that we understand when we wish, because the universal is within us," is misunderstood. This statement refers to the likeness of the universal, which, even as the likeness of the singulars, is in our soul and not the things themselves. The universal itself cannot be in our soul, for two stones would have a universal and resemble each other in some respects, even if there are no souls to consider them. Nor can anything outside a thing be attributed to it as inhering.

Second, since the universal is not in the soul, the intellect cannot make the universal in things, as was maintained by Avicenna and Averroes. The soul does not make, but finds, universality in things.

Third, the universal cannot be, in so far as it is universal, in

the soul, although in so far as it is, what it is, it is in the singular. For if the universal is neither in the soul, nor produced by the soul, the universal "secundum rationem universalis" is not in the soul; besides, in everything the "id quod est" and its "ratio" exist together. Moreover, the universal has its being by the operation of nature, but apprehension by the soul does not produce the operation of nature; and it consequently cannot be said to make the universal.

Fourth, some have held the universal is neither in the soul, nor in things, since whatever is in singulars is itself singular; the universal cannot be in things, nor can it be in the soul, because whatever is received, is received according to the mode of the receiver, and the soul being singular can receive only singulars.

This theory would undermine all nature and philosophy, according to it a genus could be only represented by one individual; it would contradict Aristotle's assumption, that the existence of the universal in the singular is representative of one of the eight modes of being.

Also Boethius has shown that the singular has a duplex *esse*—an absolute one depending on its own principles, and a relative one depending on its relation to other individuals, with which it agrees in specific nature.

Bacon explains that the universal in the soul is the likeness of the external universal, just as the particular species in the soul is the likeness of the external singular. There must be external principles corresponding to both the universal and the singular nature of things. The agreement between several individuals must have a reality in external particulars, but such reality is not the primary reality of the individual, for the universal only exists "propter singulare."

Nevertheless, as the universal species can be called up at will, and is apprehended by contact with singulars in comparison with which it is more intelligible, we find a reason for the notion that universals are internal and singulars are external.

INDIVIDUATION

Having considered the question of universals, we now come to the individuation of singulars. Bacon's treatment of this topic has been much criticized, on the whole he seems to refer it both to the individual matter and the individual form of the individual thing: in the *Quaest. Met.* he refers to passive and active potentiality in matter, the former of which only causes difference in number, whilst the latter causes multiplication of species.

PLURALITY OF FORMS

Bacon adopted the theory of plurality of forms in the individual ; he regarded forms as having incomplete existence in the matter from which they are educed, and attributed to the individual as many forms as it has perfections, and thought of each specified form as matter for the successively specified ones.

No detailed theory of essence and existence is given by Bacon. Bacon accepted the view that man is compounded of body and soul. The body constituted from elements and mixtures, develops out of the embryo, acquiring its members from the female and its spirits from the male, the intellect alone being created. Man alone is created in the image of God. Were the vegetative and sensitive souls created, at death they would become separated with the intellect. But since they are unable to operate without the organs of the body, they would lack their specific operations. 'Nulla res dum est, potest privari sua operatione perfecta.' Hence their separation at death is impossible, so they cannot be created.

FORMA CORPOREITATIS

Hence a man must have a "forma corporeitatis," a "forma vegetativa," and a "forma sensitiva," all actuated and moved by a "forma intellectiva," because the latter completes the lower forms.

SPACE

Basing his argument upon the fact that corporeal things, such as unity and number have no relation to here and there, Bacon argued that spiritual substances with their indivisible nature need not be related to space. They are said to be in place, only when they operate there, though since their power does not exceed their essence, they may be said to be in the place where they operate, even "secundum substantia." No finite spiritual substance can be in different places at the same time, and this led him to believe, relying on the statement of Aristotle that no finite power acts in an instant, that the transit of finite spiritual substances through space requires time.

SOUL, SPIRITUAL MATTER

The soul is not an accident of the body, and must be a substance, for it itself has accidents such as knowledge, virtue and grace. Hence the soul must have matter and form. It must indeed be a composite, having form to perfect the form of the embryo, and matter to perfect the matter of the embryo. This follows from the duality of his composites (cf., p. 499).

No created substance is a pure form or pure matter. Finally, composition of actuality and potentiality is found in every created being, in fact, it is only another way of saying composition of form and matter.

Bacon held that only confusion of "materia prima" with "materia naturalis" could cause anyone to think that such composition destroyed the dignity or simplicity of the soul (cf., Thomas of York, Chap. XVIII, p. 256).

VIRTUAL PARTS OF SOUL

Bacon followed Boethius in holding that the vegetative, sensitive, and rational faculties of the soul are virtual parts of the soul. He regarded the use of the term "*Virtual*" with reference to the spiritual world as equivalent to the term "*Quantitative*" when used in respect of things corporeal.⁶ "Virtual," however, as used by St. Thomas Aquinas and others has the meaning of, it must be remembered, "in a certain respect," not simply.⁷

He alleges that it is metaphysically impossible for them to be between substance and accidents; and that they cannot be accidents, because the vegetative soul in plants and the sensitive soul in animals are not accidents but substantial forms, and what is true for plants and animals must be true for man; and they cannot be identical with the essence of the soul, for in creatures operation is from potentiality and not from substance. Therefore substance, power and operation are related "per differentiam," and the operating faculties are said to be the "virtual" parts. Such parts, together with the passive potentiality, are in the lower faculties for the intellective faculty preserves the simplicity of the soul.

In this Bacon treats the vegetative and sensitive souls first as inseparable from the body and then as virtual parts of the created separable intellectual soul.

MEMORY

We have seen (p. 498) that Bacon regarded every natural agent as radiating its species in all directions. These, which are the transformed medium, become the materials of sense, but are not spiritual in the strict sense. When Aristotle says that sense receives form without matter, he is referring to corporeal matter. Such species have a perfecting effect on the sensitive and intellectual soul, which begins, when the "sensus communis" correlates the reports of the five senses and enables them to know that they are perceiving.

⁶ Cf. Ch. XXI, pp. 337, 338.

⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *S.T.*, I.Q. 71.

Such species are stored in the imagination, where they are subjected to the "virtus aestimativa" for judgment.

The results are stored in the memory and provide the dream images of man, and that cogitation which is common to both animals and men.

In addition to this conscious sense knowledge, man has an instinctive kind of reasoning (*arguendi*) that we share with animals, such as appears when we choose the more beautiful of two apples.

From conscious sense knowledge, it is through universals, that higher knowledge is acquired; ultimately by comparison of remembered species with present ones, though primarily through that power by which we are able to abstract the universal and assimilate it.

DIVINE ILLUMINATION

INTELLECTUS AGENS

Bacon follows the Augustinian illumination theory and agrees with Grosseteste, Adam Marsh and William of Auvergne, in regarding the "intellectus agens" lighting up the phantasm, as being the Divine Co-operation in human knowledge.

Aristotle's statement that the active intellect is separable, unmixed and incorruptible can only mean that it is not part of the soul; just as the statement that it knows all and is always in act must mean that it is God.

It must mean that it is God, for the Averroes' theory that there is but one intellect for all men is completely untenable.

This was strenuously denied by St. Thomas Aquinas, who held that the active intellect was but a power of the soul itself, and not a superior power extrinsic to the soul's essence, conferring upon it "ab extra" the faculty of knowing.

Sometimes, however, he uses *intellectus agens* in the same way as St. Albert the Great, as meaning only the *intellectus possibilis*, when in act.

Through the *intellectus agens* Bacon held that man could understand spiritual things, not by means of phantasms, but through innate exemplars. Such knowledge largely consisted of the soul's knowledge of itself through reflecting on the contents of consciousness.

WILL

As Bacon regarded the faculties as virtual parts of the soul, Will is not diversified from intellect. The soul is called reason, in so far as it speculates, and will, in so far as it desires; had will and intellect any difference "per essentiam," they would not be able to excite or react upon each other.

Deliberation and choice afford the conditions of the moral life.

Bacon denied that the celestial bodies had any influence on man, but thought that astronomy only helped man to know better his undesirable physical inclinations.

Bacon expressed the view that while ancient ethics may remove three impediments to our knowledge of the Divine Will and eternal life, namely sin, concern of the body and worldly pre-occupation, yet Christianity alone can remove defective revelation, which revelation is necessary because of contradictions in the different sects (*sic*) and the natural limitations in human knowledge.

ANGELS

With regard to angels, Bacon held that they were created with "aevum," a kind of created eternity of indivisible duration presupposing an uncreated eternity, but preceding time, which begins with the production of generable things.

They are not simple, for having received existence, they are a composition of essence and existence. In this he directly contradicts his own opinion mentioned on page 499 that existence is a mere "proprio passio" of essence. They have composition of spiritual matter and form, act and potentiality, genus and species. He discusses the various means of knowledge of angels, but ends by saying that, when angels are said to know God, what they apprehend is not His whole reality, but some property.

He, like others of his age, regarded angels as imparting movement to each celestial sphere.

KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

With regard to Natural Theology, Bacon held that God is that uncreated *esse* in Whom is no diversity of composition. His act, His *esse*, His duration, and His measure of duration and His essence are all one and the same. What God understands is always His own essence, either as it is an absolute essence, in which case He is knowing Himself, or inasmuch as it is an exemplar of all things, in which case, by understanding Himself, He is knowing all, even the impossible, if the impossibility arises from inferior causes, and also the bad if the bad signifies a defect in creatures. Both universals and singulars are known to God, such knowledge only applies to caused beings.

Hence it does not conflict with Aristotle's theory that the First Mover knows nothing outside Himself, for Bacon, like Thomas of York, held that Aristotle denied only that type of knowledge of externals, which is acquired by a potentiality different from

essence and one which perfects the knower, because in this case He is indeed already Perfect.

TEMPORAL CREATION

In view of the controversies at Paris prevailing in Bacon's time, it is of interest to note that Bacon, relying on a pseudo-Aristotelian treatise, *De Regimine Regnorum*, asserted that even Aristotle believed in a temporal beginning of the universe.

Bacon deals with the question whether the Creation meant a change in God, by saying that it was His Will and Wisdom from eternity, that it should be produced, when it was produced.

It is as if something near me on the right, afterwards is placed on my left, nothing is done to me by the movement or alteration of that thing. There can be no actualizing of potentiality in God, because His power is not other than His essence and His Actuality.

Robert Marston, c. 1280, an English Franciscan who studied at Paris about 1270, and subsequently taught both at Oxford and Cambridge. He was a follower of Roger Bacon, and left *Quodlibeta* and *Questiones disputatae*.

According to him, the active intellect is not a distinct "lumen creatum" derived from the "lux increata" but the "lux increata" itself. The identity of the supreme light illuminating every intelligence coming into this world can alone explain the unanimous agreement of the human race on fundamental truths. This light "with which God inundates us" is not a gratuitous gift, a supernatural strengthening of the natural powers of our minds, it is simply the actual functioning of these powers and therefore part of our nature.

It is true that formaliter the certitude of judgment rests on the evidence which the Divine light projects on the terms, but the soul nevertheless is the inchoative principle (*inchoatio*) of this certitude.

In this way there may be said to be a double active intellect, the one on the part of the soul, corresponding to a simple natural predisposition to know truth and the other, separate from us, completing the "inchoatio" of nature.

Although the identity of God with the active intellect is only referred to in order to explain the knowledge of truth in the "rationes aeternae," his illumination theory, though alluded to by both St. Thomas and St. Bonaventura, was not approved of by them. It borders on Ontologism, according to which the human intellect sees directly in God the object of its ideas, which doctrine was held to be erroneous in 1277.

Henry of Ghent, 1217-1293. *Doctor Sollemnis*, one of the pupils at Cologne of St. Albertus Magnus at the same time as St. Thomas Aquinas. About 1256 he was one of the first principals of the College founded by Robert de Sorbonne in Paris, whose name it has ever since continued to bear. Afterwards he became Archdeacon of Tournai, where he died.

Though not a Franciscan himself, his teaching was adopted by them.

His chief works were *Quodlibet Theologica* (J. Bade, Paris, 1518), and a *Summa Theologica* (J. Scarparia, Ferrara, 1520).

He united a strong infusion of Platonism with the principles of Aristotle; as a Platonist he was held in great esteem not in France, but by Pic de la Mirandola in the fifteenth century and in some schools in Italy down to the seventeenth century.

A realist, in many ways he differed both from his master St. Albertus and from St. Thomas, at the same time he was neither a mystic nor a sceptic.

As to universals "*ante rem*," St. Thomas held that ideas of existing things were in the unchangeable mind of God, and that as the Divine Essence does not come under the category of time, they really exist and being permanent are veritable entities. As to this, Henry of Gand wishes to differentiate the modes of existence by saying that these ideas are as essential 'beings' in the mind of God, and that things on earth are existing 'beings.'

St. Thomas held that comparing ideas with one another, man observes their relations, and from such observed relations are born other ideas likewise representative.

Of what use are these ideas of relationships in the structure of the world? None, but although God cannot but know of them, they are not in Him from all eternity as objective entities in respect of His Intellect. They were conceived relations not realized ones.⁸

Henry extends this exception thus.

Individual things are only represented in the Divine Mind by ideas adequate to the discrete and separate reality which they possess outside their cause.

The notion of number is contained in the idea of unity, the notion of the part in the idea of the whole, and the notion of the individual in the idea of the species.

So that God has never been unaware that individuals should 'become,' for He has always known, long before Aristotle, that the general contains the multiple, yet each of the individuals, which the whole species is in potentiality of producing by the division of its parts, has not in God the actuality of an idea.

⁸ S.T. I, 15.

Henry proceeds to lay down the dangerous rule, that the way to investigate the active power of the Supreme Worker is to study the passive potentiality, considered as the recipient and the term of the Divine Action, in order to see whether the passive potentiality corresponds in nature to the active power that we suppose in God.⁹

That is his method, but it would seem to limit the active power to the extent of its operation on any observed occasion.

However, Henry strives to prove that the universal is the first act of Creation and that it is anterior to that of the individual, instead of the individual being the first substance and the species being only the second, as Aristotle and St. Thomas held.¹⁰

“The reason of the universal consists less in the process by which the same is affirmed of the many, than in the nature or property of the thing affirmed, a thing which must be a nature or some kind of essence. Indeed, the universal adopts two modes, the object which is an essence or nature, and also the susceptibility of being predicated of many.”

Esse and *essentia* cannot differ ‘realiter,’ for a thing cannot exist by virtue of something other than its essence. Nor are *natura* and *suppositum* distinct, both are aspects of the same reality. Yet essence, quiddity and form must be distinguished from the *suppositum*, in that the one is universal and the other particular.¹¹

Henry then goes on to discuss prime matter. St. Thomas had said that indeterminate matter does not exist before the act which produces this matter, indeterminate matter is only in potentiality of becoming. Quoting Plato, St. Augustine and Avicenna as supporting him, Henry declared that matter is by itself some nature, some substance, which differs from form and which comes before form from the principle common to all generations.

Although according to the ordinary course of nature, matter cannot be deprived of all form, as nature does not destroy one substance without making another, the Creator can nevertheless by acting Himself deprive it of all form, so that the form which He did not wish to preserve would be returned to its proper nature, reduced to nothing, whilst the matter would dwell on, maintained in the condition which is proper to it, that of being itself.

This was termed the *Entitative act* of primitive matter, which was expanded by Duns Scotus at a later date.

The term ‘being’ was used, he says, by Aristotle equivocally, which does not refer to the same thing or the same manner of being in any of the nine genus, for things have diverse essences,

⁹ *Quodlibet*, 5, 3.

¹⁰ Cf. Ch. XXIII, pp. 465, 473.

¹¹ *Quod.*, V, 7.

they are not only that which they are in their genus, they are in addition what they are in themselves. So that matter can be considered under three different aspects : as it exists " simple " in itself, in a thing capable of receiving forms, and in the base of a composite. So many observed modes of being so many beings.

According to Aristotle and the Nominalists a substance diversely considered only affords observation of different modes of one being.

Henry of Gand having, as has been shown, attributed substance to matter in itself, it followed naturally that he attributed individuation to form. In fact he expresses it as all individuation comes from the form actualizing some part of a common source, and took St. Thomas to task on the celebrated question of the species of angels.

With regard to the soul, he held that its faculties did not differ from the soul itself. He held that there are impressed species in the understanding. As to the origin of these species, sometimes he called them transformed sensations ; some which did not apparently come from the senses he attributed to Grace.

He did not agree with Avicenna in the necessity of a separate agent communicating knowledge and virtue to the human intelligence, like an impression on wax. Nor with Anaxagoras nor Anaximander that the forms implanted by nature were first obscured by matter afterward to be removed by the operation of an external agent.

Plato was quite right in saying that man contemplated pure truth in the radiancy of Divine Ideas and that through the senses he only secured opinion and not certain knowledge ; but Plato was wrong in saying that the generation of souls preceded that of bodies.

Aristotle was correct in saying that the intelligence reached perfect knowledge by itself, but this statement was as incomplete as that of Plato. By a combination of what they both said a true philosophic method is obtained as, says St. Augustine : " We obtain from nature knowledge in potentiality, but knowledge in act the acquisition of information, for us is a labour of work and experience. Knowledge of first principles does not come from analysis or investigation, but is altogether natural."

On the one hand, Aristotle seemed to Henry to attribute too much influence in general ideas to the senses, whilst Plato goes to the opposite extreme. He thus arrived at the conclusion that general ideas are in the human intellect before being brought into act by means of abstraction, work and thought.

Henry held that the Will is prior to the Intellect, as the

' habitus ' of the Will is Love, which is higher than the ' habitus ' of the Intellect, which is Wisdom.¹²

The state of Beatitude consists not only in the act of the Will and the Intellect, but rather in the ingression of the Divine Essence into the beatified soul.¹³

But, he adds, neither analysis nor mental composition lead to the perfect notion of eternal verity. God gives it freely to whom He pleases.

William de la Mare, d. 1298, a Franciscan, educated at Oxford, a violent anti-Thomist.

In 1281 he wrote a book, *Quest. Met.*, which the General Chapter of the Franciscans, held at Strasbourg, 1282-4, ordered to be read with the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas Aquinas, and the latter only to be entrusted for reading to the elite of the Order.

In 1284, William wrote a further *Summa Contra Thomam*, sometimes called *Correctorium* or *Reprehensorium*, containing objections to 118 propositions embodied in the different works of St. Thomas.^{13a}

He insisted that angels possessed a spiritual matter, quoting Avicbron in his support. St. Thomas in refusing to admit this, had been unable to advance any tenable theory as to the principle of the individuation of angels in consequence.

Following Gilbert de la Porrée, he added that though there are not several souls in Socrates, yet there are several essential forms, corporeity, animality, rationality, being forms essentially separated from each other, which although subordinated the one to the other constitute different entities and meet in the individual without causing confusion.

William also maintained that God can realize the essence of matter without form, although form is its principle of act; this was later supported by Duns Scotus.

In his objections to the tenets of St. Thomas, he goes so far as to enunciate that the elect will only see God present under the similitude of God. This latter was completely in opposition to the views of St. Bonaventura, who had fully accepted the proposition of St. Thomas of the absence of any intermediary or theophany.

William de Ware, or Varr, c. 1300, *Doctor Fundatus*, educated at Oxford and Paris. He returned to Oxford and is chiefly

¹² *Quod.*, XII, 2.

¹³ *Quod.*, XIII, 12.

^{13a} *Note.*—This work has been published under the name of Gilles Colonna or Gilles of Rome as *Defensorium seu correctorium corruptorii*.

celebrated as having been the teacher of the celebrated Duns Scotus.

He was a Franciscan and a disciple of St. Bonaventura.

He taught that natural reason in itself cannot prove that there is only one God.

It is also said that he held that the Persons of the Trinity were only logically distinct.

William of Falgar, c. 1280, was a Franciscan, and was elected General of their Order in 1284 and again in 1286.

In 1296, together with Richard de Middleton, he became tutor in Naples to St. Louis, the son of Charles II, King of Sicily. He afterwards became Bishop of Viviers.

He wrote his *Questiones*¹⁴ between 1277 and 1279.

Whether all certainty comes from our reason or a Divine influence? Bacon and others had held that the human intellect is entirely passive, the agent which makes it think is always God Himself, or some mandatory of God.

William entirely rejects this, which he imputes to Plato, for if, says he, each time we form a judgment God inspires us directly in sending us a ray of His light, there would be no difference between mortals, the elect, philosophers, or prophets. According to Aristotle and others, all knowledge is founded on the evidence of the senses. But this is as bad as the other, it is not less absolute and consequently not less false.

No doubt our sensitive organs are necessary to know external things of which they attest as to their existence and manner of being.

But these things, as they appear, bear the impress of the intelligent cause, which has freely created them according to its eternal plans.

Thus God communicates to us, in making us to know things, some of the secrets of His thought.

The simple reception of an image, a species, cannot by itself produce a notion, a concept, or a judgment, this mental act is not accomplished without the co-operation of some intelligence.

This intelligence which enables us to distinguish good from evil, the truth from the false, this "naturale iudicatorium" which is indeed the principal agent of all our ideas, from whom does it come if not from God.

It is necessary, therefore, to conclude both with Plato and Aristotle, that certainty comes to us from above and below, both as to things eternal and as to things perishable. It is possible that the notions of incorporeal things are innate, but those of

¹⁴ 457, Arsenal, *Bib. Nat.*

corporeal things are certainly not; they are acquired and come from the collaboration of the intellect and the senses.

Some maintain that the intellect is naturally passive, and is only moved by the occasion, and that the occasion is furnished by things whose presence invite the intellect to form a judgment. But that is wrong, things are inert, whilst the intellect is endowed with constant activity. The intelligible species can be produced on occasion by an object whose phantasm is affecting the senses, but the agent, which produces the species, is not the object but is the intellect illuminating the phantasm. Hence it is the intellect that causes the species to be intellectualized. Thus it is proved that our ideas are not innate, but, moreover, that they are not entirely produced in us by things outside. But it is noticed that the agent does not always feel the same degree of impulsion from the phantasm, which leads one to suppose that the external mover has more or less, according to circumstances, this power of acting, which has just been denied. That, indeed, is a false conjecture, says William, the difference quite truly noted, depends on memory, habit and will, when it is not the effect of a superior determination, the angels having it in their power to increase or diminish the influence which such or such phantasm can exercise in our intellect. Such intervention is accidental, the error of the Platonists condemned in 1277 is that it is habitual.

John Pecham, d. 1292, the date of whose birth is unknown, was born at Patcham, in Sussex, and educated at Oxford, where he may have been a pupil of Adam Marsh. He became a Franciscan friar whilst at Oxford in 1250, and before 1257 he moved to Paris, where he received his degree of Doctor of Theology.

In 1269-71, as regent master at Paris, he disputed with St. Thomas Aquinas on the question of the plurality of forms in man.

He returned to England in 1272, as lector to the Franciscan Friars at Oxford, and became their Provincial minister of England. In 1277 he was appointed lector to the Roman Curia, and in 1279 he was made Archbishop of Canterbury.

It was under him in 1283 that Edward I established the Convocations of Canterbury and York, and gave them the sole right of taxing the clergy.

The Pontifical of Archbishop Pecham, containing some two hundred benedictionary prayers, is one of the few documents relating to the liturgy in England during this period, which has come down to us. He died on the 8th of December, 1292.¹⁵

¹⁵ The Dominican Trivet, d. 1328 (cf. p. 470), wrote of him "qui ordinis sui zealator erat praeceptor, carminum dictator egregius, gestus afflatusque pompatici, mentis tamen benignae, et animi ad modum liberalis."

His chief works were: *Quaestiones Quodlibeticae* (in Paris), *Questiones Disputatae* (before the Roman Curia), *Super Magistrum Sententiarum*, *Tractatus tres de Paupertate*.

In addition, as a poet his greatest work was *Philomena*, in which its devotional fervour is accompanied by consummate poetical skill. It may not be thought too out of place to append the analysis of it given by Mr. Raby in his *Christian Latin Poetry* as it is not widely known. "The subject of the poem is the nightingale, the forerunner of spring, the bird who, 'in her saddest and sweetest plight' sings a song which typifies the crying out of the soul for the heavenly country. For the nightingale when she perceives that she is near to death, flies to a tree top, and at dawn pours forth her song. When the day begins to break, she sings without pause ever louder at the hour of prime, and at tierce the joy and passion of her song increase, until it seems as if her throat must burst with the torrent of her melody. Then at last, when noon arrives, her body can endure no longer; Oci, oci, she cries, and in the anguish of her song she sinks and fails. At nones she dies, her tiny body shattered and broken.

The nightingale is the type of the pious soul, which longs for the heavenly country, and longing, beguiles itself with song. So it lives, as it were, through a mystical day, the hours of which correspond to the stages of its redemption. Dawn is the stage of man's creation; Prime is the season of the Incarnation of Christ; Tierce is the period of His life on earth; Sext represents the hour of His betrayal, scourging and crucifixion; Nones of His death; and Vespers of His burial. Stage by stage, the soul follows in meditation, and out of its meditation fashions a song. The sweetness and sadness of the meditation increase as the hour of the Passion approaches, and the soul remembers the sufferings of the Redeemer, in which it longs to share, until at the hour of the 'consummatum est' it fails and dies in the ecstasy of love and compassion."

POTENTIALITY : ACTIVE AND PASSIVE

Pecham followed his predecessors in regarding matter and form as the two factors "secundum rem" involved in "becoming," and considered that "secundum rationem" a third factor, that of potentiality, being matter in its dynamic aspect, had to be added.

This potentiality is both passive and active. Privation or potentiality indicates two things, want of form, and aptitude or appetite for it. This appetite or "potentia diminuta," as he calls it, is the "ratio seminalis" a "sina qua non" of generation.

He held that the agent was one of the causes, which actualized the form existing potentialiter or seminaliter in matter, and that

the nature of the agent is communicated in its activity in generation.

MATTER

Pecham argued at great length that, whilst matter as such does not exist apart from form, that it could do so, without involving such a contradiction as would be incompatible with the power and wisdom of God. He, however, held that such matter, with its own incomplete actuality, was not synonymous with that transmutable matter which exists in terrestrial things and which is changed from a "forma generalissima" to a "species specialissima."

This subject of substantial and accidental transmutation, he called "materia physica," which again is not the same as the matter of heavenly bodies, for their matter being fully perfected by form is free from all privation. Both these types of matter, terrestrial as well as celestial, are included in the expression "materia signata non nuda." There is in addition to these the matter peculiar to spiritual beings. The matter of spiritual beings is capable of the highest actuality as well as of as much diversity as the "materia signata non nuda." Nevertheless the matter of corporeal and spiritual things are but differentiations of "materia prima."

FORM EXTENSION

As to form, Pecham considered that it gave actuality, imparted action, and was the object of knowledge. He, like Grosseteste, divided form into three classes. Forms in actualizing matter : (1) may be extended throughout every part of the whole, and in their operation depend on the whole, *e.g.*, fire ; (2) not extended, in the sense that every part of the whole has the nature of the whole, yet dependent on the whole, in that the same operation is communicated to all parts of the whole, *e.g.*, vegetative and sensitive forms ; or (3) neither extended nor dependent, *e.g.*, the rational form, for not every part of man is a man, nor does man understand by every part of man.

Pecham agreed with Bacon (p. 500) that an educed form does not appear instantaneously, because the motion is successive and the change causes the previous to be gradually consumed.

UNIVERSALS

As to universals, Pecham begins by saying that the actualizing form educed is primarily an individual form, and secondarily a universal form, so that the universal that comes "per accidens" is that in which singular substances of the same species agree. But

he goes on to say, "I think that the universal is a real thing and differs from the singular in some respect, yet they are in one species and agree in both thing and nature, but not in accident. And so it is not repugnant to the nature of the universal to be in a definite individual, nor for its likeness to be in a definite intellect, but it is a thing differing from the singular, as the whole from the part, since it is just as much in one thing as in another."

All substance is particular in some respect. It is, indeed, particular, in that it answers to its own particularity, for even as this matter and this form make this substance, so the matter in this matter and the form in this form make a substance which is the genus. This externally existent universal is as numerous as individuals, and though it could not constitute the individual merely by being united to matter, yet it may be regarded as a secondary constituent, because it is contracted by the proper principles of the individual, that is the individual matter and the individual form.

LUX

Pecham seems to be following Grosseteste, when he refers to lux as the mover of all form, itself not moved by any corporeal form. Again, when he said that lux may be considered in a threefold aspect, as to its origin, as to its manifestation, or in the term of its manifestation in the exhibition of colour; in the first it is probably called lux, in the second light (*lumen*), and in the third the hypostasis or composite of colour. But whether he went so far as Grosseteste in thinking lux to be the "forma prima corporalis," is not known.¹⁶

THE FORMA CORPOREITATIS

Pecham regarded man as a compound of body and soul, the body constituted by the elements and mixtures, unified by a "forma corporeitatis," vitalized by vegetative and sensitive forms, and educed from the potentiality of matter.

SOUL

Later, the rational soul created and infused by God, comes to perfect these incomplete forms, and since it is united to the body as its perfection as well as its motor, it is rightly regarded as the substantial form of the body, being present in the totality of its essence in every part of the body. He quotes Aristotle as saying that the body must be included in the definition of the soul.

Without the rational soul, the body, when generated cannot remain stable, for by its very nature it stands in an essential relation to the soul.

¹⁶ Cf., Ch. XVIII, p. 242.

On the other hand, the soul desires to exercise itself in the body and to communicate its power, for even when separated from the body, the soul cannot possess an "esse stabilitum, plene et absolute perfectum," but always inclines to the body.

But the actuality of the soul is not exhausted as the form of the body, and the reality of the body is not constituted solely by its office as serving as matter for the soul.

Pecham held that the soul, though a substantial form "quantum ad esse premium," in respect of its 'actus secundus' is independent for its 'actus secundus,' that is, its proper operations in no way depend on bodily organs. The soul, indeed, both in its substance and in its operation, is separable from the body. Lastly, the independent being of the soul follows from its position in the hierarchy of forms mentioned on page 514.

For here we have the elemental form, which perfects the matter of the body, both extended and dependent; we have the vegetative and sensitive forms, which perfect their matter by being extended, but not dependent; and, finally, the rational soul, which perfects its matter without being either extended or dependent.

As the body's proper forms are perfected by the rational soul, Pecham maintained that they are not corrupted by its advent, but remain distinct though subordinate to it.

Pecham also observes that the production of the body of the first man was prior to the inbreathing of the spirit of life, from which he concludes that the body has its own proper actuality.

We have seen that Pecham regarded the rational soul as the form of the body, but at the same time that the body was not a mere "materia prima"; it was matter already informed by the diverse forms of the elements and mixtures, which composed its several parts, and these composites again informed by that "forma corporeitatis" by which it was constituted a human body. Such composite was then informed by the "forma intellectiva" which results in a rational animal or living man.

This gives rise to the question of plurality of forms in man in two ways. First does the "forma intellectiva" do away with the "forma corporeitatis," when it is infused into the body.

The argument against this is that were such the case on death, when the rational soul is separated from the body, then the dead body would not be numerically or specifically identical with the living body: what is common would be only the matter or the accidents and not the substantial form, the essential factor. From this point of view, if such were the case, the resurrection of Christ, or any miraculous restoration to life, would have no meaning. Further, the Eucharistic doctrine would be undermined, because

the whole substance of the bread is converted into the whole body of Christ, and not only into its matter; seeing, then, that the intellective form of Christ is not involved, what would be that form, which is to render possible the presence of the entire body of Christ.

Two further arguments are that mentioned *supra* about the formation of man's body before the inbreathing of the spirit, and also that deriving from the definition of the soul, given by Aristotle as "actus corpus organici physici potentia vitam habens."

From this it follows that as to man, the "forma intellectiva" informs matter already informed by the "forma corporeitatis," which having no contrary to it is not corrupted by its advent as stated on the last page; therefore the "forma intellectiva" is not the only form of man.

(Duns Scotus pointed out that this argument really showed that the "forma intellectiva" is not the only form in man and not the only form of man.)¹⁷

Pecham avoided the conclusion that man is an aggregation of body and soul, by maintaining that the forms of the body remain subordinate to the *forma intellectiva* as mentioned on the last page, "est autem dispositio propria ad intellectivam vitam anima vegetativa et sensitiva."

The question of the plurality of forms in man appeared in another way, which was in fact the way in which it was originally considered, and this was the relation of the vegetative and sensitive souls to the rational soul.

It was generally accepted that in the generation of man, the embryo acquired first its vegetative soul, and then its sensitive soul, from its parents by reason of the "ratio seminalis," or other active potency as Bacon called it, of the parents; and that the intellective or rational soul is created immediately by God and subsequently infused into such embryo, opinions differing as to whether this occurs on parturition or not until puberty. The question arose as to the relation, which exists between these souls. Since the vegetative and sensitive souls were animate forms, the question arose as to what happens to them, when the "forma intellectiva" is infused. Did they remain separate, as Plato had taught, or if they became one, or as held by Aristotle were all one, in what way do they continue to function? The three separate souls of Plato were ruled out, and as we have seen, the formation of the one soul differed from that held by Aristotle, but the question arose were there three forms in man or but one form?

The contemporary views at Oxford in the time of Pecham had

¹⁷ Cf. Ch. XXVI, p. 569.

been succinctly stated by Robert Fishacre, but without giving any decision (cf., Chap. XVIII, p. 235).

(1) Some think that the vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual souls are one and the same substance, though they vary according to their operations.

(2) Others place a substantial soul, single in number, in man, having, nevertheless, forms ordered to things different from one another.

(3) Others held that there are three substances and that these three are something in man, which gives rise to three operations, not because there are three souls in man, but one soul consisting of three essentially different substances ; like one hand consisting of nerves, bones and flesh.

The first view is that held by St. Thomas Aquinas (cf., Chap. XXI, p. 341), who was followed by Bacon, who introduced a qualification of "virtual" (cf., p. 503).

The second is that held by Pecham, and the third attributed to Olivi.

Pecham, having regard to what he called the "quasi materialia" of the vegetative and sensitive form, never raised them above the dignity of disponents for the rational soul, putting them in his second and not in his third class of forms.

He says, "nothing is corrupted except by the contrary or by subtraction. But the arrival of the rational soul is in no opposition to the sensitive, which was a necessary disposition for it indeed. The sensitive product remains and becomes the material disposition for the reason coming from outside. As the body is ordered to the soul, so is one soul ordered to the other."

Bacon contended that if the intellectual soul absorbed the sensitive and vegetative altogether, after death these would remain in the soul without any organs through which to operate. But since "*nulla res dum est, potest privari sua operatione specifica*," this would be impossible (cf., p. 502). Hence he introduced the expression "virtual."

It has seemed necessary to deal here with this conflict of opinion at some length, as it was about this that John Pecham disputed with St. Thomas Aquinas in Paris about 1269-1271, and though the doctrine of plurality of forms may have originally been formed in England by Grosseteste, it is to Pecham that it is generally attributed in its fully developed form.

As has been shown (p. 515), Pecham held that the rational soul is created and infused immediately by God, as such, and not being generated, it must be immortal ; several other reasons for which he also advances, at the same time repudiating the traducianism of Tertullian, based on his view of creation, and

also that of Origen that all souls were created before the beginning of time.

SPIRITUAL MATTER

Like Thomas of York and Bacon, he held that the soul itself was composed of both spiritual matter as well as form.

He argued that Boethius only meant to exclude such matter, as is the subject of natural transmutation, because a soul being a spiritual substance and substance being in a genus of spiritual and corporeal species, and genus being composed of matter and form as its first principle, substance must have both matter and form. Further, both St. Augustine and the *Commentator on Aristotle* (Averroes) support this view, the latter arguing that without it there would be no plurality in abstract forms. He held that individuation of souls arose both from the spiritual matter and the form. Here again he disagrees with St. Thomas Aquinas, who denied spiritual matter.

The soul exercises its operations through its faculties of intellect, will, and memory. These, again, Pecham held not to be merely diverse operations of the substance of the soul, since one is a cause of the other.

These powers are neither absolutely the same nor absolutely different from the essence of the soul, and he adopts Bacon's expression of "virtual parts" to describe them.

INTELLECT

Pecham argued that intellectual knowledge involved the co-operation of the senses as its occasion and not as its cause, also the "lux aeterna."

The senses occasion the phantasm, from which the "species intelligibis" is assimilated by the intellect. Such is that by which the external world is known, it is a likeness drawn from the whole composite of the universal and particular natures of the singular. A knowledge of the universal alone is not a sufficient ratio for knowing the singular here and now.

Pecham with Grosseteste and Bacon thought this "intellectus materialis" to be both passive and active.

It is as "intellectus agens" that it comes in contact with the "lux increata" which enables it to arrive at truth. Pecham seems to regard the "intellectus agens" as the Divine Light of God, and as such not part of the human soul, otherwise it would know all but "abstractus, immixtus neque possibilis et est in sua substantia actio et scientia in actu, est ergo in anima intellectus hic agens sicut motivum in moto." As he, on the one hand, regards it as an activity of the "intellectus materialis," and on

the other something not a part of it or else it would know all in God's mind, his attitude is obscure. Apart from the facts of a proposition, it is as to the formal or eternal truth of the proposition that the active intellect gives enlightenment.

This attitude involved him in a lengthy argument against the Averroistic doctrine, that there is but one intellect for all men, which denies individuality to human souls.

KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

Pecham held that some knowledge of God could be derived from some consideration of the order, origin, perfection and changeability of His creatures. In addition, there is knowledge by "species innatae" or species con-created with the soul as taught by John of Damascus.

Knowledge of other spiritual beings may be acquired by innate species, "species impressae," *i.e.*, species added to the soul in time by God or the angels, or by "species expressae" *i.e.*, species eternally and essentially in the soul, *e.g.*, the soul's knowledge of itself and of spiritual beings.

Pecham differs from Bacon, since he regards the infused species of the separated soul as not equal to those of angels, for only in the glorified state does man become like unto angels.

The body in its glorified state being extremely subtle, in virtue of its penetrative power, impalpability, transparency, and velocity will not retard knowledge, only as it did in man's original state of innocence, and though it will include "in actu" both the exterior and the interior senses, these senses will not contribute to the development and sanctification of the soul, as they do in this life, but exist only "propter delectationem superabundentem."

WILL

With regard to the will, though the operation of willing is occasioned or partly caused by knowledge, for without knowledge there can be no desire, Pecham puts forward the primacy of will over intellect. First because the intellect can be said to be the most superior power only when as including the will it is opposed to the senses. Second, without exertion of the will the intellect cannot operate. Third, understanding is a movement of the soul that has more of the nature of a passive potentiality, whilst the Will is more of an active potentiality. Lastly, Beatitude lies principally in the Will, because the good "proprie et per se" pertains to the Will, but only "sub ratione veri" to the intellect.

Even Aristotle did not mean by Contemplation that beatitude only lay in cogitation, but rather in the delight of wisdom.

MEMORY

As to memory, Pecham says there are three kinds, a sensible memory which we enjoy in the same way as animals, and a twofold intellectual memory. One contains the natural intellectual impressions of the soul as to truth and goodness and also the laws of Eternal Light, and this does not require any bodily organ; the other receives the intellectual species extracted from phantasms, and this, though it does not use an organ *per se*, yet by a necessary accident has recourse to an organ as Avicenna says. But the first and the third are related to time, whilst the second is not.

ANGELS

As to angels, Pecham follows Bacon in attributing to them a composition of essence and existence, matter and form, act and potentiality, species and differentia. As to their matter, it is spiritual matter, not physical matter, which is subjected to contrariety and quantity, nor mathematical matter which is subject to quantity only.

As to their cognition, Pecham held that as to inferior things it depended on innate species of both singulars and universals, and received nothing from corporeal things, apart from their being the occasion of the consideration of things.

In addition to their most innate knowledge, some angels have higher knowledge, resulting from the co-operation of supernatural light with their natural light, and a still higher knowledge, that is purely supernatural, which is the vision of things *in Verbo*.

Through the operations of their wills, angels may be said to be circumscribed to place "per accidens vel diffinitive non dimensive."

GOD

God is Pure Act, and His Existence and Action are the same as His Essence.

Pecham held that the attributes that we assign to God could not correspond to separate entities in Him, because pure actuality means pure simplicity.

As to the differentiation of the Persons of the Trinity, Pecham regards the plurality of the Persons as arising "ex sola relatione," but though when the relation is compared with the Essence "in Essendo" there is no difference, yet when the relation is compared "in propria quidditate et ratione" there is a difference, which is called a difference of reason.

Pecham's distinction by reason, as being something between a

logical and a real distinction, seems to point towards the formal distinction, subsequently brought forward by Duns Scotus, that is that the distinction is logical in respect of the common divine properties and real in regard to the Personal Characteristics.

As to God's knowledge of things other than Himself, He knows singulars because He produces them, because He knows Himself, which is the cause of all things through His Own Essence.

Pecham regarded eternal creation to be impossible, because "esse post non esse" and actuality commencing with time is of the very essence of creation.

He followed Bacon in denying that Aristotle held that the world is eternal (cf., p. 506).

Richard de Middleton, d. 1308, known as *Doctor Solidus*, *Fundatissimus*, *Copiosus*, was probably born in Northumberland, date unknown, and educated at Oxford. He joined the Franciscan Friars, and the first record of him is as teaching in Paris about 1280. In 1283 he was one of the judges of Olivi, and in 1284-5 he became a master at Paris. In 1296 he and William of Falgar were in Naples as tutors of St. Louis, the son of Charles II of Sicily.

His chief works were :

Commentum Super IV Sententiarium (c. 1285-1295).

Quodlibet Tria (c. 1284-1287).

Questiones Disputatae (330, c. 1284).

De Gradu Formarum (*Rules of Logic*).

In ethics he seems to have followed Grosseteste ; as to Plurality of Forms he followed John Pecham ; he denied Bonaventura's interpretation of the Augustinian doctrine of "rationes seminales" and that of direct Illumination without the use of phantasms. For the rest he was strongly anti-Thomistic, and followed the condemnations of Tempier in 1277.

PASSIVE POTENTIALITIES

According to Richard of Middleton, matter is the subject of "becoming," and form is the actuality which determines that subject. But he divides matter into a passive principle and an adaptation to form, which latter is really and not merely logically distinct from the former.

Potentiality is the mode in which matter receives form and the mode in which it also receives disposition to form.

In one way potentiality is passive and as such does not differ from matter, in another it is a principle or appetite concreated with matter from which the educible form is educed. At least

it seems difficult to distinguish it from a similar view held by John Pecham.

Of the causality of the agent in actualizing into a likeness of itself this preadaptation in matter or in destroying the existent form, no theory is offered by Richard or Pecham.

CREATION

Richard held that in the work of Creation, God made something out of nothing; not out of pre-existing material, which implies the eternity of the universe; nor from His Own substance, which involves a mutation in Himself.

Primordial matter he held was created, neither under one complete form, nor under the confused forms of all bodies that now exist; but rather that God created the celestial bodies, elements, and hypostases of the animal species, as so many positive potentialities in primordial matter. This agrees with the view of Hugo of St. Victor, that everything was in the form of disposition and seems to indicate progressive evolution. He did not regard time as being created before the universe, nor did he attribute to lux any of the properties ascribed to it by Grosseteste.

The likeness of the offspring to the father arises because the semen comes from the substance of the father, not "in actu" but "in potentia propinqua."

Where man is concerned, the form comes from God immediately, man generating man only in the sense of educing from the potentiality of matter an incomplete form, a disposition susceptible to the intellect given by God.

With regard to artistic or any mechanical production of a thing, which is described as generation "secundum quid," in addition to the form in the mind of the agent, Richard maintained that the material is in reality an already existent composite, whose substantial form remains the same throughout the further differentiation of its accidents. It is in this way that he explains the indestructibility of matter, since he regards Creation, as so many positive potentialities in primordial matter.

MATTER

Richard regarded matter as having an essence of its own, being ingenerable and incorruptible, but remaining the common subject of change. If form alone were the cause of the *esse* of matter, the matter of each form would be destroyed with the destruction of that form, and with each succeeding one, new matter would come into being, as Avicenna held; Aristotle

himself regarded matter as contributing something to the composite.

Though denied by St. Thomas Aquinas, Richard agreed with Pecham that though matter does not exist in nature apart from form, it possesses an *esse* mediating between "esse actu" and "non esse," "aliquid actualitatis gradum, quamvis infimum et indeterminatissimum," so that it could so exist by Divine Power in the sense that it does not involve a contrary. Such a possibility based on its proper *esse* may be supported by the fact that an accident, whose natural *esse* is "esse in subjecto," is able by the Divine Power to exist *per se* in the Sacrament of the Altar (cf., Chap. XXII, p. 457).

Richard held that terrestrial matter was only one, in respect of its successive changes, he also held that there exists two other matters of different natures to terrestrial matter, *viz.*, celestial matter of the stars, and spiritual matter, the pre-requisite subject of change and development found in angels and human souls.

FORM

As to form, Richard denies that it actually exists before it is educed as the disposition of matter to it, unless such is limited to an "esse purum possibile."

He follows Thomas of York's view of Aristotle by deriving form partly "ab intra" and partly "ab extra," but he does not follow Thomas of York and St. Augustine in regarding the "ab intra" pre-existing factor as something active. Richard, like St. Albertus Magnus and St. Thomas Aquinas, regards this as a purely passive principle, which it is somewhat difficult to harmonize with his theory that this principle is con-created with matter.

He did not identify his purely possible potentialities in matter with St. Augustine's "rationes seminales."

The actualization of the potentialities in matter is gradual in animate generation, hence a form may be received *magis vel minus*, more or less, which was denied by St. Thomas Aquinas.¹⁸

UNIVERSALS

As to the universal, Richard, like Thomas of York (cf., Chap. XVIII, p. 253), held that the universal was only *in re*, that is in the singular in potentiality, because nature does not make one thing to be in many different things. What is common is in the singular, but what is universal is in the mind. Logical premises are only found in things themselves under a different mode. Thus the common nature in individuals is not the same as their

¹⁸ *De Potentia*, III, 9, n. 9.

individual nature. Since the potential universal is not nothing, he is led to say "The universal is not any complete thing really existing in the individual, but it is really multiplied in individuals."

After at first maintaining that every singular had an individual form, he seems to agree with Bishop Tempier in condemning the theory that matter can be the cause of individuation. Finally he seems to arrive at the same opinion as John Pecham that matter, though it may be a *sine qua non* for individuation, is not indeed the cause of it. He rejects the theory held by Avicenna and Porphyry that accidents individuate, but he held that it is caused by the form.

ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE

As to the composite, Richard regarded matter and form as potential parts constituting one essence; form only being prior to matter in having greater actuality, that is that it is by form that the composite chiefly acts.

Existence gives to essence a new real relation to the giver of existence, though existence adds nothing real to essence; so that they are not really distinct. If they were, existence would either have to exist in itself, even if not definable *per se*, or it would be an accident having more actuality than its subject; further, if it were distinct, it would only be linked to essence by some other reality and so *ad infinitum*.

St. Thomas Aquinas made it quite clear that he regarded the Deity alone as having existence indistinct from essence (cf., Chap. XXI, p. 306).

But Richard, like Bacon, does not hold that they are identical, he regards the distinction as something more than logical but less than real. The relation that existence gives to essence is only virtually distinct from essence.

SOUL

As to psychology, Richard depended largely for his opinions on the "De Differentia Spiritus et Animae" of the Arabian doctor Costa-ben-Luca (Constabulus) (cf., p. 205).

Richard held that the soul is the form of man, but that the body has its own form or forms. The soul has an aptitude for the body, which is not dissolved by death; such aptitude is the result of the intense activity of the soul, as an incorruptible entity, that even its own spiritual matter does not satisfy it.

It is not the soul alone, but the whole composite, that constitutes the real person. He rejects the view of Hugo St. Victor and Avicenna that the soul is in itself a complete existence, and even

a complete person, because such would undermine the complete unity of the body and soul.

In so far as the nature of the soul demands union with its body, the soul is dependent, but in so far as the soul may exist by itself and comes into being by creation, while the body comes by generation, it is independent.

After death, the dead body retains the same accidents as the living body, hence the soul is not the only form in man. The bodily spirits perish, on being separated with the intellectual soul, they are vital spirits and could not determine matter to the "forma cadaveris." There must be a "forma corporeatatis," because the accidents of matter must be corrupted with the corruption of that which gives stability, *viz.*, the substantial form.

To the objection that the "forma corporeatatis" being in both a live and dead body, one and the same substance would rank in two genera, it is replied if that which is one and the same be incomplete, this may be like primary matter, that is incomplete but one in number, which is found in both plants and animals.

VEGETATIVE AND SENSITIVE DISPONENTS

In the human embryo the incomplete vegetative and sensitive forms educed from matter exist before the coming of the rational soul created by God.

They are not corrupted by the arrival of the intellectual soul, having nothing repugnant to it, they are incomplete and merely act as disponents. They do not remain virtually in the intellectual soul, but as they must exist before, so must they continue after, the arrival of the intellectual soul, and herein Richard differs from St. Thomas Aquinas (cf., Chap. XXI, p. 340 and Chap. XXII, p. 406).

A single form would be incompatible with the natural corruptibility of man. The intellectual soul is incorruptible, and so is "materia prima," so that if the intellectual soul were the only form in man, the composite man would be incorruptible. Richard repeats Pecham's theological arguments based on the Eucharist and adds an argument based on the doctrine of Original Sin.

"It can only be there because of some disposition, educed from the potentiality of matter by the power of the generator, and this means that it is in matter, in virtue of some form other than the rational soul."

These subordinate forms are no distinct or separate entities; each lower form exists as matter for the successively higher one, the "forma corporeatatis" together with primary matter and the lower forms make an incomplete composite that acts as a

“*materia proxima et deposita*” for the rational soul together with which it constitutes the composite man.

On death, the “*forma corporeatatis*” loses its stability, and corruption results because only an imperfect substance remains.

But the vegetative and sensitive souls, though animate, are educed out of the potentiality of prime matter, and are therefore completed by the intellectual soul, but form together one soul; as was shown above, he called them disponents to the intellectual soul.

INTELLECTUAL SOUL

Since the intellectual soul completes both the “*forma corporeatatis*” and the animate forms, it is rightly said to inform the body “*per se et essentialiter*,” so that the soul according to its complete powers is present in every complete part of it.

The intellectual soul comes into being by the creative power of God. Richard shows that it could not be educed from matter, because all that which is generated is corrupted; because it would have only organic powers, which are weakened by strong objects and old age, whilst the soul is strengthened by such; because the mode of understanding follows the mode of being, but to ratiocinate from universals, to reflect on itself, to be free in its appetites, and to desire God would be impossible; because the soul has power over the above the animation of the body and is therefore not “*secundum se totam*,” the perfection of matter and so corrupted with it. Further, man by his reason is more noble than the rest of nature. And, finally, the soul through knowledge and love stands in a definite relation to God “*Whose Image it is*.” Hence from this dignity of the soul it must be concluded that it is produced immediately by God.

With the exception of God there is nothing that can destroy the soul, for apart from the withdrawal of His conservation, the only other cause of corruption is the action of contraries and this could not affect the soul, because the matter of the soul is not in potentiality to any other specific form.

SPIRITUAL MATTER

Richard concluded that as the soul has an independent and incorruptible nature, it must be a substance and must be composed of matter and form. Moreover, its contingency, ability to change and to develop, also presuppose the existence of matter in it. Such spiritual matter does not prevent the soul from being the form of the body, for since it is unable to terminate the appetite of the form of the soul, that form can perfect two matters.

But he regarded the spiritual matter of angels, as only like that of the human soul in respect of its potentiality to change, but

unlike it in its power to completely satisfy its own form which has thus no aptitude for other matter.

INDIVIDUATION

Since the matter in the soul makes it to be a substance, the soul contains its own principle of individuation, so that each soul is an incommunicable determination of the specific human nature (cf., pp. 524, 525).

The soul is individualized by God, in virtue of its own essence, and then infused into a body indifferent to every soul. Only after the infusion does the body acquire an adaptation to its own soul, similarly the inclination towards a particular body which is created with the essence of the soul, is perfected only after the union of the soul with the body.

This differs from the "habitudo ad corpus" held by St. Thomas Aquinas, which the personal immortality of the soul without matter demanded. Richard, regarding the body and soul as two incomplete entities, is explaining the attraction of a particular soul for its resurrected body.

Richard regarded rational souls as also differing in colouring, derived from the body; by their degree of participation in the species, women with individual exceptions in virtue of their own exertions participating in the image of God to a less extent than men.

FACULTIES OF SOUL

RESPECTUS

Richard held that the faculties of the soul were not accidents, as held by Aegidius Romanus (Gilles of Rome); nor absolute natures added to the essence of the soul, like Hugo St. Victor; but were a "respectus" to the essence of the soul.

Anselm, St. Augustine, and Aristotle are quoted in support of this view, that they are incomplete forms or integrant parts of the soul but not the whole of the soul.

They add something "de genere relationis" to the soul and this cannot be nothing, because relation is one of the ten predicaments.

As to the objection that God alone acts through His Essence, Richard points out that the respectus differentiates the case. Moreover, the meaning of the statement that God alone acts through His Essence, is that His Essence is neither given Him, nor conserved by another, nor is His Action evoked by a ratio other than Himself.

The fact that the faculties require instruments, prevents the soul from being always in act.

He likens this theory to the doctrine of the Trinity, in that the soul is the image of God, comparing the Divine Persons to its relative properties.

INTELLECT

Richard follows Pecham in regarding the Intellect as secondary to the Will, though it is more important to our view since *per se* it involves form as the likeness of the thing known.

Richard calls the species extracted from the phantasm by the active intellect "refulgentia," and expressed the opinion that in addition to external singulars, from which the phantasms come, we also know "noetii" or intellectual singulars.

His reasons are that since singulars participate in the nature of entity, they participate in the nature of intelligibility, for Aristotle in *De Anima* says, that whatever is, is the object of the intellect. Further, St. Augustine points out that since we will and love the singular we must know it.

Experience teaches us that we know the singular and since no sense faculty is able to reflect on its act, for it only knows "mediante organo," we must know the singular by the intellect. Constabulus is also quoted as saying that no judgment can be made about any two things, unless we know what the things are.

We do not know the singular merely by reflection, but we possess a more distinct knowledge resolving the singular into its rational parts.

ILLUMINATION

Richard does not regard the Active Intellect as conveying any special Divine Co-operation. Such would involve supernatural knowledge, but to this type of knowledge alone can be applied such statements as "est lux vera quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum" and "ego sum lux mundi."

Knowledge of a thing is confined to "secundum id quod est" (logical truth), but, on the other hand, knowledge "sub ratione qua verum" (ontological truth), since the exemplar of the thing is in the Divine Mind, cannot be known.

However, by arguing from the nature of creative things, a creature can come to some knowledge of God as the First Cause, and thus arrive at a created truth in the eternal truth, as an effect is known from its cause.

KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

As to our natural knowledge of God, our only innate thing is our power to search for God. By consideration of His Creatures, who as effects bear some likeness to their cause, we can conclude

that God is First Cause, Creator, Governor, Immutable Law-Giver, Highest Harmony, all satisfying Good and the ultimate End to which every being tends.

KNOWLEDGE OF SOUL

Richard denies that the soul has any direct knowledge of itself, apart from knowledge through sensibles, and insists on the necessity of proportion between the intellect and its objects, and the indispensibility of the phantasms, so that we cannot apprehend purely intellectual beings like angels.

In addition to a clearer knowledge of external creatures, the separated soul is better able to reflect on itself than when it informed corporeal matter, and so it knows itself immediately without advancing from its acts to its potentialities, *i.e.*, ascertaining its powers by reflecting on its acts.

WILL PRIOR TO INTELLECT

Richard in extolling the Will at the expense of the Intellect, like all Franciscans, insists that the object of the intellect is only "ens sub ratione qua ens" not even "qua verum," for a created intellect can never grasp the "ratio veri" or exemplar in the Divine Mind. Whilst, on the other hand, the object of the Will is nobler, namely "ens sub ratione qua bonum," because the "ratio bonitatis" is one of perfection and goodness "formaliter per se ipsam," whilst a "ratio entitatis" is good only "propter rationem bonitatis."

Secondly, Charity is the noblest virtue and the love of God is our ultimate end. Thirdly, it is more possible to become like God in our Will than in our Intellect. Lastly, the Will must be nobler than the Intellect, because the cognitive act can never satisfy the rational creation, unless it culminates in an act of the appetitive potentiality. Richard admits the initial necessity of the Intellect, but its necessity does not prevent its subordination to the Will, as the Will can move as it chooses.

MEMORY

Of memory, Richard says little, its function is to retain permanently the "species intelligibiles," but because the "species imaginables" which must enter into all understanding, are easily effaced from the sense organs, man forgets much.

ANGELS

Richard regarded angels as not self-existent beings, but as having been created by God in *aeuum* before time, a state of

duration that has strictly speaking no succession. Succession belongs to time, parts of which are co-extensive with *aevum*.

He ascribed matter to angels, on account of their having potentiality, as mentioned before, such matter satisfies its form and has no appetite for another.

He quotes Boethius, Avicenna, St. Augustine and Averroes in support of his argument. Richard, like Thomas of York, says that arguments adduced from Boethius and Dionysius against angels having matter, only refer to corporeal matter.

Richard regards angels as individuated, more than one in the same species, inequality varying not only with the angelic order, but applying also to members within an order.

He regarded angels as having knowledge of creatures, including temporal beings, and a general knowledge of the "esse" and "quid est" of God.

In addition, the Good Angels have a supernatural knowledge of God, given to them on sanctification and impeccability. Such knowledge is intuitive and not discursive, but being finite, the angel must, indeed, understand conclusions successively, but since he understands each conclusion in its principle "unico intento," he does not understand by ratiocination as man does.

He also possesses a determined number of con-created species, covering "universalia omnium rerum naturalium et multa singularia incorruptibilia," he also understands himself directly. The will of angels once completed for Good is free from the servitude of sin and misery.

As to the angels relation to place, Richard agrees that it is diffinitive in place, and not by circumspection, such applies to his substance as well as operation.

TRINITY

In addition to what has been said of God (*supra*, last page), God as Pure Act is devoid of all composition, hence attributes can only be ascribed to Him "per rationem," yet each attribute indicates in the fulness of Divine perfection something which we intend to signify by such words as wisdom, power and justice.

"Inasmuch as our concepts correspond to something in the plenitude of the Divine perfection, since to speak of the power of God, is not to speak of His justice, they have value; but inasmuch as they represent our inability to express under one concept the totality of the Divine perfections they are incomplete."

The Persons of the Trinity are not merely logically distinct from the Divine Essence, because between Themselves there is real distinction; on the other hand, They are not really distinct from the Essence, for the Essence is "Simple." "The difference

is in the mode of being, because They differ in mode of being from each other by way of affirmation and negation, since the persons are different, but the essence not ; the Essence is absolute and there is no person in essence ; it means there is nothing really different from the essence, but only that based on being in a different mode."

So that for Richard the Divine Essence is preserved, it is the same Essence, which exists under the modes of being in the Father, in the Son, and in the Holy Ghost. Likewise, the multiplicity of the Divine Persons is preserved, because the mode of being is a relation, and a relation has some entity that provides our basis for regarding the Persons as *supposita*.

Like St. Thomas Aquinas, Richard regards the relation in God, when compared to its terms, as implying something other than its foundation, whilst when compared to its subject, it is the same as its foundation.

GOD'S KNOWLEDGE

As to God's knowledge, He knows all things, God knows Himself, as the efficient, final, and exemplary cause of all that is. Without detriment to His simplicity, He may be said to have plurality of ideas, extending to every individual creature actual and possible, because all are made by Him, such is likewise borne out by revealed religion. His knowledge causes things without being caused by them, it does not involve any application of a universal to a particular, since in one simple act God "intues" all the singulars of a definite species.

Although God cannot know evil individuals directly, He is not entirely ignorant of them, "Si Deus non cognascit mala approbando, certissima tamen novit ea intuendo." Both practical and speculative intellect are attributed to God.

Richard, with all the Scholastics, attributed the Creation of the world out of nothing to God's Will and Generosity, without any moving influence implying a need in His Nature.

GOD'S WILL

God is a perfectly simple and actual being and in actualizing exemplars the Divine Will does not pass from potentiality to act. Before actualization, creatures in their potential existence are neither logically, nor really distinct from God, but "secundum rationem quamvis magis debeat dici secundum rationem quam secundum rem." After actualization, creatures become really distinct from God, the change occurring only in the minor term of the relation, even as the relation of paternity implies no positive difference to the father, the change applying only to the offspring.

CREATION IN TIME

The Creation of the world is in time, production out of nothing involves newness, God had freedom of Will as to Creation, but God is not able to produce an actual infinity, thus also held John of Damascus.

Matthew of Aquasparta, 1235-1302, a Franciscan, and Master of Theology at Paris and Bologna.

He was a disciple of St. Bonaventura and became Lector of the Sacred Palace at Rome in 1281; General of the Franciscans in 1287; Cardinal in 1288; and Bishop of Porto in 1289.

He wrote a Commentary on the *Sentences*, *Quodlibeta* and *Questiones Disputatae*.

Of these latter, "De Fide" expounds the foundations of faith and its relation to reason, and "De Cognitione" contains a complete psychology.

Like William of Falgar, he held that things of sense do not act on the intellect, but *vice versa*; the operation of abstraction of species is performed by the intellect by its own unaided power. But by Divine illumination the intellect grasps the truth in its objective relation to the eternal exemplar in the Divine Mind.

He held that "knowledge begins from below but ends in an influence coming from above."

With St. Bonaventura he emphasizes the resemblance between the intelligent creature and the Creator, resulting from the power of understanding. The Creator not only creates but conserves; as applied to an act of knowledge this Divine concurrence is called an illumination, the "ratio motiva." We attain to Divine Light and Eternal Reason not as to an object, but as a motive principle which determines in us the knowledge of created things.

There are therefore three factors whose co-operation is essential to the fulfilment of the cognitive process: the "ratio materialis" which is derived from the external world, and the "ratio formalis" which is constituted partly by the light of internal reason, but in its completeness consummated by the eternal "regulae," the Divine Ideas.

Walter of Bruges, d. 1307. A Franciscan, Bishop of Poitiers, 1279-1307, a disciple of St. Bonaventura.

He wrote *Questiones Disputatae* and Commentaries on the first two books of the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard.

He was a remarkable thinker, according to Longpré, who analysed the immediate data of consciousness and the way in which the soul is present to itself in the Augustinian sense.

He also so outlined Voluntarism, that Duns Scotus could add nothing to it.

CHAPTER XXVI

DUNS SCOTUS

Duns Scotus, 1266–1308. *Doctor Subtilis*, a Realist, according to one account, was born at Maxton, in the County of Roxburgh in Scotland, educated at the school at Haddington and the Franciscan convent at Dumfries. More probably, however, he was born at Embleton, in Northumberland, where Merton College, Oxford, had lands and still has the right of presentation to the vicarage.

He was brought as a boy to Oxford and joined Merton College, where he subsequently lectured.

At Oxford he had William of Ware as his teacher.

He became a Franciscan in 1281, and was ordained a priest in 1291, at Northampton.

In 1302 he went to Paris, where he took his Doctor's degree, defending, it is alleged, the Doctrine of the Immaculate Conception (which was eventually promulgated by Pius IX in 1854) in two hundred arguments against the Dominicans.¹

In 1303 he is alleged to have been banished from Paris by Philip IV for opposing his anti-papal policy, but to have returned next year.

In any event, it seems clear that, after leaving Paris about 1305, he returned to Oxford, from whence he was sent to Cologne in 1307, where he died in the following year.

He is claimed by the Franciscans as their greatest thinker.

The school in Paris that followed his tenets was called the Scotists or Cordeliers, as opposed to the Thomists or Jacobins, who followed those of St. Thomas Aquinas; these names Cordeliers and Jacobins were taken from the names of the streets in Paris where their adherents resided.

Duns Scotus was foremost a logician and metaphysician, but he was also possessed of a strong mathematical and scientific bent, which he is said to have derived from Grosseteste, whose works he frequently quoted; but like Roger Bacon, his vituperation often degenerated into mere vulgarity.

The stress which he placed on the Priority of the Will and its

¹ This does not seem to be confirmed by his very diffident expression of opinion contained in *Op. Ox.*, III, 1, 9.

freedom may have led him to the verge of Pelagianism, but it has now been clearly proved that the charge of Pantheism, arising out of his doctrine of metaphysical First Prime Matter, cannot be sustained.

Under Pope Paul V, in 1610, the Congregation of the Inquisition decreed that "quidquid Scoti esse constat, intactum inviolatumque preserveret." For this reason, perhaps, so many spurious works have been attributed to him. His works comprise :

De Modis Significandi ; seu Grammatica Speculativa.

Logicalia (Commentaries on the Organon).

Quaestiones Subtilissimae Supra Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis.

Tractatus de Rerum Principio.

Tractatus de Primo Rerum Omnium Principio.

Quaestiones in IV Libros Sententiarum (Peter Lombard) *Opus Oxoniense.*²

Quaestiones in IV Libros Sententiarum (Peter Lombard) *Reportata Parisiensis.*³

Quaestiones Quodlibetales.

The last two books of the *Quaestiones Subtilissimae* are said to be of doubtful genuineness, and Book I of the *Reportata* is but an abridgement of the full MS., a copy of which is in Merton College, Oxford, 59 ff, 11-190, v. The distinctions 19-39 of Book III are also by a later writer.

M. Grabmann attributes the *Grammatica Speculativa* to Thomas of Erfurt (cf., Chap. XXIII, p. 467).

THEOLOGY

Duns Scotus, following the Posterior Analytics, lays down that a science must conform to four conditions :⁴

- (1) It must be a form of cognition which affords certainty.
- (2) Its object must be necessary.
- (3) It must proceed causally.
- (4) From step to step by a syllogism.

As theology lacks the last condition, strictly speaking, it is not a science. Further, it deals with contingent, as well as necessary, truths, of which there is no science ; for, according to Aristotle, to know the contingent as necessary is not to know the contingent at all, yet as defined in the Ethics, where it is contrasted with opinion and assumption, it may be called science, or better still, as St. Bonaventura termed it, "sapientia."⁵

Again, Duns Scotus maintained that theology is a practical and not a speculative science, as Aristotle had termed it.

² Merton Coll., Ox., 60, 61, 62.

⁴ *An. Pst.*, I, cap. 2.

³ Merton Coll., Ox., 59.

⁵ *OP. Ox. Prol.*, Q.3, n. 28.

Practice he defined as an act of a faculty, other than the intellect, which is naturally posterior to the act of cognition, and which must be elicited according to right reason, in order that the act may be a right act. It is an act of volition following an act of understanding determinative of the rightness of the act.⁶

Theology is a practical science because the end of man is not only to know God, but to love Him, which is a free act of the Will. Aristotle, however, held that though the First Mover moved the world as an object of love, yet this love was necessitated "Necessitate naturali," and thus theology was speculative.

By limiting theology to the expression practical science, Duns Scotus does not thereby belittle its function, nor strive to prove that it does not extend our knowledge, nor deny that it shares any portion of its subject matter with any of the other sciences.

The principles of theology are the articles of Faith, those of philosophy the self-evident principles of natural reason.

Theology carries with it an imperative, for it not only teaches what God is, but also commands us to love Him, and shows us those actions by which He is pleased to be worshipped and served, standing to the supernatural virtues in the same relation as Prudence stands to the moral and natural virtues.

It may thus be seen that herein Duns Scotus is far from promoting that scepticism which is often attributed to him.

Doctor Harris, following Minges, points out that Theorems XIV-XVI of the "Theoremata" form a "Tractatus de Creditis," which is indeed a sceptical criticism of the content of the natural theology. But this is wholly inconsistent with his *De Primo Principio* and his Two Commentaries on the *Sentences*, and that it must be regarded either as material for academic disputation, or better still, that he is there referring to a demonstration "a priori" as opposed to the empirical "demonstratio quia."

The fundamental thesis of Duns Scotus is the same as that of St. Thomas Aquinas, that there are certain truths accessible to unaided reason, whilst others are attainable only through revelation. (Kant rejected all metaphysical proof of the existence of God.)

At the time of Duns Scotus, Aristotle had attained such commanding influence in the schools, that to gain acceptance for an original view some passage of Aristotle had to be laid under contribution. It is quite clear that Duns Scotus in some cases used Aristotle more as a convention than as an authority, and utilised individual passages of his works for supporting quite un-Aristotelian opinions. St. Thomas, likewise, of course, had definitely sought to evolve a metaphysic in support of Christian

⁶ *Ibid.*, Q. IV, n. 3.

theology out of, and not as a corollary to arguments drawn from the works of the pagan philosophers.

It is argued in favour of Duns Scotus, that he clearly realized the difficulty of fully adapting the philosophy of Aristotle to the doctrines of Christianity, and that it was to avoid the dilemmas into which the system of St. Thomas Aquinas was forced, that he so largely maintained the old Augustinian tradition.

The concept of "materia primo prima" of Duns Scotus, though, indeed, little more than an abstract metaphysical entity, gave greater support to the doctrine of Creation than St. Thomas was able to derive from the Aristotelian matter and form, the co-eternal constituents of an eternal world; though Duns Scotus himself does not claim it as affording any positive proof.

Individuation due to matter, insisted on by St. Thomas, had led him to substantiate his doctrine of the individuality of the soul after death, only by sacrificing the consistency of his argument; but this offered no obstacle to the individuation by form supported by Duns Scotus. Likewise, insistence by Duns Scotus that the body and soul are two separate entities, though involving a difficulty of the substantial union of two beings which are virtually each substances, did not necessarily conflict with his different theory of the relation of form to matter; and at the same time it avoided the difficulty of proof of the survival of the soul after separation from the body.

Moreover, the Voluntarism of Duns Scotus is claimed to be more in consonance with the principles of Christianity than pure Intellectualism with its tendency to determinism; and that the doctrine of Prudence hardly adequately describes the doctrine of Christian ethics.

ONTOLOGY

Duns Scotus differed in some respects as to his Ontology from the Thomists, and this had its repercussion in several ways on his views on Metaphysics and Psychology.

Duns Scotus' difficulty starts with Being itself. Logically it can only be used in an equivocal sense, for the Categories must be irreducible to one another, if they are to remain Categories, but this is impossible when applied to metaphysics; it requires a metaphysical analogy of being in the ten genera to maintain the unity of the universe, for there is an order of being which holds their reality together.⁷

Later he abandoned this theory and he postulated univocacy of being, not only in the ten Categories, but also between God and His creatures.

⁷ *Metap.*, IV, 1, 12.

Being is the "objectum primum et adaequatum" of the human intellect. We do not know the substance of things directly, but only through their accidents, which act upon our sense organs. We have therefore no quidditative concept of the substance of sensible things, other than that abstracted from our conception of their accidents.⁸

This concept thus abstracted is the notion of being, which must be univocal in both substance and accident.

Aristotle in *Metaphysics IX* stated that in each genus there is a "primum," which is the "mesura" of all the species of that genus. But genus is a unity and is predicated univocally of its various species, and the same relation as to being obtains in the Category of substances and other accidental Categories.

Moreover, in *Metaphysics VI*, definition is stated, like essence, to belong to the Category of substance primarily, and secondarily to the other Categories. Entity, quiddity, and definability, therefore, all belong to accident as well as to substance without destroying the priority of the latter. Consequently univocal being can be postulated in all the Categories.⁹

With regard to the univocity of being between God and His creatures, in his earlier works Duns Scotus agreed with St. Thomas that such was only analogical, but later he adopted another view.

Duns Scotus distinguished between logical and metaphysical genera. The logical genera are the ten Categories in none of which can God be placed. But there is a metaphysical genus, which is prior to all these "genera generalissima," the genus "ens communissimi sumptum," which is divided into two, one "ens in se" or "esse purum" contains that which has being of its own right, that is, "is"; the other "ens habens esse," that which has derivative being. It is only the latter that is divided into the ten Categories. Such genus then has two subordinates, the one comprises God alone, the other all creation.

In the Commentaries on the *Sentences*, Duns Scotus maintains that these two divisions, into which being immediately falls, are beings of two kinds, infinite and finite, and that it is the latter only which are subdivided into the ten Categories.¹⁰

A good explanation of this somewhat abstruse theory, which lies scattered in the different works of Duns Scotus, is to be found in the second volume of Dr. Harris on Duns Scotus.

M. Gilson explains this theory somewhat as follows.

Being is only regarded as signifying the very act of existing, or the very existence of this act. It is the first intelligible concept

⁸ *Op. Ox.*, I, 3, 3, 9.

¹⁰ *Op. Ox.*, I, 8, 3, 18.

⁹ *Metap.*, IV, 1, 17.

attained by human minds. Nothing can be perceived nor conceived otherwise than as a being, only after that do we determine the nature of the object apprehended.

In spite of fallen nature, intellect attains, neither the essence of the singular, nor the essence rendered universal by a logical operation, but intelligible essence in itself, neither singular nor universal, taken in its pure determination.

Univocity of being, therefore, means that the quiddity, the very act of existing, taken apart from the modalities which determine the different modes of existence, is apprehended by the intellect as identical, whatever in other respects the being in question may be. Hence the proper object of the intellect will coincide with the adequate object, which will point to God, Who is true total and infinite Being.

There will, therefore, be an essential, though, of course, only a virtual continuity, between what nature knows and what Grace may give it power to know.

But univocity of being only provides a starting point for Beatific Vision by analogy, for it only points to the existence *qua* existence of Being, not to Infinite Being. It is thus the radical negation of Pantheism.

From this it follows that things have a truth of their own, because they are intelligible; their truth is their being, that is, their fidelity to their own essence. This fidelity is measured by the ideal type of the essence in question, that is by the Divine idea itself.

Likewise, a true judgment involves an object as it is, and every conceived truth is thus an intellectual apprehension of the essence, which is in itself what it is in God; thus the Divine thought rules our thought.

As to its existence, judgment is caused by our intellect which is caused by God, and every created intelligible light is a participation of the Divine Light.

God is first in order of knowledge, because He is first in order of Being.

“What was unknown to the Ancients is this idea of created truth, ordered of its own spontaneity towards Being, which is at once its end and its source, since by Him alone it exists and by Him alone can it be perfected and fulfilled.”¹¹

PROOFS OF GOD

Our knowledge of God's existence, “God is,” cannot be a self-evident proposition “*per se notum*,” because the terms of such proposition must have in themselves the ground of its

¹¹ *Spirit of Mediæval Philosophy*, pp. 263-8.

evidence, they must be distinctly known as in a definition ; but the Divine Essence is not known to man.¹²

For a proposition "per se notum" does not mean that its evidence has no ground, but that the grounds of its evidence lie in the terms themselves, as constituting that proposition by their conjunction and not in any other element implied, which does not fall wholly within the judgment in question, *e.g.*, the whole is greater than its part. The essence, expressed by the terms, must be distinctly known, as in a definition. This distinction between a confused and distinct concept is substituted by Duns Scotus for the distinction "in se" from "quoad nos" employed by St. Thomas.¹³

Duns Scotus held that being "per se" was the proper object of the human intellect (*cf.*, p. 539) which St. Thomas did not.¹⁴

For Duns Scotus the proposition "God exists" would be self evident to a mind having simple quidditative knowledge of Divine Essence ; but as this has not been vouchsafed to man, it is not self evident.

Duns Scotus, like Richard of Middleton, held that it could only be proved "a posteriori," or by a "demonstratio quia" resting on the contingency and mutability of creatures.

We have seen on page 538 how in the first place Duns Scotus divided being into "ens in se" and "ens habens esse," but prior to such differentiation being has certain transcendent attributes, Convertible and Disjunctive "passiones." The Convertible Passiones are Unity, Truth, and Goodness, and are so called because they are convertible with the notion of being ; everything that is, has a unity, it is also true that it is what it is, and in so far as it has being it is a good. They may be considered as inseparable, inherent accidents of being, and are virtually contained in the notion of being, which cannot be conceived without such attributes.

The Disjunctive Passiones, necessary and possible, act and potency, finite and infinite, are attributes which differ from the Convertible Passiones in that each pair must exhaust the whole of reality between them. Whilst each single attribute cannot belong to all that is, yet it is transcendent, because it does not order its "subjectum determinabile" under any of the ten Categories.¹⁵

A deduction "a priori" of the Disjunctive Passiones cannot be made from the notion of being, but granted the existence of the less noble of the two extremes of the disjunction, the more

¹² *Op. Ox.*, I, 2, 2, 3.

¹³ *Cf. S.T.*, I, 2.

¹⁴ *Cf. S.T.*, I, 84, 85.

¹⁵ *Op. Ox.*, I, 8, 3, 19.

noble can be deduced from it, though not *vice versa*. (He adduces no proof of this somewhat doubtful assumption).

The existence of contingent being is a "prima vera" and cannot be deduced from the notion of being. "Those who deny it should be tortured until they admit that it is possible not to be tortured, when they would see fit to doubt the necessity of their torments."¹⁶

Duns Scotus then begins by postulating an essential order, which is twofold, an order of eminence and an order of dependence, each of which involves a "prius" and a "posterius"; the first represents the *prius* as "eminens" and the *posterius* as "excessum"; the second uses *prius* and *posterius* to express causal dependence "secundum naturam et essentialiam," so that the *prior* can exist without the *posterius*, like the Prior in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, IV, 11 (Chap. III, p. 65).

This order of dependence in relation to the finite world is fourfold, as it is a causal order including the four causes final, efficient, formal and material.

The mutual relations of these four principles determine the conditions of the finite universe, yielding a scheme which Duns Scotus sets out in the form of nine Conclusions.

1. "No real object stands in a relation of essential order to itself," *e.g.*, all finite being is contingent.
2. "There can be no circle in the essential order."
Such is vicious as much in metaphysics as in logic.
3. "In the order of causation that which is not implicit in the prior cannot be implicit in the posterior."
4. "Whatever has no final cause cannot have an efficient cause."
"Natura nihil facit frustra." Chance is only *per accidens*.
5. "Whatever is not caused by efficient cause is not caused by a final cause."
For the final cause can only be a cause in so far as it sets in motion the efficient cause to the attainment of its end.
6. "Whatever has no efficient cause cannot have a material cause."

For matter is in potentiality to opposites and receives its actuality from form. But the union of form and matter must be brought about by the action of the efficient cause.

¹⁶ *Op. Ox.*, I, 39, 13.

7. "That which has no material cause can have no formal cause and *vice versa*."

The final and efficient causes may be regarded as extrinsic, and the material and formal causes as intrinsic.

8. "Whatever is not caused by extrinsic causes cannot be caused by intrinsic."

Because the latter need the former to originate their operation.

9. "The four causes are thus bound by an essential order, which is not an order of dependence, for such is a relation only between *causa* and *causatum*, but an order of Eminence, in which the final comes first then the efficient, the formal and the material last."

The order of dependence does not run parallel with the order of eminence, for the less noble does not always stand in a relation of cause of dependence on the more noble, *e.g.*, the compositum is dependent upon matter which is less perfect than it.

But taken together, it follows that "whatsoever has a final cause must also be exceeded in the order of eminence and this implies the existence of a higher being."

"Omni finitum est excessum."¹⁷

The existence of the world therefore implies efficient causation and the chain of causation must result in a First Cause, which must stand above the order of causation and be uncaused.

It must also be a necessary being and so actually existent and unique.

The existence of the First Being is likewise demonstrable in the order of final causation and in the order of eminence.

Thus there is a threefold primacy which can only belong to one being.

This supreme existent then, as first in the order of efficient causation, contains in itself "virtually" the totality of actuality; as first in the final order, the totality of goodness; and as first in the order of eminence the totality of perfection.¹⁸

Having proved that First Cause is possible, Duns Scotus goes on to argue that it exists and is necessary; somewhat as follows.

Of no being can it be said that it can exist of itself, unless it actually so exists.

The first cause must exist, since it would be "inconvenient to suppose that the supreme grade of possible existence did not exist."

The first Cause is not only that which is prior to other things, but that being, to be prior to which, involves a contradiction.

¹⁷ *Primo Principio*, cap. 2.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, cap. 3.

Its primacy implies its existence.

It is also necessary, for it is impossible for it not to be.

A thing has only possibility of not being, if there is a possibility of something else existing, which is incompatible with that thing ; because of two contradictory propositions one must always be false.

In the case of First Being, the possibility of which has already been established, there can be no other being, whose existence is incompatible with it. But this does not apply to contingent or caused beings, the mere possibility of which does not involve actual existence ; yet in the case of uncaused beings, possibility does imply existence. Only one being can exist necessarily 'ex se.' A plurality of such beings would involve a contradiction. For each would exist independently of each other, unrelated in an essential order, and the unity of the universe would thus be violated.¹⁹

The First Being is absolutely simple, because it is uncaused and therefore excludes all composition of form and matter ; it is limited by no privation, and contracted by no shadow of potentiality, and in it essence and existence are one.

It contains in itself all perfections of the highest degree and of necessity.

It is endowed with intelligence and will and is infinite and unique.²⁰

Before this final enunciation of the attributes of the Deity, Duns Scotus prefaces his remarks with a prayer, which while substantiating his orthodoxy, has sometimes been thought to cast doubt on his complete belief in the cogency of his arguments.²¹

For Duns Scotus human concepts must be formally univocal when applied to God as attributes, but this does not mean that He is metaphysically or actually such.

To take the concept of being for example, the being of God differs from that of the creature, which has "ens ab alio," whilst that of God is opposed, as infinite, perfect, unparticipated and essential ; it is only in virtue of an analogical participation that being belongs both to Creator and creature.

The univocal concept does not exhaust the concrete mode of the necessary and infinite being ; but if God could be conceived distinctly and set over against not-God He could be completely

¹⁹ *Primo Principio*, cap. 3, 5, 6.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, cap. 4.

²¹ "Domine Deus noster, de tua natura uniuersa, vere prima, vellem perfectiones quas in esse non dubito, aliquantulum ostendere si faveris. Credo te simplicem, infinitum, sapientem et volentem ; et quia nollem uti circulo in probando, de simplicitate quaedam praemittam, quae possunt primo probari ; alia de simplicitate usque ad suum locum, ubi possunt probari differantur."

known to His creatures. Then God would be placed in a genus and a radical difference between uncreated and created would be destroyed.

“Deus et creatura sunt primo diversa in realitate quia in nulla realitate conveniunt.”

The full discussion of the Divine Attributes is to be found both in the *De Primo Principia* and the *Opus Oxoniense I*, where the proofs are dealt with at great length and not always from the same point of view. Duns Scotus advances the following as some of his leading arguments.

As the sole necessary being in the universe, God loves no other end of necessity save His Own Being.

The universe is not necessary to Him, but the product of His Own free act, it is contingent upon His Will.

The causality of the First End is therefore the “mover” of the First Efficient as the object of Love.

The First Efficient therefore loves the First End.

But the Divine Will can have no cause, it is therefore necessary “ex se” and so is identical with the First Nature. If it were not identical it would have a cause, which would be the love of an end which would be prior to itself, which is impossible.

Similarly the Divine Act of understanding is identical with the Divine Nature. For self love implies understanding, for nothing can be loved which is not known.

The Divine Understanding is therefore “ex se” necessary and is thus identical with the Divine Nature.

As there is no act which is accidental to Him, this self love is identical with His Divine Essence.²²

As First Effective He draws the grounds of His own activity from His own essence alone. Whatever He causes to be, He causes from the love of the end. But this love presupposes knowledge and intelligence. Therefore before He knows Himself as Willing, He must know Himself as understanding.

The Divine Mind is eternally, actually, and necessarily understanding all intelligible things present, past and future, both possible and eternal. His knowledge embraces the whole of being and is identical with Himself.

As to infinity, he argues, *inter alia* :

The Divine Mind knows all intelligible things and these are infinite, but the Divine Mind is identical with the Divine Essence, which latter must therefore be infinite.

As to perfections, in finite being, no perfection which is of the same kind as accidental perfection is substantial or infinite ; thus even our understanding is accidental to our being, for it

²² *Primo Principio*, cap. 4.

is in the category of quality. But the Divine understanding is not a quality, for it is identical with the Divine Substance.

Only in an infinite substance can substance and attribute coincide.

Therefore God is infinite.

Again, God is most perfect being, but a being in which an intensive infinity is not incompatible with its nature, is not fully perfect unless it is infinite, if it were not infinite it might be surpassed in perfection.

But infinity is not incompatible with being as such.

Therefore the most perfect being is infinite.

But Duns Scotus is not clear about this proof, as there is no proof "a priori" that infinity is not incompatible with being, since the notion of being is ultimate and not subject to further analysis. Nor can finitude be shown to be an essential property of being. We must therefore rely on a kind of intuition of infinite being, for being is the "objectum primum" of the intellect, which finds no inconsistency in the notion of infinite being, which indeed seems to be a most perfectly intelligible object.²³

God as First Efficient must be infinite in power.

God possesses the causality of all secondary causes more eminently than the causes themselves.

All causality final, efficient, and formal, exists in Him "eminētius." He is the cause of all possible being in a more eminent sense than if He were its formal cause; and the number of such beings is infinite. Therefore *a fortiori* His power is infinite in intensiveness.

Elsewhere, Duns Scotus distinguishes such infinite power from omnipotence as used in a theological sense, the latter includes the power to act without the intervention of any intermediaries. But this Omnipotence is only known by Revelation.²⁴

Finally, from a voluntary, instead of from an intellectual point of view, the ontological argument of St. Anselm is set out in this way.

Our Will can desire and love something greater than any finite object; indeed, its natural inclination is to love an infinite good in the highest degree.

In this loving, we have an experience of infinite good, our Will cannot be perfectly satisfied with any other object.

Therefore, the object of this desire must be real; for if infinity were inconsistent with the good our Will would hate it as it hates non-being.²⁵

This is followed by a re-statement of the ontological argument.

²³ *Op. Ox.*, I, 2, 2, 31.

²⁴ *Rep.*, Par. I, 43, 2, 3. *Quodl.*, 7, 19.

²⁵ *Op. Ox.*, I, 2, 2, 27.

God is that Being, "than Whom nothing can be thought of as being greater without falling into a contradiction," for the notion of God is the idea of the greatest being.

This "summum cogitabile" may be thought of as existent without contradiction.

As a notion, it is supremely thinkable, infinite being expresses being, the object of thought, in its highest form: not only can it be conceived as existing, it must be thought of as existent. A notion of the greatest possible is incompatible with dependence, as a mere notion it would be dependent on the mind thinking it, for that mind though able is not bound to think it. A "cogitabile" which has actual existence is greater than everything which exists merely in the mind: the really existent can be intuited or seen, not so the other.

Therefore the most perfectly intelligible must exist.

This does not prove that it is infinite.

To the objection to the whole method of "a posteriori" proof, and that if the finite world is contingent, no necessary conclusions can be drawn from it as to the existence of God, Duns Scotus does not argue that whether the world is contingent or necessary, it is indeed a fact; but strives to avoid the maxim "De contingentibus non est scientia" in the following manner.

These arguments may be said to be "necessary," that is not within the purview of the above maxim because:

In the world beings are liable to change, therefore there must be a possibility of something existing which can bring them into being.

The fact that the finite creature can be, proves that God can be.

If the First Effective can exist, it must be able to exist for itself, otherwise it would not be First Effective, for a first being which depended on another being would be self-contradictory. But its possibility has been proved, therefore the First Effective is capable of self-existence, therefore it must exist for itself (cf., p. 542). For that which is not self-existent cannot be capable of self-existence, otherwise not-being could produce being, which is absurd, and the self-existent would be its own cause and therefore not uncaused.

The argument, itself unsatisfactory, does not meet the point.²⁶

Whilst St. Thomas rejected the Ontological Argument, Duns Scotus omitted all proof from Movement, and objected to St. Thomas's argument of infinity from lack of matter, that this would necessitate the infinity of angels, whom St. Thomas held to be immaterial.

In the *Opus Oxoniense*, Duns Scotus shows no dissatisfaction

²⁶ *Op. Ox.*, I, 2, 2, 15 and 16.

with his own proofs, but in the *Reportata*, after recapitulating briefly the above arguments as to the Infinity of God, Duns Scotus says that they are not to be taken as demonstrative; they are only probable reasonings and their conclusion is not proven (cf., p. 572).²⁷

CREATION

With regard to creation, Duns Scotus in the *De Rerum Principio* essays to demonstrate the necessity of creationism from a purely metaphysical basis; that is that the universe as such must have been created, not that creation is necessary to the Creator, it being wholly dependent on His Will.

He contrasts the Being of God, the one and self-sufficient, eternal, necessary, infinite, and absolutely simple, with that of the Creature finite, dependent, and composite.

Whilst God is Being in its totality and actuality, the creature has only being limited and determined, mixed always with potentiality, and tainted with not-being.

The infinite distance between being and not-being can only be transcended by an infinite power.

Finite being is not self-existent, and one finite cannot create another.

The divine creation is demonstrable "ex parte entitatis" by virtue of the threefold difference between the being of God and the being of the creature. First, the Being of God is primary, and that of the Creature is secondary and dependent. Second, the former is pure and self-existent, whilst that of the latter is participative and derivative. Third, the Divine *esse* is unlimited and uncontracted, whilst that of creation is limited and contracted into genus and species.

Duns Scotus insists on the fact that the relation of the Creator to the creature is one-sided and non-mutual; and in this he agrees with St. Thomas Aquinas. The relation on the part of the creature is a "ratio realis," but that on the part of God is only a "ratio rationis." The granting of existence to ideal possible natures in no way reacts on God, the act of the Will by which God confers existence is an eternal act; with Him there being no before and no after, there is no potentiality in Him.²⁸

The temporal realization of the act of creation does not effect God, because it is not truly action "Creare est formaliter referre ad Creaturam."²⁹

Like Richard of Middleton, Duns Scotus held that only the creature, having received being of its own through creation,

²⁷ *Rep.*, Par. I, 2, 3, 8.

²⁸ *Rep.*, Par. I, 30, 5.

²⁹ *Primo Principio*, IV, 13.

stands in some new relation to God, as the other term of the relation is perfect, simple and unchangeable (cf., Chap. XXV, p. 532).

But the created essence once brought into existence is "absolutum"; it has a being of its own and cannot be resolved wholly into its relation to the Divine Thought; although as such it is referred to the Divine Intellect as its proper "mesura" and also to the "Divine Will," which gave it actual existence and which conserves it.

Thus there is a real difference between God and His creatures; the creature relatively to God must not be described, as by St. Anselm, as not-being. Yet the creature may be said to have "ens per participationem" as all creatures are imitations of His Essence, varying in different degrees of perfection.³⁰

Duns Scotus offers no definite opinion as to whether temporal creation is only a matter of Faith, or demonstrable by reason; though he offers various objections to the arguments for and against it, said to be based on reason alone. 'That God is in all things depends on the free will of God, and is proportionate to the grade of being,' by this attitude Duns Scotus obviates any charge of Pantheism to which his objections might give rise.

As has been shown on page 540 all being has the Convertible "Passiones" Unity, Truth, and Goodness. The Creature is related to God as First Cause in the ontological order, and as by creation it partakes of being, has "ens per participationem," so also does it possess a share of the divine goodness, for all things are good inasmuch as they proceed from the First Good.

These three Passiones, Unity, Truth, and Goodness, represent the Triune Unity of God and may be called the "Vestigii" of the Divine Trinity. The intrinsic goodness of the creature therefore depends on the degree of actuality, of being, that it has.³¹

As regards the creation, Duns Scotus substituted for the traditional theory of Divine Action exclusive of the material cause, a theory, excluding all but the final cause, which is necessary to move the efficient cause to action. The exclusion of a formal cause is directed against Henry of Ghent, who spoke of creation from "esse possibile."

Duns Scotus maintained that creation is, "ex nihilo existentiae et essentiae," because they are really inseparable, and because "esse possibile" as an "esse cognitum" has already an "esse in actu licet secundum quid," which would prevent creation from being absolutely "de nihilo."

³⁰ *Quodl.*, 5, 26.

³¹ *Op. Ox.*, I, 3, 5, 14. *De Rerum Principio*, 1, 25.

The result of creation is angelic beings, and then matter and form, matter being prior in order of nature to form.

No creature has the power of creating; generation may resemble creation, because the agent produces a "hoc esse," but not inasmuch as it is "esse." Socrates produces Plato in so far as Plato is "this man," but not in so far as he is man, for in that case Socrates would produce all men, even himself. Generation also involves a mutation of the agent and presupposes matter.

In generation the male, in virtue of the specific form that he possesses, is able to realize in the matter of the female that assimilation characteristic of all generation. "The form is the formal principle of operation and of producing the like, 'the thisness' of the generating and of the generated are diverse."

The form is a specific one of both, but not of each. This assimilation is due not to a quantitative, but to a qualitative division of the form.

He rejects the general view of "rationes seminales" and limits it to the preadaptation for vegetative and sensitive forms possessed by the male and female semen, which forms they are capable of evolving by their own power. All this is, of course, accounted for because semen was thought to be inanimate.

Artificial generation involves only an "in virtute" pre-existence of form (in the mind of the artist) and is called "generatio secundum quid." It differs from natural animate generation, because the form produced is accidental and not substantial; and the intrinsic passive principle involved is not moved "secundum inclinationem suam," but towards a form to which it is either opposed or indifferent.

MATTER

As to matter, Duns Scotus held that it had some entity, though never existing apart from form, it is a metaphysical principle having an actuality of its own. Like Pecham and Richard of Middleton, he thought that it would involve no contrariety to suppose that by the power of God it could exist (cf., Chap. XXV, pp. 514, 524). He regarded matter as only one from an abstract point of view, and remained in doubt as to spiritual matter. Matter is prior "secundum se," to form, but form is prior to matter "secundum eminentiam," it has more entity as it confers actuality upon the composite.

The manner in which Duns Scotus deals with matter deserves something more than a passing reference; it is not a mere verbal question, which merely depends on a different signification, which he attaches to terms employed by others; but it is directly concerned with the basis of his philosophy.

Duns Scotus regards matter under three aspects, before it becomes Socrates ; First Prime Matter, " *materia metaphysica*," Second Prime Matter " *materiae mathematica* " and Third Prime Matter. First matter is bare matter deprived of all quantity, which as subject of generation is subject to no other agent but God Himself. Second matter is endowed with substantial form and rendered proper to receive other forms, it is of such a kind that it is the indeterminate foundation of all generation and corruption. Third matter is engendered, but still lacking the final act, which by the " adjunction " of the individual form, must change the human body into that of Socrates.³²

As to First Prime Matter, Duns Scotus made it clear that " matter can without any contradiction, exist without any form whatever." This is clearly in direct opposition to the Thomists, who went so far as to say that God Himself could not create such (cf., Chap. XXI, pp. 329 and 471).

In this state it possesses two potentialities to which there correspond two acts : subjective potentiality, in so far as it is the ulterior subject of all forms and to which the formal act corresponds ; and objective potentiality, in so far as it is the object, apart from its cause, to which the " entitative " (entity making) act corresponds.

This entitative act appears to be neither substance nor accident, but to precede both ; according to the Thomists it is only a principle of being. As to whether such matter is one or diverse, simple or multiple, Duns Scotus says, " I come back to the position of Avicbron (the author of *Fons Vitae*) and maintain first, that all created substance, corporeal or spiritual, participates of matter ; and I prove further that this matter is one in all."³³

First Prime Matter is one in all beings, but like unity that is the source of number ; Second Prime Matter, having received the form of corruptible and incorruptible, is divided into these two genus ; whilst Third Prime Matter is distributed between all the species, which contain the most general of genus, being subdivided down to the most inferior of species.

First Prime Matter is not one in number but in kind, one as an integral and not as a substantial whole.

It is not the human intelligence that makes the generic unity, but rather it divides that which is naturally one.

In nature, it is the multiple that becomes and disappears, hence it is the multiple which is in potentiality of being ; with regard to the multiple it is the " one," which is the permanent act. " Everything desires unity."³⁴

Second Prime Matter is subject to generation and corruption

³² *De Rerum*, 8, 3, 20. ³³ *De Rerum*, 8, 4, 24. ³⁴ *De Rerum*, 8, 1.

and all change, but it cannot be such without having some substantial form or some quantity, which does not belong to the definition of First Prime Matter.

Not regarding the doctrine of the non-different or indifferent as satisfactory (cf., Chap. IX, p. 144), Duns Scotus introduces the term "in existentia" to describe, "being possessed in participation," as he held that all common natures are real and are in order of generation before individual natures, which are actualized in the bosom of common natures.

"If," says he, "the thing, which answers to the word nature were actually individual, whence would come the intellection contrary to the true definition of this thing?" "The intellection comes from the thing, hence it is such as the thing itself. In consequence since I conceived humanity, as the common nature of all men, this nature is effectively really such as I conceive it."

He does not agree with Plato that humanity is an idea separated from individuals and existing by itself, but he says that it is prior; that being before things and being able to be without them, it is really distinguished from them, though always united to the particular existences of which it is the common support.

It is the same opinion as that of St. Anselm. "Participatione speciei plures homines sunt homo," and also that of Gilbert de la Porrée (cf., Chap. XI, p. 178).

As to Third Prime Matter, Duns Scotus says "of any art, or of any natural particular agent, since all such act by means of some semen although matter may be prime in respect of everything produced by art, it pre-supposes nevertheless matter which is subject to generation and further some form produced by nature; otherwise art produces nothing."³⁵

The question of this engendered matter, which is subject to generation all turns on what is meant by Quiddity.

Aristotle had maintained that the quiddity of a subject lay in its formal cause, in the act by which Socrates is produced, that is the act of Socrates, it had nothing material about it and was but a part of the composite.

Duns Scotus seems to have taken quiddity in another sense and to have regarded it as the whole of the composite; it is the substance of which matter and form are parts.³⁶

The difference is this, that if the quiddity comes from the form, the matter, taken as an element of the whole determined substance, is, with regard to the form as active principle, only a simple potentiality. But, on the contrary, if one acknowledges that the property of the material element contributes to the

³⁵ *De Rerum*, 8, 3.

³⁶ *Metaph.*, VII, 16, 5, 6.

generation of the quid, this element is by itself not only in objective potentiality, but in act in subjective potentiality, before meeting such a form and producing with it such a substance, such a quiddity. Whence it follows that the individual man proceeds materially from the common man, which though prior does not exist as such. From this it is therefore adduced, that it is form which individualizes the particular.

FORM

Duns Scotus held that form may be said to come "ab intra," because of the passive inclination in matter, or "ab extra" from the external agent required to give actuality to that inclination. He regarded the actuating form as successively educed from its matter; and that as specific form it actuates the composite with individual properties. Because it is the foundation of our universal concepts, it is often referred to by him as the universal. "Illud quod est universale est in re" though, as appears elsewhere, he, like the others, regarded it as but in potency in the thing and only actualized in the intellect by thinking about it. For one thing cannot be the same in many at once, except as understood in the intellect.

POTENTIALITY OF MATTER AND FORM

Duns Scotus identified matter and form with actuality, but he attributed potentiality not only to matter but to form also, the former he called "potentia subjectiva" and the latter "potentia objectiva." In some places he seems to identify "potentia objectiva" with active potentiality, but he declined to distinguish passive potentiality from the appetite for the educed form as suggested by John Pecham (cf., Chap. XXV, p. 513).

The form, which is educed from matter, previously existed as "potentia objectiva" in matter, as some intrinsic passive principle: that which actualizes this is the agent.

Concerning such actualization Duns Scotus laid down the following startling propositions:

1. The agent in virtue of its substantial form assimilated to itself the matter of the recipient and induces in it a similar form.
2. The agent and recipient do not require an actual communication in matter, but only a "communicatio aptitudinalis" (cf., Bacon, *Secundum Virtutem*, Chap. XXV, p. 498).

Indeed *a form could not act on the matter it informs.*³⁷

Hence it must be concluded that a created agent can act at a distance.³⁸

³⁷ *Op. Ox.*, II, 25, 16.

³⁸ *Rep.*, Par. II, 9, 3.

3. The agent produces gradually its effects in the innermost parts of the recipient, as well as on the surface. When the effect involved is a similitudo "in forma et in modo essendi formae" the change is called "univocatio completa," but if the change is only 'similitudo in forma' (as a house being built) then it is called "univocatio diminuta."

Variations in the effects of the same agent, are due to the nature of the recipient, *e.g.*, sun both dries mud and dissolves ice (Chap. XXV, p. 518).

4. In inducing a new form in matter the agent corrupts the old one, which retires into the potentiality of matter. If it were not so, matter would be perfected simultaneously by two ultimate forms. By producing the form in matter, the agent may be said to create the *esse* of the composite.

INDIVIDUATION

As to individuation, Duns Scotus starts from the definition of Boethius, that the chief characteristic of an individual is its numerical unity and indivisibility into parts. What then is the proximate and intrinsic foundation of this repugnance to division into subjective parts ?

First the solution of Nominalism.

Material substances are individuated, *per se*, that which gives reality to a substance is the same as that which gives individuality.

The universal only arises in the mind from considering it.

Any nature existing apart from the mind is singular, as any nature in the soul is universal.

The only possible cause of singularity is the cause of the thing, merely to ask the question implies that the nature first exists and afterwards becomes singular.

To this Duns Scotus replies : " If a nature ' *ex se* ' is a ' *this*, ' the intellect, when understanding it as a universal, understands it under a character opposed to its nature, as if it were to understand Socrates as a universal. If the nature of a stone ' *per se* ' is a ' *this* ' it will be found in every suppositum of the species, as the nature of this stone, and we shall not be able to say what ' *this* ' same substance is in the supposita.

This would mean that the nature which is ' *de se haec* ' becomes the whole substance of different individuals, thus the species would be identical with the whole nature of the individual. But we know that the intellectual soul, as the form of man, differs in different men, so that the substance of this man must differ from the substance of that ; and that all individuals are

not separate species, as we know this man and that man are both man.

If a nature of itself is a 'this' then the individual would pre-exist and there would be no generation, since any nature 'per se' is repugnant to becoming another 'this,' indeed such a nature ought to be repugnant to all numerical multitude, such as is the Divine Essence, because it is 'de se haec.' Such being the case, the world would consist of isolated beings, without any basis of comparison, which is equivalent to saying that the world is completely unknowable."

Duns Scotus argues that nature is merely a type of unity, less than numerical, of itself indifferent to singularity or universality. To become the former it must be contracted, to become the latter, the intellect must confer upon it that characteristic.

Duns Scotus then objects to the theory of Richard of St. Victor that negation is the cause of individuation; for a thing is indivisible, not only in respect of other things but also in respect of itself. Negation is of the same nature in the many and therefore cannot individuate. Negation implies no perfection, but as Aristotle says in the *Categories* "first substance (individual) is more important than second substance (the universal), hence that which constitutes its entity will not be negation. Negation is incompatible with the first substance as the principle of generation and operation."

Henry of Ghent held that existence was the cause of individuation, because Aristotle in *Met. VII* says the act determines and distinguishes, therefore the ultimate act, which is existence, ought to individuate the ultimate determination, which is the singular.

To this Duns Scotus objected that what is not distinct of itself cannot distinguish, and the *esse* of existence is not of itself distinct from the *esse* of essence, for it has no *differentia* apart from those of essence. Hence the individuation must lie in the essence. Further, God alone is His Existence itself, therefore for creatures existence is in a sense accidental (*sed contra*, Thomas of York, Chap. XVIII, p. 254).

If it were not so, there would only be a knowledge of quiddities actually existent. Hence at one time there would be a knowledge of a thing and at another time no knowledge and so definition would not be of essentials.

Duns Scotus held that accidents could not individuate (like Porphyry and Avicenna), because they presuppose something prior in nature, substance. Besides a cause cannot receive its causative principle from its effect, but the first condition in a substance for the causation of accidents is singularity.

Again, a substance becomes a "non-haecce" only by annihilation, but if the "haec" were due to accidents, the substance could become a "non-haec" or change its individuality with a change in its accidents. We know that God can conserve a substance under accidents other than its own, as in the Sacrament; this cannot be dismissed by saying that it is a miracle, for miracles do not involve contradiction.

Lastly, Aristotle calls an aggregate of substance and accidents an "ens per accidens," but a first substance is not such; it must be an "ens per se," because it generates and operates "per se" and receives predication "per se."

Duns Scotus rejects the theory that "respectus" to the producing agent produces individuation, as held by Richard of Middleton (chap. XXV, p. 528). For the nature of an individual is absolute and cannot be "formally" that which it is, because it receives existence from an agent. Respectus is not the formal term, or primary effect of action, but is based on its formal term.

If this primary term is singular, the nature of the singular is prior to the respectus, because it is its foundation.

With regard to matter, as the principle of individuation Duns Scotus took a fresh line.

First, matter, in the sense of passivity, cannot be the principle of individuation, because that which of itself is indeterminate cannot constitute a distinguishing principle.

As passivity, matter is the same in nature in every individual, or at least its distinction will follow that of form and not *vice versa*.

It would mean that the same singularity is found in the corrupted being and in the generated, since matter remains throughout change.

Aristotle, in saying that the generator cannot generate without matter, simply refers to the matter, which contracts the already complete being; for as the formal ratio of generation is a substance, so is the term of generation a substance; and just as a substance does not generate except inasmuch as it is "haec ut prior quantitate," so a substance is not generated, except inasmuch as it too is "haec ut prior quantitate."

The generator may need matter for its activities, but the quantity involved in this required matter is not its first ratio of materiality.

Matter is a manifestation of the individual and that is really all that is implied by Aristotle when he said:

"Those things are one in number whose matter is one."

"Callias and Socrates differ on account of matter."

"When I say heavens, I imply form, when I say this heaven I imply matter."

If these passages do not bear the meaning here given to them, then there are others which deny matter as the principle of definition, since Aristotle allows a distinction of form as well as matter, *e.g.*,

“The terms man and force which are applied to individuals, but universally, are not substance, but something composed of this matter and this nature.”

“The soul is some primary substance, and the body is matter, and man and animal is the compound of both taken universally.”

“But Corsicus and Socrates taken individually will mean this soul and this body.”

As to quantified matter, change in quantity of an object does not mean change in its individuality; permanence of quantity, as in the Sacrament, does not imply a permanence of individuality (*sed contra*, cf., Thomas Aquinas, Chap. XXII, p. 458).

Quantity presupposes a composite and it is not “*de se haec*”; quantity does not touch the problem of individuation as to repugnance to “division into parts” (cf., p. 553).

It is supposed that ‘to be divided’ agrees primarily with quantity; as in distinguishing this fire from that fire, the distinction of these two forms is due to their reception in different parts of matter and this requires different quantitative parts.

But Duns Scotus held that division into parts of the same nature, does not agree primarily with quantity, but rather only division into those integral parts which constitute a whole.

Quantity could not be the ratio of a division into subjective parts, for then it would have to be formally present in substance: this is clearly false because quantity is not present in human nature.

Besides, while the whole is predicated of subjective parts, it is not predicated of quantitative parts.

(Lychetus explains this passage as meaning, the statement that “this man is man” is true, but not the statement that this part of wine is the whole of wine.)³⁹

Lastly, quantity has its own quiddity and is “*secundum se*” in different individuals.

Duns Scotus admits that the principle of individuation is a positive entity, as suggested by the foregoing theories, but held that such positive entity is something else.

In his earlier works, he makes it a kind of last form, limiting the determinability of the specific nature, but in his Commentaries he declared that it is neither matter nor form nor the composite, but an “*ultima realitas entis*,” that is a *Union of this matter with this form in this composite*.

³⁹ Cf. Ch. XXVII, p. 558.

HÆCCEITAS

He admits that it is impossible to say definitely what this "Hæcceitas," as he calls it, is, owing not to the individual which is perfectly intelligible in itself, but to the limitation of our intellect due to sin (cf., Bacon, *The Problem of individuation* has no meaning, Chap. XXIV, p. 501).

Hæcceitas contracts the species, making it one in number, incommunicable, 'per se existens'; it is not so well known as the specific form, which is the principle of operation.

For St. Thomas the sensible individual is matter as specifically determined by a substantial form, which form is made intelligible by the action of the active intellect; hence there is no direct knowledge of the individual.

For Duns Scotus the particular represents a specifically determined grade of being, the idea of which is given in the unitary action of sensation and intellection, which presents the object to the mind in its concrete union of sensible and intellectual elements (cf., pp. 563, 564).

Thus in the last analysis, for St. Thomas the principle of individuation lies wholly in the perceptual order, whilst that of Duns Scotus lies in the conceptual order.

Duns Scotus alleged that his positive entity was related to the specific form of the individual composite, by a formal distinction "*distinctio formalis a parte rei*."⁴⁰

In each individual there are two entities, which are formally distinct, the universal essence or *natura* which is common to all individuals of the same species, and the *hæcceitas* which constitutes the individual.

Each has a unity of its own, the universal has a real unity independent of the mind of the knower, but less than the numerical unity of the singular as such; the *hæcceitas* has the concrete unity of the particular.

Between the *natura* and the *hæcceitas* there is a formal difference, which is a "*distinctio a parte rei*," a difference founded on an objective ground in reality itself.

It is a formal and not a real difference, because the entities which it distinguishes are not separate things, but different

⁴⁰ This is regarded as one of his contributions to philosophy.

"Ista proprietas individui numquam est res alia a forma specifica, tamen semper est non idem formaliter licet aliquid possit continere unitive utrumque. Dissimile tamen est in hoc, quod formalitas specifica semper est simpliciter perfectius gradu vel formalitate generis. Sed non oportet proprietatem individui esse simpliciter perfectionem formalitate specifica. Secunda dissimilitudo, formalitas specifica contrahit ad esse quiditativum simpliciter perfectum, sed formalitas individui contrahit quiditatem ad aliquid extra quiditatem, quia omnino alterius rationis . . . illa proprietas individui respectu quiditatis habet rationem actus."—*Rep.*, Par. II.

movements or aspects of the same thing. For the universal or *natura* and the *haecceitas* or individual do not exist in isolation from each other, but the same thing is in different relations both universal and particular.

Further, according to St. Thomas, it is the specific difference which completes the substantial determination of the thing, the species is the "ultimus actus in re"; the concept of the genus containing in itself potentially that of the difference, and the inferior differences those of the superior (Chap. XXI, p. 347).

According to Duns Scotus, the concept of the genus does not contain that of the difference potentially; the concepts are formally diverse, but correspond to different grades of being in the concrete whole, the ultimate or individual unity of which is derived from the *haecceitas*.⁴¹

This positive entity or *haecceitas* is then formally distinct from the specific nature, so that the two cannot be included in the same concept, though they cannot exist apart from each other. The specific nature is related to the *haecceitas* as potentiality to act, and they are not two actualities existing independently in one individual.

FORMALITAS A PARTE REI

This doctrine of 'Formalitates' or 'realitates' thus applies especially to the formal elements which organize it from within, but it also applies to the whole investigation of extra mental reality in any detailed treatment of metaphysical richness of being. Thus it applies to goodness and truth which are different formally but identical "in re," likewise to the faculties of the soul, which are so many aspects of reality constituting the soul itself.

It was by such metaphysical formalism that Duns Scotus arrived at the intuitive knowledge of the individual by the understanding.

M. de Wulf asks is not Scotus taking as his basis the very way in which the mind organizes the contents of its concepts when expressing reality, and if so is he not applying to extra mental reality the process of mental analysis.

If so is not this a return to a form of exaggerated realism, which, however, does not prevent him from accepting the more moderate conclusions, as the individual substances alone exist outside our minds.

M. de Wulf explains this in the following manner.

In addition to the "distinctio realis" existing between two entirely distinct elements like form and matter, and the 'distinctio rationis,' which multiplies the concepts of one and the same

⁴¹ *Metap.*, VII, 19, 3 and 12.

thing, the " *distinctio formalis a parte rei* " refers to the objective 'formalitates,' which are realized in one and the same individual substance independently of any intellectual act.

The " *ultima realitas entis* " restricts the specific form and completes it, it impresses its definite seal on it, and in uniting itself to particular matter is the *haecceitas*, the ultimate reason of individuation. Individuation is not connected with quantity, the attribute of bodies, so that immaterial creatures are multiplied in their species like corporeal creatures.

The " *distinctio formalis a parti rei* " assures this *haecceitas* a certain measure of ontological independence and at the same time explains the fundamental unity of the form of which it is the ultimate reason.

Others say that because the 'formalitates' are in being before and apart from the work of the mind, that the latter grasps them and apprehends them by an intuitive concept and this first contact, confused but real, constitutes an argument in favour of the presence of the 'formalitates a parti rei.'

To such it is objected that this is an unnecessary postulate, and the virtual distinction of St. Thomas is sufficient to ensure the real objectivity of metaphysical concepts.

COMPOSITE

As to the composite, Duns Scotus held that matter and form are partial substances, which, being related as potentiality to act, can be united by an efficient cause to produce one whole substance. " *Per se unum.* "

He agreed with Richard of Middleton, there was no real difference between essence and existence, but that they were something more than logically distinct, in that a distinction of existence pre-supposes a distinction of essence and, in all other but God, existence is in a sense accidental.

The composite is always subject to accidents, some of which (quantity) follow its matter and some (quality) follow its form.

Aristotle, on the other hand, with whom all but the Scotists agreed, had held that all accidents inhere primarily through matter.⁴²

" *Esse simpliciter* " is that given by substantial form, but " *esse tale* " is that given by accidents.

⁴² " The Schoolmen never conceived of accidents as entities superimposed upon substance as a substratum. Accidents were determinations of the determinable; so that in a sense it might have been said that a substance is its accidents, just as much as it might have been said that matter is a synthesis of universals.

But as apprehended by intellect, both substance and matter are more, substance being definitely a mode of being that exists in itself.

Accidents, since they produce a kind of *esse*, may be called forms, but the unity they produce is only "per accidents" and not "per se."

Duns Scotus held that the activity of the composite must be ascribed to the composite itself, and not to God working through it. Its activity is due primarily to its substance, though partly also to its accidents.

It is active chiefly through its form, but not active simply because it has received its being through its form. Granted that there are many forms giving being, which are not active, he fails to find any general reason why some are active and why some are not.

For some imperfect substantial forms are active whilst others less imperfect are not, some are communicative like those of animation, whilst others more perfect like celestial and angelic forms are not.

Duns Scotus held that man is a composite of body and soul, and that the 'forma corporeatatis' of the body forms the matter, which the intellective form, that is the soul, informs. Thus the soul is the form of the body.

VEGETATIVE AND SENSITIVE FORMS

In generation, the embryo is first informed by the subsidiary vegetative and sensitive forms, and the intellective form created by God is then infused.

He held that the intellectual form perfected the vegetative and sensitive forms, but it is not clear whether he regarded them taken together with the 'forma corporeatatis' as matter for the intellectual soul to inform.

INTELLECTUAL SOUL

Duns Scotus adduces as evidence of the intellectual soul the fact that thought is independent of any organ, and also that there is some more universal and extensive knowledge than that of the senses, as well as the power of reflection by which we know an "ens rationes."

Further, the power of choice, being indeterminate, could not be ascribed to an organic appetite, for nature is determinate to one thing only.

The creation of the intellective form or soul is known by Faith alone, and is supported by another article of Faith, namely its incorruptibility, for nothing can be incorruptible simpliciter, if it is the term of a natural agent or educed from matter.

He alleges that the proofs of the immortality of the soul only

amount to possible persuasions, it is by Faith alone that we are assured of immortality.

1. To the argument that since the intellect does not depend entirely on the body for its operations, it will operate when the body is destroyed, Duns Scotus objected that it can only be concluded from the above, that the soul is not prevented from operating when its organ is destroyed.
2. Because the soul is immaterial and therefore lacks matter, the principle of being and non-being, it should not be concluded that it is necessarily incorruptible.
3. It has been argued that the rational soul is a form "per se subsistens" and therefore has an independent being, in virtue of which it can exist apart from the body (cf., Thomas Aquinas, Chap. XXI, p. 333, 334 and 341).

Duns Scotus replied that the being of the soul need not mean self subsistence, but only that the soul is not an accident, nor dependent on the body as its matter.

No true conclusions can be drawn from arguments based on our desire for immortality, shrinking from death, or longing for happiness, nor because justice demands a future life; for, as St. Augustine remarked, sin is its own punishment, also reason does not know naturally that there is a judge, who acts according to retributive and punitive laws.

It is all a matter of Faith.

Duns Scotus seems to adopt a hylomorphic composition for spiritual beings, the *materia primo prima* and form (cf., p. 550).⁴³ But elsewhere he appears to reject it, saying "essentia anima in se est simplex," though it has been pointed out that in the Commentaries he always uses the term matter as referring to *materia secunda*.

He likewise denies that the soul receives any perfection from the body but insists on its independence.⁴⁴

The soul bears within itself its own individuating principle.

FACULTIES OF SOUL

Duns Scotus agreed with his predecessors that the faculties of the soul are not really distinct from its essence, otherwise the Arabian heresy of Averroes of a single active intellect for all men may creep in. Such theory argued, that if the potentialities are not really distinct the soul according to its essence is the immediate principle of operation, and so being in act must always be active.

⁴³ *De Rerum*, 8, 9.

⁴⁴ "Anima autem, est forma corporis et non materia, ideo ipsa non recipit perfectionem in toto et per consequens ipsa in se aequae est perfecta separata et conjuncta."—*Rep.*, Par. IV.

To this he replied that *actus primus* (internal being and thinking) must not be confused with *actus secundus* (operation).

The only thing that is involved in saying that the soul is an 'actus,' is the assertion that it is always in act, but not that it is always active.

The soul is the formal cause of being and operation, but it does not follow that that which has being is always in operation.

In favour of a real distinction of the faculties from the essence of the soul, it is further argued by some, that these faculties vary in different individuals, but it is impossible for substances to be received more or less, which would be the case if the essence and faculties were the same. To this Duns Scotus objected that the degree of reason, for example, does not lie in the faculty itself, but only in its "habilitates," *i.e.*, its skill and dexterity, and that therefore as a potentiality in second species of quality it can be received more or less.

Hence there is no good reason for holding a real distinction between the faculties and the essence of the soul. It is but to safeguard the unity of the soul, especially as nature works by the best method without employing more instruments than is necessary (cf., Occam's *Razor*, Chap. XXVIII, p. 590 footnote).

Through a difference of objects, a difference of acts is revealed; and through a difference of acts, a difference of potentialities can be perceived. Yet in reality a difference of acts does not constitute a difference of potentialities, for potentialities are prior to acts.

Nevertheless, Duns Scotus held that they were not merely logically distinct, else the soul would be held to be act in the same manner as God, and in addition to that it would be contrary to the maxim "potentia exeunt et quod fluunt ab essentia."

In short, Duns Scotus held that the faculties are inseparable, and therefore one with the soul as 'actus primus'; but different from the soul considered as 'actus secundus' or operation, in that the whole nature of the soul is in any one faculty; also because of the distinct action of each faculty, *e.g.*, the intellect does not include the will. They are only formally distinct, "a parte rei."⁴⁵

His analogy of the soul and the Trinity is not so strong as that of Richard of Middleton (Chap. XXV, p. 531).

He rejects the view of Henry of Ghent, that the faculties, according to their absolute reality, are identical with the essence of the soul, but that according to their relative reality they are distinct, on the ground that this would make relation in the soul the same as that in God, not only a "principium distinguendi" but a "principium operandi et distinguendi," which is incom-

⁴⁵ *Op. Ox.*, II, 16, 18.

patible with its nature as being created. In fact this theory of Henry of Ghent does not distinguish between the immediate and the mediate principle of the soul.

EMANATION OF FORCE

As to the manner of our knowledge of the external world, Duns Scotus agreed fundamentally with his predecessors. Objects propagate their species through the medium interposed between them and our sense organs and thereby evoke an "immutatio" in the senses (cf., Grosseteste, Chap. XVIII, p. 242 and Roger Bacon, Chap. XXV, pp. 498 and 503). Duns Scotus, like Bacon, is clear that no material particles are emitted, but the transmitted species is only an image of the object. The "immutatio" implies a reaction of the perceiver on the species received in the sense organs, in such reaction the "sensus communis" combining the reports of the five senses, enables the perceiver to know that he is perceiving. From the reaction results the phantasm or similitudo: it can be said of it that it is not of the same nature as the medium, as what is seen is not sight; it is not what is known, but that by which intellect comes into contact with the object hence sometimes called "intentio"; it has an "esse diminutum et secundum quid" as compared with the "esse simpliciter et reale" of the object.

INTELLECT

According to Duns Scotus the senses provide the various sense data and these are co-ordinated by the Synderesis or Common Sense, which also deals with complex perceptions as figure and motion, and which enables the phantasm thus to be formed. In contrast to the other senses, in some way it appears to be conscious of its own act. It is on a lower level than that of the understanding and is of itself incomplete and imperfect.

Synderesis is also the power by which the first principles of the moral law are known as self evident as soon as their terms are comprehended, it is formally infallible. It represents the intellectual aspect of the affection for the just.

Conscience, on the other hand, is the faculty by which moral principles are applied to the particular case.⁴⁶⁻⁷

The phantasm or imagination is closely allied to the Common Sense, but is distinguished from it in that it can operate after the senses cease to provide the data of the particular object.

It is upon this phantasm or similitudo that the active intellect operates.

The active intellect illuminates the potential universal in the

⁴⁶ *Op. Ox.*, III, 39, 2, 4.

⁴⁷ *Rep.*, Par. III, 39, 2.

similitudo and the possible or passive intellect assimilates it, and so becomes possessed of a "species intelligibilis," that represents the object "sub ratione universalis."

In this Duns Scotus differs from St. Thomas Aquinas by saying that the possible or passive intellect must have some activity, otherwise the active intellect would have to produce intellection in addition to illuminating the potential universal.

As to the active intellect, it is not only logically but formally distinct from the passive or possible intellect; yet, like Richard of Middleton, he insists that it is an intrinsic part of the soul; not as some separate intellect, functioning in all men, or as God which the Averroists held.

It cannot be any judgment of truth by way of conformity with the Divine Exemplars for they are unknown to us.

It was in connection with his extreme abhorrence of the doctrine of one World-soul of all men of Averroes, that Duns Scotus is led to adopt the theory of Avicenna, against Aristotle and St. Thomas, that One and Being are not identical. "Unum" cannot be predicated "in quid" of "ens" but only "denominative."⁴⁸

This divergence extended to the difference of Duns Scotus from St. Thomas, both as to plurality of form and the principle of individuation. For St. Thomas, numerical unity arising only in the category of quantity draws its origin from matter, which led him to his denial of there being more than one angel in a species, and at the same time to strain his doctrine of the individuality of separated souls devoid of matter.

UNIVERSALS

Universals are immediate gifts of experience requiring for their elucidation neither a direct Divine Co-operation, nor "a priori" mental forms.

Once elicited the universals are organized by the intellect into judgments and scientific conclusions, a process liable to error.

There is no error in the intellect as to what the senses convey, but as to their meaning; nor is there error about categories and first principles that emerge by the normal activities in this organizing process. But it requires a repetition of experiences, and a further comparison, and analysis, before we can arrive at a general law free from coincidences and confusion of condition with cause.

Duns Scotus held that we have a certain intuitive knowledge of singulars, as they actually exist and not merely knowledge acquired by reflection on the phantasm (as taught by St. Thomas,

⁴⁸ *Metaph.*, IV, 2, 2.

cf., Chap. XX, p. 281); yet in the present life being hindered by the body, it can only be vaguely apprehended by grasping certain general first 'intentiones' of the *haecceitas*, such as numerical unity, independent existence, and incommunicability. Hence we cannot express in the definition all that is in the essential nature of the singular; and he explains that this is what Aristotle means when he says, that "the singular is not intelligible, for in itself the singular is most intelligible" (cf., pp. 360, 557).⁴⁹

In reality an intuitive knowledge of singulars, the only type possessed by God, is more perfect because its "ratio singularitatis" can be grasped, which cannot be understood through its "ratio universalis." Though according to man's own condition knowledge by universals seems more perfect, because its validity does not cease with cessation of the existence of the particular.

This inadequate knowledge of singulars involves our lack of knowledge of substance, so that it is "per se insensibilis," from which arises our inability to grasp the substantial change in the Sacrament of the Altar.

PROPORTIO MOTIVI ET MOBILIS

For Duns Scotus the confused perception of substance and accidents is not of great importance, as it is from them both that man can form his concept of "ens in se." God has ordained for this life a conformity or a "proportio motivi et mobilis" between the activity of the intellect and the object assimilated "in modo essendi."

It is only in chronological order that the first objects of our understanding are material.

Because intellect has for its object all being, it can elevate itself to immaterial natures, though in addition to the hampering of our body, there is also the further difficulty, which comes from the lack of proportion between us and such excellent objects.

Of these immaterial natures we have no immediate or intuitive cognition, not even of our own soul. We only know by means of species, owing to sin, as St. Augustine and Grosseteste also thought.

As to God, our knowledge is neither innate nor self evident.

Though the knowledge of our own soul is not intuitive, yet it is not solely dependent on sense experience as taught by St. Thomas. It is through the experience of our inner self, the contemplation of our own purely spiritual activities, that we arrive at the knowledge of our soul, both of the 'quid' and the 'quia est.' Yet it is empirical, being derived from the inner experience, though it yields no direct knowledge of the substance of the soul.

⁴⁹ VII, *Met.*

This mediated knowledge provides the basis for a kind of intuition of the substance of the soul in an act of reflective self consciousness, by means of a "species expressa," which the soul forms from its self-reflection.⁵⁰

From this it is evident that man stands in need of Revelation as a supernatural form of knowledge, which he cannot attain by the light of reason alone.

Man, as an agent acting for an end, must know how his end is acquired, what means are necessary to obtain it and why those means are sufficient.

Supernatural happiness, the last end of man, is a reward contingent on an act of the free will of God and therefore scientifically unknowable.

Revelation is supernatural because it proceeds from an agent, which is not the natural source of human knowledge, and is derived from God Himself and not from the process of human reason. Further, it is supernatural in that its content supplies the place of an ideal supernatural object.

For the object, from which the knowledge that "God is three in One" naturally would be derived, would be the Divine Essence as known "sub ratione propria" in its own intrinsic nature; which for man is a supernatural object, for we cannot know God as He actually is in and for Himself. Revelation therefore supplies the place of the object and gives us knowledge about the Divine Persons, but not being "sub ratione propria" such is not complete.⁵¹

INTELLECT OF SEPARATED SOUL

With regard to the intellect of the separated soul, Duns Scotus affirmed that in addition to retaining its knowledge of material things, it has natural powers of intuition and abstraction, by means of which it, like the angels, it can acquire new species from things hitherto unknown.

In this Duns Scotus disagrees with St. Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent, for he regards the intellectual activity as the most vital characteristic of the separated soul, though as separated, it proceeds from corporeal things, the acquisition of knowledge will still be possible to it, as such requires "proportio" not "convenientia" with the objects known. He explains that in this way the soul can become perfect in two ways: it can have not only supernatural perfection, but also the supreme perfection of its nature.

Duns Scotus agrees that the intellect must first know an object, before the Will can act, thus the Intellect contains the power to

⁵⁰ *De Rerum*, XV, 18, 19 and 26.

⁵¹ *Op. Ox.*, Prologus, 22.

know, but the Will is not so self-sufficient. Without the fullest knowledge there cannot be the highest freedom of the Will.

WILL

As the Intellect has subordinated to it the sensitive faculties, so the Will has subordinated to it the appetitive faculties of concupiscence and irascibility, which like the sensitive faculties, are rooted in the organs of the body (cf., Chap. XXI, p. 342).

The Will is free because it is deliberative, because in its natural state it does not choose its act, but merely inclines to the reception of perfection.

He agrees with Pecham in defining the Will as "proprie appetitis rationalis." The Will can concur with the intellect in understanding since attention is a *sine qua non* of intellection and the Will has this power of directing or diverting the attention of the intellect to a certain extent.⁵² Similarly, in inclinations of the sense appetite, the Will is free but must be guided by reason, though it does not necessarily cleave to its last end, as maintained by St. Thomas Aquinas (cf., Chap. XXI, p. 367). Further, as the intellect does not determine the Will, neither, in Duns Scotus's opinion, does the Will determine the intellect; an evilly inclined Will does not generate uncertainty of knowledge; this is contrary to the teaching of St. Augustine and Grosseteste.

According to Duns Scotus, to be morally good an act must be perfectly moral: it must be a free act elicited as the result of a moral choice (of right and wrong), in accordance with the judgment of right reason, and on the responsibility of one's own deliberation. In addition to be meritorious it must proceed from the Grace of Charity (love of God).⁵³

Such was generally in accord with the ethics of all the Schoolmen, but Duns Scotus placed the Moral Virtues in the Will itself, and not in the emotional or appetitive faculties.

Moreover, he denied that Prudence and the Moral Virtues were mutually dependent on each other. Prudence indeed, as a right judgment, is a prerequisite of the Moral Virtues. But the imperatives of practical reason have no control over the will and so it is possible to have Prudence, the habit of correct judgment of right and wrong, without acting in accordance with this knowledge.⁵⁴

With the other Franciscans, Duns Scotus stresses the primacy of the Will over the intellect, for though posterior in activity it is more perfect.

⁵² *Rep.*, Par. II, 43, 4, 7.

⁵⁴ *Op. Ox.*, III, 36, 20.

⁵³ *Op. Ox.*, II, 40, 3. *Quodl.*, 18, 4.

He regards Beatitude as consisting 'formaliter' in an act of the Will, in that it is not only Beatific Vision but Love.

This dispute as to the Priority of the Will and the Intellect led to far reaching results, it not only reflected in the disputes as to the relative merits of the active and contemplative life, but affected the interpretation of the dogmas affecting Grace and the Last End. From the side of pure speculation, it affected the question of human responsibility and freedom, and the notions of the nature of the Divine Activity, and also indeed involved the question of determinism, that is to say whether man has free choice as to end as well as to means.

MEMORY

As to memory, it not only implies the reproduction of the "species intelligibiles," but also a perception of the flow of time between the species when first produced and the present reproduction ; it requires the co-operation of sense memory contained in the phantasm, which stores up the "species sensibles," but is unable to reflect on itself, *e.g.*, to perceive time or to retain intellections, volitions, or necessary propositions, such as the angles of a triangle are three in number and equal to two right angles.

This intellectual memory implies, therefore, the particulars contained in the sense memory, and also recalls the previous act of knowing. As it reflects, it must be an intellectual and not a sensitive operation, were this not so memory would not be an element in Prudence.

In short, it is upon such memory, it may be said, that moral responsibility depends, as it is not obvious how man should be made accountable for that which he did not remember. This is somewhat reminiscent of the teaching of William of Auvergne (*cf.*, Chap. XVIII, p. 230 *et seq.*).

(This, however, is somewhat of a doubtful proposition in the case of those who have subsequently been injured.)

By positing memory in this extremely limited sense, it is not clear how Duns Scotus thought the separated soul retained any memory of knowledge acquired after its separation.

ANGELS

Duns Scotus held that the only real specific difference between souls and men depends on their absolute entities. In this he rejected the opinion that the angel is superior to the human soul, because of the need of the latter for a human body.

He held that the whole human composite should be contrasted with the angels ; the "ratio essendi" of the soul is not the body, which rather presupposes the soul as its form. Further, he

rejected the opinion of St. Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent, which finds the difference in methods of intellection, because he regards these as posterior to the nature of the soul.

"The first distinction of being is not in its nature, so far as it is the principle of such and such an operation, but in its nature as 'this' nature, and because of this nature, it is the principle of such an operation and not of a different one.

So that, since an angel is of such a nature in itself, and a soul is of such a nature in itself, so are they primarily distinguished in species, not indeed as two species, but as species and its part, because a soul is not properly a species, but only part of the species."

Moreover, the difference cannot be explained by saying that the knowledge of angels is intuitive and that of human souls is discursive; since angels in addition to their intuitive knowledge have a kind of discursive knowledge, whilst, as has been stated above (p. 565), the soul has intuitive knowledge of singulars, and the knowledge of the beatified soul could not be discursive.

Duns Scotus admitted the composition of essence and existence in angels, because they are beings created in "aevum," but he never clearly adopted the theory of hylomorphic composition of matter and form in angels however, (cf., p. 561). In consequence of his "haecceitas theory" he was quite certain of their composition of species and individual differentiae.

INDIVIDUATION OF ANGELS

Since St. Thomas Aquinas held it to be impossible for two angels to be of one species, it seems well to set out Duns Scotus's arguments to the contrary.

First, the proposition of Aristotle, that in those things without matter the "quid quod est," the quiddity is the same as that of which it is, would lead to its *esse* being the same as its *posse*, but such is true of God alone.

Further, as to Aristotle's comparison of form to number and his conclusion that whatever is added to or subtracted from number varies the species, he explains that form, thus signified, really referred to the whole quiddity of a material substance, and not to its form, as opposed to its matter. Moreover, all formal differences are not specific differences, to say that an angel differs from another by his form, does not involve a difference in species, any more than to say several men thus differ.

A formal difference may mean a difference *in* form, as well as a difference *of* form.

Aristotle in saying that gender is only a material difference within the form of humanity and that all difference of form must

be specific difference, merely meant that a certain formal difference is specific, and not that all formal differences are specific.

As to the argument that multiplication of individuals is only for the preservation of the species in corruptible things, and therefore unnecessary in angels, he replies that such is not the only reason for multiplication; that the Divine Goodness is a factor, and even the nature of the sun and moon is in itself multiple. (Though as was then thought, he said it was only specifically so.)

The Divine Goodness intended that there should be several individuals of the same species, and there is no justification for saying that there is no numerical plurality in perfect (created) beings.

Duns Scotus, on the other hand, held that :

The quiddity of the intelligences like all quiddity is communicable, even the Divine Essence.

Every created quiddity being definable is able to be conceived "sub ratione universalis," and although the quiddity of an angel is really the same as its singularity, still it can be understood without its singularity.

An angel may be annihilated without the whole angelic nature perishing.

Angels though immaterial can be individual, for separated souls, which are pure forms, are individual apart from any relation to body. The whole angelic species, unlike man, did not fall.

With the exception of God, every nature is multiple, because it is not "de se" an "actus purus" and does not include of necessity some quasi singular entity, otherwise it would be infinite: for the individual nature would exhaust the whole perfection of its species and no two of its kind would be possible. (This is exactly the reverse of the opinion of St. Thomas Aquinas.)

SUBSTANCE AND FACULTIES OF ANGELS

As to the further variety of angelic composition, that of substance and faculties, Duns Scotus held that they were not identical but at the same time not really distinct. That he held that they are not really distinct, is shown by his insisting that intellection and volition are measured by *aevum*, like the angelic substance and not by a kind of time, not continuous but discrete.

KNOWLEDGE OF ANGELS

As to angelic knowledge, Duns Scotus held that angels know creatures in five ways.

By their vision of the "Word"; intuitively in themselves;

by intuition from the intellect of another angel, who is cognisant of the thing; by abstraction from the species habitually concreated; or by abstraction from species acquired. This method by acquired species was also held by Richard of Middleton. The reason given is that angels must have both an active and passive intellect as they are more perfect than men; otherwise they would either have an infinite number of 'rationes' of understanding and thus be equal to God, or they would have no means of perfecting their creaturely deficiencies and thus would be not more perfect than a stone. Such species perfect them in their intelligible and accidental *esse* and not in their substantial and essential *esse*.

Thus species though received without phantasms are not fewer in the case of superior angels (as held by St. Thomas Aquinas); but remain according to the number known, since in every created intellect, the ratio of knowing is posterior to the thing known.

Further, since universality cannot include individuality, objects for them must evoke singular as well as universal species. Thus singulars are known to angels, not only by abstracted species, but also intuitively, or "secundum existentiam actualem" as well as by concreated species (Henry of Ghent held that concreated species were the same as universals).

The concreated species which angels do not receive from things, is one of their distinguishing features from souls. Moreover, angels, like souls, know themselves "per essentiam," but he held that the intellect was not left passive, as it is only a formal and partial ratio of intellection.

He attributed to angels a distinctive, abstractive knowledge of the Divine Essence, concreated with and therefore supernatural to the angel, as it does not come through his activity, yet natural, as it does not come through Grace.

WILL OF ANGELS

Duns Scotus insisted on the freedom of will in angels, from the first moment of this creation, they were free to attain or forfeit beatitude, though beatitude came, as it only could come, as a gift from God.

Then he goes on to say, that even when the angel is confirmed in goodness and in spite of the fact that its freedom from sense and appetite enables it to follow its natural good without difficulty, it must still be able to turn from the Highest Good, since to have a will is to be free (*sic*).

He follows Aristotle and Dionysius that there is co-ordination between grades of being in the universe, and maintains that

superior angels illuminate inferior ones, and that these illuminate men, indirectly, by means of phantasms, as well as guard them and act as 'missioners.'

PLACE OF ANGELS

He regarded an angel as in place "circumscriptive" not as having correspondence of its part with place, or acting because it is there, but rather as being there because it acts.⁵⁶

His theory is that it is because an angel is in place, according to accidental "passiones" and not according to his nature, that he can be in two places at the same time, though it is not certain whether several angels can be in one place at the same time.⁵⁶

This is probably the origin of the famous gibe about the number of angels that can dance on the point of a needle.

DIVINE ATTRIBUTES

With regard to the Attributes of God, the proofs of which have already been set out (pp. 539-547), Duns Scotus held that His simplicity is proved from the infinity and necessity of being; He is without composition of essence and existence, because He is uncaused.

For the same reason, He has no material, formal, or final cause.

Being absolutely simple, He cannot possess attributes as something added to His Nature, yet His Will and Intellect are formally distinct, the distinction from essence being one "ex parte rei secundum quid."

They are distinct "realiter," in so far as they each are one in the Divine Essence, but they are distinct "formaliter" inasmuch as their notions are not identical.

This distinction is not purely conceptual in origin, it is one which exists prior to the operation of human thought.⁵⁷

God is infinite and formally necessary in Himself, only Creation and the Incarnation are contingent.

Like St. Albertus Magnus and St. Bonaventura Duns Scotus regarded the Incarnation as part of the Creation.

It does not merely serve the purpose of Redemption, but is a decree of God arising from His love ordaining the assumption of human nature by the Son, regardless of the fall of Adam.⁵⁸

He ascribes an order among the Divine Attributes, first essence, then intellect, then will and so on, in this order they are nearer or more remote from the essence.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ "Angelus est in loco quia praesens per essentiam definitive corpori locanti existenti in loco circumscriptive et non est in loco solum per operationem."

⁵⁶ *Op. Ox.*, II, 2, 6, 7 and 8.

⁵⁷ *Op. Ox.*, I, 8, 4, 17.

⁵⁸ *Op. Ox.*, III, d. 7.

⁵⁹ *Quodl.*, I, 10. *Rep.*, Par. 35, I, 4.

By such an order it is meant that when we ascribe attributes to God we speak truly of His nature, and since they are unitively contained in that nature and not absolutely distinct from it, we do not imperil the Divine Simplicity.

The most fundamental characteristic of the Divine Being is infinity; and the concept of an infinite being expresses the intrinsic mode of the Divine Essence, in a way which His other attributes do not.⁶⁰ But deductions of Divine Attributes from Divine Essence, conceived as infinite being, cannot be made; there is no ratio as a ground for their existence, they can only be proved *a posteriori* from concrete existence.⁶¹

TRINITY

Intrinsic activity is inseparable from a first and completely actual Agent, Who acts "per se" and Whose end is Himself. So to speak, if we may divide an eternal operation, there is first the apprehension of the Divine Nature by the Divine intellect, as its supreme and actually intelligible object.

This immanent intellectual activity within the Divine Being is what Duns Scotus and others understand by the generation of the Son.

Duns Scotus here has recourse to the Augustinian division of 'memoria,' 'intellectus' and 'voluntas.' The 'memoria' is, according to Duns Scotus, the Divine Intellect considered as having its intelligible object present to it "in actu secundo"; it is the formal principle of imminent production or generation, and is called the "memoria fecunda" because it produces the "notitia genita" or "Verbum." It is a perfect production only if the "notitia" is adequate to the principle producing it.

But the 'memoria' of the Divine Essence is infinite and must therefore have an infinite "notitia" corresponding to it. This "notitia infinita" the "Verbum" or "Filius," the Second Person of the Trinity, is thus generated within the Divine Essence itself, for outside of it there is no infinite.⁶²

Hence the immanent production is called the "Productio ad Intra," which being wholly within the ground of the Divine Essence and Possible is also necessary.⁶⁴

⁶⁰ *Op. Ox.*, I, 2, 3, 17 and 8, 1, 15.

⁶¹ *Rep.*, Par. I, 35, 1, 1.

⁶² "Producere autem Verbum, sive habere principium formale producendi, non competit nisi ratione memoriae. . . ."

Productionem Verbi praecedit origine intellectio distincta quae convenit Patri secundum intelligentiam propriam ingenitam; non ergo producitur Verbum primo actu intelligendi, loquendo de prima origine. . . . Sed prior est origine actus intelligendi, ut est intelligentiae paternae, et isto ut sic priore, intelligit pater essentiam propriam distincte, non tamen in Verbo producto." *Quodl.*, I, 21, 22.

⁶⁴ *Op. Ox.*, I, 2, 7, 3.

By some Duns Scotus is considered as maintaining that this very first thought-act "memoria" of the Father rests on the will of the Father and that therefore the Son is not generated by the necessity of the Father's nature.

In addition, God has a further intrinsic operation depending exclusively on His will, which consists in loving the Divine Essence; and this is what is meant by the procession of the Holy Ghost. This Third Person must be infinite and perfect, since He proceeds from the Father and the Son and satisfies the Divine Love; so that He is identical with the Father and the Son, though as something produced He is, like them, subsistent "per se." But since God's Will cannot change, God may be said to understand and love Himself of necessity.

As to the distinction of the Persons, Duns Scotus held that it is neither formal nor real, but "ex natura rei," and he followed St. Bonaventura in holding that such is a distinction of mode of being (se habendi non essendi). He wished to give more positive effect to the concept of Personality in the Trinity, in place of the usual connotation of an incommunicable suppositum. In other words, to indicate that the innascibility differs from the paternity in the Father, for He is not the Father because unbegotten, and so also with the case of the properties of Christ.

The orthodox view held by St. Thomas is that the relation is one of origin, which avoids the error of making the Persons distinguishable by absolute properties; but Duns Scotus thought that it did not make the Trinity more comprehensible. So like Richard of Middleton, he starts with the view that a relation is not nothing, and passing through the stage of making a formal distinction between the essence and the relation, he postulated positive entities for the Divine Persons; since thereby stress is laid on the fact that whilst the Divine Essence is not a genus, and suffers no plurification, the supposita are three. For the Divine Essence is at the same time both singular and universal, and not made individual in this or that suppositum. To avoid any indication of a triple existence, he insisted that any use of the word subsistent as applied to the Persons must be taken to mean an "esse incommunicabiliter per se" and not a multiplication of 'ens.'

GOD'S KNOWLEDGE

As to the secondary or extrinsic activities of God, the activity of the Divine Intellect consists in the apprehension of the Divine Essence as imitable by creatures.

Duns Scotus held that this is the Divine Essence Itself, and not under any "relatio rationis" to a creature, *i.e.*, the ratio of knowing that creature.

His objections to such relatio are that this would require a second relatio and so *ad infinitum* ; it would involve a passivity, which would mean that the Divine knowledge was caused by objects ; and a limitation of the Divine Essence, which is unnecessary, when an infinite essence is capable of representing an infinite number of objects.

The idea is not the ground of the Divine knowledge of the creature, it is the product not the condition of the Divine cognition.

That God can know creatures through His Essence is deducible from the fact that effects are in their cause in some way, and God, Who knows His Essence perfectly, knows it as a cause and knows that to which His causality extends. That this is fitting is clear, from the absence of passivity in Him which could be moved by eternal objects ; and from the incongruity in supposing the supreme Being to be subject to the influence of creatures, or ignoring the fact that His knowledge is the cause of their very existence.

God understands intuitively, and not discursively, since His intellect is identical with its act and with that which is understood ; such knowledge extends to all individuals and knows all that is in the effect.

There are three varieties of individuals unknown to God : the impossible, the evil, and contingent beings.

Impossibles cannot be known, for they are self-contradictory and therefore most truly nothing.

Evil cannot be known, because God knows things only through His Essence and therefore the objects of His knowledge must imitate the goodness of His Essence. Moreover, evil is a privation and privation has no proper ratio, but is known only through positive concepts.

Contingent beings, Duns Scotus held as unknowable. God only knows necessary complexes and the possibility of contingents. If He knew the actual temporal co-existence of any two eternal concepts, finite beings would exercise a causality on His intellect.⁶⁵ But such concerns His speculative intellect only, independent of His Will. This distinction is necessary as creation of contingent beings is dependent on His Will and as created are known to Him.⁶⁶

GOD'S WILL

According to Duns Scotus the function of the Divine Will is to give to possible natures in the Divine Intellect, a real existence.

Since the Intellect operates before the Will, such possible

⁶⁵ *Op. Ox.*, I, 39.

⁶⁶ *Op. Ox.*, I, 36, 2.

natures must be regarded as, previous to their approval by the Will, having no true or real esse, but only an "esse cognito."

But such ideal possible natures are not actualized of necessity, because they exist in the Divine Intellect.

The Will is free, having no external coercion to actualize or not some or all of such Divine ideas, but it can only actualize what the intellect knows, hence it cannot will the evil, or the impossible, or that which involves contradiction. On the other hand, there is no limit to the absolute power of God, though He cannot will that which is contrary, for it is not anything "volibile ex se." Anything that imitates the Divine Essence and is known by God is creatable; and in this sense He is Omnipotent.

Amongst creatures a sovereign can act "de potentia ordinata" according to laws already laid down, or "de potentia absoluta" in accordance with his right to make laws, as being outside or above those already made.

With God all law proceeds from His Divine Will; and to whatever extent He may vary it, as it depends entirely upon His Will, it may be said to be "de potentia ordinata" and not "absoluta."

Justice is rightness of Will adhered to for its own sake, in God the rightness of Will is His, seeing that His Will can never err; it is its own law which is willed for its own sake.

Rightness of Will, as far as befits the Divine Nature itself, cannot err, for His self-love is strictly necessary; as far as it relates to His creatures. He may act contrary to the self-imposed "regula" not "universali" but "in particulari," by which Duns Scotus means that God need not lend to anyone in particular the means of Grace; it is not given of necessity, Grace is undoubtedly a free gift of God.⁶⁷

⁶⁷ *Op. Ox.*, IV, 44, 2.

CHAPTER XXVII

FURTHER FRANCISCANS AND SCOTISTS

Raimon Lull, d. 1315—Raymond of Sabunde, d. 1432—Alexander of Alexandria, d. 1314—Peter Auriol, d. 1321—Francis of Mayrone, d. 1325—Peter Thomas, c. 1320—Antonio Andrae, c. 1320—John of Reading, c. 1320—John of Bassoles, d. 1333—Walter Burleigh, d. 1345—John Baconsthorpe, d. 1346—Hieronymus Aymas—Eliseus Garcia,—Nicholas Bonnet, d. 1360—Peter of Candia (Pope Alexander V), d. 1410—William of Vaurouillon (de Valle Rullonis), d. 1463—Petrus Tartaretus, d. 1494—Antonius Trombeta, d. 1518—Lychetus of Brescia, d. 1520—Lucas Wadding, d. 1657—Merinero of Alcalá, d. 1663—Macedo, d. 1681—Brancatus of Lauria, d. 1693—Claude Frassen, d. 1711.

Raimon Lull, or Raymond Lull, 1233–1315, was born in Majorca; he became a Franciscan when he was 32 years of age, having led an unsuccessful married life.

He built himself a cottage on the top of Mount Rouada, which was on his estate in the island; and for nine years studied theology and philosophy which he afterwards continued to do at Rome and Paris.

His philosophical works were in Latin, the chief being his *Ars Magna*, an encyclopædia, a compendious guide to all truth based on idealistic logic: it embodied in it a method of argument, which he considered would be invaluable in his mission of converting Mussulmen to the Catholic Faith. In pursuit of this mission he made journeys to the Near East and to North Africa with varying success.

His philosophy, which he held should be completely incorporated with theology, was that of realistic mysticism.

His chief reputation in modern times has been in connection with his secular works which were written in the Catalan language, the chief of which is *Blanquerna* (of which there is now an English translation).

It has been brought to notice that even at that distant period he was a greater master of prose than any of his contemporaries outside of Italy. But of that side of his life and all the legends which have become attached to it no detail need here be given.

He was a prolific writer, over five hundred works being accredited to him.

Though he is said to have attended the lectures of Duns Scotus there is not much evidence of any influence that he received from them.

As a Franciscan he was very bitter in his denunciation of the Thomists, whom he accused of being Averroists; as the logical deduction of their arguments on individuation pointed to the existence of a common soul for all mankind, which Averroes in fact had maintained.

Raymond of Sabunde, d. 1432. A physician, philosopher and theologian, he was a professor of the University of Toulouse; he wrote *Theologia naturalis sive liber creaturarum*¹ in which he distinguished truth learnt from nature from truth learnt from the Holy Scriptures. He was a faithful disciple of Raimon Lull.

Alexander of Alexandria, d. 1314. A Franciscan, was a pupil of Duns Scotus. He wrote an important commentary on the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle, which for a long time was attributed to Alexander of Hales.² There appears to be considerable doubt as to his nationality, but it was in Paris that he studied under Duns Scotus.

He appears to have been not unwilling to grant that the individuation of sensible things was due to matter, but he claimed that, in regard to separated substances, there was a certain support, which he does not further define, that takes the place of matter and furnishes the necessary foundation for the individuation of souls, angels, and God.

Peter Auriol, d. 1321. *Doctor Eloquentis*. He came from Toulouse and was a Franciscan, who publicly commented on the *Sentences* in the town of Paris.

Having completed this course of lectures, the Pope John XXII wrote to the Chancellor of the University of Paris in 1318 to grant what may be termed his degrees, as soon as possible; from which it may be concluded that he did not follow the usual routine of study and examination required by the University.

In 1321 he was appointed Archbishop of Aix en Provence, but appears to have died immediately afterwards.

He has sometimes been confused with another Franciscan of the same name who died in 1345.

His principal writings were a *Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*³ and *Quodlibeta*.

Though a Franciscan, he broke away from the tenets of Duns

¹ Printed at Venice, 1581.

² Printed at Venice, 1752.

³ Printed at Rome, 1596-1605.

Scotus, for he asserted that it was evident that man, as distinguished from Socrates, and animal as distinguished from man, are not, taken as such, different kinds of being, possessing in the bosom of nature any existence outside of the intellect of the observer. To pretend that they are, is to go back to Plato, and thus resuscitate the thesis of the third man (according to the view of Aristotle).⁴ In his opinion man, distinguished from Socrates, and animal from man, are but concepts, second "intentions," nothing more and nothing less; they are beings constructed by the intellect and nothing else. It is not nature which makes them separate beings, for they have no actual existence.

So that things only exist individually: essential modes of being are second substances, and that which corresponds as a common whole to these words man, and animal, possess only an "intentional" being.

With regard to universal matter, Henry of Gand had distinguished essence from existence, and had said that matter, as separated or separable from form, possessed the particular attributes of essence, but not those of existence. Duns Scotus, coming later, had confused essence with existence, by regarding them as the same and had thus maintained that matter taken by itself is a kind of substance, the most imperfect of beings without doubt, but nevertheless a real and common being, without any difference for all individuals of which it formed the base and of which it constitutes the real "in existentia."⁵

Contrary to these Franciscan Opinions, Peter Auriol maintained that prime matter possesses no essence: prime matter is no determined, distinct, or actual nature; it is a pure potentiality, which awaits its determination.

Inasmuch as it is not some natural being of a determined mode, as this stone, this earth, etc., yet it can without doubt become this stone, this earth, etc., but it is an entity deprived of all act, all determination, all distinction, a simple potentiality, a simple determinable. "Res antequam creatura est in potentia tantum, et non in actu; ergo est nihil. Consequentia valet; alias creatio non esset de nihilo."

From this it follows that the question of the principle of individuation does not arise "Realiter loquendo quaestio nulla est." Before the individual there is nothing except its principle of being, which is the act of the extrinsic mover which makes it what it is.

But suppose that it is made by means of two second causes;

⁴ *Contra* p. 549.

⁵ Cf. Ch. XXV, pp. 508, 514; Ch. XXVI, p. 551.

quantity dividing matter and then matter communicating to form its proper division.

The determinating principle would be quantity, but quantity is not substantial, it is accidental.

To understand this accident as residing in already subsisting matter, is to presuppose matter primordially undivided, which has just been rejected, but if, on the other hand, it is understood that this accident naturally accompanies all matter, then it is useless to introduce this agent quantity to make it confer on each part of matter that quantitative dimension which it already possesses.*

As to the universal *post rem*, Peter Auriol declared that it is not necessary to suppose, as a subjective entity in the intellect, any real form, on which the activity of thought is exercised. This form, which is viewed, or which is conceived as the simple essence of a rose, of a flower, is not a real thing, subjectively imprinted either on the intellect or on the phantom, as a substantially real thing; but it is an object from outside in a state of "intentional" being. Otherwise, since the virtue of a form is to be simply infinite and to include all individuals, there would be a certain infinite thing adhering either to the intellect, or to the phantom, or subsisting by itself, other than the prime form, which is God. And that is quite impossible. But it is not contested that this rose, which my intellect contemplates, this spectacular form which perfects the intuition of my mind, is a single nature: it is the simple nature, the total quiddity of the rose. So that if one regards a man, or a rose, observation does not stop at this man, or at this rose, it stops only at the simple notion of man or rose. Hence it follows, that this spectacular form, this image, this concept, cannot be a real thing adhering to the intellect or phantom or subsisting by itself.

For him, to admit that the speculative form is really inherent in the intellect, would result not in things, but in images only being known. Further, according to him in man's experience, man commences by perceiving the form of this rose before being led to conceive of rose in general.

Moreover the first object of intellection would be an actual spectacular form, which would revive the error of Plato, that the intellect observes the exemplaries of things and not things themselves.

(But then Plato does not confuse the higher with the lower reason, but posits them both within the mind.)

* If both form and matter are not real it is only raising a non-real accident from its limitation: form cannot exist alone, matter cannot exist alone, nor can accident, why should the composite be matter and form, and not matter, form and accident. Erwernd on Duns Scotus.

Finally, he adds that it is not true philosophy to multiply beings without a cause, for there is no need for a greater number, when a less will suffice. Now there is no necessity to suppose a thing such as the spectacular form. It is of no assistance in explaining the operation of the active intellect, since it is not finally completed if the intellect is not directed to things outside. Nor is this intermediary of any use in ascertaining things more clearly; to know them clearly, we have enough potentiality, act, and the "similitude" intervening between potentiality and act; but between act and subject the introduction of any form at all is superfluous. Further, one cannot suppose this intervention without lessening the degree of knowledge.

(Nevertheless, according to Wulf as he granted to the *esse objectivum* a stability and uniformity, which contrasts with the changing and multiple aspects of the successive and numerous psychological acts which attain to it, the controversy therefore became an empty one which turned on shades of meaning.)

Francis Mayrone, d. 1325. *Doctor Illuminatus Acutus*, a Franciscan of the Sorbonne. It was he, who is said to have promulgated in 1315 the "Great Sorbonnic Decree," that anyone taking a doctorate must sustain his thesis by answering all questions that are put to him from six o'clock in the morning to six o'clock at night without eating or drinking. He was, in addition to *Doctor Illuminatus*, known as *Magister Abstractorum*, because in following Duns Scotus, whose pupil he had been, he went out of his way to increase the number of abstractions already realized by Duns Scotus.

He was a strict realist and follower of Plato, going so far as to say that Aristotle, though a great physician, was the worst of metaphysicians, as he did not know how to abstract.

His chief works were on the *Sentences*, *Formalities* and *Univocation*.⁷

Of their two different didactic methods he compared that of Aristotle to that of St. Paul, as that of rising from lower things to higher; whilst that of Plato he compared to that of St. John, which descends from the higher to the lower.

This latter he held to be the one that theologians ought to follow, as it is the method of God Himself.

The first object of God's knowledge is His Own Essence and as Creator "naturae naturante" he proceeds always from the general to the particular.

As to universals, genus and species, they are all real individuals of themselves and are not definable; the property of the individual

⁷ Published Venice, 1517, 1520 and 1542.

being does not signify any quiddity or any quidditative perfection ; there is no such thing as the science of the individual.

Socrates is not in himself anything, he owes all his essence to the part of species that circumscribes his haecceity.

Aristotle ought not to have given to Socrates the title of " first substance," which belongs rather to his specific principle of being. " According to nature, second substances are anterior to first substances." For not reserving the term substance to the only real substant, the species, he excuses Aristotle, by explaining that the word substance has two different meanings, one coming from *substare* and the other from *subsistere*, the former meaning species, the latter Socrates. (But when did Aristotle learn or even use Latin ?)

From this follow four conclusions. First, that all indistinct individuals under the aspect of species have the same specific nature. Second, that all indistinct species under the aspect of genus, have the same generic nature. Third, that several men are (one) man, as having participation in the same species. Lastly, that (one) man is several men, in the separated individuals, the one as to species being divided into several as to number.

Francis refused to hold that matter is numerically one in the bosom of all beings. Matter is in itself deprived of all form, but to admit that it is determined by numerical unity would be to admit that it is informed, which would involve two contraries, form and privation of form in the same subject, which is impossible.

Nor will Francis agree that things are distinguished really, in the same way that they are distinguished formally, as he explained in his treatise *de Principio Formalitatis*. The same matter is one in all beings, not numerically but continuously as in a man, who has a continuous body under diverse parts.

In his *de Primo principio* and his *de Univocatione entis* he declares that the idea of first principle is innate in us, we all have it from birth. It is assumed being, " ens sub intellectum," which is found in nature, in the human intelligence and primordially in the Divine Intelligence ; the idea of *this* being is that of a being, which precedes all other beings.

It precedes them all, as being the first of principles, and it is due to its complex nature that it understands all.

This gives rise to the question as to whether being is univocal or not. He replies that the concept of being does include both God and creatures. But that does not mean that the real being of the Creator and that of the creature are confounded in a simple being in one and the same substance. Really there are two beings infinite and finite, but there is only one formally.

But the universal concept of being corresponds in nature with the being formally one ; that which distinguishes creatures from the Creator is an inferior form with regard to that which gives the universal its being, which Francis calls the essential form.

Truly indeed was he known as the *Magister Abstractorum*.

Peter Thomas, c. 1320. A Franciscan who came from Catalonia in Spain. He is thought to have been a pupil of Duns Scotus. He wrote *de Distinctione formalitatum*⁸ and *Questiones Conclusiones de Ente*.⁹

According to Aristotle the ten predicaments are ten modes of substance. Peter Thomas argues that the predicaments are "intentional" as being firstly in the Divine Mind and secondly in the human intellect ; also that they are real, and as such they are formally distinct from one another, but they have besides a positive actuality, which proves that each of them has a particular essence.

The quidditative determination of such essence is the "esse subjectivum," or the "esse essentialis," all the predicaments are really distinct from one another as regards their subjects.

He recognizes that there is an objection to relatives, being so described, but he adds that if you distinguish the relatives, you will be able to see that they are positive. The foundation of the composite is the form, so that matter in respect of form is a relative.

But for a Scotist, is it not admitted that without form matter can actually exist, so consequently the foundation is not a necessary condition of existence !¹⁰

Antonio Andrae, c. 1320. *Doctor Dulcissimus*, a Franciscan from Aragon in Spain. His works were *Questiones de Tribus Principiis Rerum Naturalium*,¹¹ in which he deals with matter, form and privation : also in *Metaphysica textualis*, printed with the works of Duns Scotus.

He was strict adherent to the views of Duns Scotus. The two elements matter and form, of which a substance is composed, are, properly speaking, in nature, two separated substances ; each of these two elements subsists by itself and is itself a thing, a reality. As a proof he advances the proposition, that if there is a composite formed of two principles A. B., either these two principles possess being apart from one another, or they do not. If they do not, how can they by allying themselves together constitute a being. No, then each possesses being before this alliance. But everything

⁸ 80, Magdalen Coll., Oxon ; 133, Merton Coll., Oxon.

⁹ Magdalen Coll., Oxon. ¹⁰ Cf. Ch. XXV, p. 514 ; Ch. XXVI, p. 551.

¹¹ Venice, 1489, 1517.

which possesses being is a being and every being according to Avicenna is a thing. Then A. and B. are things. "Materia ergo et forma sua duo entia et duae res et per consequens duo aliquid."

Matter subsists before any determination produced by quantity. From quantity come the divisions of matters, which support the forms, but before being divided matter was divisible, hence it was magnitude. That is the reasoning.

John of Reading, c. 1320. A Franciscan Master at Oxford and a disciple and contemporary of Duns Scotus. He wrote a Commentary on the *Sentences*, and also a Criticism of the Terminism of William of Occam.

John of Bassoles, d. 1333, at Tewkesbury. He was a pupil of Duns Scotus. He wrote a *Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*,¹² which was considered one of the richest treasures of learning and of scholastic subtleties.

Though his arguments as a Scotist were always directed against the tenets of St. Thomas Aquinas, he never says an ill-word against him.

He was a Platonist and Realist, who even objected to the teaching of Henry of Gand, who had formerly been the mentor of the Franciscans, for not having recognized that the soul is at least formally distinct from its faculties.

It is true that the distinction is not essential, but the soul being the most noble of forms, it can be admitted that all its faculties participate in its essence, yet each one possesses a permanent mode, a proper quiddity, a particular form, that is almost a distinct separate essence.

Matter, he maintained, taken by itself without epithet, was possible before being created, that was never in dispute; but, he added, that it was later created and that this change of state made it actual. The pure potentiality of which Aristotle speaks, cannot be called created matter, the actuality of 'being' being the contrary of the possible, that again was not contested. Further, this actual matter has been created before all form and without any form, matter and form are in effect two entities successively created and the first in order of generation is matter according to St. Augustine. So that matter is effectively and really, "in effectu et in re," without any debt to form. From this John concludes that God could create matter without form, but that God has not created this matter without form, because it did not exist. But as to the nature of this primordially informed matter, which corresponds to the notion of the first corporal subject, John held

¹² Venice, 1516; Paris, 1517.

that it was matter undivided, but susceptible of being divided by subsequent forms.

Primarily, it had no form that was such and such quantity, but quantity; nor such and such magnitude, but magnitude, magnitude properly indetermined although actual and formal. Such matter has always existed and will exist as long as the world, it will exist as the necessary basis of being, although it may appear formally divided into a crowd of genus, species and particularly determined individuals. Born capable of clothing all forms, it has clothed them, but these are accidental and superficial differences.

So that undivided matter is the affirmation of being, and the differences which give the particular existences, purely formal negations of an essential indivision, do not affect the real basis of univocal being in any way.

All this goes to prove that St. Thomas's theory of individuation by matter must be wrong; not that the pantheism of Parmenides is correct.

As to the nature of God, it is as high as the thought of man can raise itself (*sic*). It is at the summit of all beings, both as particular essence and as universal cause. Whatever God does, He does not by necessity but freely, being able not to do it; with regard to God, creation is purely contingent. The nature of God is both natural, rational, and intellectual; by rational is meant that it proves the reality of that which it defines; the proof of St. Anselm he regarded as a sophism.

According to some there are in the Divine Mind two orders of species, intelligible species the causes of future intellections, and intellectualized species the effects of accomplished intellections, but John de Bassoles, though a realist, declares very precisely against this, refusing to admit in God any other species than intellectualized species.

With the "esse cognitum" the generation of the Divine Ideas commences; previously there is only the Essence of God.

But in his explanation of these ideas, which he defines as the true exemplaries of things, John takes care not to reduce them in number, like Henry of Gand, but increases them by localizing in the Divine Understanding, as intellectual essences beyond the ideas of all particular substances, all the abstractions which the human mind can conceive.

Walter Burleigh or Burley, 1275-1345. Doctor Planus et Perspicuus, a voluminous writer credited with 120 works on Aristotle alone; he is variously thought to have been a Secular Priest, and Augustinian and a Franciscan. He taught at Oxford

and Paris, c. 1324, and became a tutor of the Black Prince. He has likewise been thought to have been an Averroist, Nominalist and Realist. M. Haureau, after review of the opposing claims, asserts that he was clearly a Realist.

For Walter the concept was a very real thing of the genus of substance, which had its place and own position in nature.

M. Bonchitté said that he was a Nominalist as regards the universal in the abstract concept, but a Realist in that he considered them realities in their union with the objects which they modified. He attributed reality to the "privatio" (when it disappears on the acquisition of a new form) likewise to the parts of quantity such as surface line and point and to the "forma totius" in an assembly such as a house. He further assigned to qualities such as love and justice a mode of growth distinct from that of quantity by a succession of entities, the inferior being destroyed at the moment of the appearance of the superior. (An interesting description of incorporeal growth.)

From his *Commentary on the Six Principles* it appears that he was not only a Master of Arts, but also a Doctor of Medicine. He was a Professor both at Oxford and Paris. Besides the *Commentary* above mentioned he wrote *De Vita et moribus Philosophorum* (Thales to Seneca),¹³ which though full of errors had great popularity and ran into twelve editions between 1467 and 1500; also a *Commentary* on the Posterior Analytics, which was bound up with that of Robert Grosseteste.¹⁴

His *Ethics* and *Tractatus de Materia* became textbooks at Oxford, so that the Royal Injunction of 1535 bids students "to substitute Aristotle for the frivolous questions of Scotus, Burleus, etc."

John Baconsthorpe, d. 1346. *Doctor Resolutus*, a Realist and a Carmelite, was born at Baconsthorpe in Norfolk. He was a great nephew of Roger Bacon and was an intimate friend of Thomas Bradwardine, Archbishop of Canterbury. He studied at Oxford and Paris, where he became a pupil of Guy Terrien and then returned to Oxford. According to Fuller, he was a very small man; pen, penknife, inkhorn, one sheet of paper and one of his works would have made up his height; yet he is alleged to have written over 120 books. He wrote a *Commentary* on the *Sentences* and *Quodlibeta*,¹⁵ published at Cremona in 1618; though called the first of the Averroists, this term rather belongs to John of Jandun (cf. Chap. XXV, p. 490).

He did not indeed adopt the doctrine of the Universal Intellect advanced by Averroes, but only considered it as a matter for

¹³ Cologne, 1467.

¹⁴ Venice and Padua, 1497.

¹⁵ B.M.R.L., 1, c. fourteenth century.

debate. Some of his opinions may be gathered from his following statements.

In the order of generation and in the order of perfection, the first subject is the substance individualized by the form. No individuality can come from matter, which is but an inert recipient. Although the external object may be intelligible by itself, it is nevertheless finally ultimate only by means of the active intellect. Hence the universal potentiality precedes the act of the intellect, but this universal at first in potentiality can be actualized subsequently by the active intellect alone.

Truth is materially and causally in the external object, it is only in the intellect formally, and as such it is the conformity of the thing thought to be the real thing. The final cause of all things is God, and if the first object of knowledge is the Divine Essence it is not nevertheless true, as the philosophers claim, that this knowledge is furnished to us by the observance of natural things: it is by Grace that it comes to us.

He is regarded by some as a distinct follower of Geoffrey of Fontaine.

Hieronymus Aymas, a Carmelite in his *Philosophia* published in Turin, 1667, followed Baconsthorpe and *Eliseus Garcia*, another Carmelite, wrote a *Cursus Philosophicus Justa Mentem John Bacconi*. *Angli Carmelitae*, published Rome, 1700.

Nicholas Bonnet, d. 1360. Of Tour, a Franciscan. He was a Master of Theology at Paris, 1334, and sat in the Assembly which pronounced against the doctrine of John XXII concerning the Beatific Vision. He was sent on a mission to the Tartars by Pope Benedict XII in 1338 and made Bishop of Malta in 1342.

He wrote *Theologia Naturalis*,¹⁶ which consisted of Commentaries on the Metaphysics, Physics and Categories of Aristotle. He was not the Spaniard whom Fabricius thought was the author.

Peter of Candia, 1340-1410. He was born in Crete of Greek stock and was educated in Paris; he became Bishop in 1386 and was elected Pope at the Council of Pisa, 1409-1410, when he took the name of Alexander V. He wrote *Commentaries* on the *Sentences* and Four Principia or Inaugural lectures. He was acquainted with both Occamists and Scotists whom he quotes. He himself was a Scotist tinged with Nominalism.

William of Vaurouillon (de Valle Rullonis), d. 1463. He was a Scotist and Master of Theology at Paris in 1448. He wrote a

¹⁶ 16132, *Bib. Nat.*

Commentary on the Sentences and Vade Mecum or Collectorum of the Opus Oxoniense of Duns Scotus. This latter was used as a manual in Paris.

Petrus Tartaretus, d. 1494. A secular and a most remarkable Scotist of his time. He commented on the works of Aristotle and the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard and the *Quodlibeta* of Duns Scotus and the *Reportata on the Opus Oxoniense*. His edition of the *Summulae of Petrus Hispanae* (cf. Chap. XXIII, p. 462) became the handbook of logic at Cambridge.

Antonius Trombeta, d. 1518. He came from Padua and wrote *In Scoti formalitates questiones quodlibetales*.

Franciscus Lychetus of Brescia, d. 1520. He commented on the *Opus Oxoniense*.

Lucas Wadding, 1588–1657. An Irishman and Professor of Divinity of Salamanca. In 1625 he founded the celebrated Scotist College of St. Isidore for Franciscans in Rome, and made a complete edition of the works of Duns Scotus.¹⁷⁻⁸

Merinero of Alcala in Spain, d. 1663. Wrote on Scotist philosophy.

Macedo, 1584–1681. A Portuguese taught in Rome and Padua and wrote *Collectiones Doctrinae S. Thomae et Scoti cum differentiis inter utrumque*.

Brancatus of Lauria, 1612–1693. Wrote Commentaries on the *Sentences* of Duns Scotus.

Claude Frassen, 1620–1711. A Doctor of the Sorbonne in Paris, wrote *Scotus Academicus*.

¹⁷ Reprinted Vives, Paris, 1891–5, 26 vols.

¹⁸ A general Chapter of the Franciscans in 1633 imposed the doctrine of Duns Scotus upon their Order.

CHAPTER XXVIII

NOMINALISTS OR TERMINALISTS

William of Occam, d. 1349—Thomas Bradwardine, d. 1349—Thomas of Strasburg, d. 1357—Gregory of Rimini, d. 1358—John Buridan, d. 1358—Adam Goddam, d. 1358—John of Mirecourt, c. 1340—Albert de Saxe, d. 1390—Marsilius d'Inghen, d. 1396—Henry of Hoyta, d. 1397—Henry of Langestein or Hesse, d. 1397—Peter d'Ailly, d. 1425—Nicholas de Clamenge, d. 1440—Gabriel Biel, d. 1495—John Scot Major, d. 1540.

William of Occam, 1280–1349. Doctor Invincibilis. A Franciscan of Merton College, Oxford, studied under Duns Scotus in Paris. He became Head of the Franciscans in England and appeared as their representative at a celebrated Council of the Order of Franciscans held at Perugia in 1322, when they declared their revolt against Pope John XXII.

For complicity in this and for the heresy in their writings, he and Michael of Cesena together with Bonagrata of Bergamos were tried before the Bishops of Ferrara and Bologna with the result that they were imprisoned in the fortress of Avignon. But after seventeen weeks, they managed to escape to Louis of Bavaria, whom they supported in his controversy with the Pope. In 1342 Michael of Cesena died and William became recognized as the General of his Order. It seems to be a question as to whether he made his peace with Rome or died excommunicate. His chief works were a *Commentary* on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, *Quodlibeta*, *Questiones*, and a *Summa Logica*.

Disputatio super potestate eccliaistica prelati atque principum terrarum commisa, which was a violent attack upon Papal authority, is no longer attributed to William, but is thought to have been written by Peter Dubois, a Paris lawyer.

William was one of the most prominent Nominalists of the Age, which witnessed the decline of the old scholastic realism and the rise of the theological scepticism of the ensuing centuries. The rejection of the fundamental principles of metaphysics led to the strengthening of individualism, but also led to a flood of sophistry amongst his followers.

In his revolt against the logical refinements of Duns Scotus, he appears to have largely contented himself with naïve statements of bare facts, which were summed up in the formula known as

Occam's razor "essentia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitam."¹

He denied that philosophy could show that God was the first effective cause of all that exists. According to logic, the mode of being of a cause corresponds to the mode of being of its effects and that it is only by Faith that one knows that God is infinite.²

He, like Duns Scotus, rejected the theory of St. Thomas that Revealed Truth could be regarded as the principles of a science; in fact from a philosophical standpoint they appeared to him to be false.³ In order to combat the then current opinions concerning psychology, he introduced a new system of terminology which requires attention. He did not reject the definition of the soul as being a form immaterial and incorruptible, which is everywhere in all the body and complete in each part of the body; though he refused to attribute the definition to Aristotle. Whilst admitting that the soul is an essence, and that this essence is the form of the body, he regarded it as being entirely a matter of Faith and not of Reason.⁴

According to him, without Divine Grace man would have no notion of his soul and would not be able to call it a substantial form, or the agent of thought, or the foundation of life. He regarded intelligence and sensibility as diverse forms of but one soul, of but one spiritual substance, which resides in each individual, and that the qualities of the soul could not be separate substances of themselves, *e.g.*, virtue.⁵

In the same way he regarded the Body of Christ contained in the Sacrament in the same way as body and soul occupy the same place at the same time. (Cf. Chap. XXII, p. 455.)

With regard to knowledge, he insisted that "All knowledge comes at the same time from a knowing subject and from a known object." For an object to be the matter of knowledge, it is not sufficient that it merely can exist, it must actually possess the property of being perceptible by the subject; the name of such property is evidence, evidence is that which demonstrates the true reality the existence of the object.

The subject which collects this evidence must be endowed with certain faculties.

Here notice must be taken of William of Occam's terminology.

¹ Doctor Harris, *Duns Scotus*, Vol. I, p. 167, n, points out that it is established that this formula is nowhere to be found in Occam's works, but it is to be found in a different form in Duns Scotus, *Questiones de Anima*, Q. XI, No. 9. "Generale enim principium est, quod si aliquid potest aeque bene fieri per pauciora sicut per plura, nullo modo talis pluralitas debet poni." And in Dante, *De Monarchia*, lib. I. "Quod potest fieri per unum melius est fieri per unum, quam per plura." (Cf., p. 581).

² *Quod.*, IV, 3.

³ *Summa Logica*, III, 1.

⁴ *Quod.*, I, 10.

⁵ *Quod.*, I, 18.

"*Vis intuitiva*," the "intuitive power," William defines as that by which the intellect is capable of contemplating or seeing (*intueri*) external objects, as contrasted with "*vis abstractiva*," the abstractive power, which gives rise to the general concept of things.

The notion produced by the intuitive power immediately brings into force the active intellect. The object having been sensed, the intellect informed of its existence, judges what it is.⁶

As to abstraction, it is a faculty which does not determine whether a thing is contingent or not. So that the notion of existence does not come from abstraction, but from intuition. The abstract notion can be that of a Chimera.

The consideration of oneself, such as one's own acts of intelligence, will, joy, or sorrow, are, according to William, intuitive, whilst the consideration of intelligence, will, suffering, or happiness, not in respect of certain determined acts, but as certain general principles of phenomena of which the soul is the subject, he held to be abstractive notions.

The first degree of knowledge is the "Apprehensive Notion," it is not a perfect idea; to complete it, it is necessary that the intellect should adhere to and seize it.

The product of this last act is the "Adhesive Notion," by virtue of which the intellect affirms the truth or falseness of what it is considering.

Thus all mental propositions, corresponding to the terms of a vocal proposition, are "apprehensive" acts, *e.g.*, Socrates is a man; the idea, which the mind forms of Socrates, in so far as he is man, is the Apprehensive Notion; the judgment which the intellect makes in recognizing that he is truly a man is an Adhesive act, which gives rise to an Adhesive Notion, that is to say the idea of such man as is called Socrates.

William called such idea a concept; and investigates the question of whether this concept is subjectively or objectively in the soul, or whether it is not rather a modality of the thinking subject.

The Realists like St. Anselm and Duns Scotus regarded the universal as *ante rem*, from the standpoint of its being a subject external to all conceptual determinations.

The Thomists regarded all universals of themselves as beings subjectively in the soul itself, distinct from thought or other concepts.

William objected that the nature of the soul is one thing, that of concepts is another; the former persists and cannot be assimilated to fugitive things like concepts.

⁶ *Quod.*, I, 15.

The Nominalists regarded it as the artificial image of things, and that therefore it is objectively in the soul ; an architect sees a house of bricks and represents it to himself, as he has seen it, then this mental representation is only like a reflection in a looking-glass ; it is not real, it is merely objective.

William, afraid of confounding this image fashioned by the intellect in objective essence "quiddam fictum existens objectivi" with the representative entities of the Realists, suggested that such a concept is a "quality" existing in the soul, which represents things outside as they are or appear to be ; and that such quality is not naturally distinct from the intellections of things and objects.

This, in short, agrees with the Cartesian definition of a concept, as a modality of the intellect, giving a perception of the object outside as it appears to be, or in short modalities essentially representative.

But as Aristotle only seems to have attributed powers, habits, and passions to the soul the term quality seems doubtful. William therefore maintains that the most probable of all opinions is that "*All passion of the soul is the act which manifests it.*"

The intellection seizes a thing to draw from it the simple notion of this single thing, and this notion is called the passion of the soul, the natural property of which is to take the place of this single thing, as the property of words is to represent things by convention.

In view of modern knowledge of light it is not necessary here to go into the various opinions expressed as to insensible qualities of spherical forms, by which objects in the first place act on the senses.

William arrives at the conclusion that sensation is to be defined as the act resulting from a relation between the external object and the sensibility of the subject ; and that likewise the intellectual act is an effect determined by two partial causes, the intellective power of the subject and the thing felt by it.

Intellection is a fact, but how matter acts on intellect remains a mystery ; the introduction of the various intermediaries only postpones, but never avoids the question, such was William's attitude.

William draws a distinction between the intuitive power, in which one act succeeds another independently, so that one thing is seen after another ; whilst the abstracted power perfects itself by exercise, and in doing this forms a "habit" by which conclusions, previously reached, are made use of to arrive at a direct result, without the necessity of employment, each time, of all the various intervening judgments. Thus again obviating intermediaries.

As to the attributes of God, he says that the saints formerly used the word "names" instead of "attributes." As some say the attributes are distinct, so they said the names are distinct and diverse, placing the distinction in the names and the unity or identity in the things signified. Formerly they knew not the terms attributes of infinity, attributes of omnipresent; they simply named God all-powerful, infinite. But what are names, signs which signify views, concepts of the human mind. (It was largely this pure Nominalist view, like that of Roscellinus, divorcing all thought from reality, which led to the exaggerated forms of terminism and scepticism to which it gave rise: together with the absurd development of sophistry, as all argument was presumed to be unrelated to certitude.)

It is alleged that certain things are not really distinct, and are uniquely one according to reason; what the Doctors have formerly intended to say was, several terms taken significantly are said of the same real subjects, and although these terms might not be really distinguished, yet they can be rational. So that a single real subject, without any difference, diversity, or real plurality, corresponds to divers rational modes, that is to say, to divers concepts as the thing signified corresponds to divers signs; and that is why it is said of God that He can be the object of rational distinctions, because He corresponds to distinct concepts, without their being anything distinct in Himself.

So, William declared, that the solution was that the Divine attributes are distinct, according to reason, because these attributes are solely conceptual qualifications, expressed by words spoken, or written, that are correct in signifying and representing God, as natural reason can abstract and legitimately deduce them from the notion of God.⁷

But William does hold the Divine perfections are all identical with the Divine Essence and with each other, so that his extreme indeterminism is but an example of sophistry.⁸ As to the Divine Ideas, William rejects the Platonic ideas; also the opinion held by St. Thomas, that the Divine Ideas are that which being known by the effective intellectual principle, serve as the active principle to produce a conformed object; also to the opinion that they subsist in God as participating in His Essence. Ideas are in God in such a case either subjectively or objectively; if subjectively the Essence would be divided into as many parts as there are ideas; if objectively they cannot participate in His Essence, for it cannot be admitted that the Essence of God may be an objective mode of being.

Again, a Divine Idea is not, moreover, a kind of relation existing

⁷ *Quod.*, III, 2.

⁸ *I, Sent.*, II, 1, 5, 6.

in the Divine Essence. It is not a real relation, for there is no real relation between God and the creature ; it is not a rational relation for that would lower the Divine Intellect below that of the human intellect ; an architect constructing a house according to a plan he has conceived, without, as it has been said, being in relation of reason to it. William of Occam therefore maintained that the Divine Ideas are simply the creatures of God, in so far as they are known by God.

It is said of the creature that it is known by the Divine Intellect before it is produced out of the Intellect. But to know thus, is to have the idea of the creature, whence it follows that the idea is the notion of the thing, which ought to be, and conformably to which this thing ought to be, it is a notion and nothing more. Such was his proposition.

From this the general opinions of William of Occam as to Divine Ideas may be shortly stated as follows.

The ideas are not subjectively nor really in the Divine Mind as subjects or entities, but objectively or intellectually as modalities of acts of intelligence. There are, therefore, as many ideas as there are things or distinct parts of such. Now prime ideas are of singulars and not of genus and species, in fact the latter are not divine ideas at all, as conceived by man, except as becoming qualities or modalities of the individual's soul. Moreover, ideas of negations are not constructive and so there is no reason to suppose that ideas of negations or privations, such as evil or sin, can be in the Divine Mind.

The infinity of the ideas of God is in relation to the infinity of His works. To have an idea, is for God to think, to know a creature, and so far as He wants to create it so far He thinks of it.⁹

The great difference between the ideas of man and God is that man's ideas follow perception, but those of God precede it : it is in this sense alone that things are said to be "virtually" in God.¹⁰

As to man's knowledge of the Essence or quiddity of God, William held that man cannot here below know this, because he can know nothing himself, except from intuition.

Yet it can be known to man by some concept proper to it, but not by a simple but only by a composite concept, which man forms with other abstract concepts of things.

From the multitude of common and identical things, which are such, by that which is contained in all, the human mind forms, by uniting all the identical things, a some one thing, which indicates particularly what is contained thereby ; and that which

⁹ I, *Sent.*, 35, 5.

¹⁰ I, *Sent.*, 36, 1.

distinguishes these common things, is that which is in this, and in that, and is in no other.

So that all the common things taken together can appertain to no other than to one and the same thing.

But there are a great number of simple concepts collected by abstraction, which appertain both to God and to creatures; all these concepts taken together form therefore the concept proper to God, and when it is understood that this concept is the true representation of something, one knows God in this concept. However, one does not know Him in Himself, that which is known here below is other than God. What are indeed the terms of this proposition, wisdom is something, likewise justice, and charity, these are terms employed to specify different concepts, of which none is really God. But the objects of knowledge are all these terms. So that by them something else is known than the very Essence of God.¹¹ If God cannot be thus known immediately in Himself, He can at least be known in another than Him. Hence not being able to know God in Himself, we can figure Him by a concept proper to Him, by attributing to the concept all that can be attributed to God, not as being this concept, but as being God.¹² (The most universal of universals.)

As to Universals in general, William of Occam, in his *Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, begins by putting forward the theory, which Aristotle attributed to Plato, that the universal was a thing in itself, so that there would be in real existence such a thing as humanity or animality. This, of course, he rejected as it would make Socrates not only a man but an animal.

It is a Divine mystery which is indeed taught by Faith, that the Divine Essence is in the many, without this manner of being altering the mysterious unity.¹³

Against those who held that the universal is real, but individually determined by the singular to which it is inherent, William replied that a thing could not be distinguished by some extrinsic principle, and since the difference, really distinct from the universal is not intrinsic in it, the universal would not be formally distinguished by it.

But some said, that the universal is a thing, apart from the mind, which is formally but not really distinct. That there is a common nature and a difference which contracts it making the thing become this thing, but that the nature is formally and not really distinct from the difference; in order of generation the nature precedes the difference, and as first in order of generation, it is in itself indifferent to become such and such singular.

¹¹ I, *Sent.*, 3, 2.

¹² I, *Sent.*, 3, 2.

¹³ I, *Sent.*, 2, 4.

The nature only becomes substance when united to the difference, so that of itself it is not a substance. (Cf. Chap. XXV, p. 508.)

William of Occam opposed this by saying that every singular thing is singular by itself; singularity, unity, and identity are not attributed to "this" thing, by an ulterior determination coming from a real formality. From the common formality, the dissemblance is said to proceed, yet they dare to say, alleging the authority of Duns Scotus, that the resemblance and this difference are in themselves "some little things distinct from things taken absolutely." He ridiculed the proposition, saying that those who held it would have difficulty in ascertaining that two white men were alike two men.¹⁴

Further, he objected to the theory of those Thomists, who added quantity to matter as a sort of formal necessity. For since a substance occupies in space some place, it is determined by itself, it has by itself some magnitude some quantity. One can logically abstract quantity from matter, but really one cannot distinguish matter from its quantity.

Everything all substance is by itself singular. Two things united to each other do not make one but make two; so that each is one by itself.

To say that thing is singular is to say that it is this and not that; and to say that a thing is singular that it is this and not that, is simply to say that it exists. So that there is no room for investigation of the principle of individuation. To be, to exist, is to be determined singularly, and this determination is a direct effect of the Creative Cause. There is nothing between Socrates and God, neither matter nor form. All intermediaries imagined are pure nothing. "*Purum nihil*" (*sic*).¹⁵

In addition to the above, William refused to entertain the suggestions of those who said, that whilst admitting that universals are not really distinct, yet intellectually they are something outside the intellect; in other words, that the same thing is according to its essential nature, really, effectively, individual, yet at the same time universal intellectually. It was their opinion that the form of the genus is not in itself a simple form, this form is naturally divided up between the forms of species, and the intellect, which possesses the faculty of reuniting that which is divided, is the sole author of universals taken as common unities.

Why, said William, should a thing really singular become universal by being considered by the intellect. The intellect does not change the nature of things. The nature of things is singularity. Whether the intellect knows or does not know them, they remain

¹⁴ *Quod.*, IV, 8.

¹⁵ *Quod.*, II, 8.

singular, which they necessarily are, which they are by the Will of God.¹⁶

The universal, then, is a name or mere word or sound outside the intellect, but William goes on to clear himself of the fallacies and heresies of Roscellinus.

The universal within the intelligence is anything but a vague imagination, nor is it without value, nor a fictitious predicate which corresponds to nothing. "Intentiones primae" first concepts are always ideas of singular objects and refer to them directly. "Intentiones secundae sive similitudines" are concepts of universals and are posterior in the mind to "intentiones primae."

Yet such "intentio" is not the "idea" through which an external thing is known, but the very act itself of understanding.¹⁷

Now William has said of sensation (page 592) that the intellectual act is determined by two partial causes, the intellectual power of the subject and the thing felt by it.

It was raised as an argument against his theory that the universal was nowhere outside the concept, that as a concept representing the thing, according to which it is formed, every concept will necessarily be individual, if everything is individual; so if the concept be universal it represents not an individual thing, but a universal thing.

To this William of Occam replied that as a matter of fact in all conception the subject and object are lost in and essentially form the same thing, although they are separable by analysis. But though the act of knowing universally has an external object, it does not follow that the external thing is essentially conformed to the conceptual universal. The universal concept representing the most general qualities of things does not come from the consideration of one of these things alone, but from the junction of the comparison of many. But since the manners of being are naturally in many, they do not form in the nature indivisible universal essences, it is in the soul, in the intellect, that they attain their unity.

He therefore finally defines the universal as "a singular concept signifying several singulars at the same time, of which it is the natural likeness, not as to mode of existence, but as to mode of representation."¹⁸

The Abbé Mahieu, in commenting upon the doctrines of Occam, points out that there is no real distinction admitted between essence and existence; substance and accident; the soul and its faculties or powers; nor between the active and passive intellect. That things are not composite, and matter has actuality and existence apart from form.

¹⁶ I, *Sent.*, 2, 7.

¹⁷ I, *Sent.*, 23, 1; *Quod.*, IV, 9.

¹⁸ I, *Sent.*, 2, 8.

That the soul is so independent of the body that it is able to have intuitive knowledge of itself.

Finally, there is no proof, but only reliance on faith, to show the immateriality or immortality of the soul. In short, that there is no human certainty for anything ; and this is what gave rise to so much sophistry and scepticism.

Thomas Bradwardine, 1296-1349. *Doctor Profundus*. Of Merton College, Oxford, where he became professor and proctor in 1325.

He afterwards became Confessor to King Edward III and died of plague forty days after his accession as Archbishop of Canterbury in 1349.

His chief work was against Pelagianism which had broken out at Oxford. *De causa Dei contra Pelagium et de virtute causarum ad suos Mertonenses*, 1338-1346. He also wrote *Commentaries* on the *Sentences of Peter Lombard* and a *Summa Theologica* or *Summa Scientiarum*.

Though he attacked certain nominalist theses, his doctrines in the main are dependent on the philosophy of William Occam.

But he is chiefly noted for his views on *Divine Determinism*. His error that the Father could create without the Son was condemned at Oxford, 1314, Nicholas Trivet (Chap. XXIII, p. 470) consenting.

The Pelagianism which he attempted to controvert gave rise to the important problem of human liberty in its relation to God.

According to Thomas Bradwardine, God, Whose existence can be proved by the idea which we have of a perfect being (*pace* St. Anselm), is infinite knowledge and Will. His free Will is the sovereign master of the essences and existences in the contingent world, and is the arbiter of human nature and the morality of human acts. From this it follows, so he maintained, that the Divine Will is the necessitating cause (*necessitas antecedens*) of all contingent activity and therefore of our own volitions.

Man is only free in the measure in which his act is independent of everything other than God, and in particular independent of intelligence and the conditions of sensibility. He refutes the determinism of external agents, heavenly bodies, and of external violence. Liberty is thus reduced to the spontaneous act of the Will.

He strives to safeguard responsibility and moral merit, but his principles compel him to declare that God is the whole Cause of cosmic evil and sin ; yet he is alarmed at such consequences and has recourse to subterfuges to avoid it.

Chaucer refers to his opinions in his *Canterbury Tales*.

This doctrine was adopted and developed by John Wycliff and John of Mirecourt.

Thomas of Strasburg, d. 1357. An Augustinian and Nominalist, became General of his Order, 1345. He wrote a *Commentary* on the *Sentences*.¹⁹

As to ideas, he maintained them to be neither really nor formally distinct, whether in the Divine or human intellect. He would not admit any difference between the "formalities" of the Scotists and simple forms.

Matter only existed in particulars, nor were there any concrete universals united to things defined as the common supports of these things. Being in general is the object of investigation by the intellect, but this object is not in the nature of a determined thing occupying like all other things its own place; it is being which is considered as that which can be said of an infinite number of born and to be born beings and not any general or common being.

He was a follower of William of Occam, but inclined to the eclectism of Giles of Rome.

Gregory of Rimini, d. 1358. An Augustinian who became General of his Order and afterwards Archbishop of Vienna. He had studied and taught at Paris and taught at Padua in 1347.

A Nominalist opponent to Thomists and Scotists alike. He wrote a *Commentary* on the *Sentences*,²⁰ so much quoted by Paul Soncinian as to render its orthodoxy suspect. Nominalist though he was, he accepted Duns Scotus view that the faculties are the very essence of the soul.

It was he who held that unbaptized infants were condemned to everlasting torment, a doctrine that was rejected by the Council of Trent in 1563.

John Buridan, 1297-1358. A Nominalist born at Béthune, a Secular priest and a pupil of William of Occam; he became a Rector of the University of Paris. He afterwards appears to have gone to Vienna, where through his influence that University became imbued with Nominalism. He wrote many *Questiones* on the Logic, Physics, Metaphysics, Politics, and Ethics of Aristotle, also a work called *Sophismata*.²¹

Bayle records of him that he perfected logic, modal propositions, modal syllogisms, and compiled rules for syllogistic terms.

¹⁹ Genoa, 1585.

²⁰ Paris, 1642.

²¹ Paris, 1489-1518.

Adam Goddam (Vozodeanus or Wodeham), d. 1358. A Franciscan and Nominalist, he was a pupil of William of Occam, a Doctor of Oxford, and Professor at Oxford, London, and Norwich. He is not to be confused, as has been done, with Adam St. Victor. He wrote a *Commentary* on the *Sentences*.²²

In general he repudiated all the psychological entities both of the Thomists and of the Scotists.

As to the attributes of God, he declared that the Intellect of God, His Wisdom, and His Will are not things either distinct between themselves, or distinct in the Divine Essence "in divinis amnia unum est."

As to non-equality of soul, suggested by Durand de Pourçain, Adam objected that if they were unequal, what could be said to the impious accusation that God is unjust? For then it must be said that God is not just or that souls are equal. Such was the kind of argument he adopted.

John of Mirecourt, c. 1340. A Cistercian known in documents as "monarchus albus." Bachelor of the College of St. Bernard at Paris. He wrote a *Principium* or *Commentary* on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard. Forty of his propositions were condemned by the Chancellor of the University of Paris in 1347. On the one hand, he was tainted with subjectivism, denying the principle of causality and of the certainty of any knowledge beyond that of ourselves; on the other hand, he was an adherent to the terminism of Thomas of Bradwardine.

According to him our primordial knowledge endowed with absolute certainty, in addition to a series of analytical judgments reducible to the principle of contradiction, only includes an immediate intuition of our own existence. Experience, which puts us in contact with the external world, does not present the same guarantees of certitude; for God or some other agent could play the part of an evil genius and give us the illusion of the existence of things outside us, though nothing really existed.

Activities immanent to each being would explain equally well the modification which we ascribe to their causal interaction. Hence it follows that causality is indemonstrable, and so the argument for the existence of God as Prime Mover fails.

He likewise inferred the extreme consequences of the determinism of Thomas Bradwardine. If it is God, Who acts in us and Who gives rise to our volitions, there is no free will and sin becomes the work of God and we cannot do wrong in committing it.

With John of Mirecourt the evolution of exaggerated Occamism reaches its culminating point.

²² Paris, John Mair, 1512.

Albert de Saxe, 1316–1390. He was educated at Prague and Paris and was a Scotist rather than a Thomist, who whilst generally declaring against realistic solutions, often accepted them in amended terms. He helped greatly to spread Occamistic ideas in the German Universities.

He has been claimed as an Augustinian, Franciscan, and Dominican, but was probably a Secular, as when at Paris he was Procurer of the English Nation in 1351 and Rector in 1353; but Religious were not allowed to belong to the English Nation in Paris. In 1365 he became Rector of the University of Vienna and Bishop of Halberstadt.

He is thought to have written *Glosses* on the Physics, Soul, and Logic of Aristotle, also *De Modis Significandi seu Grammatica Speculativa*, which was assigned to him by Henry Willot (d. 1599); but this latter is now generally recognized as having been written by Duns Scotus (sed., cf., p. 535).

Marsilus d'Inghen, d. 1396. A Nominalist and a Secular priest. A pupil of William of Occam. He was Rector at Paris, 1367–1371, at the same time as John Buridan. He was first Rector of the University of Heidelberg, 1386.

He wrote a *Dialectic* and *Commentary* on the *Sentences* and on some of the works of Aristotle.²³

He held that all universals, of which the human intelligence has a more or less notion, belong to the genus of rational predicates. As to the doctrine of Divine Ideas these are purely anthropomorphic fictions, which ought to be rejected by all true Catholic philosophers. "In divinis omnia sunt idem," said St. Anselm and the authority of St. Anselm is of more value than that of Plato.

Henry of Hoyta (Hueceta or Oyta), d. 1397. A Nominalist and Secular priest who became Regent of the University of Vienna, founded by Rudolf IV, 1365.

He wrote an abbreviation of the *Sentences*, being an abridgment of the work of Adam Goddam.²⁴

Henry of Langestein or Hesse, d. 1397. A Nominalist and Secular priest who became a Regent of the University of Vienna. He was a theologian, moralist, canonist, liturgist, and logician of great reputation. He was also an astronomer and mathematician if he can be identified with Henry of Orta or Oyta.

Peter d'Ailly, 1350–1425. A Nominalist, he was treasurer of

²³ Printed at Strasburg 1501.

²⁴ Paris, John Major, 1512.

the College of Navarre in Paris in 1372, and became Doctor and Professor of Theology there in 1380.

He subsequently became Bishop of Cambrai and was made a Cardinal, having taken a leading part in the Councils of Pisa, 1409, and Constance in 1417, where he was a great opponent of England.

He wrote *Commentaries* on the *Sentences* and on the *Treatise of the Soul of Aristotle*.

Peter held that in this life, with the means of knowledge provided by nature, we represent God under a form and by a concept which are truly proper to Him.

He repudiated the doctrine of Divine Ideas: the mind of God does not admit of any division, and ideas are in number. If ideas participate really in the Divine Essence, then they are not really in number in respect of concepts. (Cf. Chap. XXII, p. 383.)

The word idea is not the name of a reality, it is a connative term; it does not designate precisely a thing, but it takes one thing in the place of another. If the term of knowledge is an idea, then the idea is neither the instrument or cause of the knowledge.

“Deus non cognoscit per ideas ut per dicit circumstantiam causae motivae vel potentiae cognitivae vel objecti nudii bene ut improprie dicit circumstantiam objecti terminantis.” (But logically the Divine and human order of cognition are not posited as identical.)

Nicholas de Clamenge, d. 1440. A Nominalist and pupil of Gerson and Peter d'Ailly. He was a Rector of Paris and opponent to Schoolmen. He supported the party urging the reform of the clergy at the Councils of Pisa, 1409, and Constance, 1417.

He wrote, *inter alia*, *de Studio Theologico* in which he decried Scholastic Philosophy in general.

Gabriel Biel, 1425–1495, of Tübingen, was one of the last leading Occamists in Germany. He was the teacher of Staupitz the superior and adviser of Martin Luther. He wrote *Epitome et collectarium super IV. libri sententiarum*.²⁵

Tenneman gives the following quotation as an example of his work. “A species is the similitude or image of a thing known naturally, remaining in the mind after it ceases to be the object of actual knowledge, or otherwise that likeness of a thing which is a previous condition of knowledge, which excites the knowledge of the understanding and which may remain in the absence of the thing represented.”

²⁵ Baale, 1508; Paris, 1521.

Though called by some the last of the Scholastics there is a long list of his decadent terminist followers in Germany ending with Conrad of Buchen, d. 1531.

Without metaphysical foundation their sophistries and jargon collapsed under ridicule.

John Scot Major, 1469-1550. Studied at Haddington and "God's House" (Christ's College, Cambridge). He was a Nominalist and Regent of the College of Montaigu at Paris, and afterwards of Glasgow and St. Andrews. He wrote a *Propositum de Infinito* and commented on Buridan, and the Physics and Ethics of Aristotle, and the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard; he also wrote *Questiones inveterem artem*.²⁶

It was he, and not Duns Scotus, who became the object of the wit of Rabelais.

Amongst his pupils and followers were David Cranston of Glasgow, and Antonius Coronel, and Gaspar Lax from Spain, and John Dullaert of Gand.

²⁶ 1527-28.

CHAPTER XXIX

THE MYSTICS

Mysticism—Joachim of Flora, d. 1202—Peter John Olivi, d. 1298—Peter de Trabibus, c. 1290—Theodoric of Freiburg, d. 1320—Meister Eckhart, d. 1327—John Sterngassen, c. 1320—Gerard Sterngassen, c. 1320—Nicholas of Strasburg, c. 1320—John Tauler, d. 1361—Henry Suso, d. 1366—Petrarch, d. 1374—John Ruysbroek, d. 1381—Gerard of Liège, c. 1400—John Gerson, d. 1429—Nicholas of Cusa, d. 1464—Dionysius the Carthusian, d. 1471—Thomas Hammerken called Thomas à Kempis, d. 1471—John Wessel (Goosefoot), d. 1489.

MYSTICISM

IT would generally appear that mysticism is a way of life and is neither a philosophy, nor a religion in itself.

As far as the History of Scholasticism is concerned, it is not necessary here to deal with the mysticism of St. Bernard and the Victorines (cf. Chap. IX) as that is prior to Scholasticism.

Commencement is therefore made with Joachim of Flora on account of his alleged spiritual power of exposition of the allegorical meaning of the Bible and his prophecies arising therefrom.

These were the occasion of a number of spurious works which were produced in the thirteenth century, and which to a certain extent led to the extravagances of Olivi and other Spiritual Franciscans.

The mysticism of St. Bonaventura seems to have been based on the neo-platonic views of St. Augustine; whilst that of Theodoric of Freiburg were largely due to the works of Proclus (cf. Chap. IV, p. 108).

But in dealing with Eckhart, Tauler and Ruysbroek, three Dominicans, who flourished in Germany in the fourteenth century and other mystics of that period, it is necessary to take various other matters into consideration.

As is pointed out by Doctor Inge in his Bampton Lectures of 1899, they all appear to have based their doctrine on three propositions.

- I. That the soul (as well as the body) can see and perceive, such even as was insisted upon by Proclus.

II. That man in order to know God must be a partaker of the Divine Nature.

III. Without holiness no man can see the Lord.

As to I. they refer to what they call the "Apex" or ground of the soul, in which the soul acts directly and not through its powers of intellect and of will. It seems to combine the functions of intellect, will, and emotion with a special stress on the latter under the aspect of Love.

St. Bonaventura's definition is "theologica mystica est animi extensio in Deum per amoris desiderium."

Such apex of the soul may be regarded as the pure Intellect of Plato (cf. Chap. II, p. 38) according to the view of St. Bonaventura and William of Auvergne (Chap. XVIII, p. 231), or as the Active Intellect of Aristotle: such was also the opinion of Albertus Magnus (cf. Chap. XIX, p. 267). Roger Bacon calls it the Divine co-operation in human knowledge (cf. Chap. XXV, p. 502).

As to II. they did not seem to rely on Grace, but rather on their individual efforts.

As to III. Dr. Inge quotes many passages from St. John and St. Paul, but it is not clear that these promises are all to be obtained in this life, otherwise only a few ecclesiastical saints could ever be recipients of them.

They laid great stress on the like only being able to know the like, but adopting for the moment the psychology of the Scholastics which then obtained; the intellect indeed was said to become the object; but, and this is what they appear to have left out of sufficient consideration that it is so "according to the mode of the knower." In this life, though assisted by Grace, human knowledge remains in the mode of humanity.

The three great steps towards mysticism seem to be Purgation, or Confession, and Repentance, Illumination, and finally Contemplation. Illumination, or Recollection as it is usually called in the Roman Catholic Church, consists in such concentration on one object of thought, until all awareness of sense, and of self and its powers are lost, and in which there is nothing but tangible darkness. The object is to make contact with the Real.

But as all knowledge must be within the mode of the knower, the intellect cannot in this life form anything but symbols of such reality.

The recollection or "Via Negativa" arises from the method of Abstraction.

The Absolute or God is not limited to or by any of His Attributes, and therefore anything that is essential of the Godhead must be represented to man's mind by negative symbols.

Dr. Inge, in his Bampton Lectures already referred to, suggested

that such "Via Negativa" has led to a multitude of errors and quotes Tauler in support, as thereby causing a widespread pessimism and world weariness.

It is found in Plato and Plotinus and is a heritage from the Asiatic mysticism of Nirvana or final escape from life into nothingness.

Later, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, with the translation into Latin by Ficinus¹ and others of all the works of Plato (hitherto only the *Timaeus* being generally known, cf. Chap. V) and of Plotinus, the advent of this new knowledge had a considerable effect on the unrivalled philosophy which St. Thomas had evolved, based as it then was on the newly-discovered works of Aristotle (cf. Chap. XIV, pp. 206, 207).

It cannot be denied that much of the growth of mysticism may be traced to the effect that the revival of Platonism had upon philosophy, whether Thomist or Scotist, which was based on Aristotle.

It should here be noted that all the later Mystics have placed but little reliance on Visions and Prophecies, such as those of Joachim of Flora, and have laid it down that they are never to be sought for. Though they hold that some such Visions may be granted by Grace to a weary soul, yet they are for the most part of an unreliable or even evil nature. So that reliance on such has often led to pride and even grievous error.

In a way, notice of these Mystics is not very cogent to a history of scholasticism, for as has been said, it is not in itself a philosophy or a religion.

On its intellectual side it has been called formless speculation, but as in religion it appears to revolt against dry formalism and cold rationalism, so in philosophy it takes the field against materialism and scepticism.

In reply to Harnack's criticism that "Mysticism is nothing else than rationalism applied to a sphere above reason," Dr. Inge remarks that it was rather a case of "reason applied to a sphere above rationalism."

The Abbé Victor Cousin, whom it will be remembered was the great authority on Abelard (cf. Chap. X), said: "Mysticism is the pretension to know God without intermediary and so to speak face to face. For Mysticism whatever is between God and us hides Him from us. Mysticism consists in substituting direct inspiration for indirect; ecstasy for reason; rapture for philosophy."

For Dr. Inge, "Mysticism is an attempt to realize the presence of the Living God in the soul and in nature; or more generally

¹ Printed Paris, 1651.

the attempt to realize in thought and feeling the immanence of the temporal in the eternal, and of the eternal in the temporal."

Evelyn Underhill, in the standard work on Mysticism, very ably distinguishes Mysticism from Magic, "In mysticism the Will is united with the Emotions in an impassioned desire to transcend the sense-world, in order that Self may be joined by Love to One Eternal Object of Love, whose existence is intuitively perceived by the soul or that which is now often called the cosmic or transcendental sense" Love here mentioned is not superficial affection or emotion, but the total dedication of the Will, a life movement of self, and the deep-seated desire and tendency of the soul towards its Source. (As St. Thomas puts it, "intends the final end.")

As to Magic, the Will is united with the Intellect in an impassioned desire for supersensible knowledge, trying to extend its field of consciousness.

Joachim of Flora, 1130-1202. A Mystic and Cistercian first, and subsequently the founder of the separate Order of Flora. He was born at Celico near the Cosenza, and was brought up at the Court of Roger II of Sicily, at Palermo, where his father, who was a notary, held some office.

About 1158 he made a pilgrimage to Jerusalem, losing most of his companions through plague at Constantinople on his way there.

Having spent the whole of Lent on Mount Tabor in prayer and fasting, he was traditionally believed to have received an illumination on the eve of Easter Day, in which the substance of his three principal works was revealed to him.

He himself, when challenged at the Papal Court in 1195 as to his authority as a prophet, is said to have replied that "God, Who once gave to the prophets the spirit of prophecy, had given to him a spirit of understanding, that by the Spirit of God he might understand all the mysteries of Scripture."

On his return from his pilgrimage to Jerusalem he at first became a lay Brother of the Cistercian Monastery of Sambucina, and subsequently a monk of the recently-founded abbey of Corazzo.

In 1168 he was ordained priest and afterwards became Prior and then in 1178 Abbot of Corazzo in Calabria.

About 1183 he was engaged in finishing his work *Concordia* and at the same time employed in writing his two other chief works, *Expositio in Apocalypsim* and *Psalterium decem Chordarum*, and two hymns "De Patria Celesti" and "De Gloria Paradisi" attached to it. These with the smaller works, *Contra Judaeos*,

De articulis fidei, *De Unitate Trinitatis*, *Super regula Sancti Benedicti* and *Tractatus Super quatuor Evangelia* are his only genuine writings.

As will be seen, it was chiefly the spurious works attributed to him which either gave rise to or were propounded by the numerous heresies which arose in the following two or three centuries.

In 1184 he presented his *Concordia*, which was still unfinished, to Pope Lucius III at Veroli, and the Consistory to whom the Pope referred it gave a qualified approval; whereupon at his request the Pope released him from the temporal cares of his office as Abbot in order that he might devote himself to writing. In 1186 his work was approved of by Urban III, and again in 1188 by Clement III, who, however, demanded the submission of his works when they should be completed.

Being dissatisfied with the laxity of his monks, in 1192 he founded a stricter Order of St. Flora, and founded the abbey of St. John of Flora on Monte Nero, in the district of La Sila, in Calabria, where the town of San Giovanni in Flore, which grew up outside its walls, still stands.

This Order was approved by a Bull of Celestine III in 1196 and again by Bulls of Innocent III in 1204 and Honorius III in 1216 and 1220: but it never extended to more than twenty or thirty houses, all of which were in Italy and in the sixteenth century they all became affiliated to the Carthusians or Dominicans.

His literary testament addressed to the Abbots of his Order refers to his genuine works and submits these writings to the judgment of the Holy See, to which he declares his devotion and fidelity, adding, "I am prepared to observe what it has decreed or shall decree and never to defend any opinion of mine against its holy faith, fully believing what it believes."

This testament which enumerates his works is of great importance as showing the spirit in which they were written, which is in complete opposition to the violence of the spurious works.

The same theme underlies all three of his works, that the Trinity is manifested in three dispensations.

The age of the Father ends with the birth of Christ, and the age of the Son with the final reign of the Spirit; the first is the age of law, the second of grace, and the third of love.

In the *Concordia* every personage, period and event in the Old Testament is a prototype of a similar personage, period and event in the New Testament, and all these prefigure in some way the third and final age of the Spirit.

Hugh St. Victor, in his *Eruditio Didascalica*,² had adopted a

² VII, 26, 27.

similar scheme but there he had been careful to say that the operation of the Trinity is inseparable and that the three ages are not successive but accessive (cf. Chap. IX, p. 157).

Though there is a similarity of notion of these three dispensations, there is nothing to connect Joachim with the doctrines of Almaric of Bène which were alleged to be derived from Erigena (Chap. XVI, p. 218).

The southern part of Italy was still half Greek, and no doubt Joachim was in some measure influenced by his neighbours, and by his contact with the Greeks whom he encountered in his pilgrimage to Jerusalem. But the notion of the three dispensations was not very widespread in the Orthodox Church. At the same time it must be noted that John of Parma, the General of the Franciscans, who had had so much to do with the Greek Church, was one of the strongest Joachites in the following century.

In the *Psalterum* the figure of a ten-stringed psaltery is a symbol of the mystery of the Trinity; the body of the instrument represents the Father, the psalms which are sung with its aid, as Divine Wisdom, represents the Son; and the method of psalmody, as melody and unction, represents the Holy Spirit.

In the *Concordia* he explained that there were six methods of interpretation of the Scripture, the historical, moral, tropological, contemplative, anagogic and typical all of which were allegorical.

So amongst numerous other interpretations, he alleged that there were seven ages, of which six were of strife, followed by a final peace, all of which were foreshadowed under the Old and New Testaments.

The strife between Israel and Egypt typifies that of the primitive Church against the Jews; Israel against the Canaanites, the Christian against the heathen; the separation of Judah and Israel, the separation of the Roman Church and the Greek Church, and the strife of the Catholics against the Arians, and of the Lombards and Vandals against the Roman Church, and the Persians against the Greek Church; Israel against Assyria, the Church against the Saracens; Judah against Babylon, the Church against the Emperor, from Henry I onwards. So much for the first five ages, the sixth is a time of great tribulation, the events in the books of Judith and Esther typifying a strife between the Church on the one hand and pagan kings and false prophets on the other.

This he went on to prophesy would happen between 1200 and 1260, at which date the seventh and last age of the Spirit would begin.

The year 1260 was derived from the one thousand two hundred and three score days mentioned in Revelation XI, 3, and XII, 6,

and the Jews appear to have had some legend to a similar effect.

Apart from the forgoing, Joachim attacked the doctrine of Peter Lombard as to the Trinity, on the ground that it showed a quarternity of the Three Persons and also the Divine Essence.

Peter Lombard had taught the perfectly orthodox doctrine which is a perfectly guarded Modalism, which goes back to St. Augustine. "The Son is generated of the Father and not of the Divine Essentia, likewise the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son and not from the Divine Essentia. Two of the Persons are not more than One, for that would divide the Divine Essentia ; the Divine Essentia is common to the Three Persons and entire in each. The relations that are expressed in the terms generation and procession are relations between the Persons of the Trinity and are not to be predicated of the Essential Nature of God."

Joachim's own arguments in fact were very nearly tritheistic, whilst at the same time the whole trend of his general doctrine with successive manifestations was more allied to Sabellianism.

This doctrine of Joachim was condemned and that of Peter Lombard upheld at the Fourth Lateran Council under Innocent III in 1215, but Joachim was not condemned as a heretic. Innocent III drawing special attention to the submission contained in his literary testament above referred to (p. 608). Joachim himself had died in 1202.

Nothing more is heard of his doctrine until some fifty years had elapsed, when several forgeries were produced by the "Spiritual Franciscans" as being his genuine work.

The *Commentary on Jeremiah* is first mentioned in 1248 and is mostly against the Emperor Frederick II. In the body of this work it is stated that it was written in 1197 at the request of the Emperor Henry VI : that is before the Literary Testament written in 1200 and against Frederick II, who could only have been an infant of about two years of age !

The *Commentary on Isaiah* was probably written about 1266 and therefore contains no reference to the end of the world in 1260.

He was also supposed to have written Commentaries on the prophecies of the Erythraean Sibyl, of Cyril and of Merlin.

The *Prophecy of Cyril* was an angelic message supposed to have been given to Cyril of Constantinople, who died in 1235 and who was the third General of the Carmelite Order. The prophecy was supposed to have been written in Greek on silver tablets and brought by the Calabrian monk Telesphorus to Joachim to read and comment upon. Later, the prophecy was sometimes attributed to Cyril of Jerusalem, c. 348, and also to Cyril of Alexandria,

412-444. The prophecy appears to deal with the rivalry of the Houses of Anjou and Aragon and foretells the ruin of the Papacy the predictions beginning about 1254!

The *Sibyl Prophecy* has nothing to do with the Sibylline literature of antiquity and was probably written about 1250 by one of the Guelph party among the Franciscans.

The *Merlin Prophecy* is one which took the name of the British Enchanter from Geoffrey of Monmouth, whose work had been commented on by Alain of Lille (cf. Chap. IX, p. 160). But as regards the prophecy it had no other connection with Joachim or Merlin and was probably written after the latter's death in the thirteenth century.

The *Vaticinia Pontificum* consisted of twenty-four enigmatic paragraphs supposed to refer to the future line of Popes. The predictions seem to have been fairly accurate for the Popes from Nicholas III to Clement V, d. 1316, so it was probably written about 1317 or 1318 as Bernard Delicieux seems to have had a copy in 1319.

In 1254 there appeared in Paris a book entitled *Introductorius in Evangelium Aeternum*, the work derives its title from Revelation XIV, 6, and is an apocalyptic manifesto containing extracts from Joachim's genuine works, but, as is now known, was written by a Franciscan, Gherardo di Borgo San Donnino, near Parma.

According to this work, since 1200 the spirit of life has departed from the Scriptures and they are replaced by the Eternal Gospel as proclaimed in Joachim's three works. The Old Testament is like the light of the stars, the New Testament like that of the moon, and the Eternal Gospel like that of the sun. The first is literal, the second spiritual, and the third is the law written in the heart, of which the prophet Jeremiah spoke.

What John the Baptist and Christ were to the second Covenant so were Joachim and Francis of Assisi to the third.

The Eternal Gospel is specially committed to the bare-footed Order of the followers of Francis. A Simoniacal Pope will reign at the end of the age, afterwards will come the reign of the Holy Spirit, when all rights and ordinances will pass away in a blessed age of love and liberty.

In 1258 Gherardo with Leonard and John of Parma, a former General of the Franciscans who had been Papal Legate in Greece in 1249, were sentenced to imprisonment for life by St. Bonaventura, the then General of the Franciscans, for holding the erroneous doctrine of Joachim as to the Trinity, which had been condemned by the Lateran Council of 1215.

A discreet silence was maintained about the Eternal Gospel.

Gherardo died eighteen years later in prison, Leonard also died

in prison ; but the sentence was never executed against John of Parma, who retired to Rieti and whom both John XXI and Nicholas III offered to make a Cardinal. John of Parma was beatified in 1877 by Pius IX !!

In the disputes between the seculars and medicants at Paris, the *Introductorius in Evangelium Aeternum* was brought forward as a heresy supported by the Franciscans. Alexander IV appointed a Commission to examine it, and as a result the work was condemned and burnt ; and in a letter to the Bishop of Paris in 1255 it was ordered to be suppressed, but so as not to bring reproach on the Franciscans.

In 1263 the works of Joachim, including this Eternal Gospel, were condemned by the Council of Arles.

In 1292 Olivi (*q.v.* below), who held Joachite doctrines, abjured them at the Council at Paris, but twenty-nine of his followers were punished. Again in 1300, Arnold of Vilanova, who though a layman was a Joachite, even when ambassador from the King of Aragon to the King of France, was arrested by the order of the Bishop of Paris and compelled to recant. He appealed to Boniface VIII and was imprisoned and forced to recant again ; after which Boniface released him and appointed him his own physician, imposing silence upon him as to theological matters. Arnold left the Papal Court and obtained the assistance of Robert King of Naples, who was also Count of Provence, for the Franciscan Spirituals : also in 1309 when on a mission from James II of Aragon to Clement V, he persuaded the latter to hear the complaints of the Spirituals from their own number.

Angelo, their leader, went to Avignon in 1311 and cleared himself, but having been imprisoned by John the XXII in 1317 he escaped and founded the Fraticelli in Italy. These Fraticelli existed in groups under the protection of different nobles and were not finally suppressed until 1562 by Pius V.

Ubertino of Casale was head of the Spirituals after Olivi in Tuscany, he defended Olivi's teaching at the Council of Vienne in 1310 ; then in 1317 he became a Benedictine ; and finally in 1325, accused of heresy for maintaining the opinions of Olivi, he was the first of those who fled to the Court of Louis of Bavaria. Ubertino, in his *Arbor Vitae Crucifixae*, identifies Francis as the angelic man prophesied about by Joachim, as coming into the world at the beginning of the third age.

The "Apostles" founded by Segarelli in 1260, who was succeeded by Dolcino in 1300, gave rise to the siege of 1304-1307 in the Val Sesia before they were suppressed. Though imbued with Joachite doctrines all the Franciscans maintained that these

"Apostles" derived their heresies from Almaric of Bène rather than from Joachim.

In order to pacify the Franciscan Spirituals, Innocent IV, in 1245, by the Bull "quo studiosus" had vested all the property of the Franciscans in the Pope, leaving them to administer it as Commissioners for the Pope. This had been confirmed by Nicholas III by the Bull "Exiit qui seminat," by which the Franciscans were to have the Usufruct of their property, which was vested in the Holy See.

However the Spirituals having denied all rights of property amongst Christians, John XXII, in 1323, by the Bull "Cum inter non nullus," asserted that to say that Our Lord and His Apostles had no rights of property was heretical; and by the Bull "Ad conditorem canonum" renounced the title of the Papacy to the property of the Franciscans and restored the ownership of it to their order.

Shortly after this, Bonagratia of Bergamo, Michael of Cesena and William of Occam who had been imprisoned at Avignon escaped, and all went to join Ubertino at the Court of Louis of Bavaria, and became merged in the Ghibelline opposition to the Papacy.

Throughout the next two centuries there were those who from time to time preached the advent of the Age of the Holy Spirit, accusing the Pope for the time being, or some King, of being anti-Christ, but their connection with the doctrines of Joachim, if any, were purely nominal.

Peter John Olivi, 1248-1298, was one of the "Spiritual" Franciscans and an adherent of Joachim of Flora. He was a Mystic and it must be remembered that the Head of the Franciscan Order at that time was St. Bonaventura who was also a Mystic (cf. Chap. XXV, p. 494).

After studying at Paris he became Master of Studies to the Franciscans first at Florence and then at Montpellier.

His works were discovered in 1878 in the Borghese Collection (Jansen) and in 1880 in Cod Vatic III6 (5) (Ehrle).

In 1278 his extreme views on Mariolatry was disapproved of by Jerome d'Ascoli (afterwards Pope Nicholas IV) at the General Chapter of the Order (which also condemned Roger Bacon) and he was ordered to burn his own writings with his own hand. Again the General Chapter of Strasburg in 1283 to 1284 ordered his writings to be examined and they were condemned, so he had to sign the prescribed recantation. He was brought before another Chapter in 1287, but the new General of the Order, Matthew Aquasparta, approved of his declaration as to

poverty, and certified his orthodoxy by appointing him teacher in Florence.

Nevertheless certain of his doctrines were condemned after his death by the Council of Vienne in 1312 : in fact not for plurality of forms, but for making one form subordinate to another.

He had in fact held that the vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual souls formed three substances in one soul.

But though not clearly expressed, it seems more probable that Olivi was not wishing to imply that one form could be the matter of another form, but rather that one composite of matter and form could be the matter of a higher composite ; in fact, attributing celestial matter to incorporeal things without stating it.

It is thought by some that Olivi may here be putting forward the proposition of a " *Distinctio formalis a parte rei*" which Duns Scotus afterwards rendered so celebrated.

Peter de Trabibus, c. 1290. A Franciscan and follower of Olivi ; he wrote a *Commentary on the Sentences*.³

According to his teaching both existence and essence are identical in concrete things. The distinction of active and passive intellects is a necessary mechanism in the theory of ideas.

Thought is an active phenomenon which the soul produces in itself, with the concurrence of God.

This work was included in the condemnation of the works of Olivi in 1312.

Theodoric of Freiburg, in Saxony, 1250-1320. A Dominican, Master of Theology in Paris, c. 1297. A neo-Platonic Mystic. He wrote many works on light and science and evolved a new theory of the rainbow, which was afterwards adopted by Descartes. His chief philosophical work was *De intellectu et intelligibili*, in which he largely followed the teaching of Proclus from whose *Elementa theologica* he makes frequent quotations. He regarded Proclus as a Philosopher on a par with Aristotle and St. Augustine.

According to him the production of beings takes place through intermediaries, The One, Intelligences, souls, and bodies. God creates the purest intelligences, which animate the heavenly bodies as essential forms and not as extrinsic movers. Such heavenly bodies engender the visible beings of our earth. He adopts the neo-Platonist theory of Light, which he does not regard as a corporeal constituent, but as a subsequent determination of corporeity.

The primordial act of the *λόγος*, by virtue of which the pure intelligences receive their being is alone a created act, their

³ Florent. Bibl. Nation., 1149, b.5.

production is his work indirectly. But finite beings are not prolongations of forms of Divine Energy, they are substances distinct from God and from one another. There is thus no taint here of monism or pantheism.

God is super-eternal, the pure intelligences, including the active intellect, are eternal; earthly substances alone exist in time. Every intelligence proceeding from an anterior one, receives and conserves its being from the contemplative act by which it knows the principle whence it is derived, as stated by Proclus. Thought is the being of a pure intelligence.

The soul is the form of the body and identical with its own faculties for the principle of its being is the active intellect.

The active intellect, an ocean of intelligibility, is the divine element in us.

Being and action are identical, in the soul everything is activity, it acts as soon as the conditions are present.

All knowledge is an active phenomenon, sensation is produced not by the causal influence of the object, but on the occasion of its presence.

The active intellect multiplied from man to man, knows God its Producer, and in Him sees the exemplary form of all things, so that we can know all truth in the "rationes aeternae." The active intellect produces these "species intelligibiles" in the "intellectus possibilis" on the occasion of sense perception and determines the actual knowledge of the abstract quiddities of things.

The passive intellect, the "species intelligibiles," knows the active intellect, which gives being to the passive intellect.

The Will is a natural inclination of the Soul on representation of a particular good by the "vis aestimativa."

God, who is the primordial intellectual Actuality, is the starting point of the procession of things, and also the terminus to which all beings direct their activities.

Corporeal substances are composed of matter and form; matter is indetermined and incapable of existing without form. But each being possesses only one determining principle and this substantial form is the source of all its perfections, as St. Thomas taught.

Yet the reason of the multiplicity of individuals in one species, is the presence in each of elements foreign to the specific essence.

They have "partes post totum quae non ingrediuntur definitionem." Such "partes post totum" are not only quantitative but also qualitative, and include the natural inclination of a being to exercise its activity in a particular direction. (Cf. Guy of Terrien, Chap. XXIV, p. 492.)

Meister Eckhart of Hochheim (near Gotha) 1260-1327. A Mystic and Dominican called the "Father of German Thought."

Boniface VIII, in 1302, conferred the title of Doctor on him at Rome. But some of his writings were condemned in 1329, after his death, by Pope John XXII.

His works were collected in *Opus tripartitum-propositionum-questionum et expositionum*.

In many ways he resembled Theodoric of Freiburg.

In God alone are essence and existence identical. Simplicity is the ultimate and profound source of intelligibility, the simple alone can completely turn back on itself, thus the *Liber de Causis* (cf. Chap. XIV, p. 205) says the simple knows itself and all things by its essence. He establishes the "processus" of the Trinity by distinguishing the Divine Substance as such, and this same substance in relation to the Divine Persons. Under the first aspect, the Divine Being is in no way a principle of generation, it becomes this only when regarded in a "relation of order": this twofold consideration is necessitated by man's imperfect grasp of God.

As with God, there is no past or future, therefore creation is eternal.

Everything in this created world has its own essence, but the one existence of God maintains their reality of being. Man by his nature is an animate corporeal substance, but his existence is due to God, so that one and same existence, numerically one includes God and the world: therefore in very truth things only exist in God.

Eckhart compares the union of the creature with God to that of matter and form, which constitutes but one concrete substance, whose parts together are identical with the whole.

Though the reality of God is other than the essence of the creatures, yet their existence is common; do they remain distinct, do not the creatures, sustained by the internal principle of reality, which is the actuality of God, form with God one existing thing?

This is a variation of the theory of the real distinction of essence and existence, which St. Thomas had repudiated in *De Ente et Essentia*.

It is not repugnant that the simple should contain the multiple, so it is not repugnant that the simple should produce the multiple. God made the universe all at once in its totality, and thus the term of His creation is marked with unity.

The parts are created for and in the whole. Thus Eckhart thought he had combined the neo-Platonist axiom "a simple being can only produce another simple being" with the Scholastic

doctrine that God creates the universe by a direct and immediate act.

The human soul, existing with the very existence of God, tends to contract with Him the closest of unions, which is brought about by knowledge and love, of which love is the greater as it is unified by nature.

The modes of love and knowledge are simple activities of the soul, which flow from its substance but do not constitute it.

The union with God takes place in the substance or spark of the soul. As the soul thirsts after God, so God loves the human soul; for He loves His own existence or *esse* by which the soul lives.

If the soul renounces every creature, its own self, its knowledge and its will, and is thus in a state of complete renunciation and poverty, then the miracle takes place. God reveals Himself in the unity and infinity of His nature. The soul is transported into the silent desert in which there is no more effort, doubt, or faith, and where in order to know, we no longer require images, resemblances, interpretations of Scripture and dogma, or teaching by others. God loves Himself in the soul because He finds Himself there and cannot do without it. Thus is brought about the return of man into the bosom of the Infinite.

"As I am Immanent in the Being of God, He accomplishes all His works by me and I am all that is the object of His knowledge; God became man that I might become God."

"*Nos transformamur totaliter in Deum*," this was one of the condemned propositions.

This doctrine of Deification was also held by Tauler and Ruysbroek, but could never be complete, as a process of unification with the Infinite must be a "*progressus ad infinitum*." The error arose through the attempted elimination of Christ is the explanation given by Dr. Inge.

Deificari was a term used by Ireneus, Clement, Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa and St. Augustine; but for the most part it meant little else than immortality (cf. Chap. IX, p. 159).

As Fenelon, 1651-1715, later, after asserting the truth of the mystical transformation, adds, "it is false to say that transformation is a deification of the real and natural soul, or hypostatic union, or an unalterable conformity with God."

Eckhart denied that he taught pantheism, or the wish to destroy the existence of the creature, but rather to establish it. God is the *esse* of everything, but though He introduces a distinction between "*esse formaliter inherens*," and "*esse absolutum*," he does not develop it.

Whether the logic of his system, or his declared intentions be

considered, so is he regarded on the one hand as a pantheist, and on the other as an individualist.

John of Sterngassen, c. 1320. A Dominican of Cologne and a Mystic, who followed St. Thomas rather than Eckhart. He wrote a *Commentary* on the *Sentences* (recently discovered by Grabmann, 1921) and *Sermons*.

He agreed with St. Thomas as to Unity of Form, but did not follow him in all things such as the distinction between essence and existence.

Gerard of Sterngassen, c. 1320. A Dominican of Cologne and a Mystic like John Sterngassen. He wrote *Medela animae languentis* and displayed the same relation to the works of St. Thomas.

Nicholas of Strasburg, c. 1320. A Mystic and Thomist like John and Gerard of Sterngassen. He wrote a *Summa Theologica* (fragments of which are contained in the *Catena Aurea entium* of Henry of Herford (cf. Chap. XXIV, p. 492), who died 1370.⁴

John Tauler, d. 1361. *Doctor Sublimis et Illuminatus*. A Mystic of Strasburg, wrote *Divine Imitations*, approved of by Luther, published in Frankfurt, 1680-1692.

He was always careful to enunciate the substantial distinction between the soul and God, and thereby avoided the exaggerated ideas which accompanied pantheistic mysticism.

He did not regard mysticism as withdrawing one from the business of life, but was careful to put social service on its true basis; and tried to make his teaching popular.

He attached little value to visions.

As to the ground of the soul, Tauler seems to regard it as an emanation of the Divine Nature and to be uncreated, as did also Suzo, *q.v.*

Henry Suzo, 1295-1366. A Mystic who spent most of his life in a monastery at Constance; where in his youth he is said to have practised the greatest austerities which, however, he later relaxed.

He wrote *Book of Eternal Wisdom*, called by Denifle the finest fruit of German Mysticism: also *Book of Truth*, in which is drawn a substantial distinction between the soul and God.

His works savour of the "Minnesong." *Eternal Wisdom* sometimes appears as a wise monitress and sometimes as a buxom mistress. In May he sets up a spiritual Maypole, the Cross, and

⁴ Cod. Vat. Lat., 3091.

celebrates it in a lovely ode ; above all flowers, songs, and birds, and above all the deckings that ever graced the Maypole.

Petrarch, 1304-1374. Of Padua, became a Mystic : cherished by Italian Dukes, and Princes, and Popes Benedict XII, Clement VI and Urban V who enriched him with many benefices.

He wrote :

1. *De Contemptu Mundi.*
2. *Secretum sivi de Conflictu Carnarum.*
3. *De Remediis. Utriusque Fortunae.*
4. *De Vita Solitaria et de otio Religiosorum.*

John Ruysbroek, 1293-1381. A Mystic who became Prior of the Augustinian Monastery of Groenedael.

He exercised a great influence on Gerard Groot, 1340-1384, the founder of the Brethren of the Common Life ; but he denounced the tenets of the Brethren of the Free Spirit. He wrote *Spiritual Marriage* and *Kingdom of Lovers*.

He did not, as Gerson alleged, hold the identity of soul and God.

“The mystical life consists in a fertile union of the soul with God, which is constantly renewed by love and consists in a super-essential contemplation of the Trinity, an experience impossible to name, a sublime ignorance.”

What we are that we behold, and what we behold that we are : such is an example of the omission of the saving clause “according to the mode of the knower.”

“Grace works from inwards outwards, for God is nearer to us than our own faculties. Hence it cannot come from images and sensible forms.” (By this he does not refer to concepts.)

He agrees with Tauler that the “ground of the soul” is the immanence of the Being and Nature of God Himself.

Gerard of Liège, c. 1400, was a Mystic, he wrote *De Doctrina Cordis*, which during the fifteenth century had as great a vogue as the *Imitation of Christ* by Thomas à Kempis, but its popularity did not last.

John Charlin Gerson, 1363-1429. *Doctor Christianissimus. Doctor Consolatorius.* A Mystic and Nominalist he was born at Rheims and became a pupil in 1387 of Pierre d'Ailly. He became Proctor of the French Nation in the University of Paris in 1387 and Chancellor of the University of Paris in 1395 and afterwards Dean of Bruges.

He was a leader at the Councils of Pisa, 1409, and Constance, 1417.

He was a Mystic like St. Bernard, the Victorines, and St. Bonaventura.

He wrote *Theologica Mystica* : a Tractatus against Communion for laity in both kinds ; also *Centilogium de Conceptibus et Concordantia Metaphysica cum Logicam*. The *Imitation of Christ* is thought by some not to have been written by Thomas à Kempis but by John Gerson.

He did his utmost to reduce the disorder which permeated not only the University but also the Church. And the Canons originated by him became the Charter of the Gallic Church.

Gerson defines mysticism as follows : mystical theology is a motion leading up to God by means of a fervid and pure love ; or, it is an habitual experimental knowledge of God arising from the embrace of an uniting love ; or it is wisdom (*sapientia*) that is the discerning habitual notion of God, whilst the supreme 'apex' of the affective rational power is joined to Him by love. Gerson also approved of the definition given by St. Bonaventura as "the extension of the soul to God through the yearning of love."

Whilst considering it wise to study logic and metaphysics, Gerson insisted that these must be confined to their natural sphere, and they must not be indulged in for the sake of vain curiosity or speculation. A too nice dispute, as to the reality of the Divine Attributes, led to blasphemy ; and too much reliance was placed on the dictates of Plato and Aristotle, from which many heresies might be drawn. Aristotle had made it an axiom, that 'one proceeds from one,' and that all effect is consequently of the same nature as its cause ; likewise, that the Will can produce nothing new or diverse, without submitting it to the law of movement : such axioms ought not to apply to the Divine Power. So also the Platonists, by insisting on the reality of concepts, had fabricated ideas and eternal quiddities, which not having been created in time, could not be destroyed by God in time.

As to our terrestrial and imperfect knowledge, he said "supposing the soul according to its merits be imprisoned in a dark and frightful dungeon, which is divided into three stories, a lower, middle, and upper storey ; the name of the first storey is sensibility, that of the second reason, and that of the third simple intelligence. The windows of the bottom storey do not let in any light to soul, except corporeal light, which contemplates the brutes themselves. By the openings in the middle storey some light more spiritual penetrates, which the soul receives when it raises itself up to this storey. Finally, at the end of the prison

from the top storey, the soul can see the Divine light, which shining on the high places scintillates through the narrow crevasses of the thick walls like the flashes of lightning, which suddenly light up the clouds and disappear."

Thus for John Gerson there were six degrees of order in respect of the object of Faith. First the canon of the Holy Scriptures. Second the truth promulgated by the Church. Third the truths revealed to some privileged souls. Fourth the truths deduced from propositions, which are the foundation of Faith, *e.g.*, Christ was a man, hence Christ had veins and nerves. Fifth, conclusions, which Faith does not command like the above and are in consequence only probable. Lastly certain truths, which derive nothing from intellect, but which are at least entertained and excite devotion.

Philosophic truths belong to those of the fourth and fifth classes alone.

John Gerson is careful to guard against any doctrine of sinless perfection, indicated by Eckhard, Tauler and Ruysbroek, as he declares "according to the holders of this error, the soul perfected and restored to health in God loses its Will, incapable of wishing or not wishing, only wishing what God wishes, it returns to what it was before time in the Divine thought. Given that, they claim in consequence that having neither wish nor non-wish, that they can sin without crime and condescend to all demands of the flesh."⁵

He likewise denied all fatalism or that the doctrine of predestination acted as any external control over the Will of man.

Nicholas of Cusa, 1401-1464. First studied at Deventer, where he was introduced to Mysticism derived from Gerard of Groot. He then studied Nominalism at Heidelberg, 1416, Averroism and Aristotelianism at Padua, 1417, and Thomism at Cologne in 1425.

The Councils of Basle, 1431, and of Florence, 1439, brought him into prominence.

He was created Cardinal, 1448, and Bishop of Brixen, 1450.

His chief works were *De Docta Sapientia* and *De Conjecturis*; he also wrote *Idiotæ de Sapientia*, *De Non Aliud*, *De Venatione Sapientiae* and *De Visione Dei*.⁶

In philosophy he was more neo-Platonic than anything, but by stressing the utter transcendence of God, he was charged with pantheism, which he absolutely denied. According to Nicholas the senses attain to corporeal things in a gross and confused

⁵ That was the heresy of the Albigensians or Beghards.

⁶ Printed Paris, 1514; Basle, 1650.

manner, but man also possesses a "reasoning reason," which expresses reality in abstract concepts, according to the principle of contradiction.

As no two things are alike, such knowledge is limited and relative, and human science is composed of conjectures; the beings, which reason grasps as one, are indeed separated and incommensurable.

The integral truth of things is hidden in God from Whom things come and in Whom they lie.

Above the rational mode of knowledge, there exists an intellectual intuition, in which the principle of contradiction has no place, and which with a synthetic glance grasps the coincidence of the contraries which reason regards as incompatible.

He stresses this admission of contraries, as though regarded as a heresy by the Aristotelians; it is, he thought, the starting point for the mystical ascent. The recognition of the limitation of our knowledge is the way to rise to these higher intuitions. The reality which we then attain to, in which all contradictions vanish, is God Himself.

In his *de Docta Sapientia* he deals in the first book with God or the Infinite, as the absolute maximum; in the second, with the Universe and man as the contracted maximum; in the third, with the return of the Universe to God by Redemption, the maximum which is both absolute and contracted.

God is the greatest possible being (*pace* St. Anselm) and is not only the Absolute Maximum, but also is identical with the lowest possible or minimum.

In Him to exist or not to exist coincide, for all contraries coincide in God. The paradox is perhaps best expressed by saying that God is not patient of contraries, there is no comparison between transcendent divinity and finite being; the Infinite does not admit of the more or less.

Similarly in mathematics a curved line coincides with a straight in infinity, and parallel lines meet in infinity.

Thus our knowledge of God is a mixture of ideas which tells us what He is not, and what He is.

His transcendence renders Him unknowable to us (incomprehensible, Athanasian Creed). His relations with the created world allow us to reason imperfectly and make conjectures concerning Him.

God being Infinite is all that can be.

He is the enfolding of everything in the sense that everything is in Him, and the unfolding of everything, as everything is in Him and He is in everything.

“Deus ergo est omnia complicans in hoc quod omnia in eo ; est omnia explicans in hoc quia ipse in omnibus.”

But enfolding and unfolding are human words, and God is above them both in a way which surpasses reason. Hence God is not to be confounded with the world, and the principle of identity of contraries which is valid for God, does not apply when we are dealing with the Creator in relation to the creature. The things of the Universe are to God what multiple images are to their prototypes. God calls them into existence by an “intention” which excludes any community of being between the created and the uncreated.

Humanity, of which each man is a participation, is a contracted unity which enfolds all.

Man is a microcosm comprising a human God and a human world.

The soul is immortal and is united to the body by the intermediary of a “Spiritus” or very ethereal breath which it sends all through the body.

Dionysius the Carthusian, 1402–1471. *Doctor Exstaticus*, a Thomist and Mystic, studied at Cologne and spent his life at the Carthusian monastery of Ruremonde.

He wrote *Summa Fidei Catholicae*, *Compendium Philosophicum et Theologicum* and *Diologion de Fidei Catholica*.

He developed the Mysticism of John Ruysbroek, making use of the works of the pseudo Dionysius.

He was a strong Thomist, but says that he changed his Opinion and no longer held that essence and existence were distinct.

He describes the sweetness of ecstasy and the way leading to it in his *Commentaries* on the pseudo Dionysius.

His numerous mystical works cover the whole ground of asceticism and mystical theology.

Thomas Hammerken, 1380–1471, called *Thomas à Kempis*. He was born at Kempen, near Dusseldorf, and educated at Deventer and became a monk of Mount St. Agnes monastery where he remained.

He was the Mystic who wrote the celebrated *De Imitatione Christi*.

John Wessel (Goosefoot), 1409–1489, of Gröningen. *Magister Contradictionis* at Paris, 1455. He wrote *Lux Mundi* *Magister Controversiarum*; according to Buchard he was not a decadent Terminist, and Prantl classes him as a true Mystic.

CHAPTER XXX

FRANCESCO SUAREZ

Francesco Suarez, 1548-1617. Generally called "The Last of the Schoolmen," was a Jesuit; he was born at Granada and educated at the Dominican College of St. Stephen at Salamanca.

St. Ignatius, who founded the Society of the Jesuits in 1540, had studied Thomism at Paris, 1533, and chose St. Thomas Aquinas as Doctor of the Society, which in 1593 at a General Congregation imposed the teaching of St. Thomas upon its members.

We are not here concerned in the great controversy which arose between the Jesuits and the Dominicans as to Predestination and Grace; and which gave rise to the Sacred Congregations "de Auxiliis" in 1599, 1600, 1601.

After both Popes Clement VIII and Paul V had sought to take part in this conflict, the Holy Office in 1611 decided that nothing should be published about these discussions; but in 1613 the doctrine propounded by Suarez was adopted by the Jesuits for all their members.

Nor are we here concerned with the political works of Suarez which gave rise to so much European controversy.

Suarez taught at Segovia and various places in Spain. From 1580-1585 he taught at the Jesuit College at Rome and then returned to Spain; finally he settled down at Coimbra in Portugal where he remained from 1597-1617.

In 1607 he received from Paul V the title of "*Doctor Eximius ac pius.*"

Suarez's chief philosophical work was *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, published in 1597.

Suarez adopted a philosophy that was eclectic, for though following St. Thomas Aquinas in the general trend of his thought, yet in many ways he differed from him profoundly. He quotes many conflicting authorities without always clearly expressing his own opinion.

In the first place, he held that the relation of matter to form was *compound*, and that the resulting substance was due to a 'Substantial Mode' serving as a bond of union.

He regarded prime matter as having sufficient entity of its own, apart from the form, to support itself ; and such entity of matter as sufficient to support accidents and thus take the place of quantity, which St. Thomas ascribed to " *materia signata* " (cf. Chap. XX, p. 283).

So that material substances are one by themselves from an entitive unity, and one by the quantity, which they get from a quantitative or numerical unity.¹

Unity is a transcendental quality, a passion adequate to being.

The composed being is one, but it is not indivisible but undivided. Suarez calls accident strictly speaking " being *per se* " and simple ; as he saw in it analogy of proportion to substance. Thus separable accidents are treated as modes and identified with substance, or mere denominations more or less founded on reality.

On this basis a metaphysical explanation can be given of accidents remaining unsupported by substance in the Eucharist.

Aristotle had laid it down that " Being cannot be divided in itself, nor can a being be united to or incorporated in another being." Being is of a Transcendental Universal Character and is above Genus. Suarez follows St. Thomas Aquinas in opposition to Duns Scotus as to the explanation of the penetration of beings by being " you cannot divide a cubic volume into cube and volume." The explanation of the impossibility of this penetration of Being is " that it is the expression of a concept more determined and more formal, whereby a particular being is contained in Being taken in general ; but since Being is above Genus this cannot be done."

This was what St. Thomas held to be so important and was the basis of his objection to plurality of substantial forms in one person, having regard to his view that matter had to be " *signata* " and that substance was a composite of matter and form. (Cf. Chap. XX, p. 283, and Chap. XXI, pp. 334, 335.)

But Suarez regarded substance as a compound and not a composite ; and avoided clashing with the dictum of Aristotle, by holding that the being of matter and the being of form were joined together by the bond of substantial mode.

In this he was to a certain extent following the Platonic teaching which had been adopted by the Terminalists in the preceding century.

It is in consequence of his adoption of the Substantial Mode that Suarez arrives at different results from St. Thomas Aquinas as to Essence and Existence, Substance and Accident, and Individuation, etc.

¹ *Met.*, IV, 3, 15.

Further, Suarez followed Occam in holding that reason did not prove that the soul acts through its faculties and not of itself. Moreover in his proofs of God, he neglected the Aristotelian axiom that "Being in movement is moved by another," and therefore placed no reliance on the proof of God deduced from the necessity of a First Mover.

BEING

The most general idea of the human mind is Being.²

The Formal Concept of Being is the idea of Being; as St. Thomas Aquinas says, the idea expressed by the name is the definition.³ The Objective Concept of Being is Being itself so far as we know it. The distinction of Formal and Objective Concepts of Being is indeed purely subjective; for if it is borne in mind that the Objective Concept, whilst being the object of a concept, does not cease to be a concept itself, everything said of the Objective Concept must be said of the Formal Concept.

How is the Formal Concept applied to particular beings?

Has Being the same meaning applied to God, Creature, Substance and Accident? The answer depends upon Analogy, according to Suarez.

ANALOGY

According to the Greeks analogy is a term improperly applied to two or more derived from another of the same sort, *e.g.*, medical: medical science and medical apparatus.

Or only derived from causality, *e.g.*, healthy: food because it produces health.

But according to the Latin authorities all analogies are figures of speech.

Suarez first quotes several classifications given by St. Thomas Aquinas.

I. Analogy between God and creatures.

Such is *causal*, but there is also *formal* analogy between some qualities of creatures and some attributes of God.⁴

II.

1. Analogy in spirit and not in reality: *e.g.*, animal which possesses health; and food which is the cause of health.
2. In reality and not in spirit: bodies corruptible and bodies incorruptible.
3. In spirit and reality: substance and accident.⁵

² Cf. pp. 628, 640.

³ *S.T.*, I, q. 13.

⁴ *I, Sent.*, D. 8, 3., N. 9, 10.

⁵ *I, Sent.*, D. 19, Q. 5, A. 2, ad. 1.

III.

1. By proportion, when two terms have direct relation between them, *e.g.*, 4 is twice 2. Accident is intimately bound to substance.
2. By Proportionality when two terms are part of a proportion: *e.g.*, 6 and 4, because $6 = 2 \times 3$ and $4 = 2 \times 2$. Such is the only analogy between God and His creatures.⁶

This proportionality was what Cajetan (cf. Chap XXIII, p. 479) maintained.

Suarez objected to analogy of proportionality as introducing excessive diversity. He considered that the term proportion included the analogy between God and His creatures.

Moreover, Suarez objected that one cannot abstract the being of particulars which one contracts into multiples from the universal: one cannot arrive at the being of the particular from examination of the being of the universal.⁷

IV.

1. Where several terms have reference to another term outside that series.
2. In the case of Substance and Accident, or God and His creatures there is both proportion and proportionality at the same time. Here this reference is not to another time, but of one to the other.⁸ (Cf. Chap. XX, p. 295, 296.)

Capreolus (cf. Chap. XXIII, p. 478) follows St. Thomas Aquinas but with an extension.

1. Analogical terms chiefly indicate a reality, and secondarily the various references that can have other beings opposed to it; *e.g.*, reference to cause. This he called "habitus" or even "proportio."
2. The same character is found in the analogical beings but under diverse forms.
3. There is always only an imagined character, but the difference is so great between the beings to which it is attributed, that it is reflected back on the concept itself.

⁶ *De Veritate*, q. 2, A. 11.

⁷ As Suarez was in the habit of referring to the whole of this class III by the term proportionality in spite of his objection to the use of this word as a sub-division, throughout this chapter the word proportion is used where Suarez is referring to this class as a whole. By this means it is hoped that false objections of inconsistency on this point may be avoided.

⁸ *C.G.*, I, c. 34. *S.T.*, I, q. 13, a. 5, 6.

Duns Scotus. Univocality of Being of God and Creation is one of analogy. (Chap. XXVI, p. 543.)

1. A concept realized in two beings is attributed to them by comparison to another, in which it is strictly speaking realized: *e.g.*, healthy food and animal health.
2. One of the concepts enters into definition of the other: *e.g.*, Substance is contained in the definition of Accident; the concept of their being is here applied analogically.⁹

Unity of analogy is called Unity of Attribution, Suarez makes great use of this term of Unity of Attribution.

To avoid equivocity in the concepts and consequentially illogical conclusions in the syllogisms in four terms, Suarez thought he was bound to complete the analogy of univocity by distinguishing two sorts of Being.¹⁰

God and the creature are analogous beings if one considers their being in its precise determination, in its suchness; but one is infinite and the other is finite, it is this which puts the abyss between them.

However, Duns Scotus thought that taken on a higher plane, in a sense more general and more indeterminate, the concept of being is univocal, because it indicates a very indeterminate being. It is that being, which one affirms of all beings, by means of the addition of a determination; so that a precise concept is obtained in spite of the logical objection that arises from the concept of a Being, which is Infinitely Simple.

Suarez maintained that in one case alone does the Being exactly and properly conform to the Concept, the others occur only by cause, condition, or effect, by reason of their reference to the first. This he calls "Extrinsic Attribution."

All other analogies are "Intrinsic Attribution." Since the concept of Being is neither improper, nor metaphoric, as applied to either finite or infinite Being, though there is analogy yet there is not univocity of Being.

Yet if the term Being be treated in this case as entirely equivocal it must lead to scepticism.

Objective Concept of Being

This is being itself as far as we know it.¹¹

In a way, it is similar to the formal concept, the idea of being,¹² not that there is numerically only one being, for that would

⁹ *Quest. de Rerum Principio*, I, n. 21.

¹¹ *Met.*, II, 2.

¹⁰ *Met.*, III, 18.

¹² *Cf.* pp. 626, 640.

amount to Pantheism ; but because all beings are alike in so far as they answer to the description of being.

A formal concept draws its unity from its object, so differences of being do not enter into the concept of being. Some authorities, however, deny even the unity of the formal concept of being in order to safeguard its analogy to the objective concept of being.

Hervé, Cajetan, and others thought that it is simply the nature of human reason to unify in its thoughts things that are very different in nature : the concept of being evoked at once in the mind ideas of substance and accident, so that even the ten Categories seem somehow to be included.

Duns Scotus found a real difference between being in general and being in different particulars, even as between being and substance ; as if that which characterizes substance is not-being.

Suarez avoids the difficulty by distinguishing between reality and spirit (mind). He denied that in real beings, being differed from substance, but allowed that "in our manner of thinking" there is a difference.

The concepts of substance and accident comprise that of being, but to speak of being is not to speak of substance and accidents, although being may be necessarily one or the other.

The human mind, for its own convenience, can separate those things which are inseparable and which differ only from different points of view ; this is so because in fact the human mind is inadequate to reality.

Essence and Existence

Ens is both a participle and a noun.¹³

If "ens" is used as a participle, it signifies existant, *i.e.*, something in act, which possesses a real act of existence and actual reality ; it contains an indication of time and indicates an actual existence.

If "ens" is used as a noun, it has no temporal meaning and expresses a pure and simple verbal idea, which indicates being without indicating existence, then in such case it means Essence pure and simple.

Existence is a concept too simple to be explained by synonyms.

Essence is the fundamental principle of the properties and acts of a being, and is called its nature. It is the object, the "quid est," the quiddity.

Individuality is not essence but necessarily accompanies it.

St. Thomas Aquinas used 'esse' as meaning either essence, existence, or logical affirmation ; though generally St. Thomas used 'esse' for existence and 'essentia' for essence.

¹³ *Met.*, II, 4.

Suarez used the term "ens" for both essence and existence.

Suarez speaks constantly of real essence, as if this act, which is called existence, was not really distinct from it, as if in fact it did not owe its reality to it.

He did not like the proposition that "the concept of being is only applied by analogy of proportionality to God and His Creation"; as he thought that this assumed in estimation, that both in the case of the creature as well as of God that essence and existence are really identical.

Suarez is not clear about this quality of reality; he defines it negatively by absence of contradictory elements; and positively by the effects which it produces, or the cause from which it arises. He does not refer the real to the possible, capable of real existence, as opposed to the imaginative.

From the proposition "Real essence belongs to everything real and it is quite essential," Suarez, in spite of what has been said above, deduced the absence of real distinction between essence and existence, without having explained wherein reality lies.

In created things, as noted above, Suarez does not admit of real distinction between essence and existence, not even a modal distinction but only a distinction of reason. In this Suarez follows the Scotists and Nominalists.¹⁴

Suarez, having left Aristotle on the point of matter and form in the formation of a composite, by regarding them as each having "being" in a measure, and making a compound rather than a composite, objects to any metaphysical composite. He therefore posits in a being, the being itself or its physical parts. Hence for him the fact that existence is in "being" causes it to be identified with "being."

Such is his answer to the Thomist thesis of real distinction, on the ground that otherwise one of the elements of a composite would penetrate and become part of the other. They alleged that essence is pure potentiality, like prime matter a sort of intermediary between being and non-being, that existence comes to actualize.

The Thomists also objected that in identifying essence and existence in the creature, the sole mark of contingency is suppressed and makes it pure act like God.

To this Suarez replied that the existence in a creature is not of its essence, because it proceeds entirely from the efficacy of God, whilst the Divine Existence has no need for any efficacy.

It is the necessity of the creative action of God, which makes us consider the creature, either as simply possible or afterwards actual.

¹⁴ *Met.*, XXXI, and cf. Ch. XX, p. 285 *et seq.*

It is from this duality of states that the two concepts of essence and of existence are produced, and that it is in these two states it is sought to see simultaneous realities which correspond to them.

According to Suarez, "Essence and existence are one and the same reality, to which the concept of essence is applied in so far as its constitutive characters are posited in such genus or such species; and to which the concept of existence is applied, in so far as it has the character of being outside of its causes, and being placed in reality."

Existence is the act or term of essence, and is not a sort of predicamental accident as St. Thomas, following Avicenna, would make it to be.¹⁵

Suarez refused to assimilate essence to potentiality: and existence to act: nor would he allow any of the following distinctions. Existence is individual nature and essence is specific nature abstracted from the individual: nor that essence refers to the exemplary and existence to the efficient cause of God: nor that essence is the object of thought and existence is the object of concrete thought.

Suarez distinguishes nature from the suppositum which possesses it and attributes existence to each; an incomplete existence to nature and a complete nature to the suppositum, since nature is something of the suppositum, that is the suppositum includes the nature and adds subsistence to it.

Suarez rejects the opinion of Cajetan that nature is logically anterior to existence and subsistence: he also refuses to identify nature with suppositum like Capreolus did.

Further, according to Suarez, accident communicates a being to the substance, as the substance produces a being in producing it.

Suarez, as already stated, attributes existence also to Modes and Relations.

The Thomists maintained that the danger of Nestorianism lay in failing to give sufficient force to the bond between humanity and the Word in Christ, and that such bond would be severed by giving His Humanity a distinct existence.

To this Suarez replied, that he maintains the unity of the person; and that to make Christ composite and not simple is to run the danger of Eutychianism, by making His Humanity uncreate by reason of His Divine Existence and thus controvert the doctrine of the Incarnation.

In this way Suarez was following the tenets of the Terminalists; for them, separable accidents become modes identified with the substance, or mere denominations founded more or less on reality.

¹⁵ *De Potentia*, q. 5, A. 4, ad. 3.

The notion of composite being is abolished, with the result that there is no difference between essence and existence, or substance and accidents. Hence the imperfect character of this world is not for them a sufficient revelation of the necessity of a Perfect Being, which has drawn on nothing.

The *Properties of Being* are *Unity, Truth and Goodness*. Suarez held that these add nothing to Being, except by way of negation according to our own way of thinking.¹⁶

Unity is prior to *Truth* and *Goodness* as being less relative, *Truth* is prior to *Goodness*, because *Intelligence* precedes *Will*.

If the properties of being are not real at least they are not mere inventions of the mind. These beings of reason exist fundamentally in reality, they have their foundation in that universal reality which is called "Being."

Aliquid is either synonymous with being, or if it be taken as aliud quid, then it contains a negation of identity with others.

Unity indicates nothing positive, but only a negation, it adds nothing to "Being"; but the concept of unity does add something to the concept of "Being."

Being made be divided into two classes: "Being *per se*" and "Being *per accidens*."

"Being *per se*" may be either divisible or indivisible, *i.e.*, either composite or simple.

Suarez calls accident strictly speaking "being *per se*" and simple; because he saw an analogy of proportion in it to substance.

This gave a metaphysical explanation of the accidents remaining unsupported by any substance in the "Eucharist."

"Being *per se*" may be composed in several ways.

Two substances matter and form produce a compound or composite by the aid of a particular mode serving as a bond of union (this is the Substantial Mode referred to on p. 624).

"Being *per se*" may be composed by genus and difference.

"Being *per se*" may have integral parts, either of quantity, or matter affected by quantity; but substance and accident do not form a composite *per se*.

In material substances, Suarez distinguished fundamental unity, which a being possesses by reason of its very entity, from occasional unity which comes from added being.¹⁷

So that material substances are one by themselves from an entitive unity, and one by the quantity which they get from a quantitative or numerical unity. That is to say, both by an Intrinsic and by an Extrinsic Unity so to speak.

¹⁶ *Met.*, III. Cf. "Convertible Passions" of Duns Scotus, Ch. XXVI, p. 540.

¹⁷ *Met.*, IV, 3, 15.

Unity is a transcendental quality, a passion adequate to being. Composed Being is one, but it is not indivisible but undivided.¹⁸

On the vexed question of unity and multiplicity, Suarez quotes St. Thomas that ens is one "simpliciter" and is multiple "secundum quid." Suarez seems to prefer the solution that the multiple is in potentiality and that the One is in act.

For Suarez, all the different divisions such as uncreate or created, being by essence or by participation, pure act or potentiality, "coincide under different concepts and present an identical distribution of being." Suarez appears to have held that number is only applicable to beings having quantity. "If number is the measure of quantity of the predicamental accident which bears its name, only beings furnished with such an accident would have numerical unity."¹⁹

If the number agrees with all the singular beings, the numerical unity will be extended to a much larger number of beings.

"In the first case it is only a sort of species, it has less extension. In the second case, although the extension is wider, it does not reach transcendental unity, since it is limited to singular beings and does not contain universals."

St. Thomas distinguished transcendental unity from the quantitative predicament unity, by regarding the former as only adding the negation of division to unity, whilst the latter, he held, adds to it a character of measure of the whole or part. (Cf. Chap. XXII, p. 391.)

INDIVIDUATION

All things are singular and individual.

Suarez follows Aristotle on this point against the realism of Plato, and he disagrees with Durandus de Porçain (cf. Chap. XXIII, p. 475) who had alleged that the Divine Nature was universal and not singular.

As to angels, Suarez differs from St. Thomas and also from Cajetan (cf. Chap. XXIII, p. 479) in alleging that they differ or not amongst themselves as to species, by the fact that they exist and are individuals, for it is by their nature alone that they exist; and to have a specific nature is to have individuation. Individuation is not a reality added to a specific nature. Individuation, according to Suarez, is something real, but it is not really distinguished from the individual being, which is only distinguished from it by a difference of reason.

In God the identity is absolute because the individuation is of the Essence of God.

In created beings, it is the essence actually existent, which

¹⁸ Cf. *S.T.*, I, q. 11.

¹⁹ *Met.*, IV, 9.

is the principle of individuation, not merely the essence by itself.

The principle of individuation is intrinsic and only differs by a difference of reason.

Suarez rejects the real distinction, maintained by Duns Scotus, and goes to the other extreme of individuating everything.

Suarez disagrees with the Thomist doctrine that the nature of angels is specifically distinct, on the ground that this supposes that each spiritual nature possesses a kind of infinite perfection, which excludes multiplication.

But according to Suarez, this perfection is neither infinite in comprehension nor in extension. If such nature were specific, then it would be universal and hence communicable to several.

Further, as to material substances, there the Thomists only take part of the essence, matter subjected to quantity "*materia signata quantitatae*." But it is the act which distinguishes, and such matter is not act. Matter, if the principle of individuation, would be a principle of incommunicability to an inferior, whilst in fact in many cases it is communicable, just like genus.

Suarez also differs from Avicenna, Averroes and Durandus, who regarded Form as the principle of individuation, because he regarded it as an exaggeration; for the individuation arises *in matter from form*.

Individuation is not to be attributed to essence rather than to existence, if there were a real distinction, essence would be individuated by extrinsic existence outside of it. Moreover, essence before receiving existence is not individuated.

Accidents, according to Suarez, individualize themselves, dependent though they are on their subjects, yet their subjects are extrinsic and not intrinsic to them: this is contrary to the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas.

Unity is a Universal

It is the product of a resemblance noticed by the mind between the essence of beings of the same species. The universal exists only in the mind.

Suarez follows Durandus in holding that the Passive intellect can without the Active intellect evolve a potential universal (ignoring the fact that the active intellect is not a separate power but only that whereby the passive intellect is brought into play).

Because in order to know, the active intellect only produces species representing the universal and not those representing the individual. "If God and the Angels can have a knowledge of both immaterials and also of particular matter, why, says Suarez, should not the intellect be able to know the particulars (which are

lower) that is those particulars on which the universal is based."²⁰

In this way, particulars would be known or learnt by the intellect as well as by the senses.

Universals are only beings of reason, but granted that they are not real, nevertheless they may be referred to by all the usual terms applied to the real, *e.g.*, corporeal, spiritual, substance, accident. Universals as the proper object of science have been thought to be necessary and immutable and hence eternal.

Suarez accepts the word eternal, in the sense that, since universals are made by abstraction, they are not limited in place or time; whilst the individuals from which they are derived are limited as to both.

Such eternity is not real, but only potential, it is not positive but negative. They have no formal or final cause, they have only a material cause, which is the object, and an efficient cause which is the intellect.

Suarez made the following division of universals:

1. *In causando*, because its influence is not limited to one effect.

In representando, anything representing several things, *e.g.*, word, concept, or "cognitive image."

In essendo, in existence or reality.

In praedicando, in enunciation in those things which serve as a foundation for the general idea.

Suarez thought that the five Predicables only applied to those sort of superior logical universals, which fell under the division of "In praedicando," and that they did not apply to the other logical or metaphysical universals.

Suarez regarded "Degrees of Being" as only differences of reason.

As to the formal unity that is in the principle, Suarez held, that it is only by analogy that genus is likened to matter, and species to form.

The principle of formal unity, is all the essence and all the nature.

The principle of generic unity, is this nature so far as it is susceptible of determination.

The principle of specific unity, is that according to the last essential perfection that it bears.

Unity implies indivision and is opposed to multiplicity, which results from division or distinction. Suarez classifies distinctions as follows:

Distinctions of reason, less than real.²¹

²⁰ *Met.*, VI, 7.

²¹ *Cf.* p. 640.

Reasoned distinctions, or virtual distinctions, the foundation, or that which exists in those things of which there is a concept of the mind of a distinction of reason.

Reasoning distinctions.

Modal distinctions, exist between a thing and its manner of being, they are positive and by themselves affect the entity.²²

Thus in quantity apart from the quantitative element, there is the mode which is the inherence of the quantity to the substance.

By mode is not meant the general, but the last determination of a thing. It adds nothing to the new but only modifies the pre-existing entity; though not real, it is more than nothing.

Creatures are imperfect dependent composites limited or changing according to the different states of union or development. Hence they require these modes, which are realized in their manner of being.

It is more than a distinction of reasoned reason, when the disappearance of one concept does not involve the other, for it is the mode that disappears.

TRUTH

Suarez considered that truth falls under two headings (cf. Chap. XX, p. 296):

Formal Truth, where the mind of man is modelled on things.

Transcendental Truth, where things are modelled on the Reason of God; or those things which offer in themselves an aptitude to be known by created intelligence.²³

Formal Truth, according to Suarez, resides in the mind; here he follows St. Thomas Aquinas and disagrees with Hervé and others who thought that it was in things, because they judged the exactitude of knowledge by comparison with the reality of the things.

Truth is a relation, which adds nothing to the concept, and it is not even always real or reasonable.

Such relation is not predicamental, but is the judgment in so far as it conforms with its object.

According to Capreolus formal truth has an absolute foundation not only in reality but also in the mind. Truth is the perfection of the act of knowledge, which is total in the case of evidence and partial in the case of simple certainty. Truth is absolute, when its reference to the object is concomitant, that is when judgment is not called into play.

Concepts which are images are true or false according as they conform to the object or not; but the truth lies more especially

²² *Met.*, VII.

²³ *Met.*, VIII.

in the judgment, as it not only exists but is also affirmed there. Judgment is to a certain extent a reflex knowledge but a concept is not.

In God speculative is differentiated from practical knowledge ; the former does not affect essences, it knows them because they are such, nor does it produce existences, it knows them because they do or will exist ; the latter places essences and existences in being and provides them with measure, and is sometimes called the knowledge of Approbation.

Transcendental Truth adds nothing to Being. It is being in so far as it is, or is apt to be, conformed to an intelligence.

It implies an entity, "being," also a reference, cognoscibility, or intelligibility, it is not a pure negation.

It is not an extrinsic determination, nor a positive property of being which is distinct from being. It is all of the being which is true, yet it is not absolute as it has reference to intelligence, nor is it a relation predicamental or transcendental, for the first would make it real or simple reason, and the other would make it an absolute.

The truth of things is a fruit of knowledge.

Metaphysical truth signifies the entity of a thing in alignment (*connotando*) with knowledge, or the concept of the intelligence to which such entity is conformed, or rather what the thing is or can be represented to be.²⁴

This conformity is not a relation, it is only a denomination arising from the reference of two things, of which one indeed is such as it is represented by the other.

But metaphysical truth is anterior to the knowledge one has of it through its fruit.

Suarez wavered between confounding it with being, or making it independent of knowledge, or by exaggerating the extrinsic character of the relation, making it a product of the mind.

It is distinguished from logical truth, since in a sense it is causal, and hence exists in fictitious objects of a true judgment. For the fictions are true as the objects of a true proportion, which declared them to be fictions.

Though *Transcendental Truth* only concerns real beings, Suarez admits, that there can be an analogy of proportion between it and *Formal Truth*.

THE FALSE

This concept is opposed to logical or formal truth, but not to metaphorical truth. There is no falsity in things or simple concepts, but only in judgments.²⁵

²⁴ *Met.*, VIII, 7.

²⁵ *Met.*, IX.

Yet there is an ontological falseness, but this only applies to false logic, by analogy of attribution or metaphor.

There can be no ontological falseness with reference to God, but it can exist in our works of art, or human industry, or moral actions.

False simple concepts are like inexact sensible images, if in any point they do not represent reality one ought not to call them false images, but imperfect, or diminished, or simply non-images.

Falsity in fact is only in the judgment and comes not for the most part from the intellect, but from the Will.

Some indeed are intellectual, the soul by its connection with the body does not conceive things by the representations which concern them, but by images which come from the senses.

Further, man to improve his science has to use discursive methods, in which there is a chance of error; and also that which comes from the definition, of which one does not by intuition perceive the truth from evidence.

Truth is one, but error is multiple.

THE GOOD

Good is a property of passion of Being, but it is no relation, nor a property really or formally distinct from Being.

The Good is "Being to which can be added a 'reference of convenience,' which is not a relation properly so called, but which is the indication of another being, which has an inclination or capacity for the perfection or is even united to it. The goodness indicates the perfection of the thing by stressing the propriety that comes from such being."

Suarez rejects the Thomist dictum "ens simpliciter est bonum secundum quid," as he considered that if such it would apply to substance and accident apart from each other; whilst in the case of good there is substance on the one hand, and substance united with accident on the other, which is not the same as the above.²⁶

Transcendental Good is a congruity that beings have for others. Accident is good for the substance by reason of the aptitude which it has to inform it.

In composite substances each partial substance is congruous to the other and their mode of union is congruous to both.

God is good for His creatures of whom He is the author and end.

Creatures are congruous to God, in that they are His work and the manifestation of His Wisdom and Goodness. They are congruous to one another, either for being given or received,

²⁶ *Met.*, X, 1, N. 16.

or that taken all together they add to the beauty of the Universe.

Relations if real are goods and there will therefore be in God as many Goods of Existence as Persons.

The Thomists distinguished between absolute and relative ; the absolute alone have existence and goodness, so that in God there is one sole goodness and one sole existence, that of the unique Divine Essence.

In all created relation "esse ad" must be distinguished from "esse in." Divine Relations are not in God, they are identified with Him ; so that there is only the "esse ad," which is not properly a being but a relation pure and simple.

On this point, Suarez follows Durandus de Porçain, Duns Scotus, Occam, and Biel, relations as such have their existence and perfection, but that does not put between the Persons of the Trinity too much difference ; because the Essence with which each one is identified, possesses formally and eminently all perfections, those which are relative no less than those which are absolute.

Mathematical things are no exception and so are not lacking in goodness.

Prime matter has a proper existence although dependent, and thus its goodness is not only in potentiality, as St. Thomas held, but in true actuality though it be otherwise imperfect.

Created essences have goodness either actual or potential, according to whether they have existence or not.

Suarez adheres to St. Augustine's theory of Good : "In modum, speciem, ordinem" (manifested according in measure, weight, or number. Wisdom xi, 21 Vulgate)

EVIL

Evil is opposed to Good, as False is opposed to True. Materially everything is evil, in so far as it lacks perfection. Formally evil is nothing else than a privation (cf. Chap. XXI, p. 331). Evil as a privation has no intrinsic form except its own malice, though it can have an extrinsic form "ad quam consequitur tale malum." It is neither a positive form, as the Manicheans held, nor a pure negation. Suarez held that it might be a degree of being (cf. p. 635) or only a mode of being.

Evil can be considered under four headings : Physical evil, "in genere naturæ" ; moral evil, "in genere morum" ; evil of fault, "culpa" ; and evil of penalty, "poena."

The Thomists regarded evil as having only formal and final causes.

Suarez considered that evil does not have a final cause, though

it may have one by reason of the intention of him who does or permits it.

The material cause of evil is the subject under privation, as there must be one ; for annihilation considered as an accomplished fact is not an evil properly speaking, but a negation.

Evil has always an efficient cause at least "per accidens." Grief, in itself, Suarez held not to be an evil, as it has its own perfection and all that is due to such perfection ; grief has an evil because it is not congruous either to man or to animal.

"One cannot always speak of a deficient cause, for the evil sometimes arises from the unhappy coincidence of two excellent causes : but moral evil always comes from failing, though the failing is not always blameable, but sometimes arises simply because the created Will is finite and limited. When the failing is blameable it is attributable to the Will and not to God, for God is not concerned with nothing."

BEING

Again Suarez returns to Being²⁷ and divides it into Infinite Being and Finite Being. On the one hand, there is Infinite Being, God, the "ens a se"; on the other hand, Finite Being, Creation "ens ab alio."²⁸

Being has being by participation or essence.

In God alone is existence identified with essence.

Yet it must be noted that in *Met.*, II, Suarez held that existence cannot be properly applied to God, as it is proper to Him, and at the same time there is no real distinction between essence and existence even in Creation, but only one of reason.

In this he did not distinguish real distinction from real divisibility or separability, thinking that the one involved the other.²⁹

The Infinity of the perfection of God is not a privation. It must be remembered that Aristotle treats infinity as a privation. Privation concerns that which ought to exist, but does not exist ; but there is nothing lacking to God, so that His Infinity cannot be regarded as a privation.

Suarez attributes "being" to relations, contrary to the Thomists, so that for him there can be both infinite and finite relations (cf. Duns Scotus, "Entia non Quanta").

The Divine Relations (cf. p. 639) are not infinite "simpliciter in genere entis" on account of Divine Essence which they include, but they are multiple by reason of the proper characteristics of those that oppose them.

Looked at, not as being identified with the Essence, but as adding

²⁷ Cf. pp. 626, 628.

²⁸ *Met.*, XXVIII.

²⁹ Cf. pp. 635, 636.

to it, the relation is infinite "in genere relationis sed non in genere entis." St. Thomas confined it to a relation of origin.

Finite Being, the essential characteristic of created nature, appears to be the fact that it has its being from another and that it is finite and limited in its perfections. There is only an analogy of intrinsic attribution between the concept of God and His creation.⁸⁰

SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT

The Thomists held that there was only analogy of proportion between Substance and Accident; Suarez held it to be an intrinsic analogy of attribution; accident is "ens in alio."

Substance is "A being under its accidents, which serves as their support and has not the necessity of being supported by another."

A substance is a complete being in itself and by itself and that whether provided with accidents or not.

First substance, resides in itself and not in another, it cannot be attributed to another, but only to itself, that is to say it is incommunicable (cf. p. 625).

"Subsistence is the suppositum of the person, of the hypostasis, suppositum is the concrete, which corresponds to subsistence which is the abstract."⁸¹

Person is a suppositum endowed with Reason.

Hypostasis signifies not suppositum, but Person.

According to Suarez, Divine Subsistence is common to the Three Persons of the Trinity. As the Person of Jesus Christ includes two natures, it is clear that nature differs from subsistence.

Durandus and Henry of Gand only placed an analogous difference of reason between nature and suppositum, to distinguish the abstract from the concrete.

Duns Scotus held that there was an actual, or aptness for, dependence as to suppositum.

Occam held that Subsistence is Being, but not an actual part of Being, nor does it constitute formally Being by itself.

According to Suarez, "the suppositum is the nature to which is added the perfection of subsistence. It is only a positive mode, there being only a distinction of reason between essence and existence."

Instead of establishing the unity of composite things by subsistence, Suarez divides this mode into parts and makes the union a simple juxtaposition.⁸²

⁸⁰ *Met.*, XXXII. ⁸¹ Cf. Ch. XXII, p. 399, and Ch. XXVI, p. 574.

⁸² Cf. *S.T.*, I, q. 3, a. 3, and *C.G.*, IV, c. 54, 4.

This is the doctrine of the *Substantial Mode*, though brought into prominence by Suarez, it had been advocated by Cajetan ; who, however, recognized two entities, personality and existence.

*Immaterial created Substances.*³³

Such being is more simple and more like God and reflects better His infinite perfection, which manifestly is the end of creation.

Yet their existence, according to Suarez, is not proved in their causes or effects, and it can only be affirmed as a possibility or congruity.

Suarez follows St. Thomas in holding that there is no spiritual matter in angels, but he considered that it is necessary to distinguish the nature from the suppositum in their case ; likewise to distinguish essence from existence, although it be only modal or by way of simple reason ; also their genus and difference.

The form of immaterial created substances is concreated with them.

Suarez attributes to spiritual creatures a presence in space and a possibility of multilocations like that of Divine ubiquity.

In man a single formal principle must be presumed. The soul, the true form of man, on departing at death leaves the body to become corrupt. As to the form of the corpse, Suarez says, "The elements dwell virtually in the substantial form of the compound (cf. p. 624) in respect of their substantial forms and formally as to their accidental forms although in a minor degree."

This would seem to indicate that on the departure of the substantial form the accidents adhere to the substances of the individual elements which compose the composite or compound.

ACCIDENT

Suarez regards Accident as having imperfect being, apart from its substance.³⁴ Like the Terminalists, separable accidents become modes identified with the substance, or mere denominations more or less founded on reality.

Accident is a form, which without entering into the concept of the subject affects or qualifies it.

Where the term inherent is applied to accident, it can in no way be regarded as extrinsic, thus neither of the Categories of action, habit, or place can be regarded as intrinsic.

The other six Categories can be defined by "inherence," either actual or "in aptness," according as they are entities really distinct from their subject, or as they are only modes modally distinct.

³³ *Met.*, XIII.

³⁴ *Met.*, XXXVII.

Formal cause is a mode of accident. Its nature is absolute, but one which essentially includes a transcendental reference.

The effect of such causality is an accidental composite and is not a "being per se."

According to Suarez, although substance can receive the accident, yet it is not of itself ordered to such an act; the accident does not complete the substance in its own genus, but in the genus of the composite.

Accidental form and substantial form unite, so that it can be said that accident exercises a certain formal causality on substance.

Simple substances are the material cause of their accidents, likewise subsistant forms, though incomplete, if they can truly subsist by themselves, *e.g.*, the soul.

Those forms which cannot subsist by themselves can probably, if supported by matter, support a formal or accidental mode. According to Suarez, this also applies to integral parts.

Though accidental forms are educed from the potentiality of the substance, the "Infusion of Grace" seems to be definitely of exterior origin; yet it does not exclude all dependents of the subject "in becoming" or "in being"; it is not as a drop of water added to a jar of water, but as light applied to air.

This excludes "habitus" which is the ordinary mode of such acquisition.

On the question of human knowledge, Suarez follows the Scotists and denies the Thomist tenet that "the adequate of human knowledge is the quiddity and material thing."

Suarez insists that it is being in all its extension.

"The primary object of reason is not, as St. Thomas held, the universal, which it is the work of the intellect to disentangle from the particulars offered by the senses, in order to render it 'thinkable,' or the object of thought to the passive intellect."

But the intellectual agent has to effect the transmission from the material to the spiritual world, so that it is a "given" perfectly detailed, which is transmitted. But there is no intellectual knowledge unless it is accompanied by or arises from sensible knowledge. Exception to this arises in the case of first principles, which may in certain cases be extended to first principles of knowledge, information, or understanding, not open to or taken advantage of by all. This probably has reference to the experiences of the Mystics.

"Suarez, like St. Thomas and all the Doctors, dwelt with the most philosophical concepts, such as those of nature and person; matter and form; substance and accident; and were bound to devise the most precise definitions naturally in a way that would

not offend against the most important dogmas of the Trinity, Incarnation and Eucharist.

They regarded Christianity not only as a religion, but also as a philosophy, without which it would not be a belief, that is the adhesion of the mind to ideas ; but a simple parrot-like and servile attachment to words.

The difference between the mass of the faithful and the theologians was that the former had only elementary notions of philosophical realities, often entirely experimental and in a certain measure superficial ; whilst the latter thought to probe them and to penetrate the essence, and extract from it the inward relations.”

CHAPTER XXXI

CONCLUSION

It is generally recognized that Thales was the first of the Greek Philosophers. It was he who came to the conclusion that the whole universe was in some way comprised in a Unity and that all things were ultimately derived from water. Subsequently Anaximenes thought that all things were derived from air; Heraclitus from fire; and Pythagoras from number.

To Thales was attributed the Delphic inscription "Know Thyself"; to Heraclitus the theory of "Flux and Reflux" in a world of "Becoming."

The true value of looking at a question from more than one point of view was emphasized by Zeno in his conundrum of the Achilles and the Tortoise, involving as it did the fallacy that what is infinitely divisible is infinite.

It was Plato's theory of Ideas which gave rise to the theory which posited the reality of all things in the mind of the Creator and regarded His creation as but the shadow or image of such. From Aristotle was chiefly derived the Metaphysic of Being; and from St. Augustine the traces of neo-Platonism as were found embodied in his work.

Such were some of the various Greek theories and philosophical principles which formed the materials out of which the Philosophy of the Schoolmen was evolved.

Following upon the Dark Ages, which commenced with the Fall of the Roman Empire, it was Charlemagne who first ordered that every Cathedral and Monastery should be provided with a school for the increase of learning. But owing to the incursions of the Normans in France and the Danes in England by the end of the tenth century only a few schools were left, the chief being three in Paris; the Royal Palace School; and that at the Cathedral of Chartres and those of such monasteries as Fulda in Germany, and Bec and Corbie in Normandy.

In the tenth and eleventh centuries the philosophers were little more than grammarians. Through misunderstanding Aristotle's Categories, by which classification should be made, they were led to regard them as either separate objects in themselves or else mere words. They became absorbed in Porphyry's conundrum

"whether genus and species subsist or consist merely in simple thought, if as subsisting whether they are corporeal or incorporeal, whether in short they exist apart from sensible objects or in these objects and forming with them something co-existent."

In short, whether Universals should be described with Plato as "ante rem," with Aristotle as "in re," or with the Nominalists as "post rem."

Abelard, d. 1142, however, by his theory of his Conceptualism, united that of Aristotle to that of the Nominalists, thereby preventing the latter from being entirely divorced from reality.

Of all those at that time Gilbert de la Porrée, d. 1154, probably had the fullest conception of the true import of the *Organon* of Aristotle.

S. Anselm, d. 1109, Archbishop of Canterbury, and S. Bernard of Clairvaux, d. 1153, were considered the Last of the Fathers, whilst Peter Lombard, d. 1164, "The Master of the Sentences," as he was called, is regarded as the First of the Schoolmen.

The "Sentences" were his *Sententiarum Libri Quattuor*, in which he purposed to make a collection of the opinions of the Fathers by arranging the Sacred Problems in fair order. Designed to put an end to theological controversy it became a textbook of Theology. On this work in England alone some 160 Commentaries were written and a greater number than that in France, not to mention those composed in Germany, Italy and Spain. Thus what was intended to end controversy became the chief subject of dispute.

From the time of Peter Lombard, instead of logical arguments concerning Universals the general trend of thought became more concerned with the question as to what dogmas were open to the support of reason. Then after the reception of the further works of Aristotle, as mentioned below, the question became altered to what arguments could be adduced from reason in support of Christian Dogma.

Up to the middle of the twelfth century only parts of the *Organon* of Aristotle were known in Western Europe, but about this time the Arabian Editions and Commentaries on the rest of his works began to be translated into Latin by Moorish Jews at the instigation of Raimond, Archbishop of Toledo.

In some portions these were very defective but William of Moerbeke, d. 1281, Archbishop of Corinth, made new translations for S. Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century and finally Augustus Niphus, d. 1545, made a complete Latin translation of all the works of Aristotle that have come down to us.

At the same time it must be remembered how fragmentary were the works of Plato then extant: the whole of those which

have come down to us not being made available for another 200 years.

This additional body of Aristotelian thought at first gave rise to many confused theories, so much so that for a time the Pope forbade their study at the University of Paris, though in the course of the ensuing century their study became compulsory.

Following upon the encyclopædic works of S. Albertus Magnus, his teacher, S. Thomas Aquinas, in his *Summa contra Gentes* and his *Summa Theologica*, sought to utilize these new works of Aristotle in such a way as to evolve a body of Philosophy, which from the point of view of Christianity would form "a closely inter-related system which included within it the whole teaching of the Church," as Leo XIII expressed it.

Under the prevailing Platonic tradition the exact relationship of the soul to the body had not been defined, though it was customary to compare it as that of a pilot to a ship.

S. Thomas in breaking from the Platonic tradition adopted the Aristotelian teaching that the soul though a substantial form itself became also the substantial form of the body.

Full details of this attempt of S. Thomas to utilize the Aristotelian Metaphysic of Being have been included in Chapters XX, XXI and XXII.

S. Thomas stressed the point that God is Pure Act and showed that since God is "Being," He actually is His Own attributes; whilst at the same time by showing that His creatures have only "being" and their qualities by participation, he avoided any heresy of Pantheism.

From equating matter to potentiality he arrived at the decision that Prime Matter apart from some limitation could not exist and that only "Materia Signata" had been created.¹

He adopted those statements to be found in Aristotle's works which indicated that matter was the principle of individuation and that each individual could have but one substantial form. In this he was the more emphatic, because the soul being held to be the form of the body, he thought that a plurality of substantial forms would deprive the individual soul of its identity and thus lead to the heresy of holding that there is but one world-soul as enunciated by Averroes.

The opposing Franciscan School of Thought, through placing individuation in form and not in matter, were not involved in this

¹ It is interesting to observe that whilst Aristotle defined potentiality, to which matter was equated, as the first principle of change or motion in another thing; on the other hand, the views of modern science are that the ions, protons and electrons in an atom are ever in and causing movement.

dilemma and were thus able to uphold a theory of Plurality of Forms without any risk of such heresy.

The particular way in which S. Thomas used his philosophy to support and clarify the tenets of Dogmatic Philosophy has been shown in Chapter XXII.

St. Thomas Aquinas was a Dominican Friar and very soon nearly all the Dominicans adopted his teaching.

The Franciscan Friars, however, did not follow the teaching of S. Thomas.

Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln, d. 1253, had been their first general reader in theology; he was followed by Henry of Ghent, d. 1297, who, though he was not a Franciscan, was one of the first principals of the College of the Sorbonne in Paris. He, like S. Thomas Aquinas, had been a pupil of S. Albertus Magnus; but he united a strong infusion of Platonism, chiefly derived from the neo-Platonic doctrines contained in the works of S. Augustine, with the principles of the newly-discovered works of Aristotle.

S. Bonaventura, who became head of the Franciscans in 1257, was a contemporary and friend of S. Thomas Aquinas. He was in the first place a mystic, though he reasoned and argued like a metaphysician. He never followed the teaching of S. Thomas, but inclined to that of Henry of Ghent, whose teaching the Franciscans adopted.

Some fifty years later the Franciscans adopted the views of Duns Scotus, who professed to adopt the teaching of Aristotle.

Duns Scotus agreed in the main as to Dogmatic Theology and the positing of reality in the mind of God, but differed profoundly from S. Thomas Aquinas on such basic topics as Prime Matter, the Cause of Individuation by Form and not by Matter, Plurality of Substantial Forms and the Primacy of the Will over the Intellect.

His *Haeccitas*, which differs from a specific form by a "distinctio formalis a parte rei," is generally considered as his most important contribution to Philosophy.

In the course of time, the followers of Duns Scotus, who were known as Scotists or Cordeliers in contradistinction to the followers of S. Thomas Aquinas who were known as Thomists or Jacobins, seemed to have made a point of disagreeing with the Thomists on principle on every possible occasion, which in consequence merely led to acrimony rather than to increased clarity of thought by free discussion. Their different views have been fully contrasted in Chapter XVII.

For a long period commencing with the middle of the fourteenth century, affairs in Europe were in a very disturbed condition. First there came the Black Death about 1350, and at Oxford again

about 1370, whose toll was exceptionally heavy in the universities and monasteries where men were crowded together. Then there was the Hundred years' war from 1337-1453 between England and France, which naturally had its repercussions upon the Universities of Paris and Oxford; and this was followed by the Wars of the Roses in England.

Further disturbance arose from the Great Schism in the Papacy, which lasted from 1378 to 1417, when the Great Councils of the Church were more concerned with Politics than Philosophy and the complaint at Oxford was that the students preferred the study of Law to that of Divinity.

William Occam, d. 1349, the head of the Franciscans at Oxford, is regarded as the chief Founder of the Terminalists, or as they were sometimes called Nominalists, whose doctrines rapidly spread through the universities of Europe.

In his revolt against the logical refinements of Duns Scotus, he rejected the fundamental principles of metaphysics and whilst, in accordance with the general tendency of the Renaissance, he advanced the cause of individualism, yet his philosophy being without firm foundation upon reality gave rise to theological Scepticism, which produced amongst his followers a flood of sophistry of which Oxford became the chief centre.

It was at the futilities of such sophistry that the Reformers thundered, treating it as the sole product of Scholastic Philosophy.

Mysticism, which is dealt with in Chapter XXIX, may be described as a mode of life due to direct consciousness of God by the essence or apex of the soul in a manner other than through its power of intellect. As a mode of life it does not come directly within the purview of this History, though incidentally its affects have a distinct bearing upon it.

The Schools of Spain remained free from the incursions of the Terminalists throughout the sixteenth century.

The newly-founded Society of Jesus had adopted the teaching of S. Thomas Aquinas. Francesco Suarez, a Jesuit, was the last great expositor of Scholastic Philosophy. In form his work is not unlike that of S. Albertus Magnus, for in his great *Disputationes Metaphysicae* he sought to set forth all the different leading opinions on the chief topics of philosophy regarded in their relation to the Christian Faith. He then sought by an eclectic process to harmonize the Platonic and Aristotelian, and Thomist and the Scotist and Terminalist schools of thought in their application of philosophy to Christianity.

His chief contribution rests upon his treatment of Substance. He held that the result of the relation of matter and form was a

compound and not a composite : and that the resulting substance was due to a substantial mode which serves as a bond of union.

His teaching was adopted by the Jesuits.

Francesco Suarez is generally recognized as the "Last of the Schoolmen."

It has been shown how the world of ideas in Plato's symbolic description of the dwellers in the caves came to be posited by the Schoolmen in the Mind of God as the source of all reality : how Aristotle's metaphysic of Being was not only employed to assist the Proofs of the Existence of God, but also to throw fresh light upon that human knowledge which depended directly upon Divine Revelation.

In the end, by losing sight of the fact that Scholastic Philosophy was but a means to an end, it became under the Terminalists lost in a maze of Sophistry and led to Scepticism, though such was in no way inherent to it in its inception nor in its original treatment.

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